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Foreword 
Philippe Fargues 
 
The means of communication revolution, virtual as well as physical, is continually making the world smaller 
and people more mobile and more interconnected. Yet international migration has not become truly global. 
When people leave their familiar environment to establish themselves in another country, distance 
continues to matter to them. The closer to home they end up the better, as far as they are concerned. 
Indeed, a large part of international migration takes place within rather than between geographic regions. 
This statement of fact is at the base of the present report dedicated to migration in the EU neighbourhood.1
EU neighbourhood countries do not recognise themselves as one region. They have nothing in common 
apart from the one simple fact that they share a land or a sea border or a near border with the EU. They 
greatly differ from each other in almost every way and particularly in terms of drivers for international 
migration. Demographically, the southern neighbourhood countries are still characterised by rapid 
population growth and have a high proportion of young adults. The eastern neighbourhood, meanwhile, is 
seeing pronounced population ageing and a shrinking number of citizens. In the south emigration offsets 
demographic imbalances, while in the east it amplifies them. Economically, these countries vary greatly in 
terms of the structure of the production apparatus and the gender and skills composition of the labour force, 
and to a lesser extent the income per capita. Sociologically, they comprise a variety of social structures, 
family types and religious affiliations. Politically, they span the whole spectrum from authoritarianism to 
democracy. However, if the EU’s neighbouring countries have something in common, it is that they are net 
senders of migrants to the European Union. 
 
What are the levels and trends of migration in countries at the external border of the European Union (EU) 
and how much of this migration is destined for, and how much originates in the EU? How do States in the 
EU neighbourhood legislate on immigration and emigration and how does outward and inward migration 
impact their policymaking? These are the main questions that this report addresses. 
Since its inception, the European Union (EU) has stood as an area of peace and prosperity and this is 
why it has attracted so many international migrants. The EU has an immigrant stock of around 43 million: 
20 million from another EU member state and 23 million from outside the EU. As a result the combined 27 
EU member states represent the world’s second largest destination of migrants after North America. 
Migrant stocks originating from the EU neighbourhood amount to 9.3 million, representing 40% of the total 
immigration that the EU receives from third countries. Among these, 71% come from the southern 
neighbourhood (Arab countries and Turkey) and 29% from the eastern neighbourhood (former USSR). 
The EU neighbourhood is more a source than a host of international migration. With emigrant and 
immigrant stocks standing at respectively 23.5 and 4.8 million, the 18 countries included in this report have 
a negative balance of - 18.7 million.2
                                                          
1 MPC’s Migration neighbourhood report covers eighteen countries that share (or almost share) a land or a sea 
border with the EU: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, 
Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Russia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and Ukraine.1 For lack of MPC focal points in the 
Balkan States and in Israel, these countries could not be included in the report. It must be noted that the countries 
included in MPC report do not entirely correspond with those targeted by the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) (
 Half of this number is found in the EU. Moreover, until the last phase 
of EU enlargement and the economic downturn that started in 2008, the arithmetic of migration was simple. 
All member states were net migrant receivers and all their neighbours, with a few exceptions, were net 
migrant senders. Acceding to the EU would, over a few years, transform a migrant-sending state into a 
migrant-receiving state. In 2013, it is still unclear whether this situation will resume once the EU emerges 
from the current economic crisis or whether migration flows from its neighbourhood will have been durably 
rerouted towards other destinations.  
http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/). 
2 If inter-state migration within the former Soviet Union is counted as international, then emigration and immigration 
jump respectively to 22.5 and 29.7 million, leaving a net migration of -7.3 million (see table 1). 
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Table 1. Emigration from and immigration to countries in the EU neighbourhood - 2013 stocks  
(most recent data) 
Country 
Emigration Immigration 
In the EU Total Total-B* Total Total-B* 
EU Southern Neighbourhood and Turkey 
  
Algeria 877,398 961,850 
  
95,000 
  
Egypt 224,122 4,464,963 184,070 
Jordan 33,066 339,755 191,307 
Lebanon 148,717 602,280 302,315 
Libya 66,344 100,565 768,372 
Mauritania 28,807 198,307 99,229 
Morocco 3,056,109 3,371,979 77,798 
Palestine 14,627 n.a 230,930 
Syria 131,108 1,643,747 102,396 
Tunisia 414,077 466,595 35,192 
Turkey 1,629,400 3,765,100 1,278,671 
Sub-total South 6,623,775 17,915,141 3,365,280 
EU Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia 
  
Armenia 58,323 221,846 643,823 27,556 285,705 
Azerbaijan 34,513 291,388 952,404 14,822 254,993 
Belarus 285,187 453,479 1,361,593 142,087 926,635 
Georgia 68,726 198,904 767,489 8,058 74,434 
Moldova 276,642 390,268 615,171 17,846 259,368 
Russia 934,030 2,149,607 2,149,607 971,483 11,976,822 
Ukraine 1,052,184 1,869,255 5,335,840 230,072 5,331,428 
Sub-total East 2,709,605 5,574,747 11,825,927 1,411,924 19,109,385 
TOTAL 9,333,380 23,489,888 29,741,068 4,777,204 22,474,665 
* In the case of former states of the Soviet Union, two categories of persons are often included in international migration 
statistics: those who became foreigners in their state of birth because their family originated from another state and took 
its nationality (non-migrant sons or daughters of intra-USSR inter-state migrants) and those who moved to the state of 
origin of their family when the USSR collapsed (inter-state migrants within the Soviet Union which at the time of the 
USSR was an internal migration). 
Source: data compiled from various sources by MPC (see details in each country chapter in this volume) 
Emigration and immigration are the subject of viewpoints and policies that translate into specific legislation. 
Beyond their many specificities in this regard, states in EU’s neighbourhood share a few common principles in 
the way they envision the emigration of their citizens: first, their leaving the country and, second, their 
maintaining a relationship with it from afar. Emigration is widely recognised as a way to alleviate pressures on 
labour markets and to generate remittance flows that can fuel economic growth. Accordingly, all countries in 
the EU neighbourhood have adopted legislation that allow, and often facilitate, the exit and establishment 
abroad of their citizens, though they diverge on what sort of emigration should be encouraged and what sort 
should be deterred in terms of gender, professional skills and other characteristics.  
There is a rising tendency among EU neighbours to regard expatriate nationals as part of their citizenry 
and to build specific institutions to liaise with them. State agencies and ministries have been created with a 
mandate for developing links between émigrés and their origin country in a variety of domains: economic, 
with an aim at attracting remittances, investment and business networks from the diaspora; linguistic and 
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religious, with the objective of maintaining among its members a sense of belonging to their place of origin; 
and legal, in order to protect their migrants’ rights in the countries where they live. Recognising expatriate 
nationals as political actors in their country of origin, however, is not yet generalised: while most countries 
grant voting rights to their expatriate nationals, recognising their eligibility rights remains an exception.  
In a striking symmetry with expatriate nationals becoming increasingly full members of their country of 
origin, immigrants in EU’s neighbouring countries are generally not offered full inclusion in their adopted 
society, let alone citizenry. While the conditions of entry and stay applicable to immigrants and their access 
to employment, education, health and a number of services vary considerably across the EU 
neighbourhood, one common feature is that in no country do they enjoy rights comparable to those of 
citizens. In most cases, citizenship of the receiving country is not accessible to immigrants or even to their 
children: jus sanguinis dominates everywhere without being mitigated by even a hint of jus soli.  
Limited membership in the receiving society is all the more typical if migrants are in irregular situation at 
entry, stay or regarding employment. Indeed, another feature that all EU neighbourhood countries have in 
common is a high and often rising prevalence of irregular migration. Most of this migration is attracted by the 
local demand for labour and its irregularity results from legislation that proves inadequate to labour markets’ 
needs and employer practices. But there is also some irregular migration that is linked to these countries 
sharing a border with the EU: the so-called transit migration of persons who are stuck at the door of the EU, 
which they cannot enter for lack of requested documents. Policies to contain irregular migration increasingly 
translate into legislation that criminalises traffickers in migrants and also the migrants themselves.  
Finally, political events have produced massive refugee crises at the EU’s external borders. The 
invasion of Iraq in 2003-2008, the Libyan revolution in 2011 and the Syrian civil war since 2011 have 
generated millions of refugees on the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. At the time of 
writing (early June 2013), an estimated 1.6 million refugees from Syria are sheltered in five countries - 
Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt and Iraq - all but one of which are EU neighbours. But so far, the EU has 
kept itself at arm’s length, with less than 2% of Syrian refugees being accepted in EU member states.  
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The Demographic-Economic Framework of Migration  
In 1973, after the mass emigration wave towards France in the 1960s, the Algerian government, relying on 
its oil and hydrocarbon revenues, unilaterally decided to put a halt on outward migration, which was 
considered a form of post-colonialism. For almost three decades afterwards, there was no mass emigration 
from Algeria, neither labour-driven – despite constant unemployment – nor forced – notwithstanding the 
tragic events in that country in the 1990s. In that period, what emigration there was, came as a result of 
French family-reunification schemes. As to emigrants abroad, their return home was not supported, since 
they were considered a safety valve for Algeria’s local labour market (Fargues, 2006). Since the 2000s, a 
new upsurge of Algerian labour emigration has been observed in concomitance with the gradual 
liberalization of the Algerian economy which, however, still has high unemployment, especially among the 
highly-skilled. This new wave of emigration, indeed, has a qualified emigrant profile, together with 
diversification in the choice of destination country.  
As to immigration patterns, mixed inward flows have been a constant in the history of Algeria. True, 
almost all European migrants (settled in Algeria during the colonial period) returned home at independence 
in 1962 and the medium- and highly-skilled migrants called in by the Algerian state in the framework of its 
technical cooperation with Eastern Europe and some Arab countries in the 1960s and 1970s also returned. 
But, since the 2000s, Algeria has experienced a new type of immigration, as a result of economic 
liberalization. Today, growing numbers of foreign firms and workers enter Algeria, especially from China (in 
the construction sector) and India (in the steel industry). Meanwhile, Algeria continues to play a relevant 
role in attracting Sub-Saharan migrants destined to cover labour shortages in a variety of sectors (e.g. 
agriculture, construction, tourism, domestic services, etc.).  
During the 2011 Libyan Civil war, Algeria was officially the neighbouring country that received fewest 
migrants fleeing Libya: 12,296 third-country and 1,666 Algerian nationals reached Algerian borders from 
February to November 2011 (IOM data). Official figures are perhaps inaccurate here though. International 
agencies were often kept away from Algerian transit border areas. And the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that in March 2011, it was contacted directly by the 
Senegalese embassy worried about 300 Senegalese nationals who were refused entrance to Algeria by the 
Algerian authorities at the border with Libya (UNHCR, 2011). 
Outward migration Inward migration 
Stock 
In c. 2012, 961,850 Algerian migrants resided abroad, 
that is 2.6% of the population residing in Algeria.  
 
 
Stock 
According to the 2008 Census there were 95,000 
foreign residents in Algeria, or 0.27% of the total 
resident population. 
 
 
Country of 
residence
Definition 
(a)
Reference 
date (Jan 1st)
Source Number %
877,398 91.2
of which France (A) 2009 Population Census 721,796 75.0
             Spain (A) 2012 Population Register 60,207 6.3
             Italy (A) 2012 Population Register 23,278 2.4
             UK (A) 2012 Annual Population Survey 22,000 2.3
11,209 1.2
of which Tunisia (B) 2004 Population Census 9,612 1.0
73,243 7.6
of which Canada (A) 2006 Population Census 33,515 3.5
             US (A) 2011 American Community Survey 17,068 1.8
961,850 100.0
(c): "Other countries" include other European countries (Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
Moldova, Norw ay, Russia, Sw itzerland and Ukraine), Australia, Canada, Chile, Israel, Japan, Mexico, New  Zealand 
and United States.
Sources: national statistics (Population Censuses, population registers, registers for foreigners, etc.)
Main total
Southern-Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries (b)
Other countries (c)
European Union
(a): Algerian migrants are defined according to the country of birth (A) or country of nationality criterion according 
to countries of residence.
(b): SEM countries include Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and 
Turkey.
Algerian emigration stocks by country of residence, most recent data (c. 2012)
2008
Number % Number
Arab countries 57,599 80.4 n.a.
of which Morocco 18,661 26.1 n.a.
  Tunisia 8,389 11.7 n.a.
  Egypt 5,943 8.3 n.a.
  UAE 4,143 5.8 n.a.
Non-Arab African countries 7,134 10.0 n.a.
of which Mali 4,162 5.8 n.a.
Non-Arab Asian countries 1,597 2.2 n.a.
European countries 5,021 7.0 n.a.
of which France 2,618 3.7 n.a.
Other countries and stateless 258 0.4 n.a.
Main total 71,609 100.0 95,000
% of the total resident population 0.27
Source: Algerian population census (1998 and 2008)
0.25
Foreign population residing in Algeria by country of 
nationality, 1998, 2008
Country of nationality
1998
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The majority lived in the European Union – 
especially in France (75.0%) and Spain (6.4%) – and 
in “other countries” (7.6%), particularly in Canada 
(3.5%). In the last decade, destinations for Algerian 
migrants diversified. In particular, the importance of 
Canada and Spain as new destinations for Algerian 
emigrants emerged strikingly. For instance, the 
number of Algerian migrants residing in Spain 
between 2002 and 2012 almost doubled, meaning an 
annual average growth rate of 7.1%. In Canada, 
between 2001 and 2006, the same value stood at 
6.0%. After France, these two countries host, today, 
the largest Algerian migrant communities. 
As to their profile, in OECD countries (circa 2006), 
Algerians are more likely to have a low level of 
education (51.9%) and an intermediate occupational 
profile (almost one in three – 30.7% – are employed 
as technicians or professionals, 24.4% as craft and 
related trade workers or as service and market sale 
workers and 14.1% in elementary occupations) 
(OECD.stat). This profile is largely explained by the 
relative age of the Algerian diaspora. Actually, the 
profile of Algerians residing in France has 
substantially improved: from 1999 (Census) to 2008 
(Enquête Emploi) those with a tertiary education 
passed from 15.2% to 17.3%, while those with an 
intermediate level went up from 28.1% to 37.2%. 
However, the period of emigration cannot alone 
explain the emigrant profile. For instance, as noted by 
Fargues (2011), considering two recent outward flows 
– namely, Algerians directed to the US and Spain – 
while the Algerian community is among the most 
educated in the US (13.3 average years of schooling 
vs 10.6 registered both by other foreign-born 
communities and US-born), in Spain it registers lower 
levels of education (7.4 average years of schooling) 
compared with Algerians residing in the US, as well 
as with other foreign-born communities (8.4) and 
natives (7.5).  
 
Both absolute and relative values show no 
relevant changes between the two Censuses 
(71,609 vs 95,000 and 0.25% vs 0.27% from 1998 
to 2008, respectively). 1998 data reveals how most 
foreign nationals came from other Arab countries 
(80.4%) especially other Maghreb States (Morocco, 
26.1% and Tunisia 11.7) and Egypt (8.3%) as well 
as from Mali (5.8%) and European countries 
(7.0%). This is worth mentioning as in the 1998 
Census, only 16.4% of the foreign-born population 
declared a foreign nationality: until 2005, dual 
citizenship was not allowed (Musette, 2010). 
Flows 
Work permit data allows for a better understanding 
of the recent evolution of labour immigration in 
Algeria. In the 2000s, an upsurge in labour 
immigration was observed. 
 
From 2001 to 2012, the number of work 
permits rose from 1,107 to 50,760.  
 
1,107 5,190
10,564 6,963
18,000 18,191
23,000
50,760
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 … 2012
Work permits granted to foreign nationals, 2003-2012
Source: Agence Nationale de l'Emploi (ANEM) - Algeria
41
117
6
5
3
3
3
21
China
Egypt
Turkey
United Kingdom
Italy
France
Syria
Morocco
Others
53
19
11
6
11 Constructions
Petrolium
Mechanic &        
electrical industries
Water-Gas
Others
Work permits granted to foreign nationals by country of 
citizenship and by sector of occupation (% values), 2006
Source: Agence Nationale de l'Emploi (ANEM), in Musette, 2005
2004
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
1935 1945 1955 1965 1975
Average years of schooling by cohort and country of birth, 
US and Spain, 2001
Algeria (in the US) Algeria (in Spain)
USA (in the US) Spain (in Spain)
Other countries (in the US) Other countries (in Spain)
Source: 2001 National Census (IPUMS)
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Flows 
Most recent data on outward flows confirm an 
upsurge in Algerian emigration in the 2000s. 
 
For instance, from 1994 to 2007 annual flows 
towards France more than doubled (from 10,911 to 
24,041 individuals). Growing numbers are also found 
in Algerian flows directed to Spain (from 307 to 6,338) 
and to Canada (from 541 to 3,172).  
Irregular emigration has substantially increased in 
the last decade, too.  
The phenomenon of harragas is on the rise, 
meaning that increasing numbers of (especially 
young) Algerians are exposed to the risks of crossing 
the Mediterranean: this means not ‘only’ the risk of 
death, but also the risk of a collapsing health en route 
and jail or exploitation on arrival.  
According to 2004 data, foreign workers mainly 
come from China (41.0%),1
Beyond regular migrants, Algeria hosts large 
numbers of Sub-Saharan irregular foreign workers 
employed in a variety of sectors, for example in 
agriculture, construction and tourism, in the 
northern part of the country – as well as in 
garment industries and domestic service – in the 
south (Fargues, 2009). According to official data 
(Labour and Security Ministry), from 1992 to 2003 
around 28,800 irregulars were apprehended by 
Algerian authorities; a figure which reached 
respectively 4,870, 5,680 and 3,234 in 2003, 2004 
and 2005 (first semester).  
 Egypt (11.0%) and 
Turkey (6.0%) and work in the construction and oil 
sector (respectively 53.0% and 19.0%) as well as 
in the mechanical and electrical industries 
(11.0%); finally, they are mainly employed in 
highly-skilled (32.0%), managerial (16.0%) and 
technical (15.0%) positions. These figures 
perfectly illustrate the need of the Algerian 
economy for high-level and mid-level technical 
qualifications.  
However, direct field observation suggests a 
much higher number of 6,000 irregular migrants 
deported each month (i.e. 72,000 per year) at the 
two major border points (in Guezzam on the Niger 
border and Tin Zouatin on the Malian border), figures 
which coincide with the views of the consulates of 
these countries in Tamanrasset (Bensaad, 2008). In 
this respect, it is worth noting that irregular migrants 
from Sub-Saharan migrants working in the Algerian 
informal market are probably – quantitatively – more 
significant than transit migrants aiming for Southern 
European countries. 
Finally, Algeria has been the main receiver of 
Saharawi refugees as a result of the conflict over 
Western Sahara between Morocco and the 
Polisario Front. Despite the Algerian government 
never having allowed an official Census of these 
refugees, a reliable estimate of 90,000 persons 
living in the camps around Tindouf had been 
provided by EU satellite imagery (USCRI, 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 The large number of Chinese workers is a result of agreements signed between China and Algeria to implement 
specific programmes to build housing and manufacture construction materials. 
0
5.000
10.000
15.000
20.000
25.000
30.000
35.000
France
Others
0
1.000
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(*) "Others" include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the USA
Outward flows of Algerian nationals by country of destination 
(*), 1994 - 2007
Source: Author's own elaboration on national sources (in International Migration 
Flows to and f rom Selected Countries, The 2008 Revision, UN)
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According to Algerian policy records (Direction 
Générale de la Sureté Nationale, DSGN), the number 
of apprehended migrants attempting to cross the 
Mediterranean stood at 2,215 in 2008; in the same 
year 98 migrants were reported dead at sea, figures 
which surely underestimate the phenomenon, but 
which are, nevertheless, alarming. All surveys which 
have been conducted on this phenomenon report the 
young age of these migrants, e.g. 91.3% were 
younger than 35 (DSGN); and 67.0% were younger 
than 29 (Gendarmerie nationale). 
It is worth noting how, unlike Palestinian refugees 
(who also represent an important number of forced 
migrants in Algeria, who number about 4,000, and 
who are well integrated into Algerian society), 
Saharawi conditions are inhuman: beyond the fact 
that they do not have freedom of circulation,2
Officially, the 2011 Libyan Civil war and its 
consequent migration crisis did not trigger massive 
flows of Sub-Saharan migrants coming to Algeria 
from Libya. According to IOM data, ‘only’ 12,296 
third country and 1,666 Algerian nationals reached 
Algerian borders from February to November 2011.  
 nor 
access to employment, in 2008, 18% suffered from 
global acute malnutrition (GAM) and 5% from severe 
acute malnutrition, a situation which has, if anything, 
worsened since 2005 when the same values were 
stood at respectively 8% and 2%.  
References: Bensaad, A. 2008. Les migrations subsahariennes en Algérie, CARIM Research-Report 2008⁄1, Migration 
Policy Centre, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole; Fargues P. 2011. International Migration and the 
Demographic Transition: a Two-Way Interaction, International Migration Review, Vol. 45, Issue 3: 588–614; Fargues P. 
2009. Work, Refuge, Transit: An Emerging Pattern of Irregular Immigration South and East of the Mediterranean, 
International Migration Review, Vol. 43, Issue 3, pages 544–577; Fargues P. 2006. International migration in the Arab 
region: trends and policies, UN expert group meeting on international migration and development in the Arab region, 
Beirut, 15-17 May, 2006; Musette M.S. 2010. Migration, marché du travail et développement, Document de Travail, 
Projet de recherche: Faire des migrations un facteur de développement: une étude sur l’Afrique du nord et l’Afrique de 
l’Ouest, ILO, Geneva ; Musette M.S. 2005. Summary report on migration and development in Central Maghreb, 
International Migration Papers, ILO, Geneva; US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI). 2009. Stonewalling 
on refugee rights: Algeria and the Saharawi, USCRI; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 2011. 
Humanitarian Situation in Libya and the Neighbouring Countries, UNHCR, 17 March 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 According to a recent survey (USCRI, 2009), nine out of ten camp residents aged 17-35 would desire a visa to 
emigrate. During the survey, Said, one of the respondents answered: ‘it is really a stupid waste of time to ask 
such a question – i.e. the wish to emigrate – to any young Saharawi, who has suffered from marginalization, 
because a visa is our only dream left’. 
Year
Apprehended 
cases (*)
Dead at sea          
(**)
Missing at sea 
(**)
2005 335 n.a. n.a.
2006 1.636 73 44
2007 1.858 61 55
2008 2.215 98 n.a.
Source: (*) Direction Générale de la Sureté Nationale (DGSN); (**) figures reported 
by Algerian coast guards (in Labdellaoui, 2009)
Irregular migrants who were apprehended or reported dead or 
missing at sea by Algerian police, 2001 - 2007
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The Legal Framework of Migration 
Algeria resisted reforming its migration law longer than its neighbours. However, it eventually reformed in 
two steps. On 25 June 2008, it adopted the law governing foreign nationals’ conditions of entry, stay and 
circulation, which modified for the first time the law ruling foreign nationals established in1966. Then, on 25 
February 2009, it reformed its penal code to add the offence of irregular exit from its territory for its citizens 
and foreign residents, as well as the crimes of migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons.  
Algeria has also introduced new offences and some distinctions between terminologies and penalties. 
Migrant smuggling is defined by the 2009 law as the organisation, for purposes of profit, of any illegal exit 
from Algerian territory, whereas the facilitation of a foreign national’s irregular entry, stay or circulation is 
addressed by the 2008 law. Alongside new offences such as marriages of convenience, Algeria has 
adopted an offence which is now shared throughout the Maghreb, namely irregular emigration. Sanctions 
against irregular exit from Algerian territory differ depending on whether foreign non-residents, foreign 
residents or Algerian citizens are involved. Like its neighbour, Morocco, Algeria tends to distinguish foreign 
nationals, who are supposed to reside, from foreign nationals, who are presumed to circulate, and, in this 
way, enacts the notion of transit migration. Algerian tribunals have already condemned Algerian citizens 
who intended to leave the country without passing through border posts or who lacked an entry visa for the 
destination country. Algeria officially acknowledges the conclusion, between 1994 and 2007, of six 
agreements on the readmission of irregular Algerians. 
Algeria’s reforms not only regard irregular migration’s penalisation, but also rights for immigrants. The 
new Algerian law sets time-limits on administrative detention, and it introduces procedural protection for 
some categories of foreign nationals awaiting expulsion, on the basis of their vulnerability or their links with 
Algeria, and it mentions family reunification and long-term stay. 
At the same time as it modified its Family Code, Algeria proceeded in 2005 to reform its nationality law in a 
remarkable fashion. It suppressed any kind of discrimination against women. It now has the most egalitarian 
legislation in the region. Algeria granted its female citizens the possibility of passing their nationality to their 
foreign spouse – a status previously only granted to men. Algeria also recognised that women have the right 
to transmit their nationality to children born of a foreign father, these who used to remain foreign nationals till 
they came of age when they could eventually declare their intention to become Algerians, provided they were 
born in Algeria and provided that they were residing there. Algeria has also gone further than Egypt in 2004 
and Morocco in 2007. Furthermore, it removed the provision mentioning discriminatory access to political 
rights for new nationals – although it did not reform the electoral code accordingly. Finally, Algeria removed 
the requirement to renounce foreign nationality as a condition to naturalisation.  
Since 1997, Algerian citizens abroad have been given the right to vote in Algerian elections. Of the 462 
seats in Algeria’s National Peoples’ Assembly, eight are reserved to represent Algerian citizens residing 
abroad. The electoral law reform implemented in January 2012 reaffirmed emigrant voting rights, and 
included compulsory quotas for a minimum representation of women in elected assemblies. Indeed, a 50% 
rate was deemed applicable to seats reserved for the national community living abroad.  
The main legal framework governing refugees in Algeria is a 1963 Decree creating the Algerian Office 
for Refugees and Stateless Persons (BAPRA, or Bureau Algérien pour les réfugiés et les apatrides). This 
office is the institutional body responsible for deciding upon asylum requests and recognising refugee 
status determined by UNHCR.3 UNHCR is in charge of refugee status determination and is more 
generally responsible for supporting persons under its mandate, especially the Sahrawis who have been 
in camps in the South-West of Algeria since the 1970s. In comparison to the Sahrawis, numbers of other 
refugees are much fewer, and these are hardly protected as they are generally considered irregular 
immigrants by the government.4
                                                          
3 The Algerian Government has approached UNHCR for assistance in developing a national asylum system, and in 
mid-2012, UNHCR identified an expert to support the Government in updating the draft asylum law in accordance 
with international standards. Retrieved from: UNHCR 2013 Country Operations Profile –Algeria 
 
http://www.unhcr.org/50a9f8260.pdf  
4 According to the UNHCR and other sources, Algeria may not automatically recognise the status granted to refugees 
by UNHCR. Furthermore, the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) claimed that BARPA’s 
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recognition rate for Sub-Saharan refugees is at 0%. For more information, see: UNHCR 2013 Country Operations 
Profile –Algeria (http://www.unhcr.org/50a9f8260.pdf ) and EMHRN 2012 Country Factsheet –Algeria 
(http://www.euromedrights.org/eng/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/EMHRN-Factsheet-
Algeria_EN_15JAN203_WEB.pdf).  
5 Journal Officiel de la Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire. (14 January 2012). Law n° 12-01 of 12 
January 2012. Retrieved from http://www.joradp.dz/JO2000/2012/001/F_Pag.htm  
6 Journal Officiel de la Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire. (2 September 2009). Executive Decree n° 
09-272 of 30 August 2009. Retrieved from: http://www.joradp.dz/JO2000/2009/050/F_Pag.htm  
7 Journal Officiel de la Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire. (8 March 2009). Law n°09-01 of 25 
February 2009. Retrieved from http://www.joradp.dz/JO2000/2009/015/F_Pag.htm  
8 Journal Officiel de la Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire. (2 July 2008). Law n°08-11 of 25 June 
2008 governing foreign nationals’ conditions of entry, stay and circulation. Retrieved from 
http://www.joradp.dz/JO2000/2008/036/F_Pag.htm  
9 CARIM. (n.d.). The Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria of 8 December 1996. Retrieved 
from http://www.carim.org/public/legaltexts/LE3ALG154_FR.pdf  
10 CARIM. (14 July 1981). Law n°80-10 of 11 July 1981 related to foreign nationals’ employment conditions. 
Retrieved from http://www.carim.org/public/legaltexts/ALGLEG00161.pdf  
11 Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire Minstere de la Justice. (2005). Code de la Nationalité 
Algérienne. Retrieved from http://www.droit.mjustice.dz/code_nation_alger.pdf  
12 UNHCR. (n.d.). Decree n°1963 of 25 July 1963 laying down detailed rules for the application of the Geneva 
Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,LEGISLATION,DZA,,3ae6b52518,0.html  
13 Since November 2011, Algerians need a visa to enter Libya, except for those with diplomatic or mission passports. 
Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (12 February 2013). Texte intégral du communiqué commun algéro-libyen. 
Retrieved from http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr/stories.php?story=12/12/11/8722835 
Legal 
Framework 
Outward migration Inward migration 
General Legal 
References 
• 2012 Law n° 12-01, replacing Ordinance N° 97/07 of 6 March 1997 (electoral law)5
• 2009 Executive Decree n° 09-272 amending and supplementing Decree n° 86-
276 of 11 November 1986 laying down the conditions of employment of foreign 
personnel in state agencies, local governments, institutions, organizations and 
businesses public
 
6
• 2009 Law n°09-01, modifying the Penal code (irregular migration and 
trafficking)
 
7
• 2008 Law n°08-11 governing foreign nationals’ conditions of entry, stay and 
circulation
 
8
• 1996 Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria of 8 
December 1996 and amendments
 
9
• 1981 Law n°80-10 related to foreign nationals’ employment conditions
 
10
• 1970 Code of Algerian Nationality and amendments
 
11
• 1963 Decree n°1963 laying down detailed rules for the application of the 
Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees
 
12  
Entry and Exit Visas 
Algerian citizens do not need visas to 
enter Maghreb countries (except for 
Libya13
Since 1994, the border with Morocco 
has been officially closed. 
), among others. 
Visas 
To enter, foreign nationals must present 
passport or valid travel document, and 
visa. (Law n°08-11 of 25 June 2008) 
Visas are waived for Maghreb nationals 
(except Moroccans) and Malian citizens, 
among others.  
Irregular 
Migration 
Law n°09-01 of 25 February 2009 
includes:  
Irregular exit of any foreign resident 
or national citizen is punished by 2 to 6 
months in prison;  
Law n°08-11 of 25 June 2008 includes:  
Irregular stay or labour is penalized 
with a fine;  
EU Neighbourhood Migration Report 2013 
Migration Policy Centre (www.migrationpolicycentre.eu) 17 
Migrant smuggling (exit from the 
territory) is punished with 3 to 5 years in 
prison and for up to 20 years in cases of 
aggravating circumstances. 
Law n°08-11 of 25 June 2008 
includes:  
Direct or indirect facilitation of a 
foreign national’s irregular exit is 
punished by 2 to 5 years in prison and 
60,000 to 200,000 dinar fine. 
Accentuated sentences in cases of 
aggravating circumstances.  
  
Irregular entry punished by 6 months 
to 2 years in prison and from 10,000 to 
30,000 dinars fine;  
Non-compliance with an expulsion 
decision punished by 2 to 5 years in 
prison; 
Direct or indirect facilitation of a 
foreign national’s irregular entry, 
circulation, or stay punished by 2 to 5 
years in prison, and 60,000 to 200,000 
dinar fine. Accentuated sentences in 
case of aggravating circumstances;  
Marriage of convenience punished 
by 2 to 5 years in prison. 
Human trafficking penalized with 3 to 10-year prison penalty and a 300,000 to 1 
million dinar fine, up to 20-year prison penalty in case of aggravating circumstances. 
(Law n°09-01 of 25 February 2009).  
Agreements regarding irregular migration 
 Readmission agreements include:  
• Germany (1997) 
• Italy (2000)  
• EU (2002) – in the EU-Algeria Association Agreement (2002), Algeria 
agrees to readmit any of their nationals illegally present in any Member 
State, and to negotiate the conclusion of agreements regarding 
readmission of third country nationals. 
• Spain (2002) only nationals 
• Switzerland (2006) 
• United Kingdom (2006)  
 Other:  
• Palermo Protocols: in 2001, Algeria ratified Protocol against the 
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, and in 2004 it ratified the 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
especially women and children. 
• EU-Algerian Association Agreement (2002) includes cooperation in 
order to prevent and control irregular migration. 
• Algeria and France agreement (2008) on cooperation to fight against 
irregular migration and human trafficking (Decree No. 2008-373 of 18 
April 2008). 
• United Arab Emirates and Algeria (March 2013) signed an agreement 
including cooperation on combatting human trafficking.  
Rights and 
Settlement 
Emigrant voting rights in municipal, 
presidential, and parliamentary 
elections Eight seats are reserved in 
the National People’s Assembly for 
Algerian citizens abroad; half of these 
seats are reserved for women (Law n° 
12-01 of 12 January 2012). 
Right of exit from the territory is 
guaranteed in the Constitution (Article 44).  
Protection of every citizen abroad 
is the responsibility of the State, as 
stipulated in the Constitution (Article 24). 
Right of entry for nationals is guaranteed 
in the Constitution (Article 44). 
Protection of person and 
properties of any foreigner being 
legally on the territory guaranteed by 
Constitution (Article 67).  
Residence permits: student permit 
linked to studies, worker permit linked to 
labour authorization. A 10 year-permit 
can be delivered to persons living in 
Algeria for 7 years and their children, or 
on the basis of bilateral agreements 
(Law n°08-11 of 25 June 2008).  
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Agreements related to settlement 
Agreement with Italy on persons’ 
circulation (2000); Agreement with 
France on circulation and stay of 
persons (1968, modified in 1985, 1994, 
2001); and Visa agreement (1994); and 
the Protocol on individuals’ circulation 
(2004) with Spain.  
 
Access to employment: 
Employment of foreign nationals is 
submitted to the issue of a work permit 
or a work temporary leave. When work 
duration is less than 3 months, only the 
work temporary leave is needed, and 
can be renewed once. When work 
duration does not exceed 15 days, no 
leave is required. Work permits are for 
two years. Work permits only delivered 
for positions unable to be filled by an 
Algerian domestic national or emigrant.. 
Qualification Requirement (Superior to 
technician level, principle of non-
competition with local workforce). Civil 
service positions reserved for nationals 
except on a contractual basis for 
teachers in scientific and technic fields 
at a university level or for technic 
formation. (Law n°80-10 of 11 July 1981 
and Executive Decree n° 09-272 of 30 
August 2009).  
Family reunification: under the terms 
defined by regulation (Law n°08-11 of 25 
June 2008 to be regulated by by-laws.  
Access to public services (health, 
education): yes.  
Access to estate ownership: upon 
ministerial authorisation. 
Time-limits to detention: 
placement of a migrant in detention 
centre allowed for a maximum period of 
30 days, renewable pending the 
formalities of deportation order or 
repatriation to their country of origin 
(Law n°08-11 of 25 June 2008). 
Temporary suspension of 
expulsion for: foreign parent(s) of 
foreign children dependent on these 
parents; certain categories of minors; 
and pregnant women. (Law n°08-11 of 
25 June 2008). 
Right to appeal expulsion order: 
depending upon the seriousness of the 
charges, a migrant may appeal 
expulsion order, within a maximum of 
five (5) days from the date of notification 
of this decision. The judge decides on 
the action within a maximum of 20 days 
from the date of registration of the 
application. The resort has a suspensive 
effect on the expulsion. (Law n°08-11 of 
25 June 2008).  
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Labour  Bilateral agreements regarding labour migration include the Agreement on 
cooperation in the field of labour and use of human resources signed between 
Algeria and Libya (1987), and the Protocol on labour with Jordan (2004), among 
others. 
 International agreements regarding labour migration include the 1990 
Convention on the Protection of all Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Family, and several International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions.  
Citizenship Dual citizenship is authorized. In the 
past, some obstacles for Algerians 
voluntarily obtaining another nationality 
as the Government viewed obtaining 
another citizenship as a threat to the 
homeland (especially given Algeria’s 
colonial history with France).  
 
Naturalisation possible after 7 years 
residence, under certain conditions (but 
renunciation of original nationality no 
longer required).  
Algerian citizens can transmit their 
nationality to a foreign-born spouse 
and children born from an Algerian 
citizen and a foreign-born father/mother.  
(Code of Algerian Nationality) 
International 
Protection 
 Prohibition to extradite political 
refugees stipulated in Constitution 
(Article 69). 
Algerian Office for Refugees and 
Stateless Persons established by 
Decree n°1963-274 of 25 July 1963.  
International agreements related 
to international protection: Algeria 
has ratified the 1951 Convention 
relating to the status of refugees (in 
1963); the 1967 Protocol relating to the 
status of refugees (in 1967); and the 
1969 OAU Refugee Convention 
governing specific aspects of refugees 
in Africa (in 1974). Algeria also 
accepted the League of Arab States’ 
1965 Protocol for the Treatment of 
Palestinians in Arab States.  
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The Socio-Political Framework of Migration 
Although migration policy had almost disappeared from the political agenda since 1973, when the Algerian 
State decided to end the public management of labour migration to France, Algeria has initiated ambitious 
reforms in its migration policy. The main objective of the new Algerian migration policy is to control irregular 
migration. This choice can be explained by a number of converging factors: increased EU engagement with 
Algeria on irregular migration; the proliferation of smuggling networks involved in cross-border crime; 
increase in regional terrorist activity; regional upheavals and consequent increases in population 
movements; and by the indignation of the public confronted by the drama of the harragas. 
In order to implement such a policy, the Algerian State has progressively developed new legislative 
tools, while ratifying UN conventions on the protection of the rights of the migrants and on the repression of 
human trafficking. Moreover, Algeria has strengthened cooperation with the EU and its member states, 
particularly after the enforcement of the Algeria-EU Association agreement on 1 September 2005. In 
parallel, the Algerian government has strengthened cooperation with its neighbours, with the exception of 
Morocco with which it is currently mending relations, in order to enhance border controls and tackle migrant 
smuggling and other crimes.  
Algerian officials are critical regarding European migration policies that focus on security and on 
selective immigration. They insist on necessary consultation and cooperation between sending and 
receiving countries in order to define a global and fair migration policy that facilitates the circulation of 
persons in the Mediterranean and that supports the economic development of migrant origin regions. 
In addition to border controls, the Algerian government has also been involved in dealing with 
humanitarian crises on its borders, such as the displacement of people from Libya and Tunisia after the 
Arab Spring and the Malian refugee crisis that started in 2012, and has provided humanitarian aid, among 
other services, in such circumstances. It is also working with the UNHCR to address refugee issues within 
Algeria’s borders.  
Developing links with the Diaspora remains a concern for the Algerian government, and several 
Government bodies have been created including the Delegate Ministry in Charge of the National 
Community Established Abroad and the Consultative Council for the National Community Abroad. In 
February 2013, the Secretary of State for the National Community Abroad announced the 
implementation in 2013 or early 2014 of a new body, the National Advisory Board of the National 
Community Abroad, which will "establish bridges between Algerians and create a sustainable 
partnership between Algerian competences inside and outside the country".14
 
 
                                                          
14 Algeria Ministry of Foreign Affairs (14 February 2013). Installation du conseil national consultatif de la communauté 
nationale à l'étranger fin 2013 ou début 2014. Retrieved from  
http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr/stories.php?story=13/02/14/0129945  
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15 Most recently, humanitarian aid delivered to Tunisia, Libya, and Mali to address refugee needs and needs caused 
by the influx of foreign nationals from Libya. Algeria also provided assistance to Malian refugees who were on the 
borders between the two countries, and sent humanitarian aid to the people of northern Mali and people who 
have found refuge in southern countries. 
16 For example, the Prime Ministers of Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria agreed to form teams to look into cooperation with 
neighboring countries over the Malian crisis.  
17 UNHCR. (2013). 2013 UNHCR country operations profile - Algeria. Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e485e16.html  
Socio-
Political 
Framework 
Outward migration Inward migration 
Governmental 
Institutions 
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
• Ministry of Employment 
• Ministry of National Solidarity 
• Delegate Ministry in charge of the 
National Community Established 
Abroad 
• Consultative Council for National 
Community Abroad 
• ANEM (National Agency for 
Employment, previously ONAMO) 
• ANDI (National Agency for the 
Development and the Investment) 
• CNES (Economic and Social 
National Council)  
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
• BARPA (Algerian Office for Refugees 
and Stateless Persons, located within 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
• Ministry of Employment 
• Ministry of National Solidarity 
• Ministry of Labour 
• Ministry of Social Insurance  
 
Irregular Migration 
• Ministry of the Interior 
• Ministry of Justice 
• Delegate Ministry at the Regional Cooperation 
• General Directorate of National Security 
• Army General Command 
Governmental 
Strategy 
 
Facilitation of outward movement for 
Algerians: working with Member States 
of the European Union to improve 
facilitation of movement and address 
visa issues for Algerians (e.g., with 
Belgium, Britain, France, Italy).  
Regulate the stay and the employment of 
foreign nationals in Algeria. 
International Protection: 
• Provide humanitarian assistance to 
refugees and other displaced foreign 
nationals15Working with governments 
and international organizations to 
address refugee-producing conflicts 
in the region - e.g., with the US, EU, 
Maghreb countries, Organization for 
African Union (OAU), Arab League, 
UNHCR, among others.16
• Working with UNHCR for assistance in 
developing a national asylum 
system
 
17
 
Allowing Algerian territory to be 
used as host for four refugee camps 
and one settlement in the south-
western province of Tindouf for refugees 
from Western Sahara. 
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18 Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2009). National Plan for the Alliance of Civilizations. Retrieved from 
http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr/stories.php?story=09/04/08/6791221 
19 The board will bring together 56 representatives from the national community abroad, elected by the national 
conference, 33 representatives of public administrations and institutions, and five persons appointed by the head 
of state, among people known for their competence and commitment issues national community abroad. Missions 
“will include the continuous improvement of public service delivery due by the State to its citizens abroad and 
promoting the participation of expatriate expertise and national capacity development of Algeria in the fields, 
scientific, economic and others.” For more information, see: 
http://seccne.mae.dz/?page=conseil_communaute_nationale  
20 For more information, see: (on Canada) http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr/stories.php?story=11/11/08/1781889; (on 
Britain)  
http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr/stories.php?story=12/12/02/4053625 and 
http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr/stories.php?story=11/11/04/7555950; and (on Spain) 
http://seccne.mae.dz/?page=communaute_espagne  
21Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres- Secrétaire d’Etat Chargé de la Communauté Nationale à l’étranger (n.d.). 
Enseignement à distancedes langues arabe et Tamazight. Retrieved from 
http://seccne.mae.dz/?page=enseignement  
22 Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres- Secrétaire d’Etat Chargé de la Communauté Nationale à l’étranger (n.d.). 
Compétences&Association. Retreieved from http://seccne.mae.dz/?page=competences  
23 For example, the most recent discussions held between Algerian and British officials regarding Algerians in the 
UK, and with French officials regarding Algerians in France. Retrieved from 
http://seccne.mae.dz/?page=entretient and http://seccne.mae.dz/?page=rencontre_prefet_isere  
Overall government approach to migration 
According to Algeria’s foreign policy strategy on migration, within its commitment to the 
United Nations’ Alliance of Civilization, entitled National Plan for the Alliance of 
Civilizations, Algeria states that it: “is trying to convince its partners, both regional and 
international, that the facilitation of movement of persons, the promotion of human 
exchanges, the establishment of a partnership for the development of regions with high 
migration potential, the involvement of developed countries in favour of investment in the 
countries of origin of migration flows, the economic and social cooperation between the 
country of transit and destination are all guidelines that promote an intelligent 
approach.”18 
Developing links with Algerian Diaspora 
• Implementation of new government body, National Advisory Board of the National 
Community Abroad, to consolidate links with Diaspora.19
• Secretary of State for the National Community Abroad meeting with Algerians in 
foreign countries to: address their concerns; obtain input on how to improve 
relations; encouraging their involvement in development; encouraging Algerians to 
engage in host country to better integrate (e.g., meetings in Canada, Britain, and 
Spain
 
20
• Implement programs to maintain links with Algerians abroad (e.g., teaching 
national history and socio-cultural values of the country, Arabic language programs
). 
21 
within host countries; email address where Algerians abroad can contact Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs22
• Work with host country governments to improve opportunities for Algerians abroad 
(conditions of residence, integration, employment, education, etc.
). 
23); 
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24 Algeria’s National Plan for the Alliance of Civilizations can be accessed here: 
http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr/stories.php?story=09/04/08/6791221  
25 Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (12 February 2013). Lancement d'un nouveau programme de coopération sur 
quatre ans. Retrieved from http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr/stories.php?story=13/02/13/4416957  
26 Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (12 February 2013). Texte intégral du communiqué commun algéro-libyen. 
Retrieved from http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr/stories.php?story=12/12/11/8722835 
27 Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (29 November 2012). Riches entretiens politiques de M. SAHLI à Londres. 
Retrieved from http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr/stories.php?story=12/12/02/4036702  
28 For more, see: Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (12 February 2013). Texte intégral du communiqué commun 
algéro-libyen. Retrieved from http://www.mae.dz/ma_fr/stories.php?story=12/12/11/8722835  
29 Shuaib, Ali. (12 January 2013). Libya, Algeria and Tunisia to step up border security. Reuters. Retrieved from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/12/us-libya-borders-idUSBRE90B0G220130112  
 
• Repatriation of Algerian nationals – especially during times of crises (repatriation 
from Libya and Egypt). 
• Mobilize the competences and the assets of the Algerians abroad to support 
development in Algeria. 
• Support the political participation of Algerians abroad within Algerian elections.  
Circulation of persons 
 Exchanges among peoples is a foreign policy objective for the Algerian 
government 
• According to Algeria’s National Plan for the Alliance of Civilizations 
(2009): Algeria has provided thousands of scholarships to young foreigners 
particularly in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Algeria has also sent young 
Algerians abroad for short- and long-term trainings to enable them to deepen 
their knowledge and then return to the country to practice and build on the 
achievements,24
 Working with countries to facilitate circulation of persons, for example:  
 among other efforts.  
• In 2013, as part of a new program of cooperation between Belgium and 
Algeria, over a period of four years (2013-2016) the two countries will 
create a working mechanism to examine issues related to the movement of 
people between the two countries.25
• Libya and Algeria have stated their desire to continue dialogue to cancel 
visa requirements between the two countries.
  
26
• In November 2012, UK and Algeria agreed to begin negotiations on the 
mobility of people, whose objective is to facilitate the procedures for 
obtaining visas for citizens of both countries.
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 Irregular Migration 
 Strengthen bilateral and regional cooperation regarding the control of borders 
(working with border countries Mali, Mauritania, Western Sahara, Libya, Niger, 
Tunisia, no substantial cooperation with Morocco.) For example:  
• Algeria-Libya: In February 2013, Algeria-Libya agreed to strengthen 
cooperation between the relevant departments to protect and defend the 
borders. Libya and Algeria committed to not allow anyone to use their territory 
to undermine or threaten the security and stability of each country. Algeria 
expressed willingness to support and assist in the training of Libyan army 
officers and maintenance of military equipment.28
• Algeria-Libya-Tunisia: the three countries agreed in January 2013 to 
implement measures including the creation of joint checkpoints and patrols 
along the frontiers.
 
29
 Strengthening Algerian security system and closely monitoring borders, 
especially after Mali crisis, in order to fight against trafficking networks and other 
forms of crime. 
 
 Reinforce sanctions against persons involved in irregular migration. 
 Capacity-building cooperation with the EU and some member states (France, Italy 
and Spain) to strengthen judicial administration and the police.  
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Civil Society Diaspora 
• ACA (Association of Algerian 
Competences) 
• Algerian Association for the Transfer 
of Technology 
• REAGE (Network of the Algerian 
Graduates from the Grandes Ecoles 
and the French Universities) 
• ANIMA (Network for the Investment 
in the Mediterranean) 
Assistance to migrants/refugees 
in Algeria 
• LADDH (Algerian League for the Defence 
of the Human Rights) 
• SNAPAP (National Autonomous Union of 
Public Administration Staff) 
• SOS Women in Distress 
• NADA (Algerian Network for Defence of 
Children’s Rights) 
• R&D (Rencontre et développement - 
Meeting and Development) 
• Croissant-Rouge Algerian 
Employment 
• UGEA (General Union of the Algerian 
Entrepreneur) 
International 
Cooperation 
Algeria is a member of several international organisations in which it actively works to 
address issues of migration, including: International Organization for Migration (IOM); 
International Labour Organization (ILO); UNHCR; Arab League; and Organization for 
African Union (OAU), among others. Algeria is a participant to the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (although, it has not agreed on an Action Plan within the 
framework of the ENP) and the 5+5 Dialogue. Algeria is a member of the Union for the 
Mediterranean (a multilateral partnership within the European Neighbourhood Policy). 
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The Demographic-Economic Framework of Migration  
Following wider patterns of post-Soviet states Armenia has seen continual patterns of mass emigration 
since 1991, yet this has been partially masked by a history of positive natural balances. 
In the intra-census period of 2001 and 2011 the resident population fell from 3.2 to 3.0 million persons, 
with a natural balance of +126,000 persons. Yet, the net migration balance was -320,000, which is 10% of 
the 2002 population. The annual net migration balance passed instead from -23,100 in 1995-2001 to -
32,000 in 2002-2011. Major outflows were directed toward the US and Russia. 
As with immigration trends, between 1988 and 1992 Armenia saw the arrival over 200,000 refugees from 
Azerbaijan due to the war of Nagorno-Karabakh (Yunosov, 2009). Hence a major migratory challenge for the 
Armenian government was the effective provision of socio-political rights and welfare to refugees and IDPs.  
Outward migration Inward migration 
Stocks 
According to destination countries’ statistics, 643,823 
or 221,846 Armenian migrants resided abroad in 
years around 2012 (table 1), who represent 
respectively 19.7% or 6.8% of the total population 
residing in Armenia. The huge difference between the 
two estimates depends on whether we count 
Armenian migrants in Russia according respectively 
to the country of birth or citizenship criterion.  
 
Indeed, in Russia, while individuals born in 
Armenia are 482,328, Armenian citizens stand only 
at 59,351. The former (largest) number is the result 
of massive ethnic repatriation waves occurred just 
after the collapse of the USSR, according to which 
significant numbers of people - born in the 
Armenian territory before 1991 with Russian 
descent - decided to ‘return’ their origin country. 
They are the so-called ethnic Russians who are 
generally not perceived as Armenian emigrants, but 
Russian nationals. 
In both cases, the preferred destinations for 
Armenian migrants are Russia and the US, while 
European Union Member States are just residual 
destinations. 
Stocks 
According to the 2001 population census, 25,709 
foreign citizens and 285,705 individuals born 
abroad lived in Armenia in 2001, or 0.8% and 8.9% 
of the total resident population (table 2). 
 
Resulting mainly from the conflict within the 
Nagorno Karabakh region, people born in Azerbaijan 
represented 40.4% of all individuals born abroad, 
among whom a large majority has the Armenian 
citizenship (89.7%). Other important migrants’ 
communities are from Georgia, Russia and Iran. 
As with their profile, they are mostly women 
(53.2%) with a secondary diploma (53.4%), while 
tertiary educated stand at 19.9%. 
Flows 
Despite Armenia has been mainly an emigration 
country, recently, there have been a rising number 
of immigrants via issued residence permits (figure 
3). In 2006 2,818 were issued; in 2007 3,921 and in 
2008 4,155 - an average annual increase of 15.8% 
(figure 3). In 2008, the majority of immigrants 
(90.0%) granted residence permits are citizens of 
non-CIS countries. Major countries of origin were 
Iran (almost 29%), USA (10%), Syria (9%), Iraq 
(7%), and Russia (6%).  
 
 
 
 
 
Country of residence
Definition 
(a)
Reference date 
(Jan 1st)
Number Number % %
9.1 26.3
of which France (A) 2005 2.4 6.9
             Germany (B) 2012 1.9 5.6
             Spain (A) 2012 1.7 5.0
494,650 72,673 76.8 32.8
of which Russia (A) 2002 481,328 X 74.8 X
             Russia (B) 2010 X 59,351 X 26.8
         Ukraine (B) 2001 1.7 4.8
             Belarus (B) 2009 0.3 0.7
14.1 41.0
of which US (A) 2011 13.2 38.4
             Canada (A) 2006 0.4 1.1
             Israel (A) 2005 0.2 0.5
643,823 221,846 100.0 100.0
(a): Armenian migrants are defined according to the country of birth (A) or country of nationality (B) criterion 
according to countries of residence; in Russia both numbers are reported.
(b): "Other countries" include Iceland, Liechstein, Norw ay, Sw itzerland, Jordan, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Japan 
and Israel
Sources: national statistics (Population Censuses, population registers, registers for foreigners, etc.)
Table 1 - Armenian emigration stocks by country of residence, most recent data (c. 2012)
European Union
CIS countries + Georgia
Other countries (b)
Main total
58,323
15,368
2,345
1,066
12,319
10,982
10,686
1,622
90,850
85,263
Country of 
citizenship/     
country of birth
Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Iran Russia Syria Others Total 
Armenia 2,921,973 103,826 64,117 15,358 25,776 5,084 49,321 3,185,455
Azerbaijan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Georgia 102 5 2,176 0 9 0 12 2,304
Iran 8 1 0 579 0 1 6 595
Russia 3,130 525 376 14 3,131 5 442 7,623
Syria 7 0 0 0 0 229 10 246
Others 873 78 34 35 42 15 -87 990
Stateless 1,213 11,254 93 13 119 11 1,248 13,951
Total 2,927,306 115,689 66,796 15,999 29,077 5,345 52,799 3,213,011
Table 2 - Population residing in Armenia by country of citizenship and country of birth, 2001
Source: Population Census - 2001
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The profile of Armenians abroad is gender-
balanced (males: 47.5%). As with their socio-
economic profile, Armenian migrants have a 
medium-high level of education with 43.7% holding 
at least a secondary education diploma and 35.8% 
a tertiary one. However, OECD countries host a 
larger portion of tertiary educated Armenians 
(40.4%) than CIS states do (17.7%). In the former 
region, this intermediate skill profile reflects their 
job insertion, with almost 4 out of 10 (39.0%) 
Armenian migrants employed as professionals, 
associated professional, technicians or clerks. 
Flows 
Data from the ‘Sample Survey on External and 
Internal Migration’ (SSEIM)1
The age distribution of recent migrants differs 
from that of Armenian stayers, as highlighted in 
figure 1, working age migrants are more 
represented than stayers (77.9% vs. 57.0%, 
respectively).  
 allow tracing the main 
characteristics of recent Armenian emigrants. 
Accordingly, between 2002 and 2007, 205,000 
Armenians emigrated and were still abroad in 2007 
(UNPFA, 2008). Although SSEIM data were 
measured in a different time period to the 2011 
Census, their results supply similar results i.e. the 
size and direction of migration flows and migrant 
characteristics. Hence this allows for the 
assumption that migrant characteristics may not 
have differed from 2008-2010, a period with no 
active study of migrants with regard to Armenia. 
Hence the following data are assumed to be 
consistent for flows from 2002 to 2011. 
 
 
 
As regards the prospects for immigration flows, 
we must remember here the shrinking numbers as 
well as the difficult economic and social situation in 
Armenia: no significant changes are likely in the 
immediate future. Undoubtedly, there is the 
possibility of the inflow of a considerable number of 
immigrants (forced settlers or refugees) from the 
Armenian diasporas of the Middle East: Syria, and 
quite possibly Iran.  
Yet, as the Iraqi experience has shown, for most 
diaspora-members Armenia is a jumping off point 
for further travel to the West. According to the State 
Migration Service of Armenia, between 2005 and 
2011 851 Iraqi citizens of Armenian origin 
requested asylum, in 829 cases asylum was then 
granted. Unfortunately, there is no reliable data as 
to how many eventually settled in Armenia and as 
to how many left the country.  
As for Syrian Armenians, according to the same 
service, in 2011, 4,449 fled the Syrian civil war to 
Armenia, while in the first six months of 2012, the 
number of arrivals from Syria was 1,986 people, 
813 more than in the previous year.  
                                                          
1 The 2007 “Sample Survey on External and Internal Migration in the Republic of Armenia (RA)” was conducted by 
the National Statistical Service of RA and the RA Ministry of Labor and Social Issues June-November 2007. The 
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) has provided funding and technical assistance (UNFPA, 2008) 
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Figure 3 - Residence permits granted to foreign 
nationals by country/region of citizenship and 
permit type, 2006-2008 
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Figure 1 - Armenian emigrants and stayers 
by age group (in %), 2007
Migrants Stayers
Source: Sample Survey on External and Internal Migration in 
RA (in UNPFA, 2008)
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Emigrant recent flows are 78.5% male, whilst in 
the stayer population males only take a 48% share 
of the population. On average, male migrants were 
older than their female counterparts – 36 for the 
former and 31 years of age the latter. Whereas by 
marital status migrants have similar characteristics 
to the stayer population.  
An overriding majority of Armenian recent 
emigrants left for Russia (75%), while 5% for the 
US and 3.4% for other CIS countries. Again, the 
European Union is nearly absent. 
Figure 2 confirms the medium skilled profile of 
Armenian recent migrants, which is however higher 
that of stayers. 
From an employment perspective, 80% of recent 
emigrants did find employment abroad. Among them, 
the majority (75.0%) was contracted on a private 
basis, 7.5% publicly, and 10% were self-employed. 
Employment by industry is heavily centred in 
construction - 60%, 10% in trade, nearly 7% in 
services with 4% in manufacturing and transport. 
Motivations to migrate were predominantly 
connected to issues of employment. A lack of 
employment was the key migration motivation for 
40% of migrants, 33% left for remuneration that 
could provide for adequate living standards. Family 
reunification on the other hand only accounted for 
7% of moves. Interestingly 10% moved due to a 
less than favourable socio-political climate. 
Although remuneration was a major motivation for 
one third of migrants 40% could not earn a 
sufficient wage in order to save money. One in ten 
migrants received half of their entitled 
remuneration, half received more than half but less 
than full pay. Hence the labour exploitation of 
Armenian recent emigrants is a major issue. 
 
References: United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). 2008. Report on sample survey on external and internal migration in RA, 
Yerevan; Yunosov A. 2009. Migration Processes in Azerbaijan, Adologlu, Baku.  
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Figure 2 - Armenian emigrants and stayers 
by level of education (in %), 2007
Stayers Migrants
Source: Sample Survey on External and Internal Migration in 
RA (in UNPFA, 2008)
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The Legal Framework of Migration 
In the last twenty years, the Republic of Armenia has experienced substantial changes in migration 
dynamics, the causes and consequences engendering them, the groups directly or indirectly engaged in 
migration, as well as perceptions on how to solve these problems by means of state regulation. Naturally, 
these changes have an impact on the Armenian system of public administration and the implemented 
migration policy, thus, conditioning its development.  
Following the initial focus on the issue of international protection since late 1990s, the spectrum of the 
state regulation of migration was substantially expanded and extended beyond the issues surrounding the 
solution of the refugee issues only. In this period, grounds were laid for national legislation in the area of 
migration: the Law on Refugees (1999), on the legal and socioeconomic guarantees for persons that had 
forcibly migrated from the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1988-1992 and acquired citizenship of the Republic of 
Armenia (2000), on Political Asylum (2001), on the State Border, on the Border-Guard Troops, on the State 
Register of the Population (2002). Migration was also placed on the agenda of international relations of 
Armenia. Bilateral interstate agreements for regulating relations in the area of migration were concluded 
with over 10 states. Armenia acceded to the conventions related to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954), 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), on the Nationality of Married 
Women (1957), Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, the Strasbourg 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995), the ILO Migration for Employment 
Convention C97, etc. 
Legal Framework Outward migration Inward migration 
General legal 
references 
2008 Law on Refugees and Asylum  
2006 Law on Foreigners 
2001 Law on State Boarder 
2001 Law on Border Guards Troop 
2001 Law On Political Asylum 
1999 Law on Refugees (replaced by 2008 law) 
1995 Law on Citizenship 
1995 Constitution 
Entry and Exit Visa 
Apart from being a party to the 1992 
Agreement on Visa-free Movement of 
Citizens of the CIS-Countries on the 
Territory of the Member States, 
Armenia has concluded bilateral visa-
free agreements with Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Russian Federation and 
Turkmenistan. A similar agreement has 
been also concluded with Argentina.  
EU-Armenia Visa Facilitation 
Agreement was signed in 2012 (entry 
into force together with EU-Armenia 
Readmission Agreement after internal 
procedures for their official conclusion 
are completed). 
Cross-border mobility 
Citizens of Armenia can cross the border 
freely, with a valid travel document. 
Armenia also provides for a certificate 
of Return to the Republic of Armenia. 
According to the Decision of the 
Visa 
Entry visas are issued for up to 120 
days, with the possibility of extension for 
a maximum term of up to 60 days. There 
are four types of entry visas in Armenia: 
visitor visas, official visas, diplomatic 
visas and transit visas. The entry visa is 
not required for the citizens of Argentina, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, 
the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and 
Kyrgyz Republic (acc. to the MFA, the 
visa-waiver for AZ, KG and UZ citizens 
is practiced on an ad-hoc basis, and is 
not formalised by any bilateral 
agreement). In accordance with the 
Governmental Decree No. 1255-N of 4 
October 2012, the citizens of the EU and 
Schengen Member States are exempted 
from visa requirement and can stay in 
Armenia up to 180 days per annum as of 
10 January 2013.  
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Armenian Government No 297-N 24 of 
March 2011, the certificate is a one-way 
travel document. This document enables 
Armenian citizens, those recognized as 
refugees or those who have sought 
asylum in the Republic of Armenia, and 
those with a right to reside in the 
Republic of Armenia to return quickly 
should they lack legal documents 
enabling them to cross the state border 
(point 1 of Annex 2 approved by the 
decision). Those illegally staying abroad 
without legal documents are also 
provided with the return certificate in 
order to ensure their return to the 
Republic of Armenia.  
Cross-border mobility 
Foreigners can enter Armenia through 
state border crossing points with a valid 
passport, an entry visa or a document 
attesting the residence status. Foreign 
citizens can enter Armenia either without 
a visa if they are citizens of certain 
countries exempted from the visa 
obligation mentioned above, or with a 
visa issued in an Armenian diplomatic 
mission, at the border crossing points or 
electronically.  
Exit conditions are stipulated in Art. 
12 of the Law on Foreigners. Foreigners 
may exit Armenia with a valid passport 
and a valid document attesting lawful 
stay or residence. The exit of a foreigner 
may be prohibited in case of criminal 
charges or a court sentence. 
Irregular 
migration 
Readmission agreements are in place 
with Benelux countries, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Germany, Latvia, 
Lithuania, the Russian Federation, 
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland since 
2003. In order to fulfil obligations of 
agreements, the government has 
adopted a decision No. 1360-N in 2011 
which defines relevant duties of 
Armenian state authorities as well as 
procedural issues. 
Agreement on cooperation between 
CIS Member States in combating illegal 
migration of 6 March 1998 regulates 
cooperation between Armenia and other 
countries in the CIS area. On this basis, 
Armenia must develop instruments 
curbing irregular migration of its own 
nationals, in accordance with 
international law. 
 
Migration-related offenses are included in 
the Criminal Code of Armenia (Article 329. 
Illegal state border crossing) according to 
which crossing the state border without 
relevant documents or permits, is 
punished by a fine of 100-200 of minimum 
salaries or imprisonment for up to 3 years. 
The same action committed by an 
organised group is punished with 
imprisonment for 3-7 years.  
This Article does not apply to cases 
when a foreign citizen or stateless 
person enters the Republic of Armenia 
without relevant documents or permits to 
seek political asylum stipulated by the 
Constitution and legislation of the 
Republic of Armenia. However, 
practically, there are cases when the 
foreigners who had applied for asylum 
were subjected to criminal liability 
because they did not have relevant 
document or permit.  
The Code on Administrative offences 
(Article 201) defines the sanctions for 
the foreigner who stays in Armenia 
without a valid passport or residence 
permit. Penalties are also foreseen for a 
person, who invited a foreigner without 
covering the cost of his accommodation, 
health care and travel.  
In cases of absence of travel 
documents or legal grounds to stay in 
Armenia, foreigners (except asylum 
seekers) are forcibly returned from the 
state border by the same carrier. If the 
immediate return is impossible, they 
may be detained in a transit area or in a 
special facility provided for that purpose. 
ARMENIA 
32 Migration Policy Centre (www.migrationpolicycentre.eu) 
Foreigners with no legal grounds to 
stay are obliged to leave the country on 
their own (no time limit except for rejected 
asylum seekers, 6 months). The failure to 
depart independently can lead to the 
expulsion. The latter is ordered by a court 
upon the request of the Police. The 
Police implements the expulsion 
decision. A 3-year entry ban is imposed 
for expelled foreigners. Arrest and 
detention are possible when there is a 
risk of absconding (max. 90 days). If the 
expulsion is impossible within 90 days, 
the police issues a temporary residence 
permit valid for up to one year.  
A foreigner subject to expulsion from 
the Republic of Armenia enjoys all the 
rights to judicial remedies provided for by 
the laws of the Republic of Armenia. A 
detained or arrested foreigner enjoys the 
following rights: 
− to information in their own language; 
− to appeal; the appeal has a 
suspensory effect on the expulsion. 
− to legal support and consular 
support; 
− to apply to a court for release; 
− to necessary medical assistance. 
The Code on Administrative offences 
(Art. 201) defines sanctions for the 
employer (in the case of a legal entity, 
their executive directors) if they employ 
foreigners without a work permit or 
without appropriate resident status. The 
employer is punished by a fine of 100-
150 minimum salaries. 
 The definition of “Trafficking” was stipulated in the Criminal Code (Article 132) in 
2003. This article was amended in 2006 and accepted the definition of “Trafficking” 
from “Palermo Protocol” (ratified by Armenia in 2003). 
Rights and 
settlement 
According to the Constitution, Armenian 
citizens enjoy the protection of their 
State both at home and abroad.  
Armenia is a party to the Agreement 
on guaranteeing rights of CIS citizens in 
the field of pension provision (in force 
since 1993), very relevant for Armenian 
migrant workers. 
 
 
Foreigners have the rights, freedoms, 
and responsibilities equal to the citizens 
of the Republic of Armenia, unless 
otherwise provided for by the 
Constitution, laws, and the international 
treaties of the Republic of Armenia.  
Armenian legislation distinguishes 
between three types of residence permits: 
temporary; permanent and special. 
Temporary residence permit is granted 
by the Police Department for a term of up 
to one year with a possibility of extension 
for one year every time. Permanent 
residence permit is granted for a term of 
five years with a possibility of extension for 
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the same term every time. Special 
residence status is granted to foreigners 
of Armenian origin. Special residence 
status may also be granted to other 
foreigners who carry out economic or 
cultural activities in the Republic of 
Armenia. Special residence status is 
granted (by the President) for a term of ten 
years. It may be granted more than once.  
Labour Armenia ratified ILO Migration for the 
Employment Convention (C97) and the 
ILO Migrant Workers Convention 
(C143). Arts are of particular importance 
to the employment of Armenian citizens 
abroad. 2-4 of the ILO C97 Migration for 
Employment Convention, obliging 
Armenia: to facilitate the departure of 
migrant workers; to maintain an 
adequate and free service to assist 
migrant workers, and, in particular, to 
provide them with accurate information, 
and to take all appropriate steps against 
misleading emigration and immigration 
information. 
Armenia also pre-signed a bilateral 
Agreement with Qatar on recruitment 
and effective use of Armenian health 
workers. 
 
The Law on Foreigners of 2006 is a key 
legal act regulating the employment of 
foreigners in Armenia. A definition of 
“Migrant Workers” is not stipulated by 
the Law. The Law does not classify 
foreign workers according to their 
qualifications, specific sectors of 
employment by the nature of their 
employment (paid or self-employed, 
seasonal, etc.). The Law envisages 
favourable treatment with regard to 
some categories of foreigners, 
depending on their legal status. There 
is no established quota system for 
migrant workers. 
Employers have the right to conclude 
an employment contract (service 
contract) with foreign employees. They 
also have the right to use their labour 
based on the work permits granted to 
foreigners by the authorized body. When 
granting work permits to foreign citizens, 
the needs of the Armenian labour 
market have to be taken into account. 
Therefore, time-limits for an employer 
have been established to fill available 
vacancies with Armenian citizens before 
engaging foreign nationals.  
These provisions from the relevant 
Articles of the Law on Foreigners and 
the Code of Administrative Offences 
have not been fully implemented so far, 
and all provisions on the principle of 
national preference and the requirement 
of a work permit (Arts. 22-26, 28) are not 
applicable until the Government adopts 
relevant implementing decisions. 
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Armenia has concluded bilateral agreements regulating labour migration with Belarus 
(entered into force in 2001), Georgia (into force since 1996), the Russian Federation 
(in force since 1994) and Ukraine (in force since 1997). Moreover, among several 
agreements within the framework of CIS, it is a party to the 2010 Convention on the 
legal status of migrant workers and their families, adopted by CIS Member States. 
Together with Azerbaijan, Belarus and Moldova, Armenia is a party to the 2008 CIS 
Convention on the legal status of migrant workers and members of their families, 
coming from the CIS participation (in force since 2010, for UA since 2012). 
Armenia is also a party to the following multilateral agreements in the framework 
of CIS: 
Agreement on cooperation within the field of labour migration and social 
protection for migrant workers of 15 April 1994 
Protocol on amendments to the Agreement on cooperation in the field of labour 
migration and social protection for migrant workers of 25 November 2005. 
Citizenship The Article 13.1 of the Law on the 
Citizenship of the Republic of 
Armenia of 1995 regulates the state 
approach to dual citizenship. A person 
who holds the citizenship of other 
countries in addition to Armenian 
citizenship is deemed dual citizen of the 
Republic of Armenia.  For the Republic 
of Armenia, a dual citizen is recognized 
only as Armenian citizen.  A dual citizen 
of the Republic of Armenia has the same 
rights, responsibilities and obligations as 
other citizens. An Armenian citizen upon 
accepting or receiving the citizenship of 
another country shall inform the 
authorized body of the Armenian 
Government, no later than one month 
thereafter. 
Law on the Citizenship of the 
Republic of Armenia of 1995 defines 
grounds, procedure and conditions for 
acquisition, cessation and loss of 
citizenship as well as deprivation of 
citizenship and its restoration.  
Bases for the acquisition of RA 
Citizenship are stipulated in Article 9 of 
this Law. As a rule, RA Citizenship is 
acquired:  
1. Through recognition of citizenship;   
2. By birth;   
3. Through naturalization;   
4. Through the restoration of 
citizenship;   
5. Through receiving citizenship as a 
group (group naturalization);   
According to Art. 10 (2) of the Law, 
stateless persons or former citizens of 
other USSR republics who are not 
foreign citizens and who permanently 
reside in Armenia can be recognized as 
citizen of the Republic of Armenia if they 
have applied for its acquisition up to one 
year after the entry into force of the Law. 
That deadline has been prolonged for a 
few times to encourage refugees from 
Azerbaijan /1988-1992/ to obtain 
citizenship of Armenia. According to the 
last amendment of this Law they can 
apply for that until 31 December, 2012. 
Any foreigner of 18 years of age and 
capable of working may apply for 
Armenian citizenship, if he/she:  
1. has been lawfully residing on the 
territory of the Republic of Armenia 
for the preceding 3 years;  
2. is proficient in Armenian;   
3. is familiar with the Constitution of the 
Republic of Armenia.   
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Receiving RA Citizenship as a group 
in case of repatriation or other cases 
prescribed by Law shall be carried out 
by decree of the President of the 
Republic. 
International 
Protection 
Armenia acceded to the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention and the 1967 New York 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees in 1993. 
The following forms of international protection exist in Armenia:  
a) Asylum granted to refugees and persons in need of temporary protection  
b) Political Asylum as a special status granted to publicly well-known foreigners 
and providing protection from political persecution experienced by them in 
their countries of origin. 
The RA Law on Refugees and Asylum (Chapter 2) establishes basic rights of the 
asylum seekers and recognized refugees. Asylum seekers and refugees have the 
same rights and obligations as foreigners and stateless persons legally residing in 
Armenia, unless the present Law provides otherwise (Art. 15). They have the right to 
apply to UNHCR (Art. 16).  
Asylum seekers and refugees granted asylum have a right to be allowed to seek 
and find an employment within the territory of Armenia under the same conditions as 
citizens of Armenia, unless the present Law provides otherwise (Art. 21). The Law 
On Foreigners envisages favourable treatment with regard to some categories of 
foreigners, proceeding from their legal status. At the same time, an asylum seeker or 
recognized refugee cannot fill positions in state and local self-government bodies. 
Refugees granted asylum have the right to benefit from the social services, state-
allowances and other financial assistance, which are defined by the legislation of 
Armenia for the citizens of the Republic of Armenia, as well as they have the right for 
social protection with regard to pension security and unemployment prescribed by 
the legislation of Armenia (Art. 23), the right to accommodation (Art. 24).  
Refugees do not enjoy political rights.  
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The Socio-Political Framework of Migration 
In the early 1990s, migration was not a priority in Armenia policy-making. The focus was on mobility after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the flows of Armenian refugees following the conflict in Nagorno-
Karabakh. The first decade of independence was characterised by intensive mobility of the population, with 
growing prevalence of outward migration, but the policies did not follow the phenomena on the ground. At 
that time, migration was regulated by the state mainly by legislation, i.e. law on citizenship, law on 
foreigners, law on state border, etc. Only early 2000s brought a change. For the first time, the state policy 
on migration in Armenia has been formulated in the document “Concept of State Regulation of Migration in 
Armenia” which was adopted by the Government in November 2000.  
The government of Armenia announced EU integration as a political direction for the country. This 
approach covers all possible policy areas, including migration. The latter is defined by the priorities of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Eastern Partnership initiative. In the field of Justice, Freedom 
and Security of the ENP Action Plan there are more than 20 issues related to migration: starting from the 
border management, readmission and asylum issues and ending with the combating of illegal migration and 
trafficking in human beings.  
The attitude of the Armenian authorities towards regulation of migration processes, as well as their 
causes and consequences has become more proactive as evidenced by its 2008-2012 Programme. 
To date, the Armenian government has adopted a number of strategic documents, which are also linked 
to the area of migration regulation (the Strategy of National Security, the Sustainable Development 
Programme, the Concept for the Development of Co-operation between Armenia and the Diaspora, the 
Strategy on Demographic Policy of Armenia, etc.). 
Socio-Political 
Framework Outward migration Inward migration 
Governmental 
Institutions 
The current migration management model in the Republic of Armenia is decentralized, 
in the sense that various functions and operations – such as control over entry, stay, 
residence and exit of foreigners, emigration of nationals, labour migration, asylum, etc. 
– are performed by different governmental entities. The State Migration Service (SMS) 
created in 2010 within the Ministry of Territorial Administration is the central authority 
responsible for the development and implementation of the state policy on 
management of migration processes, as well as for the coordination of activities of the 
governmental institutions dealing with migration issues in the area of policy 
development and drafting legal acts. 
Ministry of Diasporas, established in 
2008, is responsible for the 
development, implementation and 
continuous improvement of the state 
policy on development of the Armenia-
Diaspora partnership and the 
coordination of the activities of the 
state bodies in this field. The Police is 
responsible for issuance of exit stamps 
(passport validation) for Armenian 
citizens and operates the Passport and 
Residence database of the citizens of 
the Republic of Armenia.  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is 
responsible for passports, and return 
certificates as well as for the issuance 
of the special residency status and the 
relations with Armenians abroad. 
Border Guard Troops under the 
National Security Service are in charge 
of the border management and control. 
They also manage the Border 
Management Information System 
database.  
The Police investigates cases of illegal 
state border crossings but is also 
responsible for visa issuance at the 
borders, visa extension, granting of 
residence status/residence permits, 
registration of foreigners on the territory. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is 
responsible for issuance of visas.  
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Governmental 
Strategy 
Emigration is not separately 
emphasized in the “Concept for the 
Policy of State Regulation of Migration 
in the Republic of Armenia” (2010) as a 
priority direction. Issues related to 
emigration are captured in various 
emigration areas, such as labour 
emigration, illegal emigration from 
Armenia, etc.  
In 2009 the Concept Paper on 
Development of Armenia and Diaspora 
Co-operation was approved by the 
Armenian Government and the Draft of 
the Concept Paper on Organization of 
Repatriation Process was developed. 
The main objectives include protection 
of the rights of Armenian workers 
abroad (e.g. through ensuring legal 
migration); development of economic 
ties (e.g. through joint projects with 
Armenian associations abroad); 
encouragement for investment in 
Armenia; and return policy. 
Recent key policy instruments regarding 
migration include:  
− Concept for the Policy of State 
Regulation of Migration in the Republic 
of Armenia, 2010 
− The Action Plan for Implementation of 
the Policy Concept for the State 
Regulation of Migration in the Republic 
of Armenia, 2012-2016 
− Concept on Studying and Preventing 
Irregular Migration Originating from 
Armenia, 2012-2016 (adopted in 2011) 
− Trafficking Policy of Armenia 2010-
2012 
The new Concept of State Regulation 
of Migration in the Republic of Armenia 
has been approved by the Government of 
Armenia’s protocol decision N 51, on 
December 30, 2010. It is implemented by 
the “Action Plan for Implementation of the 
Policy Concept for the State Regulation of 
Migration in the Republic of Armenia in 
2012-2016”  
As a result of the measures carried out 
in the framework of the Action Plan, 
Armenia invests in substantial legislative 
reforms in the area of migration and in 
conformity with the EU legislation; 
improves institutional infrastructure as well 
as its systems of border management, and 
provision of asylum.  
One of the priorities is also the 
introduction of a migration information 
database centralizing all the information. 
Civil Society  Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF) 
EPF established six Migration and 
Return Resource Centers 
“French-Armenian Development 
Foundation in Armenia” (FFAD) 
The International Centre for 
Human Development (ICHD) NGO 
The International Centre for Human 
Development (ICHD) NGO 
 
Migration and 
economic 
development 
European integration, being a political priority for the development of the Republic of 
Armenia, the mobility facilitation of people and stimulation and intensification of the 
contacts between the citizens of Armenia and the EU being important elements of 
Armenia’s European rapprochement, as such the Joint Declaration on a Mobility 
Partnership between Armenia and the EU was signed on October 27, 2011. One 
of the potential benefits of Armenia-EU Mobility Partnership is regulated labour 
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opportunities in the participating MS, which will offer the Armenian migrant new skills 
and work experience, increased incomes, equal treatment and rights, the possibility of 
transfer of pension rights and which will offer Armenia as a country more foreign 
investment and trade links, transfer of remittances, know-how and innovations and the 
promotion of brain circulation (via circular migration schemes and increasing the role 
of the Diaspora communities in the development of their home country). However, 
there is no concrete step implemented in this framework up to this day. 
The Armenian government also strongly promotes and facilitates the mobilizing of 
migrants’ assets for the development of the economy of the country. In 2006, the 
government worked out a project for creating a special All-Armenian bank in Armenia, 
which allows more efficient use of capital of the Diaspora in the development of 
Armenian economy. Construction of All-Armenian bank has already started in one of 
the small towns of the Republic - in Dilijan, which is planned to be turned into a major 
financial centre of Armenia. 
International 
Cooperation 
Armenia is a member of the following association actively working on migration 
issues: IOM, Council of Europe, Commonwealth of Independent States, and OSCE. It 
participates in the following regional processes: Budapest Process, Prague Process, 
and Eastern Partnership. It is subject to the European Neighbourhood Policy and 
Black Sea Synergy.  
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The Demographic-Economic Framework of Migration  
Emigration in post-Soviet Azerbaijan went through several phases, each having its own set of 
characteristics and traits that had different impacts on socio-economic and political life. Generally, mass 
labour emigration started in 1995, when the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict ceased. These flows were mainly 
directed towards the Russian Federation until a major financial crisis hit this country in 1998 resulting in 
decreasing job opportunities for labour migrants there. Since then, Azeri migration has been redirected 
towards other countries including the US, Germany and Turkey, whilst Russia still represents an important 
destination country. 
As with immigration patterns, in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union Azerbaijan 
saw a mass influx of refugees originating from other former Soviet Republics, with large concentrations 
originating from Armenia; these flows included involuntary repatriation. Once these flows began to decline 
there was a rise in the amount of immigration from neighboring Middle Eastern states, which included 
Azerbaijan becoming a transit country to the Middle East. With increased oil production in the new 
millennium there was an increase in both regular and irregular immigration, attracting migrants from South 
East Asia. Unfortunately, given the absence of an official registration system for labour migrants, expert and 
media estimates are the only sources on which one can rely upon. 
Outward migration Inward migration 
Stock 
According to destination countries’ statistics, 
952,404 or 291,388 Azeri migrants resided abroad in 
years around 2012 (table 1), who represent 
respectively 10.3% or 3.2% of the total population 
residing in Azerbaijan. The huge difference between 
the two estimates depends on whether migrants 
living in Russia are counted according respectively 
to the country of birth or citizenship criterion.  
 
The large majority lived in other CIS countries, 
especially in Russia and Armenia. While European 
Union countries hosted only a small portion of Azeris, 
significant numbers were found in Israel and the US. 
Females represent the majority of Azeri migrants 
at 55.2%, even though this value dropped by 12.6% 
among the stock of Azeri temporary working age 
migrants in the Russian Federation.  
 
Stock 
In 2009, 254,993 individuals who were born 
abroad and 14,822 foreign citizens resided in 
Azerbaijan (2.9% and 0.2 of the total population, 
respectively).  
 
 
 
Country of residence
Definition 
(a)
Reference 
date (Jan 1st)
Number Number % %
3.6 11.8
of which Germany (B) 2012 1.7 5.4
             UK (A) 2012 0.3 1.0
             Latvia (A) 2011 0.3 0.9
854,961 193,945 89.8 66.6
of which Russia (A) 2002 846,104 X 88.8 X
             Russia (B) 2010 X 67,947 X 23.3
           Armenia (A) 2001 12.1 39.7
             Ukraine (B) 2001 0.9 2.9
6.6 21.6
of which Israel (A) 2005 3.0 9.9
             US (A) 2011 2.2 7.0
             Turkey (B) 2011 1.0 3.4
952,404 291,388 100.0 100.0
20,531
9,884
115,689
15,754
3,000
2,602
8,479
62,930
Sources: national statistics (Population Censuses, population registers, registers for foreigners, etc.)
European Union
CIS countries + Georgia
Table 1 - Azeri emigration stocks by country of residence, most recent data (c. 2012)
(a): Azeri migrants are defined according to the country of birth (A) or country of nationality (B) criterion 
according to countries of residence; in Russia both numbers are reported.
Other countries (b)
Main total
(b): "Other countries" include  Iceland, Liechstein, Norw ay, Sw itzerland, Jordan, Turkey, Canada, US, Australia, 
Japan and Israel
34,513
28,837
Country of citizenship/     
country of birth
Number           
(birth)
Number 
(citizenship)
CIS countries + Georgia 248,872 8,432
of which Armenia 143,726 n.a.
           Georgia 49,496 4,088
Russia 27,835 3,417
Uzbekistan 16,482 420
Kazakhstan 3,505 138
Ukraine 2,726 252
Kyrgyzstan 2,474 n.a.
Turkmenistan 1,669 117
Belarus 444 n.a.
Moldova 274 n.a.
Tajikistan 241 n.a.
Other countries 6,121 6,390
of which Turkey 2,053 1,484
Iran 1,481 518
Total migrants 254,993 14,822
% of the total population 2.9 0.2
Stateless - 3,585
Total migrants + stateless 254,993 18,407
% of the total population 2.9 0.2
Table 2 - Immigration stocks in Azerbaijan according to 
different criteria, 2009
Source: Population Census - 2009
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Azeri migrants have an intermediate level of 
education with 52.7% and 25.0% having a 
secondary and tertiary level of education, 
respectively. By looking only at tertiary educated 
migrants, their proportion is however lower in CIS 
states (17.1%) than in OECD countries (25.0%). In 
the OECD region, Azeri migrants are mainly 
employed as professionals (18.8%), service, shop 
and market sale workers (18.3%) and craft and 
related trades workers (15.2%). 
Flows 
Figures 1a and 1b illustrates the three phases of 
changes to Azeri migration flows. The first phase 
(1991-1994) was associated with the conflict 
between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-
Karabakh, as well as the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Both of these caused enormous migration 
flows from Azerbaijan and led to serious 
demographic changes in the country. The outflow of 
the population had a pronounced ethno-linguistic 
character. The first to leave were national minorities, 
mostly Armenians and Russians, as well as many 
Russian speakers, including Azerbaijanis. Most of 
these moved to Russia and Armenia, as well as to 
other CIS countries. 
 
The second phase (1995-1998) came after the 
conclusion of the 1994 Armenian-Azerbaijani 
agreement on the suspension of military operations 
on the front line. 
This discrepancy is due to the fact that the 
majority of people born abroad are individuals born 
in Armenia with Azeri descent who, during the 
Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, ‘returned’ en masse 
to their parents’ home country. Rather than 
international migrants, they are today perceived as 
ethnic Azeris. 
Apart from the 2009 Census – which fails to 
capture both irregular and temporary migrants - in 
Azerbaijan there is no official registration for labour 
migrants even of those foreign nationals that work 
regularly within the country.  
Alternative sources may therefore help in this 
sense.  
First, the Turkish presence is likely to be 
significant. According to the Turkish embassy, in 
2012 over 43,846 Turkish citizens lived and 
worked in Azerbaijan, 30,971 of which are not 
officially registered, and 12,875 of who work legally 
(Salam News Agency, 2012). Turkish migrants are 
mainly employed in construction business and 
furniture as well as service companies. 
Second, irregular labour migrants also seem to 
be numerous - recently the Ministry of Labour and 
Ministry of Social Welfare assessed their number 
at 25,000. 
Flows 
From 1991 to 2011 a total of about 410,000 
migrants arrived in Azerbaijan for permanent 
residence according to official statistics (figure 1a 
and 1b). They were both composed by Azeri return 
migrants and other foreign citizens. Unfortunately, 
data do not allow for those categories to be 
distinguished. 
The influx in the early 1990s was the most 
numerous. It was caused primarily by the 
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. For the most part they were 
refugees from Armenia (mostly, Azerbaijanis but 
also Kurds and Russians) and Uzbekistan 
(Meskhetian Turks).  
In the second half of the 1990s, refugees from 
other countries began to appear in Azerbaijan, in 
connection with various conflicts, e.g. from Russia 
(Chechens), as well as from Afghanistan and Iraq. 
In addition, religious missionaries and migrant 
workers from Eastern countries arrived. Among 
them Turks and Iranians dominated. 
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Figure 1a - Inward and outward permanent 
migration flows (in thousands), 1991-1994
Arrivals Departures Net Migration
Source: State Statistics Committee of Azerbaijan 
1st phase
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In the second phase ethno-linguistic factors 
began to fade, and economics took over as the main 
factor in emigration. It is at this stage that we can 
start to speak of labour emigration in Azerbaijan, a 
result of the strong economic crisis. And in this time 
the main role in the migration flows was played by 
Azeri citizens, particularly those residing in the 
provinces. Nevertheless, the main flow of migrants 
from Azerbaijan headed for Russia and the CIS 
countries. At the same time, since 1996 Azerbaijani 
migrants had become interested in emigrating to the 
West. Most Azeri citizens preferred Germany, as 
well as the US.  
The third phase (1998-current) began after the 
August 1998 economic crisis in Russia, which was a 
serious blow to the financial hopes of Azeri migrants. 
They refocused on the West and the Middle East. All 
this significantly reduced the migration flows from 
Azerbaijan to Russia. 
Remittances have tended to play an increasingly 
prominent role in Azerbaijan. As figure 2 illustrates 
there has been a considerable increase in 
remittances from 2004 onwards. Although there was 
a noticeable fall in remittances in 2009 attributable to 
the world financial crisis it is also worthy of noting 
that a year later in 2010 remittances nearly returned 
to peak levels in 2008. As a percentage of GDP, 
they represented 2.8% in 2010. 
 
In the 2000s migrant workers were pulled in by 
the activities of Western oil companies, which 
recruited cheap labour from South-East Asia. 
Initially, most of them came from Pakistan. Further 
along came migrants from India, Iran, Bangladesh, 
from the eastern republics of the CIS, mostly from 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.  
The tightening of immigration rules in late 2006 
in Russia caused the outflow from this country into 
Azerbaijan of Chinese migrants as well as citizens 
of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and other far eastern 
countries. As a result, by the fall of 2008, 
according to the official data of the Ministry of 
Interior, there were up to 1,000 Chinese people, 
while according to NGOs and press agencies; 
there were nearly 7,000 of them. 
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Figure 1b - Inward and outward permanent 
migration flows (in thousands), 1995-2011
Arrivals Departures Net Migration
Source: State Statistics Committee of Azerbaijan 
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The majority of remittances were sent from 
Russia with over 60% being received by persons in 
the rural regions of Azerbaijan (IFAD, 2006).  
References: International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). 2006. Sending Money Home – Worldwide 
Remittance Flows to Developing and Transition Countries. International Organization of Migration; Salam News Agency. 
2012. In Azerbaijan live and work over 43,846 Turkish citizens [in Russian].  
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The Legal Framework of Migration 
The system of migration-related legislation in the Republic of Azerbaijan includes the Constitution, 
international treaties concluded, national laws and by-laws. The Constitution stipulates that foreigners have 
same rights and fulfil the same duties as the Azeri citizens, if not prescribed otherwise by the law or by 
international agreements, which have been ratified by Azerbaijan. However, an implementation gap exists 
in this area. Although Azerbaijan has ratified a number of Conventions, including the Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness, the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless persons, and the Convention 
on the Nationality of Married Women, national legal norms are not always in compliance with such 
instruments, and the relevant implementation mechanisms are not always clearly defined.  
A single Migration Code, a draft of which is currently being prepared, purports to eliminate the existing 
contradictions between the various legal sources that regulate relations within the area of migration. 
Legal Framework Outward migration Inward migration 
General Legal 
References 
2002 Law On State Policy Concerning Citizens Residing Abroad (amended in 
2003) 
2000 Law On Labour Migration  
1999 Law On the Legal Status of Refugees and Displaced Persons 
1998 Law On Citizenship 
1996 Law On the Legal Status of Foreigners and Stateless Persons  
1999 Law On Immigration 
1995 Constitution of Azerbaijan (amended 2002) 
1994 Law On Exit from the Country, Entry into the Country and Passports 
Entry and Exit Visa 
Azerbaijan (AZ) is currently in the 
process of negotiating a Visa Facilitation 
Agreement with the EU.  
Azeri citizens are exempted from 
visa requirements in the CIS countries 
(except Turkmenistan), as well as in 
Georgia. Agreements on reciprocal visa-
free visits of citizens are signed with the 
Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, and China (for tourists 
only). Agreements of reciprocal visits of 
persons with diplomatic and service 
passports are signed with Egypt, 
Montenegro, Qatar, Serbia, UAE, 
Mexico, Vietnam, Libya, Austria, 
Portugal, Estonia and Slovenia.  
Usually a person who becomes a 
citizen of any other country without 
renouncing the Azeri citizenship is 
regarded as a foreigner and should 
obtain a visa to enter Azerbaijan. 
 
 
 
Visa 
Agreements on reciprocal visa-free 
visits for CIS citizens (except 
Turkmenistan) and Georgia, tourist 
groups from China and persons with 
diplomatic and service passports with 
Egypt, Montenegro, Qatar, Serbia, UAE, 
Mexico, Vietnam, Libya, Austria, 
Portugal, Estonia, Slovenia.  
Maximum period of stay in AZ for 
citizens coming from visa-free countries 
is 90 days. Single or multiple transit visas 
are granted to foreigners going to other 
countries for passing through the territory 
of Azerbaijan Republic. If the transit visa 
has no notes or seals about the non-stop 
passage, its owner has a right to stay in 
Azerbaijan Republic for not longer than 
five days. Singe entry visa is granted for 
a period from three days to three 
months, and a multiple entry-exit visa is 
granted from 1 to 2 years.  
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Cross-border mobility 
Issues related to the exit from and entry 
into the AR territory of foreigners and 
stateless persons are regulated by the 
AR Law on ‘Exit from the Country, Entry 
into the Country and about Passports’ 
(14 June 1994). According to this Law, 
Azeri citizens have the right to exit and 
enter the Azerbaijan Republic. Every 
citizen of the AR has the right to exit from 
and enter the country freely through the 
checkpoints established for these 
purposes. Citizens of Azerbaijan cannot 
be deprived of the right to exit from and 
enter their country. The entry/exit 
procedure is carried out at the border 
checkpoints and is regulated by the Law 
‘On State Border’ (9 December 1991). 
The citizens’ right to exit from and 
enter the country is exercised only upon 
the availability of his/her passport and 
permit to enter another country, i.e. a 
visa issued in accordance with 
international treaties. 
 
 
 
Cross-border mobility 
Foreigners and stateless persons are 
allowed to enter and exit from 
Azerbaijan when they pass through 
special checkpoints while holding 
personal passports and stay permits.  
The Law forbids entry of foreigners 
into the Azerbaijan Republic if:  
1. it is vital for the protection of national 
security or public order;  
2. it is necessary for the protection of 
rights and legal interests of the 
citizens of the AR and other persons;  
3. the persons violated requirements of 
laws of the Azerbaijan Republic 
during his previous visit to the 
country;  
4. the person gave false information 
about himself/herself in the 
application to enter the Azerbaijan 
Republic;  
5. the entry into the AR of the person 
suffering from mental or infectious 
(contagious) diseases constitutes a 
threat to public health (except those 
persons who do not constitute such 
threat and arriving at his/her or their 
legal trustee’s expense for medical 
treatment). 
The exit of foreigners from the 
Azerbaijan Republic can be temporarily 
restricted if:  
1. their exit can cause damage to 
national security - till the removal of 
this reason;  
2. they are suspects or defendants 
(accused) in committing a crime - till 
the completion of the case;  
3. they are condemned for committing a 
crime - till the discharge or full 
serving of the punishment;  
4. a civil action is brought against them 
in court accordingly till a decision on 
this civil case comes into force as 
specified by the legislation of the 
Azerbaijan Republic. 
Information about the entry and exit 
of foreigners is registered at the “Entry-
Exit and Registration” automated data-
retrieval system. 
Only those persons who have been 
granted immigrant status in Azerbaijan 
may exit from and enter the country 
without a visa by presenting their 
passports and immigrant identity 
document. Although there is no 
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1 Article 13 of the Law on Immigration. 
limitation on the duration of the 
immigrant’s stay out of Azerbaijan, 
his/her absence in the country for more 
than six months during a year serves as 
a basis to discontinue that status1
Despite the fact that over half of 
foreigners entering Azerbaijan are either 
citizens of the ex-USSR who lived in 
Azerbaijan in the Soviet times or ethnic 
Azerbaijanis living now in other 
countries, there is no simplified 
procedure for them to enter or exit from 
Azerbaijan.  
.  
Irregular 
Migration 
No bilateral agreements are signed on 
readmission of illegal migrants. 
Although in Art. 75(1) of the EC-
Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (entered into force in 1999) 
Azerbaijan agreed to readmit any of its 
nationals illegally present within the 
territory of a Member State, upon 
request by the latter and without further 
formalities, this clause has never 
worked in practice. 
Azerbaijan ratified Palermo Protocol 
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, supplementing 
the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, in 
2003. Azerbaijan is also party to the 
1998 Agreement on Cooperation 
between CIS Member States in 
Combating Illegal Migration (entered 
into force for AZ in 1999).  
Illegal entry, stay and transit are 
administrative infringements. The Code 
of Administrative Offences regulates the 
removal of irregular migrants and the 
procedure of reimbursement for 
expenses related to the removal of 
individuals. The person expelled from 
Azerbaijan has no right to re-enter. 
In case of absence of travel 
documents or legal grounds to stay in 
Azerbaijan (except for asylum seekers) 
migrants are forcibly returned without 
any possibility to appeal against the 
return decision. Expulsion of immigrants 
can be ordered by a court in relation to 
those whose immigrant status have been 
annulled because they have fraudulently 
acquired this status; committed certain 
administrative infringements; for the 
purpose of national security; or resided 
outside AZ longer than 6 months in a 
year. Seven days are granted for 
independent departure, and the failure 
to comply leads to forced expulsion. 
Absolute entry ban is imposed.  
Expulsion of non-immigrant 
foreigners can be ordered by the MIA, 
State Migration Service or a court in 
relation to foreigners who have seriously 
infringed the legislation on the legal 
status of foreigners. 48h are granted for 
independent departure, which can be 
extended in justified cases. Failure to 
depart within the fixed time-limit leads to 
detention and forced expulsion 
ordered by a court. In this case too, an 
absolute entry ban is imposed. 
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Forced expulsion from AR as an 
additional form of punishment is also 
provided for by the AR Criminal Code 
(‘RA CC’). Article 52 of the RA CC 
stipulates that forced expulsion from AR 
may be imposed on foreign nationals 
following their initial punishment for 
serious and very serious crimes.  
THB: The Criminal Code provides for 
the criminal liability for trafficking in 
persons (i.e. sale and purchase of 
human beings, other transactions with 
respect to human beings, as well as 
transportation of a person across the 
border of the Republic of Azerbaijan for 
the purpose of his/her exploitation, or 
transfer, harbouring, receipt, 
transportation), for imposing forced 
labour, and for illegal sale and purchase 
and forced withdrawal for transplantation 
of human organs and tissues. 
In 2005, the Law on Combating 
Human Trafficking was adopted. The 
Law includes inter alia provisions on 
social rehabilitation of the victims of 
human trafficking (Art. 15). According to 
Article 20 foreigners and stateless 
persons who are victims of human 
trafficking have the right to apply for 
residence permit on the territory of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan. This Article also 
stipulates that such foreigners and 
stateless persons who were recognized 
as victims of human trafficking shall not 
be subject to expulsion from the country 
for one year. 
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2 Article 12 of the Electoral Code of Azerbaijan Republic. 
3 Point 1 of the provision on application of the Law ‘On Registration in the Place of Residence and Place of Stay’; 
Rights and 
Settlement 
Rights 
According to the constitution, Azerbaijan 
citizens enjoy the protection of their 
State both at home and abroad. 
Article 7.1 of the Law ‘On State 
Policy Concerning Citizens Residing 
Abroad’ stipulates that public authorities 
of the RA assist citizens residing in 
another country in preservation and 
development of cultural legacy and 
national language and assist the 
citizens of AR in obtaining education in 
their own language. 
 
 
Rights 
Chapter 4 of the Law ‘On Legal Status 
of Foreigners and Stateless Persons’ 
stipulates that foreign nationals and 
stateless persons have the same rights 
and freedoms and the same 
responsibilities as citizens of Azerbaijan, 
if it is not otherwise provided for in the 
Constitution of AR, other laws and 
international treaties of AR. Foreign 
nationals and stateless persons are 
obliged to adhere to the requirements 
provided for in the AR legislation, and to 
respect the customs and traditions of 
the Azerbaijani people. 
Foreigners and their family members 
have a right to social welfare and 
retirement benefits in Azerbaijan. 
Foreigners are exempt from military 
duties. Foreigners do not have a right to 
participate in elections and 
referendums. They have the right to 
participate in municipal elections if they 
resided within a relevant municipal 
territory for at least 5 years, and if 
similar right is in place for foreigners in 
their country of citizenship2
Settlement 
. 
“Rules of Granting Permits for 
Temporary Residence in the Territory of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan to Foreigners 
and Stateless Persons” determine the 
procedure of granting temporary 
residence permits to foreigners and 
stateless persons who arrived in the AR 
based on a visa or visa-free regime. In 
order to obtain temporary residence 
permits, foreigners and stateless 
persons must file an application to the 
State Migration Service. When 
temporary residence permits are issued 
to foreigners and stateless persons, 
they are also issued an ID that serves 
as a valid document for entry and exit. 
The Law ‘On Registration in the 
Place of Residence and Place of Stay’ 
regulates the procedure of registration 
of citizens, foreigners and stateless 
persons in the place of residence and 
place of stay. Citizens of Azerbaijan, 
foreigners and stateless persons must 
register in the place of residence or 
place of stay3. 
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4 Point 20 of the provision on application of the Law ‘On Registration in the Place of Residence and Place of Stay’. 
5 Point 6 of the provision on application of the Law ‘On Registration in the Place of Residence and Place of Stay’. 
Foreigners who want to stay on the 
territory of the AR less than 30 days are 
registered at their place of stay.  
Foreigners intending to reside in the 
territory of Azerbaijan for more than 30 
days must refer to the relevant 
executive body to register in the place of 
residence within 3 days after arriving in 
the place of residence4. Persons, 
having addressed the relevant executive 
body for registration in the place of 
residence, are registered immediately5
A stateless person is registered at 
the place of residence. Having referred 
to the relevant executive body to obtain 
an identity card replaced, he or she 
shall be issued a document temporarily 
proving his or her identity.  
. 
Foreigners or stateless persons who 
resided in the territory of Azerbaijan on 
legal grounds for no less than 2 years 
have a right to file an application to the 
State Migration Service to obtain the 
status of an immigrant. Immigrant status 
is granted by the State Migration Service 
upon coordination with the Ministry of 
National Security. Immigrant status is 
granted for 5 years, but can be extended 
unlimited number of times for 5 years. 
Labour The main law regulating labour 
migration issues of the Azeri citizens 
abroad is the Law ‘On Labour 
Migration’.  
Article 12 stipulates that: 
1. citizens of Azerbaijan who 
reached the age of 18 have a right 
to move to another country to be 
engaged in labour activities; 
2. within one month after the date of 
arrival in another country to be 
engaged in labour activities they 
are obliged to register at the 
diplomatic mission of Azerbaijan. 
According to Article 14 of the Law, the 
limitation of labour migration for Azeri 
citizens in certain qualifications may be 
determined by higher executive powers. 
This provision can be interpreted as a 
restriction on the circular migration of 
Azeri migrant workers. 
According to Art. 13 of the Labour 
Code, foreigners and stateless persons 
can benefit from all labour rights on par 
with the citizens of the AR and bear 
liabilities in accordance with these 
rights. It is prohibited to limit the labour 
rights of foreigners and stateless 
persons, unless otherwise provided by 
the law. At the same time, it is 
inadmissible to set preferential rights for 
foreigners and stateless persons as 
regards labour.  
To employ foreigners, legal and 
physical persons have to obtain a 
special permission from the State 
Migration Service. 
According to the Law ‘On Labour 
Migration’, national preference applies 
to all job vacancies (Art. 5). There is no 
recruitment organized on state level. 
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Art. 13 regulates the activities of the 
private employment agencies and the 
licensing procedure. 
 
Foreigners and stateless persons 
need a work permit issued by the State 
Migration Service. In order to obtain this 
permit, foreigners address the SMS via 
their employers. Work-permit (valid for 1 
year) is obligatory in all cases except for 
the heads of representative offices and 
branches of foreign legal entities, as 
well as for foreigners engaged into 
business activities in Azerbaijan.  
Law on Immigration states that only 
those persons who have been granted 
immigrant status in Azerbaijan may be 
employed in Azerbaijan without work 
permits (Art.13)  
A labour migrant has a right to 
terminate the labour contract based on 
the stipulated legal procedure (Art. 8). 
Foreigners are granted permits for 
temporary residence in the territory of 
Azerbaijan for the period of individual 
work permit validity.  
Migrant workers and their family 
members have the same rights as 
citizens of Azerbaijan to social security 
and retirement benefits (Art. 10).  
This Law and the Regulation ‘On 
Determination of Quotas for Labour 
Migration’ stipulate labour migration 
quotas. The number of quotas is 
decided upon by the Cabinet of 
Ministers.  
 Azerbaijan is party to the: 
− International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of their Families (ratified in 1999) 
− CIS Convention on the legal status of migrant workers and members of their 
families, coming from the CIS participating states (in force since 2010); 
− Agreement on cooperation in the field of labour migration and social protection 
for migrant workers, adopted by CIS Member States (in force since 1996); 
− Protocol on amendments to the Agreement on cooperation in the field of labour 
migration and social protection for migrant workers, adopted by CIS Member 
States (signed in 2005). 
In 2004 Republic of Azerbaijan signed an agreement with Ukraine on the 
Employment and Social Security of the Ukrainian citizens working temporarily in 
the territory of Azerbaijan and Azeri citizens temporarily working in Ukraine. The 
agreement regulates recognition of professional experience, social security, 
pension rights and health insurance. Azerbaijan signed similar bilateral 
agreements on cooperation in the field of migration from Moldova, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus. 
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Citizenship The Constitution and the Law ‘On 
Citizenship of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan’ (Art. 1) stipulate that a 
person belonging to Azerbaijani state, 
having political and legal ties with it, as 
well as mutual rights and obligations, is 
a citizen of the AR. A person born on 
the territory of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan is a citizen of the AR. A 
person, one of whose parents is a 
citizen of the AR, is a citizen of the AR. 
The Law ‘On State Policy 
Concerning Citizens Residing Abroad’ 
provides the definition of a citizen 
residing abroad: citizens of AR and their 
children, former USSR citizens or 
former citizens of Azerbaijan and their 
children. This Law stipulates that 
residence of an AR citizen in another 
country shall not serve as a pretext for 
termination of his or her citizenship. 
Dual or multiple citizenships are 
not recognized for the citizens of the 
AR. However, the President of the 
Republic may grant the permission to 
have dual citizenship. 
Citizens of Azerbaijan, who are at 
the same time citizens of other states (if 
according to the law of the second 
country, the foreigner that acquires its 
citizenship does not have to renounce to 
his/her previous citizenship), in the legal 
relations with Azerbaijan are recognized 
only as a citizens of Azerbaijan.  
The Law on citizenship permits 
voluntary renunciation of Azerbaijani 
citizenship. A person, who used to be the 
citizen of AR but has renounced to it, has 
a right to recover the citizenship of AR. 
The grounds for involuntary loss of 
Azerbaijani citizenship are:  
1. A person voluntarily acquires foreign 
citizenship; 
2. A person commits an act that 
affronts the dignity of the Republic 
of Azerbaijan. 
The main preconditions for 
naturalization are:  
1. Permanent lawful residence on the 
territory of the republic during the 
last five years, 
2. Knowledge of the state language 
(a certificate confirming the 
knowledge of the language is 
required),  
3. Lawful means of subsistence, 
4. Recognition and observance of the 
Constitution of the AR and national 
laws. 
A person willing to obtain the 
citizenship of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan submits an application 
addressed to the President of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan and all 
necessary documents to the State 
Migration Service. All data submitted 
by the person are verified by the 
State Migration Service. Decision on 
granting, recovery or termination of 
citizenship is made by the President 
of the AR. 
Since 1996, Azerbaijan is party to the  
− 1957 Convention on the Nationality 
of Married Women,  
− 1954 Convention relating to the 
Status of Stateless Persons, and  
− 1961 Convention on the Reduction 
of Statelessness.  
 
 
International 
Protection 
The issues of political asylum and refugee status are regulated by the 
Constitution of Azerbaijan, the Law ‘‘On Status of Refugees and Displaced Persons’ 
of 1 May, 1999, and other national legislative acts and regulations. 
In 1993, Azerbaijan ratified The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has a representation in the 
Republic of Azerbaijan. 
According to Art. 70 and 109 of the Constitution of the AR, an asylum in 
Azerbaijan may be granted to foreigners and stateless persons. 
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In accordance with the 1999 Law on the Status of Refugees and Internally 
Displaced Persons, the following forms of international protection exist in 
Azerbaijan:  
− refugee status: in compliance with Geneva Convention;  
− political asylum: a person who arrived in the territory of the AR, and applied 
for refugee status or intends to do so, is considered to be seeking asylum 
until decision on granting or denying him refugee status is adopted. 
Paragraph 1.1 of the ‘Regulation on the State Committee on Affairs of Refugees 
and Internally Displaced Persons’ of 1 February, 2005, regulates the activities of 
central executive authority in charge of state practice in the sphere of transportation, 
accommodation, repatriation, social protection of the persons who became refugees 
as a result of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  
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The Socio-Political Framework of Migration 
Last two decades have been marked by increasing importance of migration processes in Azerbaijan. The 
changing character of migration flows has had diverse impact on the socio-political developments of the 
country. The collapse of the USSR was accompanied by the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, pushing 
hundreds of thousands of Armenians and Russian Jews to leave the country. Refugees and internally 
displaced persons, most of them ethnic Azeris, flew in the opposite direction. The 1990’s saw the revival of 
oil and gas economy, creating a strong pull factor for international migrant workers as well as for internal 
migration. At the same time the emigration stayed on high levels. However, these migrations in both 
directions have not led to the development of a targeted immigration policy. The focus of the authorities is 
on Diaspora policies. At the same time in the late 2000s the government began to pay closer attention to 
the control of immigration, one of the consequences being the creation of the State Migration Service. This 
organ was created in order develop a comprehensive system of migration management, and to forecast 
migration processes and enhance international cooperation in this field. The implementation of state policy 
vis-à-vis migration also implies the creation of a unified database and an up-to-the-minute automated 
control system. As a result, from 2007 onwards, Azeri migration policy has gradually become stricter. The 
State Migration Service enforces severe sanctions against irregular migrants (but not against employers). 
Socio-Political 
Framework Outward migration Inward migration 
Governmental 
Institutions 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs protects the 
rights of citizens abroad, ensures 
development of ties with the Azeri 
citizens abroad, provides consular 
services and registers Azeri citizens 
who live in foreign countries on 
permanent or temporary basis. 
In 2008 the State Committee on 
Diaspora was established in 
Azerbaijan. 
The chairman of the committee is 
appointed by the President. 
 
 
The President participates in shaping the 
migration policy (legislative initiative, 
signing of laws, veto right, management of 
foreign affairs). He/she takes decisions 
regarding acquisition of citizenship, 
granting of asylum in Azerbaijan, etc.  
The State Migration Service maintains a 
database on migration; grants temporary 
and permanent residence permits to 
foreigners and stateless persons; grants 
immigrant status; grants extensions of 
temporary stay periods for foreigners and 
stateless persons in the Republic of 
Azerbaijan; determines citizenship and 
refugee status. It cooperates with the 
Ministry of National Security, the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Protection, the Ministry 
of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible 
for visa policy. 
The Ministry of Internal Affairs is 
responsible for registering foreign citizens 
and persons without citizenship by their 
residence and whereabouts, issues identity 
registration documents and grants 
citizenship.  
State Border Service is the main state 
authority responsible for exercising border 
control. It registers foreigners at border 
check points, counteracts irregular 
migration and checks grounds for 
foreigners’ entry. 
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Governmental 
Strategy 
The main strategic document 
addressing emigration is 2004 State 
Concept of the Azerbaijan Republic on 
the Migration Management Policy.  
Main challenges include: 
− social-economic migration, 
− ecological migration from the 
Caspian sea region, 
− labour migration. 
 
 
The main strategic document addressing 
immigration is 2004 State Concept of the 
Azerbaijan Republic on Migration 
Management Policy.  
The main challenges include: 
− refugees and asylum seekers from the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region and 
Georgia, 
− labour migrants, 
− transit migrants, 
− irregular migrants, 
− re-emigrants and their family members. 
The objectives of the 2006-2008 State 
Migration Program of Azerbaijan Republic 
included:  
− improvement of migration legislation 
and assurance of its implementation, 
− development of a system of migration 
management, 
− creation of an automated system of 
control in the field of migration,  
− prevention of irregular migration, 
− enhancement of international 
cooperation. 
In 2007, State Migration Service was 
created, which has taken up the 
implementation of these objectives.  
Civil Society  Since 2008, the State Committee on 
Diaspora carries out state activities in 
the field of Diaspora relations, 
expansion of cooperation with Azeri 
citizens residing abroad, diasporas 
formed by them and diasporas of other 
states that demonstrate friendly attitude 
to Azerbaijani people, as well as 
coordinates NGO activities in this field. 
Forum of Azeri NGOs on Migration 
“FANGOM” co-ordinates the activity of 
NGOs in Migration Sector. Centre for Legal 
Assistance to Migrants provides free of 
charge legal assistance to all foreigners 
and stateless persons staying in 
Azerbaijan and represents them in various 
public and judicial authorities. Eurasian 
Civil Initiatives’ Platform (ECIP) assists 
migrants and provides consultations on 
citizenship issues. 
Migration and 
Economic 
Growth  
Azerbaijan has not yet implemented 
programs that would visibly link its 
communities abroad to economic 
development objectives at home. 
Migration contributes to the 
economic growth by means of practice 
of remittances that are sent to 
Azerbaijan by circular migrants. 
Traditionally immigration to the AR was 
limited to people originating from the Soviet 
or post-Soviet area. In the recent years, 
Azerbaijan saw an influx of immigrants 
coming from culturally different regions of 
the world. These new challenges have 
been recognized by the government 
strategy of 2006-2008 and are currently 
addressed by the State Migration Service 
on a case-by-case basis. 
International 
Cooperation 
Azerbaijan is a member of the following: IOM, Council of Europe, Commonwealth of 
Independent States, OSCE, ILO and BSEC. It participates in the following regional 
processes: Budapest Process, Prague Process, Eastern Partnership, European 
Neighbourhood Policy and Black Sea Synergy.  
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The Demographic-Economic Framework of Migration  
Since gaining independence in 1991, emigration patterns have been particularly centred toward Russia as 
well as some European Union Member States. The profile of Belarusian migrants tends largely to differ 
according to destination. The majority of labour migrants moving toward the European Union are female, 
whilst the contrary is observed regarding flows to Russia and other CIS states. On average, Belarusian 
migrants show a medium-high level of education and are employed in medium skilled jobs. 
According to official Belarusian statistics, since 2000 Belarus has experienced a net positive migration 
balance. Immigrants are mainly originating in other CIS countries and likely to be employed in the 
construction, trade and agriculture sector. Despite few estimates available, irregular migrants employed in 
the informal economy is well known as being a major feature of migration in Belarus. 
Outward migration Inward migration 
Stock 
According to destination countries’ statistics, 
1,361,593 or 453,479 Belarusian migrants resided 
abroad in years around 2012 (table 1), who represent 
respectively 14.4% or 4.8% of the total population 
residing in Belarus. The difference between the two 
estimates depends on whether migrants living in 
Russia are counted according respectively to the 
country of birth or citizenship criterion.  
 
Indeed, in Russia, while individuals born in 
Belarus are almost 1 million, Belarusian citizens 
stand only at 27,668. The former (largest) number 
is the result of massive ethnic repatriation waves 
occurred just after the collapse of the USSR, 
according to which millions of people - born in the 
Belarusian territory before 1991 with Russian 
descent - decided to ‘return’ to their origin country. 
They are the so-called ethnic Russians who are 
generally not perceived as Belarusian emigrants, 
but are Russian nationals. 
Females account for 59.1% of all migrants. In 
the European Union, this percentage is even higher 
especially for some countries. According to Polish 
and Italian national statistics (the top EU receivers 
of Belarusian citizens in 2011), females 
represented 83.6% and 63.1%, respectively (). 
Female work opportunities in domestic work – 
often, at least initially, in the informal sector – may 
explain these figures. According to Russian 
sources, in 2002, only 10.1% of Belarusian regular 
temporary worker migrants were females.  
Stock 
In 2009, 926,635 individuals born abroad and 
142,087 foreign citizens resided in Belarus, or 9.8% 
and 1.5% of the total population, respectively. 
 
Again, this discrepancy is due to the fact that the 
majority of individuals born abroad are people born 
in the USSR with Belarusian descent who, after the 
dissolution of the USSR, ‘returned’ en masse to 
their parents’ home country. Rather than 
international migrants, they are today perceived as 
ethnic Belarusians.  
The majority of the born abroad population is 
indeed originating from former Soviet Republics 
(91.7%) and especially Russia (56.6%), Ukraine 
(20.1%) and Kazakhstan (7.8%).  
As with the foreign population, more than 1 out 
of 2 persons (53.1%) did not declare their country 
of citizenship at the time of the census, while 
another 4.8% were stateless.  
Country of residence
Definition 
(a)
Reference date 
(Jan 1st)
Number Number % %
20.9 62.9
of which Poland (A) 2012 6.1 18.4
             Latvia (A) 2011 4.2 12.8
             Lithuania (A) 2008 4.1 12.4
941,674 33,560 69.2 7.4
of which Russia (A) 2002 935,782 X 68.7 X
             Russia (B) 2010 X 27,668 X 6.1
      Ukraine (B) 2001 0.4 1.3
9.9 29.7
of which Israel (A) 2005 4.6 13.8
             US (A) 2011 4.4 13.4
             Canada (A) 2006 0.5 1.6
1,361,593 453,479 100.0 100.0
(b): "Other countries" include Iceland, Liechstein, Norw ay, Sw itzerland, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Turkey, US, Canada, 
Australia, New  Zealand and Japan.
Sources: national statistics (Population Censuses, population registers, registers for foreigners, etc.)
Table 1 - Belarusian emigration stocks by country of residence, most recent data (c. 2012)
European Union
CIS countries + Georgia
Other countries (b)
Main total
(a): Belarusian migrants are defined according to the country of birth (A) or country of nationality (B) criterion 
according to countries of residence, in Russia both numbers are reported.
285,187
83,620
7,395
57,867
56,170
5,872
134,732
62,541
60,590
Country of citizenship/country of birth Number 
(birth)
Number 
(citizenship)
CIS countries + Georgia 850,173 112,978
of which Russia 524,101 83,561
Ukraine 186,266 16,874
Kazakhstan 72,077 1,811
Uzbekistan 14,653 1,661
Azerbaijan 11,848 1,452
Moldova 8,138 1,636
Turkmenistan 7,627 2,828
Georgia 7,452 1,078
Armenia 7,255 1,622
Tajikistan 5,389 320
Kyrgyzstan 5,367 135
Other countries 76,462 29,109
of which Germany 17,605 216
Lithuania 15,191 2,995
Poland 8,516 1,553
China 2,247 1,545
Total migrants 926,635 142,087
% of the total population 9.8 1.5
Stateless - 16,116
Country not declared 188,391 179,450
Total migrants + stateless + country not declared 1,115,026 337,653
% of the total population 11.7 3.6
Table 2 - Immigration stocks in Belarus according to different criteria, 
2009
Source: Population Census - 2009
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The age division of migrants shows just under 
two thirds are within the age group of the working 
population, with only 3.6% aged less than 15.  
39.9% of Belarusian emigration stocks, sourced 
in 2006, are educated to the tertiary level. The 
same value stands at 34.8% in other CIS countries 
and 40.1% in OECD states. In the latter countries, 
Belarusian migrants are mainly employed as 
professionals (26.5%), service workers and shop 
and market sales workers (17.6%). 
Flows 
As with other CIS countries major outflows were 
experienced in the early 1990s peaking at 11.5 
persons per thousand in 1990. In 2009 this had 
fallen to 2.1 persons per thousand. The fall in flows 
can be attributed to a shift from socio-political push 
factors in the early 1990s to an increase in the 
influence of economic push and pull factors.  
According to official Belarusian statistics, since 
2000 Belarus has experienced net positive 
(permanent) migration balance (figure 1). 
 
In 2000-2012, permanent departures were 
recorded at 136,114, among which 66.6% towards 
CIS countries. The reasons why two-thirds of 
emigrant flows went there and especially to Russia 
include: common language, common traditions, 
family reunification and freedom of movement 
agreement.  
Specifically regarding temporary migration, data 
highlights that in 2010, 5,000 Belarusians officially 
registered for temporary work abroad, with 60% 
aged less than 24 years of age. Belarusian 
migrants working in CIS countries are heavily 
distributed within the construction and 
manufacturing industries, whereas for countries 
outside of the CIS migrants are employed in trades 
These huge numbers reflect a situation shared 
by most CIS countries. After the dissolution of the 
USSR, large number of people lost their citizenship 
as they were unable to confirm or acquire 
citizenship of any new-born state. This was the 
result of cumbersome legal requirements adopted 
in new independent states (for more details, see the 
section on ‘citizenship’ in ‘The Legal Framework’ 
below). As a result, all these people fell in the 
category of ‘non status migrants’.  
Flows 
Out of all post-Soviet countries Belarus and Russia 
were the only countries to have positive migration 
inflows in the 2000s (figure 1).  
On average there was a positive 9,000 inflow of 
permanent migrants, with 90% emanating from 
Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Of these 
nationalities Ukrainians are more likely to be 
distributed in in urban centres. Motivations for 
migrating into Belarus give a telling picture: 32% 
were family reunifications, 24% return migrants and 
24% to work.  
Among labour migrants, Ukrainians, Russians 
and Turks constitute the highest number. Overall, 
the construction, trade and agriculture sectors are 
the main sources of employment, despite labour 
migrants from Russia are from particularly highly 
paid occupations such as heads of enterprises and 
organisations, finance, economic and accounting 
professionals. 
Young males (15-24 years of age) and young 
women (20-29 years of age) are the dominant age 
groups. Females generally have high levels of 
education whereas males tend to have general or 
incomplete secondary-level education.  
There are varying estimates to the size of 
irregular migration flows into Belarus. The Ministry 
of Taxes and Duties claim 15% of the workforce are 
irregular migrants. Another study by Dreher, 
Schneider (2006) claims nearly half of the 
workforce is constituted by irregular migrants.  
Sectors that have large concentrations of 
irregular migrants include the service sector, 
construction, trade, consultancy and catering. One 
clear conclusion taken from Belarus is the ease in 
which informal and formal economies can be 
crossed (Chubrik, Pelipas, and Rakova, 2007). 
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Figure 1 - Inward and outward permanent 
migration flows to and from Belarus, 1995-2012
Arrivals Departures Net Migration
Source: National Statistical Committee of the Republic of 
Belarus (www.belstat.org).
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and services (source: registration cards for labour 
migrants, in Bobrova and Shakhotska 2012). It is 
worth mentioning that these data on temporary 
migration are likely to underestimate current flows 
as detected at the origin end. For example, in 2011 
only in Poland, 10,788 first residence permits for 
work reasons were granted to Belarusian citizens 
whereas the Belarusian authorities estimated a total 
of 1,811 emigrants in all non-CIS countries. This 
discrepancy is also due to the fact that most 
Belarusian migrants simply emigrate via tourists or 
guest visas and then find temporary employment at 
the destination end. Recent estimates put at 
150,000 persons per annum irregularly migrating 
from Belarus, with 85% going to Russia (Luchenok 
and Kolesnikova, 2011). 
Remittances from Belarus are comparatively 
small in comparison to other CIS countries. Yet 
there has been a continual increase (see figure 2), 
with the exception of the world financial crisis.  
 
References: Bobrova A., Shakhotska L., Shymanovich G. 2012. Belarus country report // Social Impact of Emigration and 
Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe - European Commission DG Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion, available at  
http://www.google.it/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CDcQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.e
u%2Fsocial%2FBlobServlet%3FdocId%3D8844%26langId%3Den&ei=FGVlUa_YKKX44QT8xYCQDQ&usg=AFQjCNEt4
Jvm-eJ5V9VoPJfmhhhkMyLJGg&bvm=bv.44990110,d.bGE, date of access: 10/04/2013; Chubrik, A., Haiduk K., Pelipas. 
I. (Eds.). 2007. Growth for All? Economy of Belarus: The Challenges Ahead, Minsk, IPM Research Center; Dreher, Axel 
& Schneider, Friedrich, 2006. "Corruption and the Shadow Economy: An Empirical Analysis," IZA Discussion Papers 
1936, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); Luchenok, K., Kolesnikova, I. 2011. The influence of migration flows on 
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The Legal Framework of Migration 
In the early 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Belarus had to face the problem of migration 
management and, in particular, of international labour flows. The development of the Belarusian legislation 
regulating social relations in the field of labour migration took place against the background of significant 
social, economic and political changes. Belarus became both the host country for labour migrants and their 
country of origin. It should be noted that the Republic of Belarus had no experience in the field of legal 
regulation of international labour migration. Therefore, the development of the Belarusian legislation in this 
area took place, on the one hand, in accordance with international law. On the other hand, Belarusian 
legislation took over many provisions from the regulations of the former Soviet Union, with all their 
advantages and flaws. 
In the first half of the 1990s laws were passed, which established the basis of the legal regulation of 
migration. Belarusian legislation however still lacks comprehensive solutions regulating labour migration, 
integration of migrants and refugees as well as return and reintegration. Its particular feature is also that it 
tries to extensively regulate entry and exit of its own citizens. 
Legal Framework Outward migration Inward migration 
General legal 
references 
Legal and political framework governing migration and mobility 
2010 Law On the Legal Status of Foreign Nationals and Stateless Persons  
2010 Law On External Labour Migration 
2010 Law On the Legal Status of Foreign Nationals and Stateless Persons  
2009 Law On the Procedure of Entry and Exit for the Citizens of the Republic of 
Belarus 
2008 Law On Refugee Status, Subsidiary and Temporary Protection to Foreign 
Nationals and Stateless Persons 
2006 Law On the Legal Status of Foreign Nationals and Stateless Persons in the 
Republic of Belarus 
2002 Law On Citizenship of the Republic of Belarus 1994 Constitution 
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Entry and Exit 
Visa 
Citizens of Belarus are exempt from 
short-term visa requirements in the CIS 
countries, Georgia, Montenegro, Serbia, 
China (tourist group travels), Cuba, 
Bolivia and Venezuela.  
Belarusian citizens enjoy freedom of 
movement within the Union State of 
Russia and Belarus, as well as within 
the Common Economic Space of the 
Eurasian Economic Community, with 
the Russian Federation and 
Kazakhstan. 
Cross-border mobility 
Local Border Traffic agreements have 
been signed with Latvia, Lithuania and 
Poland for visa-free travel of residents 
of border territories.  
National legislation related to the 
right of citizens to exit and enter the 
Republic of Belarus is based on the 
following principles (art. 3 of the 
Law № 49-З on the rules of entry and 
exit of the Belarusian citizens):  
1. every citizen has a right to exit 
the Republic of Belarus and enter 
the Republic of Belarus; 
2. citizens cannot be denied the 
right to enter the Republic of 
Belarus and exit it; 
3. the right to enter the Republic of 
Belarus can not be restricted. 
However, according to art. 3 of the 
Law № 49-З the right of a citizen to exit 
the Republic of Belarus can temporarily 
be restricted. Article 7 of the Law № 49-
З contains a comprehensive list of 
reasons to temporarily restrict citizens’ 
right to exit the country.  
Law № 49-З (art. 23) establishes 
that citizens, whose right to exit the 
Republic of Belarus is temporarily 
restricted, have the right to appeal 
against the actions (or failure to act) of 
the state authorities to the superior state 
authority (superior official) and/or court. 
Visa 
Belarus applies 3 types of visa: “B” - 
transit visa for max 2 days; “C” – short 
term visa for max 90 days stay; and “D” 
- long-term visa for a stay of max 90 
days during one year, unless stated 
otherwise in an international agreement.  
Citizens of CIS countries, Georgia, 
Serbia, Montenegro, China (tourist 
group travel), Bolivia, Cuba and 
Venezuela are exempted from the short-
term visa requirement. 
Cross-border mobility 
In accordance with the Law № 105-З on 
legal status of foreign nationals, those 
foreigners who have no valid residence 
permit can enter the Republic of 
Belarus, exit it or carry out transit travel 
through the territory of the Republic of 
Belarus only with valid travel documents 
and with a visa. 
Foreigners applying for visa or entry 
to the Republic of Belarus are required 
to have enough funds to cover their 
expenses during their stay in Belarus 
and to timely leave the country.  
Foreigners can only exit the Republic 
of Belarus if they have visas. A foreigner 
can temporarily be restricted in his right 
to leave the Republic of Belarus. 
Comprehensive list of grounds for such 
a refusal can be found in art. 33 of the 
Law № 105-З.  
Law № 105-З envisages mandatory 
non-judicial procedure for foreigners to 
file an appeal against decisions or 
actions (including failure to act) of state 
authorities and officials of the Republic 
of Belarus related to the execution of 
Law № 105-З. 
Irregular 
migration 
Belarus has no readmission agreements 
in place. 
At the legal level, the issues of 
readmission in the Republic of Belarus 
are currently poorly developed due to 
difficulties in concluding such bilateral 
agreements. The only relevant 
regulation pertaining to this issue is the 
The legal basis for preventing irregular 
migration to the Republic of Belarus is 
provided by: 
a. The Decree by the President of the 
Republic of Belarus of 2 October 
2010 № 518 “On the State program 
for the prevention of human 
trafficking, irregular migration and 
related unlawful acts for 2011-2013”; 
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decree by the Council of Ministers of the 
Republic of Belarus of 31.12.2010 № 
1918 “On the Approval of the 
Regulations on the procedure of 
handing over to neighbouring states 
foreign nationals and stateless persons, 
who have violated the rules of local 
border traffic, set up by international 
agreements of the Republic of Belarus 
or who have lost the documents, 
according to which they had entered the 
territory of the republic of Belarus.” 
 
 
b. Administrative Code of the Republic 
of Belarus of 21 April 2003. № 194-З 
(arts. 23, 29, 23.55); 
c. Criminal Code of the Republic of 
Belarus of 9 July 1999. № 275-З (art. 
371, 371-1, 371-2). 
Article 23.29 of the Administrative 
Code (AC) envisages responsibility for 
trespassing the State Border of the 
Republic of Belarus (i.e. at unauthorized 
points, using counterfeit documents, 
etc.) The sanction by article 23.29 
envisages expulsion of the offender. 
The remark in article 23.29 indicates, 
however, that this article does not cover 
the instances of violating the rules of 
crossing the State Border of the 
Republic of Belarus by foreign nationals 
and stateless persons applying for 
refugee status, asylum or other kind of 
protection on the territory of the country. 
Belarusian legislation also envisages 
employer’s sanctions for employing 
irregular migrants (including illegal 
employment) (section 2 art. 23.55 of AC).  
Art.371-1 of the Criminal Code that 
defines criminal responsibility for 
organizing irregular migration 
(smuggling activities). 
Art. 371-2 of the Criminal Code 
establishes responsibility for violating 
terms of entry ban to the Republic of 
Belarus in case a foreigner, who had 
been previously expelled or removed 
from the country, entered Belarus 
before the expiration of expulsion term 
and is staying on its territory.  
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 Belarus is a party to the following regional agreements: 
− 1998 Agreement on cooperation between CIS Member States in combating 
illegal migration (entered into force in Belarus in 1999) 
− 2010 EurAsEC Cooperation Agreement on Countering Illegal Labour Migration 
from Third Countries (entry into force on 1 January 2012) 
The legal basis for prevention of human trafficking in the Republic of Belarus is 
ensured by: 
1. The Law of the Republic of Belarus of 07.01.2012 № 350-З “On Human 
Trafficking Prevention”; 
2. A decree by the President of the Republic of Belarus of 02.10.2010 № 518 “On 
the State Program for the prevention of human trafficking, irregular migration and 
related unlawful acts for 2011-2013”; 
3. A decree by the Ministry of Public Health of the Republic of Belarus of 
28.04.2012 № 41 “On establishing a list of required medical services provided by 
state health service agencies, including in-patient departments, to the victims of 
human trafficking irrespective of the place of their permanent residence”; 
4. The Criminal Code of the Republic of Belarus (arts. 181, 181-1, 182, 183). 
Belarus ratified Palermo Protocols in 2003.  
Rights and 
settlement 
The issues of emigration from the 
Republic of Belarus are addressed in 
chapter 4 of Law № 49-З on the rules of 
entry and exit of the Belarusian citizens. 
Permanent residence of Belarusian 
citizens abroad is formally established 
by issuing a passport of the citizen of 
the Republic of Belarus for permanent 
residence abroad and by registering 
them at Belarusian consulates.  
Art 20 of Law № 49-З lists the 
responsibilities of citizens declaring their 
will to emigrate permanently before they 
are issued the above-mentioned 
passport. 
Citizens who have received the 
passport are required to register at a 
consulate or diplomatic mission of the 
Republic of Belarus in the country of 
permanent residence (art. 21 of 
Law № 49-З). Based on the data 
provided by the consular register of the 
citizens permanently residing abroad, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus 
upkeeps the relevant database. 
Upon their arrival to Belarus, foreigners 
are required to register within 5 days 
with a nearest registering authority (30 
days for the citizens of the Russian 
Federation, Kazakhstan, the Republics 
of Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine).  
Permits for temporary stay are 
granted to foreigners coming for a 
period shorter than one year (art. 43, 
Law № 105-З on legal status of foreign 
nationals). Family members of a 
temporary resident can likewise apply 
for similar permits if they authenticate 
the sources of lawful income.  
Permanent residence permit is 
granted to foreigners who: 1) are close 
relatives of the citizens of the Republic of 
Belarus permanently residing in the 
country; 2) have been granted refugee 
status or asylum; 3) have a right to family 
reunification; 4) have been legally 
residing in Belarus for past seven or 
more years; 5) are eligible to obtain 
Belarusian citizenship; 6) previously had 
the citizenship of the Republic of Belarus; 
7) have sought for skills; 8) have abilities 
and talents or have performed 
outstanding services to the Republic of 
Belarus; 9) have invested in Belarus no 
less than 150,000 Euros; 10) are ethnic 
Belarusians or their direct descendants: 
children, grandchildren, great-
grandchildren, born outside the current 
territory of the Republic of Belarus. 
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Foreigners on the territory of Belarus 
are equal before the law as the citizens 
of the Republic of Belarus (chapter 2 of 
the Law № 105-З). Law № 105-З on the 
legal status of foreign nationals and 
stateless persons defines the scope of 
the rights and duties according to the 
category. In accordance with the Law 
foreign nationals have the right to freely 
move and to choose the place of stay 
(residence). At the same time 
temporarily staying and residing 
foreigners are obliged to reside only at 
the address of registration (or for which 
a permit for temporary residence has 
been issued).  
Foreign nationals cannot become 
members of political parties or other 
associations pursuing political goals 
(art. 9, Law № 105-З). 
Permanent residents enjoy all the 
socio-economic rights (art. 10, Law № 
105-З). Temporary residents are 
granted the right to legally participate in 
the state social security system 
programs with mandatory contributions 
by employers.  
All foreigners in the Republic of 
Belarus are obliged to reimburse the 
costs spent by the Republic of Belarus 
for the upkeep of their children in public 
care (art. 24 of the Law № 105-З). 
There are exceptions from the 
general legislation defining the status of 
foreign nationals related to the citizens 
of CIS countries. These exceptions are 
established by agreements between 
CIS member states. 
Labour The principle normative legal act related to labour migration is the Law № 225-З “On 
External Labour Migration.” It regulates employment of foreigners in the Republic of 
Belarus, as well as overseas employment according to labour contracts of citizens 
and foreigners permanently residing in Belarus.  
Bilateral agreements on labour 
migration have been concluded with six 
CIS countries (AM, AZ, KZ, MD, RF, 
UA) and Lithuania, Poland, Serbia. CIS 
Convention on the legal status of 
migrant workers and members of their 
families, coming from the CIS 
participating states (2008) and 
Agreement on Cooperation in the Field 
of Labour Migration and Social 
Projection for Migrant Workers (1994) 
apply vis-à-vis certain CIS states. 
Russian and Kazakh citizens enjoy a 
free access to the Belarusian labour 
market, with the same right as 
Belarusian citizens. 
All other foreigners are subject to 
Law № 225-З. 
Foreigners permanently residing in 
the country have the right to engage in 
labour or entrepreneurial activities equal 
to that of the citizens of the Republic of 
Belarus and according to the procedure 
established by law. 
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2010 EurAsEC Agreement on the 
Legal Status of Migrant Workers and the 
Members of their Families with RF and 
KZ allowing BY citizens to work in these 
countries without work permits.  
Law № 225-З envisages a number of 
measures to ensure the rights of 
Belarusian migrant workers abroad. A 
contract is required for people who plan 
to work abroad. Activities of private 
firms engaged in employment abroad 
are now licensed, precisely regulated by 
law and put under control of relevant 
state institutions. Liability for abuses in 
this field has likewise been established. 
The powers of state institutions have 
been defined, including of those 
responsible for supervision of migrants’ 
contracts with employers. It has also 
been established that such contracts 
should include conditions of paying 
wages, residence, overtime work, social 
security in case of illness, etc.  
 
Temporary residents do not have the 
right to carry out entrepreneurial 
activities without forming a legal entity, 
unless otherwise specified by law and 
international agreement of the Republic 
of Belarus. 
The procedure of recruitment of 
foreign labour is regulated by the 
decree of the Council of Ministers of 
Belarus № 885.  
Activities related to attracting foreign 
labour force to Belarus is not licensed. If 
an employer intends to bring in and 
employ 10 or more migrants, an 
authorization issued by the Department 
for citizenship and migration of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs is needed. 
The legislation of the Republic of 
Belarus establishes a comprehensive 
list of the reasons to refuse or cancel 
employers’ authorizations or special 
licenses to labour immigrants.  
Moreover the legislation defines the 
state guarantees to labour immigrants 
carrying out their labour activities in the 
Republic of Belarus (art. 33 of the Law 
№ 225-З). 
Recently, the Council of Ministers of 
the Republic of Belarus proposed to 
establish quotas for labour migrants.  
The peculiarity of international agreements of the Republic of Belarus related to 
migration is that the greatest progress in developing bilateral agreements has been 
achieved only in agreements with the countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (hereinafter – CIS or Commonwealth) on the whole and within 
the Eurasian Economic Community (Common Economic Space) in particular.  
The key bilateral agreement related to free movement of people is the 
Agreement between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation on 
ensuring equal rights of the citizens of the Republic of Belarus and of the Russian 
Federation to the freedom of movement, free choice of the place of stay and 
residence on the territories of the member states of the Union State (concluded in 
Saint-Petersburg on 24.01.2006). Other CIS agreements on labour migration 
concluded by Belarus mostly duplicate, complement and specify the articles of the 
Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Labour Migration and Social Protection for 
Migrant Workers (concluded in Moscow on 15.04.1994, the version of 25.11.2005). 
In case there are no bilateral agreements between the Republic of Belarus and a 
particular CIS state related to the exchange of labour force, the countries apply the 
aforementioned Agreement of 1994, as well as the 2008 CIS Convention on the 
legal status of migrant workers and members of their families, coming from the CIS 
participating states, which apart from Belarus has been ratified by Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Ukraine.  
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Citizenship Simplified procedure for granting 
citizenship is established for 
Belarusians. For example, as required 
by the general rules, 7 year residence 
term can be shortened or omitted for 
ethnic Belarusians or people identifying 
themselves as Belarusians, as well as 
their descendants born outside the 
territory of the present day Belarus (art. 
14 of the Law 136-З “On the Citizenship 
of the Republic of Belarus”). 
In accordance with article 17 of Law 
136-З the citizenship of the Republic of 
Belarus ceases in case of: 1) 
renunciation of the citizenship of the 
Republic of Belarus; 2) loss of the 
citizenship of the Republic of Belarus. 
A citizen of the Republic of Belarus 
upon reaching the age of 18 is eligible 
to apply for renunciation of the 
citizenship of the Republic of Belarus 
(art. 18 of the Law № 136-З).  
The citizenship of the Republic of 
Belarus is lost (art. 19 of the Law 
№ 136-З) in case: 
1) the person enters military service, 
police service, national security 
agencies, justices or other national 
agencies of a foreign state; 2) parents 
(single parent) submit application on 
behalf of their child, who along with the 
citizenship of a foreign state also 
acquired the citizenship of the Republic 
of Belarus. 
The decision on cessation of the 
citizenship of the Republic of Belarus 
is cancelled if it has been made on the 
basis of deliberately misleading data 
or counterfeit documents. The 
decision on cessation of the 
citizenship of the Republic of Belarus 
is made by the President of the 
Republic of Belarus according to 
procedure established by him. 
The principal normative legal act related 
to citizenship is the Law of the Republic 
of Belarus of 2002 № 136-З “On the 
citizenship of the Republic of Belarus.” 
Citizenship in the Republic of 
Belarus can be obtained: 
1)  by birth (art. 13 of Law № 136-З) to 
Belarusian citizens or stateless 
persons, or  
2) by acquisition (art. 14 of Law №136-
З). This procedure is open to any 
permanent resident, after 7 years of 
residence, who can prove links with 
the country, including knowledge of 
one of the official languages, has the 
source of lawful income and has no 
citizenship or loses the previous 
citizenship upon acquisition of the 
Belarusian citizenship. 
3) by registration (art. 15 of the Law 
№136-З). This procedure is open to 
any permanent resident with a 
citizenship of the former USSR and 
no Belarusian citizenship  
4) in line with international agreements 
on simplified acquisition that Belarus 
concluded with several countries. 
Simplified procedure for granting 
citizenship is established for certain 
categories of persons (art. 14 of Law 
136-З).  
The decision on acquisition of the 
citizenship of the Republic of Belarus 
is cancelled if it has been made on the 
basis of deliberately misleading data 
or counterfeit documents. The 
decision on acquisition of the 
citizenship of the Republic of Belarus 
is made by the President of the 
Republic of Belarus according to 
procedure established by him. 
International 
Protection 
The legislation of the Republic of Belarus envisages granting people, persecuted in 
other states for their political or religious beliefs, ethnic origin etc.,  
1. refugee status;  
2. asylum. 
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According to the Decree of the President № 204 a right to asylum is the right of a 
foreigner, persecuted in any other state for his/her political or religious beliefs or 
ethnic origin, to stay on the territory of the Republic of Belarus (point 2). Asylum is 
granted by the President of the Republic of Belarus. 
Foreigners who have been granted Asylum in Belarus enjoy the rights and 
freedoms, as well as the duties, equal to those of foreigners permanently residing in 
Belarus. Asylum also extends to family members, who have arrived together with the 
foreigner who has been granted asylum.  
Law № 354-З “On Granting Foreign Nationals and Stateless Persons in the 
Republic of Belarus with Refugee Status, Subsidiary and Temporary Protection” 
defines three categories of foreigners as according to their legal status. 
1) Foreigners who have been granted refugee status; 
2) Foreigners who have been granted subsidiary protection (up to 1 year); 
3) Foreigners who have been granted temporary protection (group protection up to 
1 year). 
Article 47 (“Family reunification”) of Law № 354-З states that members of the 
family of a foreigner who have been granted refugee status or additional protection, 
are also granted refugee status or additional protection in accordance with the 
principle of family unity. 
The application distribution system is based on annually established quotas. 
These quotas define the number of applications for granting protection which can be 
filed in each of the six regions of the Republic of Belarus within a calendar year. In 
case of the exhaustion of the above-mentioned regional quotas, applications can still 
be filed in Minsk. 
Refugees obtain special benefits and their socio-economic rights are equal to 
those of the citizens of the Republic of Belarus: for example, refugees are eligible to 
free access to national education and health care systems, refugees’ children can 
attend the institutions of pre-school education, etc. 
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The Socio-Political Framework of Migration 
Belarusian migration policy is concerned with national security and economic development. For the first 
issue, the questions of border management and a fight against irregular migration (including trafficking) has 
been on the top of policy objectives. Belarus has in place a legislative and policy framework dealing with 
these topics.  
However, since its independence, Belarus has also developed a complex system of normative 
documents regulating legal status of foreigners in Belarus, as well as labour immigration and emigration. 
Especially recently, the policy attempts to regulate the import and export of workforce. One of the concerns 
is the protection of the Belarusian labour market from an uncontrolled inflow of migrant workers, the other: 
improving the situation on the domestic labour market through employment of Belarusians abroad. The 
country has set up licensing procedure for recruitment of foreign labour force and for employment of 
citizens of the Republic of Belarus abroad. This type of activity carried out by legal entities and individual 
entrepreneurs who have received in due course special permit (license) issued by the authority as the 
Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Belarus. 
Migration is viewed as an important resource in the economy. According to the state program one of the 
prerequisites for efficient external migration policy is a creation of favourable environment for social and 
economic adaptation and integration of migrants. In terms of geographic destinations however, Belarus 
considers only CIS countries (in particular, Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan). This emphasis is not 
coincidental: Belarus acceded to the Common Economic Space (Eurasian Community). 
Socio-Political 
Framework Outward migration Inward migration 
Governmental 
Institutions 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs protects the 
rights of citizens abroad; ensures 
development of ties with Belarusians 
abroad. 
 
The President participates in shaping the 
details of migration policy through decrees 
and takes decisions regarding acquisition 
or loss of citizenship  
Executive power in the country is 
represented by the Council of Ministers of 
Belarus which is not elected but appointed 
by the supreme authorities.  
Other authorities included in migration 
policy making:  
Ministry of Internal Affairs is 
responsible for a range of migration 
issues: migration statistics, monitoring 
migration situation, countering illegal 
migration, improving legislative acts, 
migration policy, informing the population 
about migration issues.  
Governmental 
Strategy 
Policy framework on emigration 
focuses on development of the country. 
Relevant recent document:  
− National Demographic Policy and 
Action Plan of Belarus, 2011-2015 
Proposes several measures 
supporting return of Belarusian 
scientists from abroad, especially if 
their skills could be useful for economic 
development of the country. 
Policy framework on immigration covers 
three policy fields: demographic 
development, irregular migration and 
trafficking. Relevant recent documents:  
− National Demographic Policy and 
Action Plan of Belarus, 2011-2015 
− National Policy and Action Plan on 
Trafficking and Illegal Migration, 2011-
2013 
 
 
 
EU Neighbourhood Migration Report 2013 
Migration Policy Centre (www.migrationpolicycentre.eu) 71 
The National Demographic strategy 
includes measures aimed at attracting 
qualified labour force in the priority sectors 
of the economy, providing migration 
facilities to those foreign under- graduate 
and graduate students who successfully 
completed their studies in Belarus and are 
invited to work here. Among the foreign 
labour immigrants priority is given to high-
skilled migrants and those foreigners 
ready to invest in Belarus.  
Civil Society  Belarusians establish associations in 
their countries of destination. There is 
no central association in Belarus 
dealing with emigrants. 
Immigrants tend to organize themselves in 
Belarus in ethnic associations, unions or 
friendship societies. There is no official 
NGO supporting migrant integration. 
Migration and 
economic 
development 
Belarusian legislation does not regulate 
legal relations with Belarusian 
emigrants and the Diaspora abroad. 
The very term ‘Diaspora’ is not defined. 
The legal basis for establishing and 
regulating activities of ethno-cultural 
public associations was established by 
the model law “On Ethno-Cultural 
Public Associations” which is not 
binding for CIS countries.  
As mentioned above, some 
elements of Belarusian policy 
strategies include a focus on specific 
categories of return emigrants: highly 
skilled specialists. 
Immigration to Belarus is seen as a 
challenge and Belarusian authorities 
perceive the country as entering the global 
race for talent. The level of economic 
development in Belarus is high and thus 
the most important policy question seems 
to be: how can migration be tapped to 
move the country ahead on the way of 
economic transition. However, the policy 
discourse has not been matched with 
concrete policy actions so far.  
International 
Cooperation 
Belarus is a member of the following organizations actively working on migration 
issues: IOM, Commonwealth of Independent States, and OSCE. It 
participates in the following regional processes: Budapest Process, Prague Process, 
and Eastern Partnership.  
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EGYPT 
  
EGYPT 
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The Demographic-Economic Framework of Migration 
Egyptian emigration, which has never ceased since the 1970s, went through distinct phases. Until 1971, 
emigration from the country was subject to legal restrictions and limited numbers. Professionals, especially, 
could migrate permanently to the US, Canada, Australia and Western European countries. The largest 
boost to outward flows occurred, however, after the adoption of the 1971 Constitution, where “permanent” 
and “temporary” emigration was authorized and, especially after the 1973 War, when soaring oil prices and 
increasing demand for migrant labour in Gulf countries triggered massive emigration from Egypt to Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq and the other Gulf states as well as to Libya. After phases of greater and lesser migration in the 
1980s and 1990s, Egypt is currently experiencing what has been called the permanence of temporary 
migration, whereby migration towards Arab countries is becoming less temporary and outnumbers long-
term migration to Europe and North America.1
In terms of immigration, Egypt is host to limited flows of migrant workers, but rising numbers of refugees 
and asylum seekers. In addition to some 70,000 Palestinian refugees whose families arrived in the wake of 
the 1948 war, tens of thousands of refugees from Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia, as well as Iraq, are 
now stranded in Egypt. During the 2011 Libyan Civil war, large numbers of migrants fleeing Libya reached 
Egypt. A majority were, however, Egyptian nationals. 
 Recently a rise in migration to Europe – mostly irregular – 
especially Italy and France, has been recorded.  
                                                          
1 It should be noted that Egyptian statistics use the terminology “temporary” and “permanent” emigration referring 
respectively to emigration towards “Arab countries” and the “rest of the world”. Rather than being based on 
comparative data on the duration of residence, this criteria may reflect a distinction between the policies 
pursued by destination countries, which are integration-oriented in Europe and North America, but generally 
not so in Arab countries. 
Outward migration Inward migration 
Stock 
According to Egyptian consular statistics, in 2009 
there were 6.5 million Egyptian migrants, among 
whom 74.0% were temporary migrants.  
 
The majority live in Libya (30.9%), Saudi Arabia 
(20.1%), US (9.8%), Jordan (8.1%), and Kuwait 
(7.4%).  
 
Stock 
In 2006, according to census data, 184,070 foreign 
nationals resided in Egypt representing 0.3% of the 
total population. They came mainly from Arab 
(42.8%) and European (31.6%) countries.  
 
Among them, males represented the majority 
(56.2%). 
 
Country of 
residence
Temporary 
migrants
Country of 
residence
Permanent 
migrants
Arab countries 4,783,800 North America 776,000 203,932
of which Libya 2,000,000 of which US 635,000 162,232
Saudi Arabia 1,300,000 Canada 141,000 41,700
Jordan 525,000 Europe 790,645 224,122
Kuwait 480,000 of which UK 250,000 31,000
UAE 260,000 Italy 190,000 92,001
Qatar 88,500 France 160,000 26,825
Oman 45,000 Greece 80,000 9,461
Lebanon 38,000 Germany 30,000 13,316
Iraq 15,000 Netherlands 30,000 12,038
Bahrain 12,000 Others 48,645 39,481
Yemen 10,300 Oceania 106,000 34,838
Syria 10,000 Others 8,518 166,175
Total temporary 
migrants
4,783,800 Total permanent 
migrants
1,681,163 629,067
-
Notes: (a) Destination countries' statistics are taken from national sources (population 
censuses, population registers, registers for foreigners, etc.). Such statistics are not available 
for Arab countries (left-hand side of the table)
Total temporary and permanent 
migrants 6,464,963
Egyptian emigration stock by country of residence according to Egyptian consular 
statistics (year 2009) and destination countries' statistics (years around 2012)
Source: Egyptian consular records and destination countries' statistics
Egyptian consular statistics Destination 
countries' 
statistics (a) Males Females
Number Number Number % 
Arab countries 44,490 34,350 78,840 42.8
of which Palestine 18,310 13,590 31,900 17.3
  Iraq 5,650 5,670 11,320 6.1
  Saudi Arabia 4,570 2,360 6,930 3.8
European countries 29,630 28,510 58,140 31.6
of which Russia 7,480 9,350 16,830 9.1
             United Kingdom 5,990 4,540 10,530 5.7
             Germany 4,450 3,500 7,950 4.3
Other countries 29,250 17,840 47,090 25.6
of which Somalia 9,410 7,060 16,470 8.9
             United States 2,160 1,590 3,750 2.0
             Indonesia 1,980 620 2,600 1.4
Total 103,370 80,700 184,070 100.0
% of the total resident 
population
Both sexes
0.3
Foreign population residing in Egypt by country of nationality 
and sex, 2006
Source: Egyptian population census (2006)
Country of nationality
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2 The type and level of occupation is defined respectively according to the International Standard Classification of 
Occupations, ISCO-88 and the European Working Conditions Observatory. Specifically, four categories of 
employees are distinguished: 1) highly-skilled white collar (legislators, senior officials and managers, professionals, 
technicians and associate professionals); 2) highly-skilled blue collar (skilled agricultural and fishery workers, craft 
and related trades workers); 3) low-skilled white collar (clerks, service workers and shop and market sales workers); 
4) low-skilled blue collar (plant and machine operators and assemblers, elementary occupations). 
Data on Egyptians abroad largely depend on 
where migrants are counted. Indeed, Egyptian and 
destination countries’ statistics show significant 
divergences for a variety of reasons. First, consular 
records allow interested parties to recover a 
significant part of those migrants living in Arab 
countries – and especially Gulf States and Libya, 
which do not give detailed nationality breakdowns. 
Second, they capture specific migrant populations 
who are usually not counted by destination countries 
statistics (e.g., naturalized and irregular migrants).  
While emigration to Europe is characterized by a 
more gender-balanced profile (men are 58.1%), 
labor emigration towards Arab countries is a male 
phenomenon; here, in 2007, men accounted for 
96.6% of the total of (employed) emigrants.  
As to their educational and occupational 
characteristics, Egyptian emigrants tend to have an 
intermediate skill profile. Migration towards OECD 
countries is mainly skilled: in c. 2006, 86.5% had a 
medium-high level of education and 66.4% were 
employed in highly-skilled occupations 
(OECD.stat).2 On the contrary, migration towards 
other Arab countries is mainly low-skilled: according 
to the Egyptian Central Agency for Public 
Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), in 2007 the 
proportion of tertiary educated Egyptians living in 
other Arab countries equalled 26.4% on average 
ranking from 4.1% in Jordan to 71.1% in Bahrain.  
As to their occupational profile, in 2006, foreign 
nationals tended to be employed in low-skilled 
professions (50.5%). Arab and Western European 
nationals had a medium-high occupational profile, 
and respectively 58.8% and 44.5% were employed 
in highly-skilled jobs (e.g. professionals, technicians 
and associate professionals, etc.). 
Otherwise, foreign workers from Eastern 
European countries were, for the most part, 
employed in low-skilled white collar occupations 
(91.6%), predominantly as sales and service 
workers (90.4%). 
 
Flows 
Economic migrants are fewer than refugees, who 
though hardly appear in the official statistics. 
Among refugees, Palestinians form the largest 
group, followed by Sudanese, Somali and Ethiopian 
nationals, who mainly arrived in the 1990s as a 
result of civil wars and political instability in the 
Horn of Africa. In addition, Iraqi refugees have 
increased massively especially since 2006.  
Despite the lack of reliable figures, it seems that 
many refugees do not register with the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR): this is because of the difficulty in 
obtaining refugee status in Egypt (as indicated too 
by the low/high values of the 
acceptance/resettlement rates). Further, a huge 
gap exists between official figures and media or 
NGO estimates. 
18.0
1.5 0.5
11.5 10.7
23.2 54.1
91.6
27.4
39.8
15.0
2.4
0.7
6.1
8.6
43.8 42.1
7.2
55.0
40.8
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Arab countries  
(24 712) 
Western Europe           
(13 012)
Eastern Europe             
(6 224)
Others               
(9 615)
Total               
(53 563)
Employed foreign population by occupation, 2006 (*)
Low skilled blue collar Low skilled white collar
High skilled blue collar High skilled white collar
(*) Occupation is defined according to the ISCO-88 and the European Working 
Conditions Observatory (EWCO).
Source: Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), Egypt.
A brief note on migration from Egypt to Libya 
The Egyptian community is considered one of the 
most important components of the foreign 
population working in Libya, whose presence can be 
partially captured only through a variety of sources. 
The unreliability of Libyan statistics does not help 
here. This gap is, instead, partially filled by Egyptian 
consular statistics according to which, in 2009, there 
were around 2 million Egyptian nationals living in 
Libya. Most are estimated to work irregularly: 
according to a recent survey on Egyptian youth (see 
IOM, 2011), among those who had migrated to 
Libya in the past, the majority entered it without “a 
valid visa” (56.0%) or “a work contract” (8.0%). As to 
their profile, Egyptian workers tend to be employed 
in agriculture and teaching (Pliez, 2004), though the 
aforementioned IOM survey reveals that the great 
majority of young Egyptians in Libya are likely to 
experience a dramatic mismatch between their 
educational and occupational profile (IOM, 2011). 
Moreover, recent data collected by IOM during the 
Libyan civil war (February-November 2011) 
registered 154,634 Egyptian nationals fleeing Libya 
and going back to Egypt.  
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References: International Organization for Migration (IOM). 2011. Egyptian Migration to Libya, IOM; Pliez, O. 2004. De 
l'immigration au transit? La Libye, dans l'espace migratoire euro-africain in Pliez O. (ed.), La nouvelle Libye, Sociétés, 
espaces et géopolitique au lendemain de l'embargo, Karthala, Paris 
Flows 
In the last three decades, notwithstanding high 
fluctuations in outward flows – mainly linked to wars 
in the Gulf and the international embargo against 
Libya – temporary flows towards Arab countries 
exceeded permanent flows to the US and Europe. 
Meanwhile, in the last 15-20 years new 
migration streams directed towards Europe have 
been observed. For instance, in 2011, Italy 
registered the largest inflows of Egyptian nationals 
(12,855) compared with other OECD countries. 
Many of these migrants are poorly educated men in 
irregular situations.  
Two surveys conducted in 1997 (Eurostat) and 
2007 (European Training Foundation) may give 
some idea of the rising importance of Europe for 
Egyptians: among those who desire to migrate. In 
1997 only 6.0% chose Europe as their preferred 
destination, while this percentage had reached 
33.7% by 2007. This pattern is probably due to an 
interplay of factors, including the competition 
Egyptians face in the Arab Gulf from cheap South 
East Asian labour and geographical proximity. 
 
Today, Egypt is the fourteenth main receiver of 
remittances in the world and the second one among 
MENA countries. In the fiscal year 2009/2010 the 
amount of remittances was 9.7 million USD, 5.1% 
of Egyptian GDP. 75.5% of these flows come from 
five countries: UK (50.9%), the US (14.7%), Libya 
(3.5%), Saudi Arabia (3.3%), and United Arab 
Emirates (3.1%). 
 From 1990/91 to 2009/2010, remittances grew 
from 3,775 to 9,706 million USD at an annual 
average growth rate of 8.3%. Until 2003/3004, a 
stable trend was evident, except for a peak in the 
early 1990s, due to: a) an upsurge in oil prices until 
2007, which led to an increase in the demand for 
workers in Arab oil countries; and b) the stability of 
the Egyptian pound. Since 2003/04, remittances 
have, instead, continuously increased. 
 
Sudanese refugees mainly arrived during the 
1990s and 2000s as a consequence of the Civil 
War in Southern Sudan then in Darfur. Their true 
numbers are unknown and estimates are in the 
order of tens of thousands.  
Local conflicts and political instability during the 
1990s were also the cause of massive inflows of 
Somali, Ethiopian and Eritrean nationals.  
The Iraqi refugee exodus, which started shortly 
after the 2003 invasion, began to seriously involve 
Egypt from 2006. According to a survey carried out 
by the Center for Migration and Refugee Studies 
and the Institute of Decision and Support Center of 
Cairo, in 2008 the number of Iraqi refugees stood at 
16,853, a figure which is much lower than the 
100,000-150,000 often claimed. 
Finally, as a consequence of the Libyan civil 
war, Egypt received large numbers of Sub-Saharan 
and Egyptian nationals fleeing Libya. According to 
IOM data, 242,797 migrants reached Egyptian 
borders, among whom 154,634 were Egyptian 
nationals. Of the remaining 88,163 Third Country 
Nationals, around 38,436 were repatriated through 
IOM schemes. 
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Remittances by expatriates to Egypt, million 
USD, 1990/91 - 2009/2010, fiscal year
Source: Ministry of Manpower and Emigration, Emigration Sector 
(1990/91-1998/99); Central Bank of Egypt (1999/2000 - 2009/2010)
Refugees 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Palestine 134 70,195 70,215 70,245 70,255 70,198 70,213 70,174 70,024 70,026 70,029
Sudan 4,659 7,629 14,178 14,904 13,446 12,157 10,499 10,146 9,818 10,035 10,324
Somalia 1,177 1,639 3,068 3,809 3,940 4,317 5,139 5,600 6,096 6,172 6,328
Others 5,883 8,624 15,433 16,250 14,716 13,464 11,931 11,996 11,714 12,086 12,693
Asylum seekers 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Sudan 9,529 6,253 5,726 9,720 2,400 2,523 1,343 782 1,310 1,409 2,735
Somalia 2,559 1,977 224 340 538 1,135 770 450 659 516 713
Ethiopia 545 299 325 289 189 193 248 266 217 183 671
Others 543 473 405 353 352 3,159 1,180 773 423 497 1,057
Acceptance and 
resettlement rate
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Asylum seekers 13,176 8,920 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Recognized refugees 3,921 4,944 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Resettled refugees 2,057 1,716 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Acceptance rate (*) 29.8 55.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Resettlement rate 52.5 34.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Notes: (*) Acceptance rate=(recognized refugees/asylum seekers)*100; (**) Resettlement rate: (resettled refugees/recognized 
refugees)*100
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Refugees and asylum seekers in Egypt, 2001-2011
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The Legal Framework of Migration 
The rules governing foreign nationals’ entry, stay and exit from Egypt, which dated back to the 1960s, were 
modified in 2005. The reform records the dissolution, in 1961, of the United Arab Republic, and submits 
Syrian and Arab citizens to the same entry conditions as other foreign nationals. Sanctions for irregular 
entry were also slightly strengthened. Though, sentences for irregular entry or stay are much lower than 
those adopted during the same period by new legislation in Maghreb countries, and the irregular emigration 
of nationals is not punished. In 2010, Egypt further reformed its penal code to include the crime of human 
trafficking and enumerated punishments for foreigners and nationals, as well as stipulated protection and 
rehabilitation for victims.  
Following Egypt’s revolution in 2011, the country ratified a new Constitution on 26 December 2012. 
While constitutional guarantees such as the right of entry and exit for Egyptian citizens were stipulated in 
the 1971 Constitution, Egypt’s 2012 Constitution introduces rights and protections for Egyptians living 
abroad. Article 56 reads: “The state represents and protects the interests of citizens living abroad, and it 
guarantees their rights and freedoms and holds them to fulfilling their public duties towards the Egyptian 
state and Egyptian society. It encourages their contribution to developing the homeland.” 
The new constitution also affirms the right of political asylum in Article 57: “The state grants asylum to 
foreigners deprived in their home country of rights and freedoms that are guaranteed by the Constitution. 
The extradition of political refugees is prohibited.” 
Concerning access to residence and rights, different treatment is set out for nationals and foreign 
nationals, foreign nationals are then treated differently according to their citizenship, and men and women 
are also treated differently. 
Reformed in 2004, the 1975 Citizenship Law now gives women the right to transmit their nationality to 
their children. The reform’s implementation regarding children born before the adoption of the law varies, 
however, according to the citizenship of any foreign father. 
Egypt receives a large number of refugees whose status is determined by UNHCR, since no national 
procedure exists. Unlike its neighbours (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan) that along with Egypt received most 
Palestinian refugees, Cairo ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention and UNRWA3
                                                          
3 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East. 
 has no competence on its 
territory. Resettlement constitutes a fundamental stake for the development of asylum right in the country. 
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4 Draft Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, signed into law on 26 December 2012 (30 November 2012). 
Retrieved from http://egelections-2011.appspot.com/Referendum2012/dostor_masr_final.pdf.  
5 Protection Project. Law n° 64 of 2010 regarding Combating Human Trafficking. Retrieved from 
http://www.protectionproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/09/Law_regarding_Combating_Human_Trafficking_FINAL.pdf.  
6 CARIM. Law n° 88 of 2005 on the Entry, Stay and Exit of Foreigners on the Territory of Egypt. 
http://www.carim.org/public/legaltexts/LE3EGY1050_839.pdf. 
7 CARIM. Law n° 154 of 14 July 2004. Retrieved from http://www.carim.org/public/legaltexts/LE3EGY1047_834.pdf. 
8 CARIM. Decree 12025 of 26 July 2003. Retrieved from 
http://www.carim.org/public/legaltexts/LE3EGY1047_834.pdf 
9 CARIM. Labour code of 7 April 2003. Retrieved from http://www.carim.org/public/legaltexts/LE2EGY002_EN.pdf 
10 CARIM. Minister of Manpower Decree 136 of 2003. Retrieved from 
http://www.carim.org/public/legaltexts/LE3EGY1049_838.pdf 
11 CARIM. Law n° 111 of 1983 - Law on Emigration and Egyptians Welfare Abroad. Retrieved from 
http://www.carim.org/public/legaltexts/EGYLaw_111_1983.pdf 
Legal 
Framework  
Outward migration Inward migration 
General Legal 
References 
• 2012 Egyptian Constitution of 26 December 20124
• 2010 Law n° 64 of 2010 regarding Combating Human Trafficking
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• 2005 Law n° 88 of 5 May 2005 (entry, residence, and exit of foreigners)
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• 2004 Law n° 154 of 14 July 2004 amending Law n° 26 of 29 May 1975 
(concerning Egyptian nationality)
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• 2003 Decree 12025 of 26 July 2003 (on citizenship)
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• 2003 Labour code of 7 April 2003
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• 2003 Minister of Manpower Decree 136 of 2003 (work of foreigners)
  
10
• 1983 Law n° 111 of 1983 - Law on Emigration and Egyptians Welfare Abroad
 
11  
Entry and Exit Visa 
No exit visa required. But exit is 
submitted to the presentation of a 
passport and is controlled. 
Visa 
Passport (or equivalent) and visa are 
required to enter the country (citizens of 
Hong Kong, Guinea Conakry and 
Macau are exempt from visa 
requirements).  
Irregular 
Migration 
Law n° 88 of 5 May 2005:  
Irregular exit: migrant or the person 
who assists him/her is punished with 
up to a 6 month prison sentence and 
a 200-1,000 pound fine (or one of 
these); 2-5 years prison sentence 
and 1,000-5,000 pounds fine if the 
migrant or violator comes from a 
country in conflict with Egypt or from 
a country with which political 
relations have been cut. 
 
Law n° 88 of 5 May 2005:  
Irregular entry: migrant or the 
person who assists him/her is 
punished with up to a 6 month 
prison sentence and a 200-1,000 
pound fine (or one of these); 2-5 
year prison sentence and 1,000-
5,000 pound fine if the migrant or 
violator comes from a country in 
conflict with Egypt or from a country 
with which political relations have 
been cut. 
Document falsification up to 2-year 
prison sentence and up to 2,000 
pound fine (or one of these).  
Non-compliance of a deportation 
decision prison sentence with labour 
for a period up to 2 years and fine of 
500-2,000 pounds (or one of these).  
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12 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially women and children, and Protocol 
against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime. 
Irregular stay is punished with 
fines. 
Refugees who violate the 
particular reason for entry or stay 
are punished with 200-1,000 pound 
fine and possible deportation.  
Human Trafficking 
 Penalisations: Anyone who has committed the crime of human trafficking is 
punished with imprisonment and a fine from 50,000-200,000 pounds or a fine 
equal to the value of the benefit gained, whichever is greater; aggravating 
circumstances (e.g., victim was a minor) punished with life imprisonment and a 
fine from 100,000-500,000 pounds; threatening or bribing witnesses, 
knowingly concealing the crime, revealing the identity or endangering a 
victim punished with imprisonment; failing to alert the authorities is punished 
with no less than 6 months imprisonment and a fine from 10,000-20,000 pounds 
(Law n° 64 of 2010). 
 Protection of victims: State shall guarantee protection of the victim and work to 
create the appropriate conditions for: assistance, health, psychological, 
educational and social care; rehabilitation and reintegration into the society; and 
return victim to their homeland, if they were a foreigner or a non-permanent 
resident in the State. The State will also return Egyptian victims back to Egypt 
and provide rehabilitation programs (Law n° 64 of 2010).  
Agreements regarding irregular migration 
 Readmission agreements include: 
• EU-Egypt Association Agreement (2004) Egypt agrees to readmit any of 
its nationals illegally present on the territory of a Member State. 
• Italy (2007) for readmission of Egyptian nationals and third-country 
nationals.  
 Other: 
• Greece-Egypt Agreement (1998) on cooperation against transnational 
crime, including the fight against human trafficking and smuggling.  
• In 2002, Egypt ratified Palermo protocols12
• EU-Egypt Association Agreement (2004) stipulates cooperation for the 
prevention and control of illegal migration.  
, which entered into force in 2004. 
EU Neighbourhood Migration Report 2013 
Migration Policy Centre (www.migrationpolicycentre.eu) 81 
                                                          
13 For more information, see: Jacobsen, K. and Ayoub, M. (September 2012). Remittances to Transit Countries: The 
impact on Sudanese refugee livelihoods in Cairo. Retrieved from 
 http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/cmrs/reports/Documents/paper%20No.%203.pdf ; Sudan Tribune. (24 February 
2013). Sudan-Egypt relations hit speed bump over Four Freedoms accord. Retrieved from 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45646; and Badawy, T. (2007). Comments on Egypt’s Report to the 
Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. Retrieved from 
www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cmw/docs/tarek_badawy.doc  
Rights and 
Settlement 
Right to exit: no citizen may be 
prevented from leaving the country 
(Article 42, Constitution). 
No citizen may be deported from the 
country (Article 42, Constitution).  
Protection of Egyptians abroad 
stipulated in the Constitution: the State 
guarantees to safeguard the interests of 
Egyptians living abroad, protect them 
and protect their rights and freedoms, 
help them perform their public duties 
toward the Egyptian State and society, 
and encourage their contribution to the 
development of the nation (Article 56, 
Constitution) 
Diaspora participation in elections 
and referendums is regulated by law 
(Article 56, Constitution) 
Egyptian Diaspora rights as stipulated 
by Law n° 111 of 1983, including: 
recognition of some rights (tax 
exemption from investments, right to be 
reintegrated in civil service); emigration 
permits delivery to “permanent 
migrants”; state commitment to links 
with the diaspora; and registration of 
people willing to emigrate and 
distribution to them of emigration 
opportunities.  
Right to return: no citizen may be 
prevented from returning to the country 
(Article 42, Constitution). 
Stay permits: special (10 years) and 
regular (5 years) residence permits 
handed out in very specific situations 
(persons of Egyptian origin or long-
lasting residence from before 1952).  
Three other permit categories: 5 
years residence (e.g., for investors and 
the wives of Egyptians); 3 years 
residence (e.g., for the husbands of 
Egyptians, some Palestinians, 
refugees); and temporary residence 
(e.g., for students, people whose bank 
account is at least $50,000). 
Family reunification: yes (spouse and 
children, sometimes parents). Different 
treatment of men and women. 
Access to Employment: Subject to 
reciprocity conditions. A maximum of 
10% of a company’s workforce may be 
foreign workers. National preference for 
access to employment. Civil service 
reserved to nationals, and to Arab 
citizens issued from countries 
guaranteeing reciprocity. No access to 
liberal professions, with exceptions. 
Preferential treatment for some 
nationalities (e.g., Greece, Italy, 
Palestine, Sudan, Jordan, Syria). Proof 
of absence of HIV required.  
Access to public services: no equal 
access to public education, except for 
some nationalities. Equal access to 
health service. Access to social security 
after ten years residence. High cost of 
access to university. 
Access to estate ownership: for 
investment or residence. 
The Constitution stipulates that freedom of movement, residence, and immigration 
shall be safeguarded (Article 42).  
Bilateral agreements regarding entry, stay and work 
 In 2004, Egypt and Sudan signed the Four Freedoms Agreement that 
guarantees freedoms of movement, stay, ownership and work for Egyptians and 
Sudanese while in the other’s country. However, there have been reported 
discrepancies regarding implementation of the agreement.13  
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Labour Bilateral agreements related to labour include: Jordan-Egypt Organization of 
Egyptian labour force in (2007); Italy-Egypt agreements, including: in 2005 regulating 
Egyptian labour migration to Italy; Joint Declaration to enhance and regulate seasonal 
labour migration (2010); and Memorandum of Understanding (2011) establishing new 
modalities of cooperation and establishment of Local Coordination Office in Egypt to 
select labour migrants to Italy; and Libya-Egypt agreement (2010) regarding Egyptian 
labour in Libya, especially in construction fields.  
International agreements related to labour include the 1990 Convention on the 
Protection of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Family (ratified with slight 
reservations), and several International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions.  
Citizenship Dual citizenship is allowed for long-
term emigrants (Law n°111 of 1983). 
For others, the acquisition of another 
nationality requires permission from the 
Minister of Interior (Law n° 26 of 1975).  
Law n°54 of 2004 gives women the 
right to transmit their nationality to their 
children. Jus sanguinis by descent of 
father or mother, whatever the 
birthplace. Jus soli: nationality on 
request at the age of majority for 
children born in Egypt, if the foreign 
father was also born in Egypt and 
belongs to an Arab speaking and 
Muslim community; and for persons of 
“Egyptian origin”. Access to nationality 
for foreign women after 2 years of 
marriage with a male citizen. No right to 
nationality through marriage with an 
Egyptian woman. Possible 
naturalization of foreign children born 
and raised in the country.  
International 
Protection 
 Political asylum shall be granted by 
the State to every foreigner deprived in 
their country of public rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the 
Constitution, and no political refugee 
will be extradited (Article 57, 
Constitution). 
Agreement with UNHCR in 1954. 
Recognition of the UNHCR refugee 
status determination and delivery of 
residence permits which must be 
checked every 6 months.  
Egypt lacks a national procedure for 
refugees.  
International agreements related to 
international protection: Egypt ratified 
the 1951 Convention relating to the 
status of refugees (in 1981); the 1967 
Protocol relating to the status of 
refugees (in 1981); the 1969 OAU 
Convention governing specific aspects 
of refugees in Africa (in 1980); and is a 
party to the Protocol for the Treatment 
of Palestinians in Arab States.  
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The Socio-Political Framework of Migration 
An important regional player in migration-agenda setting, Egypt has embarked upon cooperation initiatives 
with Arab and OECD countries. Yet, Egypt’s position as a nexus between the turbulent Middle East, 
Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa routes has also added further challenges to an already encumbered 
migration agenda.14
Irregular migration, including human trafficking, is a policy concern for the Egyptian State. In addition to 
the international legal instruments it has signed to tackle the issue, the Egyptian Government has also 
created the National Coordinating Committee on Combatting and Prevention of Human Trafficking, which 
collaborates with all governmental and non-governmental agencies dealing with human trafficking. In 2010, 
the Committee designed its National Plan of Action Against Human Trafficking (implemented from January 
2011 through January 2013)
 Egypt has, in the last years, received massive inflows of refugees and undocumented 
migrants whose mobility is to a large extent conflict-induced. We cite for example the case of Syrian, Iraqi, 
and Sudanese migrants, but also Somali and Eritrean refugees, the magnitude and desperateness of such 
flows having attracted much international attention in the last years.  
15
In emigration-related fields, Egypt has made sure – at least in its political stances – that Egyptian 
emigration flows are linked to Egypt’s internal development and national imperatives. The Ministry of 
Manpower and Emigration (MME) has consolidated cooperation frameworks with international 
organizations and Arab as well as EU countries with a view to: (a) organizing legal emigration flows; (b) 
stimulating demand for Egyptian labor; (c) curbing irregular emigration from Egypt to Europe; and (d) 
sharing information on irregular migration patterns with selected destination countries.
. 
16 In the longer term 
however, tackling the root causes behind the irregular emigration of Egyptians (unemployment, poverty 
etc.) is a challenge.17
Whereas Egypt has achieved high levels of institutionalization in its emigration policies, the institutional 
framework regulating its immigration apparatus remains frail. For instance, openness to labour immigration 
contributes to the growth of the informal sector (particularly in low skilled workforce sectors such as 
domestic work). Moreover, the absence of a clear framework regarding refugees means large numbers of 
stranded migrants and de facto refugees in the country. Furthermore, while various initiatives in the local 
associative sector have attempted to improve the lot of refugees in the greater Cairo area, there is some 
question over whether civil society initiatives succeed in altering governmental policies.
 
18
 
  
  
                                                          
14 A case in a point are the border tensions between Egypt and Israel as irregular migrants originating from Sub-
Saharan Africa attempt to cross Egyptian borders to Israel.  
15 The Arab Republic of Egypt - National Coordinating Committee on Preventing and Combatting Human Trafficking. 
(2 December 2012). National Plan of Action Against Human Trafficking. Retrieved from 
http://www.ungift.org/doc/knowledgehub/resource-centre/Governments/Egypt_National_Action_Plan_2011-2013-
en.pdf 
16 See Howaida Roman, “Irregular Migration of Egyptians”, CARIM Synthetic Notes 2008, 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/10113/CARIM_AS&N_2008_68.pdf?sequence=1. , p. 8. 
17 Ibid, p. 8-9. 
18 See Samy, “The Impact of Civil Society”, op.cit.  
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19 Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and Emigration. (3 March 2013). Kuwaiti companies request workers in 
construction and building. Retrieved from  
http://www.manpower.gov.eg/(S(f1flxc45jeqr5rivlgqokgf0))/NewsDetails.aspx?MeetingBasicInfo=953 
20 For example, the 2007 agreement signed between Jordan and Egypt extended the registration period for Egyptian 
workers to regularise their status. The Egyptian Government has also called upon irregular Egyptian workers in 
Jordan to regularise their status (for example see: http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/02/04/jordan-offers-
grace-period-for-egyptian-migrant-workers/ ). For more information, see also: The Jordan Times. (26 March 
2013). Authorities crackdown on illegal workers. Retrieved from http://jordantimes.com/article/authorities-halt-
crackdown-on-illegal-workers----official 
21 Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and Emigration. (5 March 2013). Hisham Qandil of Iraq to open the labor market 
between the two countries. Retrieved from 
http://www.manpower.gov.eg/(S(uahk0k454jwbkd55jnmyq455))/NewsDetails.aspx?MeetingBasicInfo=955 
22 See Nadina Sika, “Highly-Skilled Migration Patterns and Development: The Case of Egypt”, CARIM Analytical and 
Synthetic Notes 2010, p.12, retrieved from http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/13454.  
Socio-Political 
Framework Outward migration Inward migration 
Governmental 
Institutions 
• Ministry of Manpower and 
Emigration  
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
• Ministry of Interior 
• Higher Committee for Migration 
• National Coordinating 
Committee on Preventing and 
Combating Human Trafficking 
• Ministry of Interior 
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
• Ministry of Manpower and 
Emigration 
• Higher Committee for Migration 
• National Coordinating Committee 
on Preventing and Combating 
Human Trafficking 
Governmental 
Strategy 
Organise and facilitate legal 
emigration flows by: establishing 
bilateral agreements or frameworks 
with the Arab world (e.g., posting 
foreign jobs on Ministry of Manpower 
and Emigration website and 
assistance in applying for such 
positions –for example, jobs in 
Kuwait19); and OECD countries; 
cooperation with international 
organisations (e.g., IOM); creating 
training centers for would-be migrants; 
legalising irregular Egyptian 
emigration through regularisation by 
negotiating with other destination 
countries (e.g., in Jordan20); 
assessing new labour markets as well 
as security situations in countries to 
provide Egyptians with new jobs and 
ensure safe working environments 
(e.g., in Iraq21); and stimulate the 
demand for Egyptian labour.22
Enhance links with the Egyptian 
Diaspora, including: sponsor 
Egyptians abroad and encourage them 
to establish unions and associations; 
benefit from Egyptian potential abroad 
in the field of development and 
technology; encourage remittances; 
establish an integrated database on 
Egyptians abroad; collect information 
on Egyptian diasporas and their 
profiles by cooperating with 
  
Set up rules concerning the entry and 
residence of foreign nationals. 
Establish recruitment procedures with 
regard to economic immigrants, 
including establishing recruitment 
agencies for hiring skilled foreign labour. 
Recruitment of skilled foreign 
workforce by consolidating bilateral 
cooperation with external parties. 
Fight illegal immigration by cooperating 
with other bodies through joint technical, 
security, policy-making and legislative 
mechanisms. 
Identify refugees and define their status 
and rights and devise action plans 
regarding their presence and stay in 
Egypt; and develop collaborative 
mechanisms to deal with refugees’ stay 
in Egyptian territory with NGOs and 
international organisations (e.g., 
collaboration with UNHCR and WFP, 
among others, to provide for Syrian 
refugees in Egypt).  
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23 For example, the IOM programs in which Egypt participates, including the “Education and Training for Egyptian 
Youth in Fayoum Governorate: Alternatives to Promote Regular Migration and Positive Alternatives” program, and 
the “Stabilizing At-risk Communities and Enhancing Migration Management to Enable Smooth Transitions in 
Egypt, Tunisia and Libya” program. For more information on these programs, see: 
http://www.egypt.iom.int/projects.htm. .  
24 For more information regarding cooperation between Egypt and the IOM regarding cooperation on human 
trafficking, see: http://www.egypt.iom.int/Doc/Counter%20Trafficking%20Fact%20Sheet%20Egypt%20(2012).pdf 
international stakeholders; improving 
Egyptian migrants’ integration in 
receiving contexts (e.g., cooperation 
between the Ministry of Manpower and 
Emigration with the IOM).  
Support policies linking migration 
and development (e.g., previous Joint 
Migration and Development Initiative 
with IOM, UNHCR, European Union 
and the UNDP).  
Fight against and dissuade Egyptian 
irregular emigration by organising 
information and awareness-raising 
campaigns, and providing migrants 
with information on legal migration 
possibilities, and working with 
international organisations to enhance 
migration management.23
Developing information-sharing 
mechanisms with international 
stakeholders in order to mitigate the 
effects of irregular emigration. 
 
Fight against human trafficking with 
creation of the National Coordinating 
Committee to collaborate with Egyptian 
Government and other institutions, and 
cooperation with IOM (e.g., judicial 
trainings and diplomat trainings24). 
Civil Society   Initiatives of Egyptian migrant 
associations as well as professional 
and student Diaspora networks 
aimed at:  
• Protecting emigrants' rights (e.g., 
The Egyptian Organisation for 
Human Rights). 
• Reinforcing ties among Egyptian 
emigrants (e.g., Egyptian 
Association in the United 
Kingdom).  
 Initiatives of research institutions 
aimed at: 
• Researching Egyptian emigration 
(e.g. The Egyptian centre for 
Economic Studies), collecting 
data on the Diaspora and 
carrying out research studies on 
the potential role of Egyptian 
expatriates in their country's 
development. 
 
 Civil society networks and initiatives 
aimed at:  
• Improving regular and irregular 
immigrants' socio-economic and 
cultural rights (e.g., Tadamon, 
Caritas, and Egyptian Initiative for 
Personal Rights). 
• Assisting refugees and developing 
integration projects (e.g., Africa and 
Middle East Refugee Assistance; 
Tadamon; the South Center for 
Human Rights (SCHR); the Somali 
Association for Refugee Affairs). 
 Initiatives of research institutions 
aimed at:  
• Filling in knowledge gaps concerning 
the presence of refugees on Egyptian 
territory [e.g., the survey carried out 
by the American University of Cairo 
together with the Government 
Decision and Support Center 
(GDSC) on Iraqi households in 
Egypt]. 
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International 
Cooperation 
Egypt is a member of several international organisations in which it actively works 
to address issues of migration, including: International Organization for Migration 
(IOM); International Labour Organization (ILO); UNHCR; Arab League; and 
Organization for African Union (OAU), among others. Egypt is a participant to the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and is a member of the Union for the 
Mediterranean (a multilateral partnership within the European Neighbourhood Policy).  
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The Demographic-Economic Framework of Migration  
From the early to mid-nineties the national economic output of Georgia fell by a factor of four. This drastic 
economic decline was complemented by significant flows of people who permanently moved abroad. 
Historically, migration patterns have been heavily influenced by the Georgian civil war in the early 1990s as 
well as ethnic conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Still, the major motivation for most emigrants has 
been to gain employment and improve their economic situation. Emigration flows are mainly directed 
toward the EU, the US and the Russian Federation. 
Immigration stocks in Georgia are relatively small flows in comparison to countries in the CIS region. 
However in the past decade flows have steadily increased. Labour immigrants move to Georgia mostly 
from India, Turkey and China.  
Outward migration Inward migration 
Stock 
According to destination countries’ statistics, 767,489 
or 198,904 Georgian migrants resided abroad in 
years around 2012 (table 1), who represent 
respectively 17.1% or 4.4% of the total population 
residing in Georgia. The huge difference between 
the two estimates depends on whether migrants 
living in Russia are counted according respectively to 
the country of birth or citizenship criterion.  
 
Indeed, in Russia, while individuals born in 
Georgia are 628,973, Georgian citizens stand only 
at 52,918. The former (largest) number is the result 
of large scale ethnic repatriation waves which 
occurred just after the collapse of the USSR, 
whereby a significant amount of persons born in the 
Georgian territory before 1991 with Russian 
descent, decided to ‘return’ to their origin country. 
They are the so-called ethnic Russians who are 
generally not perceived as Georgian emigrants, but 
Russian nationals.  
Significant stocks are also found in Israel 
(44,462) and the US (14,270).  
 
Stock 
In 2002, 74,434 individuals born abroad and 8,058 
foreigners resided in Georgia (1.7% and 0.2% of 
the total population, respectively).  
 
The vast majority of immigrants are from former 
Soviet countries, and especially Russia and 
Ukraine.  
The age distribution of immigrant stocks by age 
highlights that only 10% are 0-14 years of age, 
whereas 29% are within the retirement age range of 
65 years and over. The remaining 61% are of 
working age.  
Half of the immigrant stocks have a medium-
level education to ISCED level 4 (post-secondary, 
non-tertiary education). Of the remaining population 
22% were educated to the tertiary-level and 30% 
were educated to basic education or below.  
Country of residence
Definition 
(a)
Reference date 
(Jan 1st)
Number Number %    %    
9.0 34.6
of which Germany (B) 2012 2.2 8.6
             Greece (A) 2006 1.7 6.7
             Spain (A) 2012 1.4 5.3
635,419 66,834 82.8 33.6
of which Russia (A) 2002 628,973 X 82.0
             Russia (B) 2002 X 52,918 26.6
         Ukraine (B) 2001 0.8 3.2
             Azerbaijan (B) 2009 0.5 2.0
8.3 31.8
of which Israel (A) 2005 5.8 22.4
             US (A) 2011 1.9 7.2
             Turkey (B) 2011 0.2 0.9
767,489 198,904 100.0 100.0
14,270
1,740
Main total
(a): Georgian migrants are defined according to the country of birth (A) or country of nationality (B) criterion 
according to countries of residence, in Russia both numbers are reported.
(b): "Other countries" include Iceland, Liechstein, Norw ay, Sw itzerland, Israel, US, Turkey, Canada, Australia and 
Japan.
Sources: national statistics (Population Censuses, population registers, registers for foreigners, etc.)
CIS countries + Georgia
6,446
4,008
Other countries (b) 63,344
44,462
Table 1 - Georgian emigration stocks by country of residence, most recent data (c. 2012)
European Union 68,726
17,163
13,254
10,501
Country of citizenship/     
country of birth
Number           
(birth)
Number 
(citizenship)
CIS countries 70,922 7,026
of which Russia 38,672 5,316
               Armenia 12,268 859
Ukraine 9,706 360
Azerbaijan 5,780 378
Kazakhstan 1,651 45
Belarus 1,059 20
Uzbekistan 736 12
Moldova 466 24
Kyrgyzstan 242 3
Turkmenistan 197 5
Tajikistan 145 4
Other countries 3,512 1,032
of which Germany 607 81
 Turkey 455 300
Total 74,434 8,058
% of the total population 1.7 0.2
Table 2 - Immigration stocks in Georgia according to 
different criteria, 2002
Source: Population Census - 2002
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It is worth mentioning that Georgian consular 
statistics found stocks to amount to 405,433 
emigrants. Based on country of citizenship criterion, 
these statistics likely include a part of irregular 
migrants - who want to be in a regular position at 
least with their origin country institutions - and some 
second generation migrants. According to these 
figures over half of all migrant stocks are in Russia.  
Migrants are heavily distributed across the 
working ages. As to their gender composition, 
males are much more represented in other former 
Soviet republics (64.0%), while a more gender 
balanced profile is observed in other countries 
(males are 49.2%). 
Georgian migrants tend to be medium-highly 
educated with 45.3% holding a secondary diploma 
and 32.8% a tertiary education. It should be 
mentioned that migrants in OECD countries tend 
however to be higher skilled with the same 
percentage being at 35.7% and 38.7% compared 
with those staying in other former Soviet republics 
(where the same values stand at 53.8% and 27.7%, 
respectively).  
In OECD countries, there are three main 
occupational shares for Georgian emigrants – 
professionals (18.4%), service workers and shop 
and market sales workers (16.4%) and craft and 
related trades workers (14.8%). 
According to the 2002 Georgian Census 
(Emigration module), the main motivation to migrate 
for 78.4% of all emigrants was to improve their 
current economic situation. Study (6.6%) and 
asylum (1.1%) were the other motivations of note. 
Skills mismatch is a likely trend amongst Georgian 
stocks, as one in four potential migrants has been 
found not to have a particular job preference. 
Instead gaining employment is their major aim. For 
example, potential emigrants are willing to accept 
lowly qualified jobs such as domestic 
help/caregiving. 
Flows 
According to Georgian official statistics, in 2000s 
Georgia experienced a positive migration balance 
except for the year 2000 because of the ‘Rose’ 
revolution and for the 2009-2011 period. However, 
these data do not include either irregular migration 
- which is said to be a large phenomenon in 
Georgia (Badurashvili, 2012) – or temporary 
migration to Russia.  
To deal with this, looking at the evolution of 
remittances of expatriates from Georgia as a rough 
proxy of migrants’ stock and their annual variations as 
flow proxies seems a reasonable exercise (figure 1). 
Flows 
Data on residence permits granted to foreign people 
in 2009-2011 signals that temporary migration to 
Georgia is the more popular migration option in 
comparison to permanent migration (table 3). 
 
Among recent temporary migrants, the most 
represented nationalities are from India, Turkey and 
China (table 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Temporary 
permits (T)
Permanent 
permits (P)
Total Ratio T/P
2009 2,725 1,350 4,075 2.0
2010 4,858 2,530 7,388 1.9
2011 (Jan-Apr) 1,524 632 2,156 2.4
Table 3 - Granted residence permits to foreign citizens by type of permit,                 
2009-Jan/2011-Apr
Source: National Statistics Office - Georgia
Country of 
citizenship
2009 2010 2011         
(Jan-Apr)
Total
India 390 1,645 448 2,483
Turkey 981 1,020 276 2,277
China 404 904 400 1,708
Russia 184 218 46 448
Others 766 1,071 354 2,191
Total 2,725 4,858 1,524 9,107
Table 4 - Granted temporary residence permits by country of citizenship,            
2009-Jan/2011-Apr
Source: National Statistics Office - Georgia
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Figure 1 seems to show that emigration started 
to be significant since 2004, without interruption till 
2009 (one year after the start of the global 
economic recession) and started again to increase 
in 2010.  
In 2010, remittances equalled 8.1% of the GDP 
with Russia being the first country of origin of 
remittances. 
 
References: Badurashvili, I. 2012. The Socio-Political Impact of Labour Migration on Georgia. , Carim-East Research 
Report 2012/21, Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole. 
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Figure 1 - Remittances sent to Georgia by country of 
origin of remittances, thousand USD, 2003-2010
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Source: Central Bank of Georgia
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The Legal Framework of Migration 
In 1993, soon after independence, the Georgian Parliament adopted several laws, which constituted a core 
of the migration legislation: the Law on the Citizenship of Georgia; the Law on Foreigners’ Temporary Entry 
into, Stay in and Exit from Georgia; the Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners; the Law on Immigration, and 
the Law on Emigration. It took a relatively long time before a legislative act regulating the granting of 
refugee status was adopted by the Parliament in 1998, which was declared invalid recently upon the entry 
into force of the Law on Refugee and Humanitarian Status on 18 March 2012.  
The most important event with regard to regulating migration was the adoption of the new Law on Legal 
Status of Foreigners on 27 December 2005, which came into force on 1 July 2006, declaring invalid the 
previous Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners, the Law on Temporary Entry of Foreigners as well as the 
Law on Immigration. The aforementioned law is a legal document regulating legal grounds of foreign 
citizens’ entry into, stay in and exit from Georgia, determining their legal status and regulating most of the 
relations with participation of foreign citizens. The abovementioned Law on Emigration was declared void 
on 2 February 2009 when its provisions were incorporated in the Law on the Rules of Georgian Citizen’s 
Entry into and Exit from Georgia, which was renamed in the “Law of Georgia on the Rules of Georgian 
Citizen’s Entry into and Exit from Georgia”. 
As to the legislation on citizenship, worth mentioning are the amendments of 6 December 2004 to the 
Constitution of Georgia and the Constitutional Law on Citizenship of Georgia which empowered the 
President of Georgia to grant citizenship to a citizen of a foreign country who has a special merit before 
Georgia or whose citizenship is in the state’ interest. 
Finally, at the end of 2011, the Law on Compatriots Living Abroad and Diaspora Organizations was 
adopted (it entered into force on 1 March 2012), which, among other, defines the basis for acquiring the 
status of compatriots living abroad and benefits deriving from that status.  
Legal Framework Outward migration Inward migration 
General legal 
references 
Legal framework governing migration and mobility 
2011 Law on the Refugee Status and Humanitarian Status 
2011 Law Compatriots Living Abroad and Diaspora Organizations 
2009 (1993) Law on the Rules of Georgian Citizen’s Entry into and Exit from 
Georgia 
2006 Law on Combating Human Trafficking 
2005 Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners 
1996 Law on the Rules of Registration of Georgian Citizens and Foreigners 
Residing in Georgia 
1995 Constitution of Georgia 
1993 Law on the Citizenship of Georgia 
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Entry and Exit Visa 
Georgian citizens are exempted from 
the visa requirements in Mongolia, 
Turkey and the CIS countries, except for 
the Russian Federation. 
- EU-Georgia Visa Facilitation 
Agreement is in force since 1 March 
2011. The EU-Georgia Visa Dialogue 
with a view to visa-free travel of GE 
citizens to the Schengen MS was 
launched in June 2012, and the relevant 
Visa Liberalisation Action Plan, which 
needs to be implemented by Georgia 
before the visa requirement for GE 
citizens is waved, was handed to 
Georgian government by Commissioner 
Malmström in February 2013. 
Cross-border mobility 
According to Art. 22.2 of the 
Constitution, everyone legally residing in 
Georgia shall be free to leave Georgia. 
This right may be restricted only: in 
accordance with the law; in the interests 
of securing national security or public 
safety; for the protection of health; for 
the prevention of crime; and for the 
administration of justice that is 
necessary for maintaining a democratic 
society. Special restrictions regarding 
the exit of citizens of Georgia are set in 
the Law on the Rules of Georgian 
Citizen’s Entry into and Exit from 
Georgia. In particular, a Georgian 
citizen may be refused to exit Georgia if 
he/she is wanted by the law 
enforcement agencies of Georgia or if 
he/she has presented any invalid or 
false documents. 
Reference should also be made to 
the Decree of the President of Georgia 
of 27 February 2012, No 142 regulating 
the issue, validity and use of the return 
certificate to Georgia, which is a 
document to be issued to Georgian 
citizens in specific cases so that they 
can return to Georgia. 
Visa 
Georgia has in place a visa-free regime 
for the citizens of more than 90 
countries (including the CIS and 
EU/EFTA MS) 
- 4 types of visa exist: diplomatic, 
service, ordinary, study. Diplomatic, 
service and ordinary visas can be for 
stays up to 90 or 360 days; study visas 
are up to 360 days. 
Cross-border mobility 
Foreigners can enter the territory of 
Georgia and exit from Georgia through the 
border checkpoints open for international 
travel when they have a valid travel 
document and a stay permit in Georgia. 
The types of stay permits are: a) GE Visa; 
b) residence permit; c) Certificate of 
temporary residence for a refugee or a 
person with humanitarian status.  
An foreigner may be denied entry 
into GE, if a) he/she does not have 
documents required for entry into GE; b) 
there were established facts of violation 
of the GE Criminal Law during his/her 
previous stay in GE, or during the last 
year before submission of an 
application, the person concerned was 
expelled or has not paid the fine 
imposed for illegal stay in GE; c) he/she 
has presented any false information or 
documents in order to receive a visa or 
enter GE; d) he/she does not have 
sufficient financial means for staying 
and living in GE, or for returning back; 
e) his/her presence in GE may pose 
threat to public order and security, to the 
protection of health, or to the rights and 
legitimate interests of citizens and 
residents of GE; f) his/her presence in 
GE will harm relationships between the 
latter and any other foreign country; g) 
he/she does not provide information or 
provides false information about 
himself/herself and his/her travel 
intentions; h) other grounds for refusal 
envisaged by the legislation of Georgia. 
Refusal to enter Georgia has to be 
made in a written form indicating 
grounds for refusal. 
Irregular 
migration 
The Agreement between the European 
Union and Georgia on the Readmission 
of Persons Residing without 
Authorization was signed on 22 
November 2010 and came into force on 
1 march 2011. It has concluded before 
readmission agreements with Italy 
(signed in 1997, not entered into force), 
The Criminal Code sets sanctions for 
the illegal crossing of Georgian borders 
(Article 344) and for assisting a migrant 
in illegal border crossing (Art. 3441). The 
violation of the rules of stay/residence 
and illegal employment of foreigners are 
administrative infringements. 
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Bulgaria (2003), Switzerland (2005), 
Germany (2008) and Latvia (2009). The 
most recent readmission agreement 
was signed on 10 November 2011 
between Georgia and the Kingdom of 
Norway (it came into force on 3 
February 2012).  
The Readmission Agreement 
concluded between the EU and Georgia 
does not supersede all previous 
agreements between individual Member 
States and Georgia. However, its 
provisions take precedence over the 
provisions of any bilateral agreement. 
For example, under the EU-Georgia 
readmission agreement, a readmission 
application must be replied to within 12 
calendar days. The Agreement between 
GE and Bulgaria sets 30 days as the 
time limit for replying a readmission 
agreement. In such cases of difference 
as this, the provisions of the EU-
Georgia Readmission Agreement take 
precedence. 
The Decree of the President of 
Georgia of 26 April 2011, N225 
designates the Ministry of Interior as the 
competent authority for the 
implementation of the EU-Georgia 
readmission agreement. 
Georgia has concluded a 
readmission agreement with Ukraine in 
2004 and a relevant readmission 
protocol in 2005. 
 
After the loss of the right to stay and 
before being apprehended, a foreigner, 
although de jure in irregular situation, 
can depart independently within 10 
days. In this case neither administrative 
fine nor an entry ban is imposed. After 
10 days, the border guard fines the 
foreigner. The fine can be paid either 
before or after leaving the territory. No 
entry ban will be imposed as long as the 
fine is paid. 
A foreigner who entered or stays 
illegally or who poses a risk to public 
policy, public security or national 
security can be expelled from Georgia. 
The decision-making body in case of 
illegal entry/stay is the Ministry of 
Justice while in other cases it is a court 
of justice. If the decision is taken by the 
Ministry of Justice, 3 days are fixed for 
independent departure (non-compliance 
leads to forced expulsion). A court’s 
decision on expulsion has to be 
implemented immediately (i.e. forced 
expulsion carried out by the National 
Bureau of Enforcement).  
Administrative detention is possible 
for the purposes of identification or 
carrying out the expulsion decision. 
After 48h, a court’s decision is needed. 
No time limit for such a detention is set. 
1 year entry ban is imposed in case of 
expulsion.  
Georgia ratified the so-called 
Palermo Protocols on THB and 
smuggling in 2006. 
2006 Law Combating Trafficking in 
Persons lays down legal and 
organisational grounds for preventing 
and combating trafficking in persons in 
Georgia. It also defines the 
responsibilities and obligations of state 
agencies, officials and legal bodies, as 
well as the rules for the coordination of 
their activities. The Law determines the 
legal status of victims of trafficking and 
sets guarantees to their social and legal 
protection. 
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Rights and 
settlement 
The Georgian legislation provides 
citizens of Georgia with the right to exit 
from Georgia for permanent residence 
to another state.1 Whereas, Georgian 
citizens who decide to emigrate from 
Georgia have to obtain an emigration 
permit.2
The Georgian legislation provides for 
a special status of compatriots and 
Diaspora organizations. A compatriot 
residing abroad is defined as a citizen of 
Georgia, who resides in other state for a 
long period of time, or a citizen of other 
state, who is of Georgian descent 
or/and whose native language belongs 
to the Georgian-Caucasian language 
group. The Georgian descent means 
when a person or his/her ancestor 
belongs to any ethnic group living within 
the territory of Georgia, and recognizes 
Georgia as own country of origin.
 In practice, most emigrants do 
not apply for it. Consequently, the 
numbers of the emigrants registered by 
Georgian authorities do not reflect the 
scale of emigration from Georgia.  
3 A 
Diaspora organization is defined as 
community established pursuant to the 
laws of the state of residence, for the 
purpose of popularization of Georgian 
culture, national language and 
traditions, initiation of communication 
between the diasporas, cooperation with 
Georgia in cultural, scientific and 
technical, and other fields.4 Persons 
with a status of compatriots living 
abroad are allowed to enter Georgia 
without visa and stay in Georgia for up 
to 30 days.5 They also have the right to 
receive state study grants for secondary 
and higher education.6 In case of the 
approval of a respective sport’s 
governing body, compatriots living 
abroad will have an opportunity to 
represent Georgia at sport events.7  
Foreigners have the same rights as the 
citizens with the exception of the right to 
found/join or donate to political parties, 
vote in national or local elections. 
Foreigners qualify to social and 
retirement benefits if they have legally 
resided in Georgia during the last 10 
years. Persons with asylum, refugee or 
humanitarian status have the same 
rights to education as Georgian citizens. 
There are two types of residence 
permits in Georgia: temporary and 
permanent.  
The temporary residence permit is 
issued for no more than six years to a 
foreigner who: a) has been engaged in 
labour activities in Georgia; b) has 
arrived in Georgia for the purpose of 
medical treatment or study; c) has been 
invited by a relevant governmental 
agency, as a highly skilled expert or a 
cultural worker and such invitation is in 
the interests of Georgia; d) is a guardian 
or custodian of a Georgian citizen; e) is 
under the guardianship or custody of a 
Georgian citizen; f) is a family member a 
GE citizen or of a foreign citizen having 
a residence permit in Georgia; g) upon a 
grounded assumption can be a victim of 
trafficking; h) has been suspended 
citizenship of Georgia.  
The permanent residence permit is 
issued, as a rule, to: a) a foreigner who 
has legally lived in Georgia for the last 
six years, excluding the living period for 
study or medical treatment and working 
period within the diplomatic and 
equivalent representation; b) a family 
member of a GE citizen; c) highly 
qualified specialists-technicians, 
sportsmen and art workers whose 
arrival is in the interests of Georgia; d) a 
person who has been suspended 
citizenship of Georgia. 
                                                          
1 Article 3 (1) of the Law on the Rules of Georgian Citizen’s Entry into and Exit from Georgia. 
2 Article 20 of the Law on the Rules of Georgian Citizen’s Entry into and Exit from Georgia. 
3 Article 3 (b) and (c) of the Law on Diaspora Organizations and Compatriots. 
4 Article 3 (g) of the Law on Diaspora Organizations and Compatriots. 
5 Article 11 (1) (c) of the Law on Diaspora Organizations and Compatriots; Article 4 (54) of the Law on Legal Status of 
Foreigners. 
6 Article 11 (1) (d) of the Law on Diaspora Organizations and Compatriots; Article 22 (7) of the Law on General 
Education; Articles 80 and 801 of the Law on Higher Education. 
7 Article 11 (1) (a) of the Law on Diaspora Organizations and Compatriots; Article 20 (4) of the Law on Sport. 
GEORGIA 
96 Migration Policy Centre (www.migrationpolicycentre.eu) 
A foreign citizen having a residence 
permit in Georgia has to register him or 
herself at the place of his or her 
residence within one month after 
entering the territory of Georgia or in 
case of being on the territory of Georgia 
after receiving the residence permit. 
Labour Accession to the ILO Discrimination 
(Employment and Occupation) 
Convention in 1995. Accession to the 
ILO Convention on Private Employment 
Agencies in 2002. 
In 1996, Georgia ratified Revised 
European Social Charter. Among those 
provisions of the Charter which are 
binding for Georgia is Article 19 which 
deals with the right of migrant workers 
and their families to protection and 
assistance. Though, the Revised Social 
Charter is not yet ratified by eleven 
member states of the Council of Europe, 
including Germany, the Czech Republic 
and the United Kingdom. This reduces 
the application area of the Charter. 
According to Art. 20 of the 1996 EC-
Georgia Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement, “the Community and the 
Member States shall endeavour to 
ensure that the treatment accorded to 
Georgian nationals legally employed in 
the territory of a Member State shall be 
free from any discrimination based on 
nationality, as regards working 
conditions, remuneration or dismissal, 
as compared to its own nationals.” 
In the framework of the EU-Georgia 
Mobility Partnership signed in 2009, 
Georgia is the process of negotiating 
two labour migration agreements: one 
with Germany and another with France. 
There are also other measures enacted 
by some individual EU MS in the 
framework of the MP, which aim to 
support circular or temporary migration 
of GE citizens. In particular, Georgian 
Citizens can take up temporary 
employment in Poland without a work 
permit, and Germany allows Georgian 
citizens who have legal residence 
permits in Germany to leave Germany 
for longer periods (up to two years) than 
the usual six months without losing their 
residence titles. 
The Georgian legislation stipulates 
some limitations only with regard to the 
employment in the public service and 
also to becoming an attorney and 
occupying a notary’s position. The 
Labour Code and the Law on 
Entrepreneurs do not provide for any 
limitations for foreigners to engage in 
employment relations or establish 
commercial legal entities or get 
registered as individual entrepreneurs in 
Georgia.  
In order to enter Georgia for work 
purposes and perform labour activities 
in Georgia foreigners do not need to 
obtain work permits. They may enter 
into Georgia with ordinary visas, unless 
they fall under the visa exemptions. 
Ordinary visa is issued for a period of 
360 days, in the case of issuing ordinary 
visas at the border crossing points – for 
a period up to 90 days. After the expiry 
of the validity period of the ordinary visa, 
a foreign citizen willing to work or study 
in Georgia has to obtain a temporary 
residence permit. A temporary 
residence permit in Georgia is issued to 
those foreign citizens willing to stay in 
Georgia for not more than six years who 
are engaged in labour activity. After 6 
years the person may apply for a 
permanent residence permit. In order to 
obtain a temporary residence permit on 
the basis of performing labour activities 
in Georgia the foreign citizen has to 
submit along with other necessary 
documents a document confirming 
labour activity in Georgia (labour 
contract or any other employment 
document); for persons of free 
profession - a certificate from bank, 
depicting turnover of sums on his/her 
personal account for the last year. The 
termination of residence permit occurs 
automatically upon the expiry of its 
validity period. One of the grounds for 
termination of the term of stay in 
Georgia is the termination of labour 
activities on the ground of which the 
residence permit was obtained. 
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Citizenship Dual citizenship is not allowed for 
citizens of Georgia, unless granting 
Georgian citizenship to the person is in 
the interest of the Georgian state or if 
the person has made special 
contribution to the Georgia state 
(granted by the president). 
The grounds for termination of 
citizenship of Georgia are: a) withdrawal 
from citizenship of Georgia; b) loss of 
citizenship of Georgia; c) other 
circumstances provided for by 
international treaties of Georgia. 
A person loses citizenship of 
Georgia if he or she: a) enters into 
military service, police, bodies of justice, 
government or state power of a foreign 
state, without permission of competent 
bodies of Georgia; b) permanently 
resides on the territory of another state 
and has not registered in the consulate 
within two years, without due excuse; c) 
has acquired citizenship of Georgia by 
providing false documents; d) obtains 
citizenship of another state. 
In 2011, Georgia acceded to the 
Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons. 
Georgian citizenship is based primarily 
on the principle of jus sanguinis. 
Namely, a child whose parents were 
citizens of Georgia as of the date of its 
birth is a citizen of Georgia regardless of 
the place of birth. In the case where 
only one of the parents is a Georgian 
citizen, the child is considered to be a 
citizen of Georgia if it was born: a) on 
the territory of Georgia; b) outside the 
borders of Georgia but one of the 
parents has a permanent place of 
residence on the territory of Georgia; c) 
one of the parents, at the date of a birth 
of a child (regardless of the place of 
birth) is a citizen of Georgia and the 
other is a stateless person or unknown. 
Where only one of parents is a 
Georgian citizen and both of the parents 
reside outside the territory of Georgia, 
the question of citizenship of the child 
born outside the borders of Georgia 
shall be determined by an agreement of 
parents. In the absence of such 
agreement - by the legislation of the 
state of birth.  
Preconditions for naturalization are: 
5 years of permanent residence, 
knowledge of the Georgian language, 
history and legislation, legal means of 
income or real estate in Georgia or 
shares in either capital or stocks of 
companies, registered in Georgia. 
Facilitated naturalization for persons 
with merit to Georgia or mankind or 
profession or qualifications, which are of 
interest to Georgia, for spouses of 
Georgian citizens and for persons with 
repatriate status. 
International 
Protection 
Georgia ratified 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention and the 1967 New York Protocol 
in 1999. 
The Georgian legislation differentiates between the procedures of granting of 
asylum, the refugee status and the humanitarian status. Asylum is granted by the 
President of Georgia, whereas the refugee status and the humanitarian status are 
granted by the Ministry of IDP, Accommodation and Refugees. 
Asylum is granted to those foreigners who are persecuted in their home countries 
for promoting human rights protection and peace, as well as for carrying out 
progressive socio-political, scientific and other intellectual activities. Asylum is 
granted by the President of Georgia, whereas the refugee status and the 
humanitarian status are granted by the Ministry of IDPs from the Occupied 
Territories, Accommodation and Refugees.  
A refugee status may be granted to a person who is not a Georgian citizen and 
is not a stateless person permanently residing in Georgia and owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country 
of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
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of the protection of that country or to return it8. As to the humanitarian status, it can 
be obtained by a person, who cannot fulfil the requirements of the refugee status, 
but is unable to return to his or her place of permanent residence due to certain 
humanitarian reasons9
After illegally crossing the border, a person seeking asylum in Georgia is 
obliged to apply to a state body within 24 hours. The Ministry of IDPs, 
Accommodation and Refugees has to reach a decision on the registration of the 
person as asylum seeker within 10 days from the date of filing the application.
. 
10
Persons who apply for protection in Georgia are offered accommodation in the 
asylum reception centre.
 
The decision on the granting to the person a refugee or humanitarian status is 
made by the Ministry within 6 months after the registration, whereas, this period 
may be extended by up to 9 months. 
11
Persons with the refugee or humanitarian status receive the temporary residence 
permit. 
 Persons who were granted the refugee or humanitarian 
status has the right to stay in the reception centre up to 3 months and then either to 
choose accommodation provided by Ministry of IDPs, Accommodation and 
Refugees or find their own accommodation. 
                                                          
8 Article 2 of the Law on Refugee and Humanitarian Status. 
9 Article 4 of the Law on Refugee and Humanitarian Status. 
10 Article 12 (1) of the Law on Refugee and Humanitarian Status. 
11 Article 18 (1) (b) of the Law on Refugee and Humanitarian Status. 
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The Socio-Political Framework of Migration 
Due to Georgia’s geopolitical location and its demographic and economic development, the migration 
process management is one of the priorities in the country. Local politicians are well aware of the potential 
economic and demographic consequences resulting from large-scale labour emigration. At the same time, 
they are aware of the benefits that could be derived from the remittances sent by the migrants to their 
country of origin, and the Georgian Diaspora’s contribution to this process. In terms of the development of 
migration processes, Georgia is a country of both origin and destination and transit. Prior to the “Rose 
Revolution”, the need for migration regulation was not present in the political priorities of the ruling party. 
Several laws regulating the migration sphere at the time have been declared ineffective today or amended 
legislatively substantially. Since 2004, fundamental institutional reforms have been carried out and strategic 
goals for Georgia’s foreign policy have been defined. In order to promote regional stability, the strategic 
document of Georgia’s foreign policy for 2006-2009 sought to fight illegal migration and establish a 
respective legislative base for legal employment of Georgian citizens abroad. Migration regulation is also 
one of the priorities in terms of cooperation between Georgia and the European Union. In the early spring 
2013 the government adopted a new State Strategy on Migration (see below). 
In order to determine overall policy line of Georgia’s government for internal and external migration and 
improve the state system for migration management, the Governmental Commission on Migration Issues was 
established in fall 2010. It comprises the following entities: the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, the Ministry of IDPs, Accommodation and Refugees, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of 
Economy and Sustainable Development, the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Protection, the Ministry of 
Finance, the Office of the State Minister for Diaspora Issues and the National Statistics Office. 
Socio-Political 
Framework Outward migration Inward migration 
Governmental 
Institutions 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs through its 
consulates protects the rights of 
Georgian citizens abroad and keeps 
record of registered migrants, provides 
them with consular services. 
The Office of the State Minister of 
Georgia for Diaspora Issues works with 
Diaspora organisations, creates contact 
databases of these organizations and 
Diaspora members, supports various 
cultural events to foster links between 
Georgia and its Diaspora. 
Ministry of Internally Displaced 
Persons from the Occupied Territories, 
Accommodation and Refugees works 
mainly on social and economic 
reintegration of refugees and IDPs in 
Georgia, and return migrants, including 
returnees, readmitted in accordance 
with the readmission agreements (see 
above).  
 
Asylum: Public Service Development 
Agency (formerly: the Civil Registry 
Agency) of the Ministry of Justice is 
responsible for issuing travel documents 
for stateless persons and refugees, 
residing in Georgia. Ministry of Internally 
Displaced Persons from the Occupied 
Territories, Accommodation and Refugees 
is responsible for the policies regarding 
refugees, asylum seekers, internally 
displaced persons, return migrants, 
repatriation, disaster victims, and 
resettlement. The Ministry is in charge of 
the refugee status determination and 
granting refugee or humanitarian statuses. 
Border Management: Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, namely its Patrol Police 
Department (PPD) is responsible for 
border management and border protection 
of the country. PPD is also responsible for 
issuing visas at the state border. 
Legal and Labour Migration: Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs through its consulates 
issues visas abroad. Ministry of 
Justice/Public Service Development 
Agency (formerly: the Civil Registry 
Agency) issues temporary and permanent 
residence permits. Ministry of Internally 
Displaced Persons from the Occupied 
Territories, Accommodation and Refugees 
is responsible for monitoring of processes 
connected to labour migration. 
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Irregular migration: Ministry of 
Internally Displaced Persons from the 
Occupied Territories, Accommodation and 
Refugees works to prevent illegal/irregular 
migration. Ministry of Internal Affairs/Patrol 
Police Department controls the borders to 
ensure the legal regime of the Georgian 
state border; to combat irregular migration 
and trafficking in human beings. 
Citizenship: The President of Georgia 
has the authority to grant/revoke 
citizenship, grant dual citizenship. Public 
Service Development Agency of the 
Ministry of Justice is responsible for issuing 
citizenship documents, processing 
citizenship applications and preparing 
relevant conclusions for the President. 
Governmental 
Strategy 
The newly adopted State Migration 
Strategy aims at: 
− Supporting legal emigration 
(providing assistance to Georgian 
citizens for emigrating legally, 
getting temporary employment 
abroad, also supporting educational 
exchange programs and raising 
awareness of the public);  
− Supporting Georgian citizens’ 
repatriation and reintegration with 
dignity (the implementation of the 
international treaties and national 
legislation with regard to the return 
of Georgian citizens, reintegration 
of Georgian citizens, strengthening 
of the capacities of the institutions 
involved in reintegration process 
and development of a legal 
framework, the increase of 
awareness with respect to 
reintegration, recognition of the 
skills and education acquired 
abroad). 
The newly adopted State Migration 
Strategy aims at: 
− Supporting legal immigration; 
− Fighting and preventing illegal migration 
(enhancement of combating against 
human trafficking and illegal smuggling 
of migrants across borders and 
improvement of relevant mechanisms, 
general public awareness raising, 
identification of legal deficiencies and 
their follow-up elimination, institutional 
development, improvement of inter-
agency and international cooperation, 
implementation of preventive activities, 
improvement of shelter (refuge) system 
and the process of refugees’ 
integration);  
− Developing an asylum system 
(formation of a legal and institutional 
framework within the asylum system, 
the development of an efficient system 
for obtaining information on the country 
of origin, further improvement of the 
integration mechanism for refugees 
and the persons under humanitarian 
status and provision for their 
employment, education and healthcare, 
creation of favourable conditions for the 
persons living in a reception centre);  
Civil Society  Civil Development Agency (CiDA) 
Open Society Georgia Foundation 
United Nations Association of Georgia 
Danish Refugee Council 
Eurasia Partnership Foundation 
People’s Harmonious Development 
Society 
Innovations and Reforms Centre 
Liberal Academy – Tbilisi 
Georgian Young Lawyers Association 
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Migration and 
development 
Strengthening cooperation with Georgian diasporas abroad has already become one 
of the major goals reflected within the Foreign Policy Strategy of Georgia, strategy 
documents for migration and the EU-Georgia Joint Declaration on Mobility Partnership 
signed in 2009. In 2008, the Office of the State Minister for Diaspora Issues has been 
established in Georgia. Since that time, the Parliamentary Committee for Diaspora and 
the Caucasus Region Issues has started working on the affairs related to Georgian 
compatriots residing abroad. The joint efforts undertaken by these two agencies 
resulted in adopting a “Law of Georgia on Compatriots and Diaspora Organizations 
Residing Abroad” in 2011, a major step taken forward in this direction. As mentioned 
above, granting the status of compatriots according to the law gives certain 
advantages: the certificate holders may enter the territory of Georgia without a visa; 
they can get state-funded general and higher education, while being able to participate 
in various targeted programs designated for diasporas and financed by state. In 
compliance with the action plan for 2011 developed by the Office of the State Minister 
for Diaspora Issues, some of the priorities of the Office included economy, education 
and culture. In terms of economy, the Office is planning to attract diasporas 
investments, arrange business forums and promote the attraction of labour migrants’ 
savings and investments into Georgian economy; propose and popularize specific 
projects based on active cooperation with respective state agencies.  
International 
Cooperation 
Georgia is a member of the following forums actively working on migration issues: 
IOM, Council of Europe, and OSCE. It participates in the following regional processes: 
Budapest Process, Prague Process, and Eastern Partnership. It is subject to the 
European Neighbourhood Policy and Black Sea Synergy.  
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The Demographic-Economic Framework of Migration 
Various forms of migration movements from, to and through Jordan have played a key role in shaping the 
country’s demographic, economic and political structure.  
As to emigration patterns, since the 1973 oil price increases, large outflows of Jordanian citizens – 
mainly highly-skilled and of Palestinian origins – emigrated overseas and towards the oil-producing states, 
states which still represent today the most important destination for Jordanians.  
In the same period, Jordan became the recipient of unskilled and semi-skilled workers destined to fill 
shortages in the agrarian, construction and service sectors. Considered as a sort of replacement migration, 
today’s foreign workers are fundamental in the Jordanian labor market. However, the combination of high 
levels of unemployment among nationals and large numbers of foreign workers is much debated. 
Furthermore, being at the crossroads of two major areas of instability and prolonged conflicts, Jordan has 
become a destination for several waves of forced migrants from Palestine –the majority of whom were 
granted Jordanian citizenship – but also forced migrants from Lebanon, Iraq and, recently, Syria.  
Outward migration Inward migration 
Stock 
Data on Jordanians abroad are scarce and 
fragmentary. Only by using origin and destination 
sources, can a quantitative picture of the 
phenomenon be partially traced.1
 
  
In 2009, according to the national Ministry of 
Labor, Jordanians residing in oil-producing 
countries stood at 140,722. The majority of them 
lived in the United Arab Emirates (39.0%), Saudi 
Arabia (36.2%), Kuwait (13.4%) and Qatar (6.8%). 
As to the rest of the world, the most recent data (c. 
2012) would put the figure at 177,901, of whom a 
very large proportion (41.7%) live in the US. 31.6% 
live, instead, in other southern and eastern 
Mediterranean (SEM) countries and ‘only’ 18.6% in 
the European Union. The total number of Jordanian 
migrants thus stands at 339,755, or 5.4% of the 
total population in Jordan. Men represent 52.4%.  
Stock 
In 2004, according to census data, 342,273 foreign 
nationals resided in Jordan or 7.7% of the total 
resident population. Among them, 191,307 were 
economically active – or 13.2% of the total active 
population – of which 178,636 were employed. The 
unemployment rate of foreign nationals was thus 
estimated at 6.6% vs 22.8% of the total resident 
population and 25.2% among Jordanian nationals. 
In this regard, the Census revealed the seriousness 
of unemployment in Jordan which, until the 
dissemination of the Census results, was instead 
estimated at ‘only’ 12.5% by the 2004 Employment 
and Unemployment Survey.  
 
Foreign nationals came mainly from other Arab 
Asian countries (52.5%) especially Palestine 
(29.4%), Iraq (10.2%) and Syria (9.7%) and Arab 
African countries (30.0%) – of which the vast 
majority were Egyptian nationals (28.7%). 
                                                          
1 For Jordan, the issue of where emigrants are counted emerges strikingly. Indeed, using statistics provided by 
destination countries would underestimate Jordanian emigrants since the Gulf states (the main destination for 
Jordanians) do not disseminate data on population by nationality; on the other hand, using only Jordanian 
statistics is not feasible either since the Ministry of Labor does not collect data on destination countries from the 
“oil-producing countries”. Finally, the national Census only considers migrants away from home for less than one 
year, leading again to an underestimation of emigrants. 
UAE 54,834 33.9 European Union 33,066 18.6
Qatar 50,928 31.5 of which UK (2012) 9,000 5.1
Kuwait 30,748 19.0                 Germany (2012) 7,686 4.3
Oman 18,888 11.7                 Italy (2012) 3,260 1.8
Saudi Arabia 3,396 2.1 SEM countries (b) 56,295 31.6
Libya 3,060 1.9 of which Palestine (2007) 50,350 28.3
Total 161,854 100.0 Other countries (b) 88,540 49.8
of which US (2011) 74,166 41.7
                Canada (2006) 7,920 4.5
Total 177,901 100.0
(a) : In destination countries' statistics, Jordanian migrants are defined according to the country of birth (A) 
or country of citizenship (B) criterion according to countries of residence. In Jordanian statistcs, Jordanian 
migrants are defined according to the country of citizenship criterion.                                                                                                                        
(b): According to data availability, "Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries" Algeria, Egypt, 
Morocco, Palestine and Turkey, while "Other countries" include Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, 
Switzerland, Belarus, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Canada, US, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Israel.
Sources: Jordanian Ministry of Labor (Jordanian statistics); population censuses, population registers, 
registers for foreigners, etc. (destination countries' statistics).
Jordanian emigration stocks (a) by country of residence, most recent data (c. 2012)
JORDANIAN STATISTICS                                    
(available only for oil-producing countries, 2008)
DESTINATION COUNTRIES' STATISTICS           
(most recent data, c. 2012)
Main total 339,755
Total % Total % Total %
Arab Asian countries 157,998 50.2 205,887 52.5 3.0 58,576 30.6
of which Palestine 92,131 29.3 115,190 29.4 2.5 29,696 15.5
             Iraq 24,501 7.8 40,084 10.2 6.4 13,148 6.9
             Syria 31,805 10.1 38,130 9.7 2.0 14,185 7.4
Arab African Countries 127,976 40.6 117,754 30.0 -0.8 80,023 41.8
of which Egypt 124,566 39.5 112,392 28.7 -1.0 78,486 41.0
Non-Arab Asian Countries 21,608 6.9 58,146 14.8 16.9 51,101 26.7
of which Sri Lanka 9,933 3.2 13,552 3.5 3.6 13,369 7.0
Other countries 7,383 2.3 10,486 2.7 4.2 1,607 0.8
Total 314,965 100.0 392,273 100.0 2.5 191,307 100.0
% of foreigners on the 
total resident population
13,2 (*)
20041994
7.7
Foreign resident population by country/region of citizenship, 1994, 2004
Average 
annual 
growth rate 
(%)
(*) Percentage of economically active foreigners on the total economically active population. 
Source: Jordanian national Census (1994 and 2004)
Country/region of 
citizenship
7.6
2004           
Economically 
active population
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Due to data limitations, the socio-economic 
profile of Jordanians abroad is available only for 
those who reside in OECD countries. In c. 2006, 
Jordanians abroad had a highly-skilled profile both 
in terms of educational skills (43.2% held a tertiary 
education and 39.8% a secondary or post-
secondary degree) and occupational position 
(57.6% were employed in medium-highly-skilled 
jobs, especially as professionals, 21.8%; 
legislators, senior officials and managers, 13.7%; 
technicians and associate professionals, 11.4% and 
clerks, 10.6%) (OECD.stat). Finally, it is worth 
noting that, unlike the majority of southern and 
eastern Mediterranean countries, the profile of 
Jordanian emigrants is very similar in all OECD 
countries. It is apparently determined more by 
educational conditions at home than by destination 
countries’ selective migratory policies. 
Flows 
Data provided by the Jordanian Public Security 
Department permit a history of Jordanian migration 
flows from 1990 to 2011.  
 
As a consequence of the 1990-1991 Gulf War, 
around 300,000 Palestinians, many of them born in 
the Gulf, became forced migrants from Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia and headed for Jordan, whether it 
was home for them or not. Emigration started 
growing again in the mid-1990s – just after the 
signing of the peace accord between Jordan and 
Israel – and persists though fluctuating. 
By looking at the evolution of remittances of 
expatriates to Jordan from 1961 to 2009, the same 
trend is observable. In this regard, the use of 
remittances as a rough proxy of migrants’ stock 
and their annual variations as flow proxies seems 
a reasonable exercise. 
Nevertheless, by comparing the two censuses 
(1994 and 2004), the growing importance of non-
Arab nationals emerged: their annual average 
growth rate stood at 16.9% (vs 2.5% for the total 
foreign population), while the proportion of the total 
foreign population more than doubled from 6.9% to 
14.8%, reaching 26.7% when only the economically 
active foreign population is considered. 
 
As to their profile, foreign nationals in Jordan 
are: a) mainly men (59.0%), b) young (mean age of 
26.2), c) poorly educated (62.4% have less than 
secondary level), d) employed at low occupational 
levels (e.g. 43.9% as craft and related trades 
workers and 27.8% in elementary occupations) and 
e) mainly working in the manufacturing (26.6%), 
construction (22.5%), in the service sector (17.9%, 
of whom 82.6% employed in private households) 
and in the agricultural sector (11.7%).  
Flows 
Data on the evolution of foreign workers holding work 
permits confirm the growing importance of Asian 
nationals: from 12.0% in 2001 to 29.2% in 2011 as a 
percentage of all foreign nationals holding work 
permits. There was a parallel rise in the percentage of 
foreign nationals employed in the service sector 
(where Asian nationals are mainly employed).  
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Here, the two previous phases of Jordanian 
emigration emerge: the start of massive emigration 
after 1973 and the gradual return in the mid-1980s 
as a consequence of the progressive replacement 
of Arab by Asian workers in the Gulf countries. 
Furthermore, the importance of remittances comes 
out strikingly. In 2009 they equalled 2,682 Million 
USD or 20.0% of GDP. 
They also confirm the relevance of Egyptian 
nationals in the Jordanian labour market: in the period 
1994-2011, they always represented more than 60% 
of all foreign nationals holding work permits. 
After decades of an ‘open door’ policy, in 2007, 
Jordan initiated a protectionist policy aimed at 
granting certain jobs to nationals. For instance, in 
2007-2011, the number of foreign nationals holding 
work permits dropped – except for 2009 – as a 
consequence of changes in the labor law which 
made many foreign nationals with a valid work 
permit irregular. In 2005-2006, just a few years 
before these normative changes, 34,586 foreign 
nationals were expelled from Jordan, while another 
5,000 Bangladeshis were repatriated in 2008. 
(www.smc.org in Fargues, 2009).  
“Refugees” in Jordan: a complex issue 
Starting in 2011, the Syrian civil war has resulted in large numbers of Syrian nationals fleeing to 
neighbouring states. As of 14 April 2013, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), 424,771 Syrian nationals reached Jordan, among whom 360,731 registered with the UN 
Refugee Agency. These flows have strikingly increased in the last 6 months: as of 16 October 2012, 
registered refugees were ‘only’ 58,005. Similar increasing numbers were observed in all countries 
neighbouring Syria confirming a further recent escalation of violence there and a consequent aggravation of 
the refuge crisis.  
The UN refugee agency warns that its statistics do not include a number of Syrians who simply did not 
seek refuge as they were either able to establish themselves or were hosted by relatives or friends. 
According to the Jordanian government, the total number of Syrian nationals reaching Jordanian borders 
since the beginning of the 2011 revolts stands at 470,000 people as of 28 March 2013. Most of them live in 
Ramtha and Mafraq at the Syrian border, as well as in housing which was rented at low prices or donated 
by the Jordanian government (Olwan and Shiyab, 2012).  
A recent survey, targeting Syrians arriving in Jordan due to the crisis, assessed their characteristics as 
well as their socio-economic conditions and needs (for more details, see Olwan and Shiyab, 2012). They 
are predominantly male (83.5%), young (80.9% are younger than 40), and have low education (83.8% have 
no or only primary education). Most probably, the part belonging to the Syrian middle class (la bourgeoisie 
syrienne) has resorted more distant and safer destinations, e.g. the EU and the US. Most of them were 
married (68.6%), arrived with other family members (81.9%) and ‘chose’ Jordan as a refuge for ‘security 
and stability reasons’ (29.4%), and its safe ‘economic and democratic environment’ (21.2%). Indeed, 
despite Jordan not being a signatory of the Refuge Convention of 1951, 90.5% of the respondents had no 
fear of expulsion. Here, Syrians are certainly perceived as guests rather than as refugees.2
In addition, the survey shows that Syrians arriving in Jordan after 2011 have faced difficult economic 
conditions (61.9% did not receive any aid from families at home; 80% do not have a job). There is a need, 
then, to provide them with the means to afford basic health, education and housing services. Despite the 
Jordanian authorities providing them with basic school and health facilities, Jordan alone has modest 
potential to deal with the worsening of the refugee crisis. This begs the question of how long Jordan will be 
able to manage, while also flagging up the responsibilities of international actors. 
  
                                                          
2 It is worth mentioning that Syrians going to Jordan do not need any visa or residence permit to enter, provided they 
have a valid passport (Olwan and Shiyab, 2012). 
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As well as recent Syrians’ flows, massive inflows of Palestinian and Lebanese and Iraqi forced migrants 
have, over time, reinforced the idea of Jordan as ‘a refugee haven’ (Chatelard, 2010).  
As to Palestinians, following the Arab-Israeli 1948-war and the subsequent extension of Jordanian 
sovereignty over the West Bank and East Jerusalem, the Palestinians who settled in Jordan in that period 
stood at around 506,200 (100,000 on the East Bank and the rest on the West Bank, source: United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East - UNRWA). All of them were granted 
Jordanian citizenship by the Jordanian state together with refugee status (including their descendants) by 
UNRWA. Later, after the Israeli occupation of West Bank and East Jerusalem in 1967, about 240,000 
Jordanians of Palestinian origin fled from the West Bank to the East Bank (Jordanian Ministry of the 
Occupied Territories); however, they were considered as Internally Displaced Persons since they had just 
moved from one part of Jordan to another. In addition, a smaller group of around 15,000 Palestinians 
(Olwan, 2010), who fled from Gaza to Jordan ,had been granted refugee status under UNWRA but had not 
been granted citizenship rights. A major change in the status of Jordanians of Palestinian origins occurred 
in 1988 when the Jordanian authorities’ decision to sever administrative and legal ties with the WB meant 
that Jordanians of Palestinian origins residing there (before July 1988) lost their nationality and full 
citizenship: according to McDowall (1989) around one million individuals (860,000 from the West Bank and 
130,000 from East Jerusalem) became stateless Palestinians. 
Today, as a result of this complex situation, there are 2.0 million Palestinian refugees in Jordan 
(UNRWA, 2012 data) the majority of whom are not migrants under the ‘country of birth criterion’ since they 
were born in Jordan. Furthermore, most of them (except for about 120,000 refugees originally from the 
Gaza Strip) have full Jordanian citizenship so they cannot be considered migrants either under the ‘country 
of citizenship’ criterion.3
As to Iraqi refugees, some of them fled to Jordan in the 1990s and the rest after the US-led invasion of 
Iraq in 2003. However, they have never been counted and due to the political sensitivity of this issue, 
estimates have to be taken with caution. For instance, in 2007 UNHCR estimated that there were 750,000 
Iraqi refugees in Jordan. In the same year the Norwegian research centre FAFO suggested a much lower 
number, 161,000, an estimate which was later revised upwards to 450,000-500,000. Still today, the number 
of Iraqis refugees in Jordan is unknown. 
 However, since 1988 and especially over the past few years, the Jordanian 
government has been arbitrarily withdrawing Jordanian nationality from its citizens of Palestinian origin, 
making them stateless. According to Human Rights Watch (2010), between 2004 and 2008, the Jordanian 
authorities had withdrawn nationality from over 2,700 of its citizens of Palestinian origins.  
References: Chatelard G. 2010. Jordan: A Refugee Haven, Country Profiles, Migration Policy Institute; Fargues P. 
2009. “Work, Refuge, Transit: An Emerging Pattern of Irregular Immigration South and East of the Mediterranean”, 
International Migration Review, Vol. 43, Issue 3, pages 544–577; Fargues P. 2006. International migration in the Arab 
region: trends and policies, paper presented at the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and 
Development in the Arab Region, Beirut, 15-17 May 2006; Human Right Watch. 2010. Stateless again, New York; 
McDowall D. 1989. A profile of the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol.2, No.1; 
Olwan M., Shiyab A. 2012. Forced Migration of Syrians to Jordan: An Exploratory Study, MPC Research Report 2012/06, 
Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole; Olwan M. 2010. Palestinians in Jordan, 
CARIM, RSCAS, European University Institute, internal note. 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
3 Again, UNRWA data on Jordanians of Palestinian origins residing in Jordan (i.e. refugees) have to be taken with 
caution because registration is a voluntary act. However, while declaring a birth implies an interest, the same 
does not apply to registering a death or a departure (Fargues, 2006). 
EU Neighbourhood Migration Report 2013 
Migration Policy Centre (www.migrationpolicycentre.eu) 109 
The Legal Framework of Migration 
Foreign nationals’ entry and stay in Jordan are mainly governed by law n°24 of 1973, as modified in 1998. 
The status of foreign nationals in Jordan varies greatly according to, inter alia, activity, place of work, and 
national origin. Overall, immigration is considered temporary- as a response to needs in the national 
economy, which is legally protected from foreign competition and speculation. Arab nationals are privileged 
as far as entry, stay and access to citizenship are concerned.  
In the last years, Jordan has attempted to improve the framework and the rights of some foreign worker 
categories, especially domestic workers who mostly come from the Philippines, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, 
but also foreign workers employed in Qualifying Industrialised Zones where already lax rules are regularly 
violated. Like in neighbouring countries, exploited workers organised some strikes – considered as illegal. 
Besides, the work of Egyptian citizens, who are numerous in Jordan, was further regulated in 2007, the 
same year as in Libya.  
Palestinians form a specific category, or rather several categories. Among the Palestinians who were 
granted Jordanian citizenship between 1948 and 1988, one million would have lost it after Jordan withdrew 
from the West Bank. If they resided in the West Bank before 1988, they are considered foreign nationals 
whose entry into Jordan is not guaranteed, while they can obtain a five-year passport enabling them to 
travel. Palestinians from Gaza are not entitled to Jordan citizenship, but can also be granted a five-year 
passport, which is a residence permit as well as a travel document. They constitute a part of Palestinian 
refugees received in Jordan and placed under the mandate of UNRWA. The most part of Palestinian 
refugees have Jordanian citizenship. The status of Palestinians varies then, be they in Jordan or in 
Palestine. This status is in the thrall of the “Jordan solution”, which is sometimes proclaimed in the region 
as an alternative to the Palestinians’ right of return, and as a threat of a new influx of Palestinians. 
While UNRWA is in charge of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, UNHCR, which has been in Jordan since 
1991, deals with other nationalities. Although Jordan has not ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention, it has 
recognized refugee status granted by UNHCR since 1998. Protection can only be temporary in Jordan, 
which rejects the idea of local integration. Longer-term solutions depend for the most part on resettlement 
opportunities in third countries.  
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4 CARIM. By-law n°89 governing the employment of non-Jordanian domestic workers by the private recruitment 
agencies. Retrieved from http://www.carim.org/index.php?callContent=401&callText=1410  
5 National Information System. http://www.lob.gov.jo/ui/laws/search_no.jsp?no=9&year=2009  
6 CARIM. Passport Regulation n°5 of 2003. Retrieved from http://www.carim.org/public/legaltexts/JordLegN52003.pdf  
7 CARIM. Law n°48 amending labour law. Retrieved from 
http://www.carim.org/index.php?callContent=401&callText=1043 
8 CARIM. Legal Database – Jordan. Retrieved from 
http://www.carim.org/index.php?callContent=400&callCountry=2400  
9 CARIM. 1973 Law n°24 on Residence and Foreign Nationals’ Affairs. Retrieved from 
http://www.carim.org/public/legaltexts/JordLegResForAff.pdf  
10 CARIM. 1954 Law n° 6 on Nationality. Retrieved from 
http://www.carim.org/index.php?callContent=401&callText=312  
11 Jordanian Judicial Council. Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Retrieved from 
http://www.jc.jo/rules_and_regulations/jordanian_constitution  
12 The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. 
Legal 
Framework  
Outward migration Inward migration 
General Legal 
References 
• 2009 By-law n°89 governing the employment of non-Jordanian domestic 
workers by the private recruitment agencies4
• 2009 Law n°9 on Prevention of Trafficking in Persons
 
5
• 2009 Foreign Workers Recruitment Regulation
  
6
• 2008 Law n°48 amending labour law
 
7
• 2005 and 2007 Regulations concerning the employment of foreign workers
 
8
• 1973 Law n°24 on Residence and Foreign Nationals’ Affairs, modified by 
Amendment n°90 of 1998
 
9
• 1954 Law n° 6 on Nationality, amended in 1987
 
10
• 1952 Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and amendments
 
11 
Entry and Exit Exit and entry freedom for Jordanian 
citizens with a valid passport.  
Circulation simplified in border zones for 
neighbouring countries’ citizens. 
Citizens from CCG12 member states can 
get entry visas at the border, as do 
many other nationalities, including 
Europeans. 
Irregular 
Migration 
 
Law n°24 of 1973 includes: 
Irregular entry is penalised with one to 
six months in prison or a 10 to 50 dinar-
fine (or both).  
Facilitation of irregular entry penalised 
with imprisonment or fines (or both). 
Irregular stay is punished with a fines 
for each month overstayed.  
Employment of irregular workers is 
punished with a fine.  
Any other offence can be sanctioned by 
a 1 week to a 1 month-prison sentence, 
or at least a 10 dinar-fine (or both).  
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13 CARIM. Regulation on Egyptian workers' families visit to Jordan. Retrieved from 
http://www.carim.org/index.php?callContent=401&callText=1046  
Human Trafficking 
 Penalisations: anyone who commits human trafficking penalised with 
imprisonment no less than 6 months or a fine no less than 1,000 dinars (or both). 
Imprisonment up to 10 years with hard labour and a fine no less than 5,000 dinars 
in aggravating circumstances. Failing to alert authorities penalised with 
imprisonment up to 6 months. (Law n°9 of 2009, Prevention of Trafficking in 
Persons). 
 Protection: measures to facilitate the return of victims and others affected to 
home countries or other countries, and supervision of housing of victims and those 
affected in facilities providing necessary support. (Law n°9 of 2009, Prevention of 
Trafficking in Persons). 
International agreements regarding irregular migration 
 EU-Jordan Association Agreement (1997) includes establishing dialogue 
on illegal immigration and the conditions attaching to the repatriation of illegal 
immigrants. Jordan also agrees to give priority to social cooperation actions 
regarding the reintegration of repatriated illegal immigrants. 
 Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons (acceptance in 2009). 
Rights and 
Settlement 
No citizen may be deported from the 
country (Article 9, Constitution).  
Freedom to stay abroad.  
Right to participation in local or 
general elections with a residence in 
Jordan.  
Access to Social Security (law n°30 of 
1978). 
Any foreign national should be 
registered if staying more than two 
weeks. Any estate rented to a foreign 
national should be declared. 
Stay permits: temporary permit of one 
year renewable; residence permit of 5 
years for women married to Jordanian 
citizens, and for people living regularly 
in the country for ten years. 
Residence permit is delivered in the 
case of professional activity, sufficient 
means of living, commercial or industrial 
investments, locally unavailable skills, or 
for studies. Arabs and students, among 
others, are exempted from residence 
fees. Arab investors and their families 
can obtain a 3-year permit. 
Family reunification: minor children in 
the charge of the migrant. For 
Egyptians, one-year residence in Jordan 
and sufficient income (350 dinar per 
month) enable the right of visit for the 
wife, ascendants, minor children and 
non-married daughters (Regulation on 
Egyptian workers’ families to visit 
Jordan August 200913
Access to Employment: modified in 
2007. Linked to a stay permit and a work 
permit. Employer’s statement. National 
preference + Arab priority. Professional 
activity, as employee or not, should not 
). 
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14 Including conventions C111 concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation and C118 
Equality of Treatment of Nationals and Non-Nationals in Social Security, but excluding conventions C97 
concerning Migration for Employment and C143 concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion 
of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers. 
compete with Jordanians’ activities 
(certificate to be obtained from 
authorities). Liberal professions, 
government employment and a list of 
professions are reserved for nationals.  
Improvements in domestic workers’ 
labour since 2003. Since Law n°48 of 
2008, domestic and agriculture workers 
have been covered by Labour Law. Law 
n°89 of 2009 reforms recruitment 
agencies.  
Specific stay and employment 
conditions in Qualifying Industrial Zones 
(Decree n°90 of 2000 and 28 of 2002). 
Limited social rights for foreign 
citizens (strike, union participation). 
Access to public services (health, 
education): no. 
Access to estate ownership: yes, for 
residence, upon ministerial 
authorisation with reciprocity condition. 
Re-sale to a Jordan citizen is forbidden 
for 3 years after purchase. Arab 
citizens are exempted from reciprocity 
condition and they can also buy to 
invest. (Law n°24 of 2002) 
Labour  Bilateral Agreements regarding labour migration, including: Jordan-Yemen 
(1987); Jordan-Qatar (1997); Jordan-Libya (1998); Jordan-Kuwait (2001); 
agreements on manpower with Algeria (2004), the Philippines (2006), the 
United Arab Emirates (2006), Pakistan (2007), and Sri Lanka (2007); Jordan-
Syria (2007) on recruitment and use of workers; agreements with Egypt on 
Egyptian workers’ employment in Jordan (2007 and 2012); Memorandum of 
Understanding with Indonesia on the placement and protection of Indonesian 
domestic workers (2001 and 2009), among others. 
 International Agreements regarding labour migration 20 ILO conventions 
ratified14; Memorandum of Understanding between Jordan and United Nations 
Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) regarding empowering women 
migrant workers in Asia (2001).  
Citizenship Dual Citizenship there is the possibility 
for Jordan nationals to acquire another 
citizenship without losing their Jordan 
citizenship. 
 
 
Law n° 6 on Nationality provides jus 
sanguinis by descent of father. Jordan 
mothers only transmit their citizenship to 
their children in case of the risk of 
statelessness and if the children are 
born in Jordan. No Jus soli. Specific 
provisions for Arabs concerning access 
to nationality through marriage (3 years 
instead of 5) or naturalization (possible 
exemption of the previous 4 year-
residency requirement). Specific 
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15 Royal Norwegian Embassy in Amman. Signing of bilateral agreements between Norway and Jordan. Retrieved 
from http://www.norway.jo/News_and_events/Signing-of-bilateral-agreements-between-Norway-and-Jordan/  
naturalization procedure for Arabs after 
15-year residency. Marriage with a 
Jordan woman does not grant a foreign 
male any right to Jordan citizenship. 
Jordanian naturalization is conditioned 
to the loss of the nationality of origin. 
Specific citizenship granting conditions 
for Arab investors after 3-year residency 
(1999 Decision). 
Palestinians and Citizenship: granting of Jordan Citizenship to Palestinians who 
lived in the West Bank – annexed to Jordan – from 20/12/1949 to 16/02/1954. No 
extension to Palestinians in Gaza. End of granting citizenship with the end of 
territorial claims on the West Bank in 1988.  
International 
Protection 
 
Political refugees shall not be 
extradited on account of their 
political beliefs or for their defense of 
liberty (Article 21, Constitution).  
UNHCR in the country since 1991. 
Agreement with UNHCR in 1997 and 
Memorandum of Understanding in 1998: 
recognition of the UNHCR refugee 
status determination. Refugees’ stay in 
Jordan limited to 6 months with the right 
to work.  
UNRWA competence on Palestinian 
refugees, whether Jordanian or not, who 
are granted a five-year passport.  
No national procedure. Jordan has 
not ratified the 1951 Convention 
relating to the status of refugees. 
International agreements regarding 
international protection: Protocol for 
the Treatment of Palestinians in Arab 
States 1965; Memorandum of 
Understanding between Norway and 
Jordan (2011) regarding studies of 
Palestinian refugees in Jordan.15  
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The Socio-Political Framework of Migration 
Jordan’s migration scene has been shaped by economic, political, and security considerations.16
The Jordanian government has, first and foremost, galvanized bilateral cooperation for economic 
emigration with receiving countries, notably the Gulf States, so as to export Jordanian skilled labour.
 In the last 
decades, Jordan has undergone a process of economic liberalization that has had a deep impact on 
emigration and immigration policies and flows from, through and into the country.  
17 
Policies spurring skilled emigration from Jordan are to be read against an economic and socio-political 
backdrop; namely as a governmental reaction to rising challenges such as the need to relieve 
unemployment, to attract foreign aid, to increase private revenues through emigrants’ financial transfers, 
and to ensure control over political opposition.18 It was also a response to the Gulf States’ high demand for 
skilled Jordanian labour. Spurring skilled emigration has, however, raised contentions, especially when it 
comes to evaluating the extent to which the departure of professionals leads to human-capital drainage in 
the country.19
Historically characterized by its pan-Arab stance, Jordan has welcomed, since the 1920s, massive 
inflows of Arab (and to a lesser extent non-Arab) economic migrants (e.g. From Egypt, Syria etc.) and 
refugees.
  
20
Formerly labeled as a “refugee haven”
 With a relatively open-door policy for semi-skilled and low-skilled economic immigration, Jordan 
has devised an immigration policy apparatus that focuses on regulating the status of foreign labour and 
allocating quotas for their recruitment. These policies have responded to economic and labour needs in the 
country, while sparing the Jordanian government from having to implement drastic and structural socio-
economic adjustments in the country.  
21, Jordan has received massive inflows of refugees, transit and 
undocumented migrants whose mobility and displacement are intricately connected to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and to other regional tensions. The latest massive refugee inflows that took place were in the wake 
of the 2003 war in Iraq and the 2011 uprisings in Syria. Similar to the Iraqi refugee crisis, Jordan has kept 
an open door policy allowing Syrians to freely cross into Jordan. Unlike the situation of Iraqi refugees in 
Jordan, however, whereby refugee camps were not built to accommodate Iraqi refugees, the majority of 
Syrian refugees in Jordan registered with UNHCR are housed in the Za'atri refugee camp in Jordan (further 
camps are being planned - in addition to the King Abdullah Park and Cyber City camps - between the 
UNHCR and the Jordanian Government22
Although Jordan has an active civil society carrying out humanitarian and awareness-raising functions, 
local actors are in many ways kept in check and are unable to significantly alter or infiltrate policy-making in 
the migration realm, especially with regard to the refugee question.  
). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 See Geraldine Chatelard, “Jordan: A Refugee Haven”, Migration Information Source, 2004. 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=236.  
17 Ali S. Zaghal and Arda Freij Dergarabedian, “Migration-Related Institutions and Policies in Jordan” CARIM 
Analytical Paper, 2004 http://www.carim.org/Publications/CARIM-AS04_04-Dergarabedian-Zaghal.pdf.  
18 See Laurie Brand, “State, Citizenship, and Diaspora: the cases of Jordan and Lebanon”, Working Paper, School of 
International Relations USC, February 2007, p.3; Francoise de Bel Air 2010, “Highly-skilled Migration from 
Jordan: a response to socio-political challenges”, CARIM Analytical Paper , 2010, p.12.  
19 Brain drain has been acknowledged at governmental level, yet no clear action is undertaken. See 
http://www.carim.org/public/polsoctexts/PO3JOR1095_922.pd.  
20 In addition to the Palestinian and Iraqi refugees who have fled to Jordan in different waves, we cite the cases of 
Armenian and Circassian migrants who arrived to Jordan in the 1920 and the 1930s . 
21 See Chatelard, op.cit. See also p.4 in the migration profile.  
22 UNHCR. (March 2013). UN Weekly Inter-Agency Situational Report – Jordan 10 March- 17 March 2013. Retrieved 
from http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/documents.php?page=1&view=grid&Country%5B%5D=107  
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23 Most recently, for example, discussions between Jordan and the UAE to increase skilled Jordanian labour to the 
UAE. For more information, see: 
http://www.mfa.gov.jo/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%85%D8%A9%D8%A7%D9%84%
D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A
7%D8%B1/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/tabid/159/ArticleId/228/-228.aspx  
24 Jordanian embassies in the Gulf (labour attachés, i.e., seconded from the Ministry of Labour) are now organising a 
round of survey in order to identify characteristics of expatriates in the Gulf (questionnaire forms are available at 
the embassies' websites). 
25 Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Strategic Plan 2012-2014. Retrieved from 
http://www.mfa.gov.jo/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%85%D8%A9%D8%A7%D9%84%
D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9%D8%A
7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9/tabid/92/Default.aspx  
26 For a list of the endorsed bilateral agreements in the field of workforce, see  
http://www.carim.org/public/polsoctexts/PS2JOR031_EN.pdf 
Socio-Political 
Framework Outward migration Inward migration 
Governmental 
Institutions 
   Ministry of Interior 
Ministry of Labour 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Ministry of Higher Education 
Ministry of Interior 
Ministry of Labour 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Ministry of Planning and International 
Cooperation 
Ministry of Health 
Governmental 
Strategy 
Facilitate successful Jordanian 
emigration pass bilateral labour 
agreements to employ Jordanians 
abroad (notably in the Gulf states); 
consolidating bilateral cooperation with 
external parties for the recruitment of 
skilled Jordanian workforce (close 
cooperation with neighbouring Arab 
states as well as the Gulf23
Devise policies on return migration. 
); forming 
consultative committees in conjunction 
with international organisations (e.g. 
IOM) in issues related to economic 
emigration and reform of labour 
legislation.  
Establish links with the Jordanian 
Diaspora and encourage remittances 
and local investments; organise 
expatriate conferences so as to 
consolidate business links between 
Jordan and its Diaspora communities; 
collect information on Jordanian 
professionals abroad working in OECD 
and Arab countries24
Protecting the rights and national 
interests of Jordanian citizens abroad 
is listed as a strategic objective of 
Jordan’s Strategic Plan 2012-2014.
. 
25 
Set up rules concerning the entry and 
residence of foreign nationals and regulate 
their residence for legal periods of time. 
Regulate labour migration to the 
country: provide estimates pertaining to 
the actual figures and location of foreign 
workers; enforce work permits’ fees 
collection; define quotas for the 
employment of foreign manpower and 
design employment conditions and 
minimum salaries of foreign workers in the 
Jordanian labour market; set up bilateral 
agreements in the labour field (including 
the recruitment and bringing of guest 
workers);26
Fight against irregular and transit 
immigration in, through, and from Jordan, 
and combat human trafficking and 
protection of victims (e.g., counter-
trafficking awareness and capacity building 
program between IOM and Jordanian 
Government).  
 work with foreign governments 
and international organisations (e.g., 
UNIFEM and ILO) to improve working 
conditions of domestic workers in Jordan 
(especially those from Southeast Asia); 
reduce the number of undocumented 
workers through practices such as 
deportation. 
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27 See section on immigration policies, Ministry of Labour, Jordan, http://www.mol.gov.jo/Default.aspx?tabid=225.  
28 Jordanian Foreign Ministry. Working with the organisations of the United Nations to assist Syrian refugees. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.mfa.gov.jo/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%85%D8%A9%D8%A7%D9%84%
D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A
7%D8%B1/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/tabid/159/ArticleId/240/-240.aspx  
 
Identify refugees and define their “status” 
and legal as well as social rights. 
Managing immigration by collaborating with 
international organisations so as to reinforce 
the Jordanian government’s capacity building 
in (e.g. collaboration with IOM for the 
establishment of the Center for Studies and 
Analysis of Immigration Policies in 
Jordan)27
Host Syrian refugees and coordinate with 
international organizations and 
governments to assist them,
; developing collaborative 
mechanisms with the UNRWA, UNHCR and 
IOM so as to deal with refugees’ stay and 
provide them with services. 
28 and work 
with the international community for their 
safe return (Strategic Plan 2012-2014). 
Civil Society   Initiatives of Jordanian 
organisations, migrant 
associations as well as 
professional and student Diaspora 
networks aimed at: providing special 
services to Jordanians working 
abroad and fostering and 
consolidating links among them (e.g. 
Jordan Medical Association; the 
Jordanian Engineers Association 
abroad; the businessmen 
Association for the organisation of bi-
yearly expatriate investors' 
conference; and Jordanian social 
clubs abroad (e.g., Nadi al Ijtima’i al-
Urduni). 
 Associations' and labour unions' 
initiatives aimed at improving the 
socio-economic rights of immigrants 
and immigrant workers, providing 
assistance to refugees, loosening 
restrictions targeting them as well as 
safeguarding and improving their civil 
and human rights or offering legal aid 
(e.g. National Centre for Human Rights, 
Jordanian Domestic Helpers Agencies 
Association (DHAA); the General 
Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions; 
the Textile Workers' Union; Jordanian 
Red Cross; Caritas, Jordanian Women 
Union, Nour al Hussein Foundation)  
 Associations operating strictly as 
socio-cultural clubs or “jama’iyat 
khairia” (benevolent associations) 
targeting Palestinian and Caucasian 
refugees;  
 Professional associations' initiatives 
aimed at banning the hiring of 
foreigners in sixteen professions so as 
to reduce unemployment in Jordan and 
support the Palestinians' right of return 
(e.g. The Professional Association 
Complex) 
International 
Cooperation 
Jordan is a member of several international organisations in which it actively works 
to address issues of migration, including: International Organization for Migration 
(IOM); International Labour Organization (ILO); UNHCR; Arab League, among others. 
Jordan is a participant to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Jordan is a 
member of the Union for the Mediterranean (a multilateral partnership within the 
European Neighbourhood Policy).  
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The Demographic-Economic Framework of Migration  
Lebanon is the Arab country with the longest history of emigration. Starting in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the first emigration flows were a response to a number of factors, in particular Christian-
Muslim communal conflicts and the economic crisis around Mount-Lebanon. Emigration was concentrated 
in Latin America and to a lesser extent Europe and the US. Later waves, during most of the twentieth 
century, headed to the US, Canada, Australia and France (permanently) as well as to Western Africa 
(temporarily) and, starting from the 1960s, to the Gulf States. The Civil War of 1975-1989 meant increased 
emigration to all the countries and regions mentioned above and included emigrants with greatly varying 
socio-economic profiles.  
Today, notwithstanding national efforts to slow emigration, outward flows remain significant. They are 
mainly directed to the Gulf countries and include a high proportion of highly-skilled individuals.  
Lebanon has also a long history of immigration and is currently a destination for temporary workers coming 
mainly from Syria and Asia. Meanwhile, it hosts large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers, especially 
Palestinians and Iraqis, who today go to make up important parts of the population residing in Lebanon. In 
addition, Lebanon has been the most affected country (together with Jordan) in terms of the arrival of forced 
migrants fleeing Syria: for Lebanon their number stood at 450,639 Syrians as of 29 April 2013. 
Outward migration Inward migration 
Stock 
Data on the number of Lebanese emigrants and 
their characteristics are fragmented and uncertain. 
Historical controversies over the true size of the 
Lebanese population give some idea of how 
emigration is perceived (e.g. in 2009, UN and 
national population estimates differed by almost 
400,000 individuals). Much depends on whether 
children and grandchildren of former migrants are 
considered. 
A quantitative picture of the phenomenon can, 
however, be traced by using origin and destination 
sources1
 
, the latter allowing us to partially recover 
Lebanese workers living in the Gulf States. 
 
Stock 
In 2007, foreign nationals (including Palestinians) 
represented 9.0% of the resident population 
(Lebanese Central Administration of Statistics, ACS). 
Foreign immigration in Lebanon includes migrant 
workers, whose stay is mainly temporary or 
seasonal, together with refugees and asylum 
seekers. Among this second group, Palestinian 
refugees are predominantly longstanding (post-
1948): in January 2012, the number of Palestinian 
refugees recorded by UNWRA in Lebanon was 
436,154, a number which includes an unknown 
proportion of persons whose ancestors found refuge 
in Lebanon, but who are currently living outside 
Lebanon. To this number, one should add another 
32,000 Palestinians, who had arrived in Lebanon 
due to the on-going Syrian civil war as of 11 March 
2013 (UNHCR data). 
                                                          
1 As with origin sources, here the survey carried out by St. Joseph University (USJ) in 2007 “L’estimation des jeunes 
libanais et leurs projets d’avenir 1992-2007”, is employed. This survey refers to the number of Lebanese people 
who emigrated 1992-2007 and who were still abroad in 2007. 
Country of residence
Definition 
(a)
Reference 
date (Jan 1st)
Source Number %
148,717 24.7
of which France (A) 2009 Population Census 36,112 6.0
             Germany (B) 2012 Register of foreigners 35,025 5.8
             Sweden (A) 2012 Population Register 24,394 4.1
Arab countries (B) 2007 Lebanese statistics (see 
"sources")
162,663 27.0
290,900 48.3
of which US (A) 2011 American Community Survey 122,594 20.4
             Canada (A) 2006 Population Census 77,390 12.8
             Australia (A) 2006 Population Census 74,850 12.4
602,280 100.0
(b): "Other countries" include other European countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norw ay, Sw itzerland, Armenia, Belarus, 
Georgia, Russia and Ukraine), Canada, United States, Australia, New  Zealand, Chile, Japan, Mexico and Israel.
Sources: national statistics of destination countries (Population Censuses, population registers, registers for foreigners, 
etc.). As w ith Lebanese emigrants residing in Arab countries, data are taken from Lebanese statistics (i.e. “Estimation 
USJ, OURSE – L’estimation des jeunes libanais et leurs projets d’avenir 1992-2007”) and refer to the number of 
Lebanese people w ho emigrated in the period 1992-2007 and w ere still abroad in 2007
Lebanese emigration stocks by country of residence, most recent data (c. 2012)
European Union
Other countries (b)
Main total
(a): Lebanese migrants are defined according to the country of birth (A) or country of nationality criterion according to 
countries of residence.
Citizenship 1997 2004 (*) 2007
Lebanese 3,702,710 3,506,429 4,042,858
Foreign 302,315 248,605 n.a.
of which Syrians 44,129 n.a. n.a.
               Palestinians 198,258 n.a. n.a.
               Other Arabs 18,032 n.a. n.a.
Others 41,896 n.a. n.a.
Total 4,005,025 3,755,034 4,042,858
Estimation of the resident population by citizenship, years 1997, 2004 and 2007
Source: Estimation ACS Conditions de vie des ménages (years 1997, 2004); 
Estimation USJ, OURSE: L'émigration des jeunes libanais et leurs projets d'avenir 
1992-2007 (year 2007)
n.a.: not available
(*) In 2004 Palestinans in the camps were not included
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Around 2012, there were 602,280 Lebanese 
migrants residing abroad. Lebanese emigrants are 
well known for being widely dispersed. Indeed, very 
high proportions are found in Arab countries 
(27.0%), North America (33.2%), European Union 
(24.7%) and Australia (12.5%). 
It is worth noting that there have been frequent 
attempts to assess the total number of people of 
Lebanese descent, though such estimates are often 
politically-driven. Frequent but unfounded claims 
are made for several million Lebanese in the 
Diaspora.  
As to their gender profile, a majority of emigrants 
are men (53.6%). In OECD countries, Lebanese 
emigrants have, on average, a highly-skilled profile, 
which substantially improved over generations 
thanks to the growth in women’s education. c.2005, 
the percentage of tertiary-educated migrants 
ranged respectively from 37.6% to 47.2% among 
migrants aged 35+ and 20-34. This highly-skilled 
profile reflects the Lebanese job profile as migrants 
are mainly employed in highly-skilled occupations: 
e.g. professionals and technicians (29.2%), 
legislators, senior officials and managers (15.7%) 
and clerks (10.3%).  
Flows 
From 1880 to the end of WWI, around 350,000 
Lebanese citizens emigrated (Issawi, 1992). During 
the post WWII emigration wave, these flows were 
less intense with peaks during the Middle-East 
conflicts. According to Labaki (1992) and Labaki 
and Abu Rjaili (2005), the annual number of 
emigrants averaged around 3,000 from 1945 to 
1960, 9,000 from 1960 to 1970 and 10,000 from 
1970 to 1975. Based on cross-border exits and 
entries data, Labaki (1992) estimated that the 
migration balance during the civil war (1975-1989) 
stood at (-) 822,913. Meanwhile, large numbers 
were recorded in the post-war period.  
It is noteworthy that in the last ten years (1997-
2007) half of those Lebanese nationals who left the 
country went to the Gulf states (49.8%), whereas in 
the same period highly-skilled emigrants (with a 
university degree) were at about 38.9% of the total 
(USJ estimates). 
 
Meanwhile, after the US-led occupation of Iraq 
in the 2000s, the presence of Iraqi refugees 
sharply increased, though current estimates are 
largely unreliable. According to UNHCR, in 2013 
there were 8,130.  
Flows 
Today, despite its economic uncertainties, Lebanon 
remains an important destination country for migrant 
workers. In 2011, 184,960 work permits were 
granted to foreign nationals, especially to Asian 
(54.8%) and African (29.6%) non-Arab nationals. An 
important proportion (12.5%) was granted to 
Egyptians. 
 
The main limitation of these figures lies in the 
fact that, due to peculiar Lebanese-Syrian relations, 
Syrian workers have never been counted. However, 
it is well known that they represent an important 
proportion of temporary immigrants in the country 
working mostly in the construction and agricultural 
sector. Some estimates of NGOs and the media talk 
of hundreds of thousands or even of half a million. 
This has changed as a consequence of the on-
going Syrian civil war. Indeed, it is estimated that, 
since the beginning of hostilities, as of 29 April 
2013, 450,639 Syrians fled to Lebanon. Of these 
339,293 registered with UNHCR. These flows 
increased dramatically in recent months: as of 29 
October 2012, registered refugees stood at ‘only’ 
74,720. This confirms a further recent escalation of 
violence in Syria and a consequent aggravation of 
the refuge crisis.  
 
References: Issawi, C. 1992. The Historical Background of Lebanese Emigration: 1800-1914” in The Lebanese in the 
World: A Century of Migration, Ed. Hourani and Shehadi. London; Labaki, B. 1992. Lebanese Emigration during the War 
(1975-1989), in The Lebanese in the World. A Century of Emigration, Ed. Hourani and Shehadi, London; Labaki, B. and 
Abu Rjaili, Khalil. 2005. Jardat Hisab al-Hurub min 'Ajl 'Al'Akhareen 'ala 'ArdLubnan, 1975-1990, Beirut. 
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The Legal Framework of Migration 
Lebanese legislation concerning entry, stay and exit of foreign nationals (adopted in 1962) as well as 
access to nationality (1925 regulation last amended in 1960) dates back to the 1960s. Since this multi-
confessional country is based on a fragile political balance, these issues are considered as potential 
sources of instability and susceptible to be politically manipulated. In the absence of consensus, regulation 
usually appears in an ad hoc, opportunist and executive/administrative manner: not as legislation. It is thus 
unstable and linked to the different categories of foreign nationals concerned (by categories of workers or 
by nationality). Lebanon does not commit itself to international agreements much, even avoiding 
fundamental texts (1951 Geneva Convention, 1990 Convention), aware that it will not be able to apply 
them. As for immigrants or emigrants, Lebanese legislation has been paralyzed in as much as it is 
politicized. A case in point is the right for Lebanese expatriates to vote in parliamentary elections while 
residing abroad, which was allowed under the 2008 Parliamentary Elections Law. Although the law is to be 
implemented during the 2013 elections, multi-confessional debates may postpone the elections.  
Legal 
Framework  
Outward migration Inward migration 
General Legal 
References 
• 2011 Anti-Trafficking Law n° 164 
• 2010 Decree n° 4186, amending Decree n° 10188 of 28 July 1962 on the 
implementation of the law regulating the entry and stay in Lebanon, as well as 
leaving the country 
• 2010 Law n° 129 amending article 59 of the Labour Code of 1946 
• 2008 Parliamentary Elections Law n° 25 
• 1995 Decision n°. 621/1 on occupations reserved to Lebanese nationals 
• 1964 By-Law n° 17561 regulating the work of foreigners in Lebanon and its 
amendment  
• 1962 Law regulating the entry of foreigners into Lebanon, their stay and their exit 
from Lebanon 
• 1962 Law n° 320 on the control of entry and exit from Lebanese border posts 
• 1925 Decree n°15 modified by law of January 11, 1960  
Entry and Exit No formal requirement for nationals to 
exit. Circulation between Lebanon and 
Syria is facilitated for nationals from both 
countries as well as for Palestinian 
Refugees. 
Exit of foreign nationals may be 
submitted to a visa. 
No visa requirement for nationals of 
Jordan and GCC states. A free one-
month visa (renewable 3 months) is 
delivered at airports and frontier posts to 
nationals from 80 non-Arab countries, 
and only at airports to nationals from 11 
Arab states and 3 African states. 6 to 
11- month visas are delivered to some 
categories of foreign nationals (company 
leader, investors, etc). 
Workers entry submitted to an 
authorization of the Ministry of Labour 
and of the General Security Direction. 
List of countries whose nationals have 
easier access to Lebanon. Women from 
Indonesia, Guinea and Sierra Leone are 
not allowed to work as servants.  
Syrian nationals enter with their 
identity card. 
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Irregular 
Migration 
Penalization of irregular entry, stay and exit: stay prohibition, duration according 
to nationality and status. Sanctions against employers of irregular migrants but high 
rate of informal employment. Annual regularization of irregular migrants through 
labour authorization. 
Human trafficking is prohibited and punished under Lebanese law. The prescribed 
penalties for sex trafficking and forced labour range from five to 15 years' 
imprisonment (2011 Anti-Trafficking Law n° 164).  
Agreements regarding irregular migration  
 Readmission agreements 
• Romania (2002) 
• Bulgaria (2002) 
• Cyprus (2002) 
• Switzerland (2004) 
• EU-Lebanon Association Agreement (2006) whereby EU Member 
States and Lebanon agree to readmit any of their nationals illegally present 
on their respective territories. 
 Bilateral agreements 
• Lebanon-Bulgaria (2001) Cooperation agreement on organized crime 
(including the fight against illegal immigration and trafficking of human 
members and the resulting crimes) 
• Lebanon-Cyprus (2002) Cooperation agreement on organized crime 
(including cooperation on trafficking in human beings and illegal 
immigration)  
 International Agreements 
• Palermo Protocols: Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, Especially Women and Children and the Protocol against the 
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (both signed in 2002, ratified 
in 2005). 
• EU-Lebanon Association Agreement (2006): includes dialogue on illegal 
immigration, and cooperation for the prevention and control of illegal 
immigration.  
Rights and 
Settlement 
Right to vote in parliamentary 
elections while abroad beginning in 
2013 for Lebanese expatriates - 
Parliamentary Elections Law No. 25 of 
2008 (previously, expatriates had to be 
physically present in Lebanon in order to 
vote).  
Courtesy residence giving foreign 
husbands and children of Lebanese 
women a three-year residence permit 
provided they have been previously living 
in Lebanon for a year (Decree n° 4186).  
Family reunification: with permit of 
residence. 
Access to Employment: annual list of 
professions reserved to nationals. 
Labour contract submitted to work 
authorization and a sponsor. No access 
to the liberal professions, except through 
bilateral agreements. National 
preference. Exceptions for Palestinians. 
Equal access to public services: No. 
No access to estate ownership 
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Labour Agreements regarding labour migration 
 Bilateral agreements: Lebanon-Syria agreement on employment of nationals 
(1994); agreements with Syria and Egypt (2009) granting equal treatment of 
Syrian/Egyptian workers in Lebanon. 
 International agreements: 49 ILO conventions ratified 
Citizenship Decree n°15 of January 19, 1925 modified by law of January 11, 1960: jus 
sanguinis by descent of a father. Women do not transmit their nationality. No jus soli 
except for stateless children born in the country. Access to nationality for foreign 
women after one year of marriage with a male citizen. No access to nationality 
through marriage with a Lebanese woman. No naturalization rules, but ad hoc 
naturalization processes (latest by decree 5247 of June 20, 1994: between 100,000 
and 300,000 naturalizations).  
International 
Protection 
UNHCR competence to organize the 
return of Lebanese refugees from Syria. 
No national asylum procedure, yet 
Article 26 of the 1962 Law of entry and 
exit of foreigners states that any 
foreigner condemned for a political crime 
by a non-Lebanese authority or whose 
lifeor freedom is threatened for political 
reasons can request to be granted 
political asylum.  
Registration, refugee status 
determination ad and resettlement by 
the UNHCR. UNRWA in charge of 
Palestinian refugees. 
Granting of a 6-month permit before 
resettlement (2003 Memorandum). In 
case of non-resettlement, the refugee is 
considered an irregular immigrant. 
International agreements regarding 
international protection: Lebanon is 
not a party to the 1951 Convention or 
1967 Protocol on refugees. Lebanon is a 
party to the Protocol for the Treatment of 
Palestinians in Arab States, ratified with 
reservation.  
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The Socio-Political Framework of Migration 
Lebanon’s migration agenda has been sidelined by the country’s entanglement in several conflicts that 
have overburdened its domestic and foreign policies. Currently, the country is coordinating with UNHCR 
and other international organisations in order to provide humanitarian assistance to the 400,000 (by April 
2013) Syrian refugees who have sought protection within Lebanon.  
Although the Lebanese Diaspora spans all continents and its size has become incontrovertible, concrete 
efforts aimed at overhauling emigration policies so as to channel contributions from the Diaspora 
communities and counter the repercussions of brain drain (especially brain drain in the post-1990 era) are 
still lacking. Notwithstanding the fact that political leaders praise the role of the Diaspora in their rhetorical 
discourses or ‘court’ them in pre-electoral periods, sustainable initiatives that boost expatriates’ participation 
in the homeland remain half-hearted. However, after enactment of the 2008 Parliamentary Elections Law, 
which guaranteed the right to vote while residing abroad for Lebanese expatriates, the Lebanese 
Government has been engaging with the Diaspora and encouraging them to register and vote in the 
upcoming 2013 elections.  
Despite the increasing number of migrant workers in Lebanon, regulatory frameworks are inadequate. 
The rights and socio-economic status of migrant workers are generally curtailed and are contingent upon 
changing public policies. It is noteworthy that the Lebanese government has come under fire in the last 
decade for undermining immigrant rights (migrant workers and refugees). On the other hand, the Lebanese 
state has delayed devising clear-cut policies for refugees. A case in point is that of the Palestinian 
professionals who, despite their longstanding presence in the country, still face various national labour 
policy restrictions.  
This incapacity or lack of readiness to reform policies can be explained by many factors, which are both 
exogenous and endogenous. On the one hand, due to the country’s circumscribed sovereignty, post-war 
Lebanese governments have been unable to ensure a full and efficient control of their borders and of their 
domestic political agenda. Moreover, the fate of Palestinian refugees (naturalisation, return, or the right to 
choose) in Lebanon does not only depend on the Lebanese state’s political agenda but is contingent on the 
Arab-Israeli peace settlement. There is today a general political consensus in Lebanon that Palestinian 
refugees should maintain the right of return and that any future naturalisation would risk disturbing 
Lebanon’s shaky confessional balance.  
While state-led policies in the realm of migration have lagged behind, Lebanese civil society has shown 
increasing commitment to consolidate links with the Diaspora and to improve migrants’ rights. Since the 
end of the Civil War (1975-1990), Lebanon has witnessed a proliferation of transnational and Diaspora 
networks that have financed development projects or contributed to expanding the country’s social capital. 
These networks have also lobbied local and foreign governments so as to boost Lebanon’s derailed post-
war democratic transition or to exert pressure over Syrian influence in Lebanon. Still, even if these groups 
are very active, they mirror in one way or another Lebanon’s internal confessional and political divisions. 
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2 The Daily Star. (5 December 2012). Lebanese expats urged to register to vote. Retrieved from 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Dec-05/197363-lebanese-expats-urged-to-register-to-vote-before-
dec-31.ashx#axzz2QWY0TUtt  
Socio-Political 
Framework Outward migration Inward migration 
Governmental 
Institutions 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Lebanese Expatriates Abroad 
Ministry of Interior 
Ministry of Labour 
Ministry of Social Affairs 
Governmental 
Strategy 
Sustain links with the Lebanese 
Diaspora: encourage pacific links 
among different Lebanese confessional 
groups residing abroad through what 
the Ministry of Emigration calls a policy 
of 'concord'; encourage Lebanese 
abroad to establish unions and 
associations and organise events (e.g., 
Lebanese Emigrants Youth Camp); 
benefit from Lebanese potential abroad 
in the field of development and 
technology; encourage remittances 
and the circularity of social capital; 
encourage Lebanese living abroad to 
return regularly to Lebanon; launching 
a moderately active dialogue with 
international organisations (mainly 
UNDP and IOM) on the Diaspora’s 
potential contribution to development in 
the homeland with a view to mobilising 
their competencies (UNDP through 
TOKTEN and Live Lebanon in 
coordination with the Foreign Ministry); 
urge Lebanese abroad to register and 
participate in elections.2 
Regulate immigration with regard to the 
admission, residency and work permits 
of foreign nationals and migrant 
workers; reduce the number of 
undocumented workers by apprehending, 
regularising and deportation procedures. 
Mitigate irregular and transit 
immigration by developing action plans 
with international organisations (e.g., IOM). 
Prevent and address human trafficking 
(e.g., Lebanese government awareness 
campaign in 2012 distributing booklets to 
migrant domestic workers upon their 
arrival at the airport on the anti-trafficking 
law and rights and obligations; Lebanon-
IOM programs to assist victims of 
trafficking and strengthen capacity of 
government bodies to deal with the issue).  
Identify refugees; devise action plans 
with regard to their presence and stay 
in Lebanon or with regard to their 
resettlement. 
Developing cooperative mechanisms 
with international organisations (e.g. 
IOM, UNHCR and UNRWA) so as to: deal 
with internal migration in Lebanon 
stemming from the severe conflicts that 
have afflicted the country since 1975 (e.g. 
the 1975-1990 war; the 2006 July war); 
and coordinate with the UNRWA for 
Palestinian refugees and with UNHCR for 
non-Palestinian refugees (e.g., 
coordination between federal and 
municipal governments and UNHCR and 
other humanitarian organisations to 
provide basic humanitarian services to 
Syrian refugees inside Lebanon). 
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Civil Society  Initiatives of migrant advocacy 
groups, migrant organisations, 
professional expatriates' networks 
as well as local civil society groups 
focusing on: 
• Consolidating links among the 
Diaspora communities in different 
destination countries, and providing 
them with services (e.g. 
transnational organisations such as 
the World Cultural Lebanese 
Union, the Union of 
Parliamentarians originally from 
Lebanon, the Lebanese 
International Council of Affairs, not 
to mention local organisations 
promoting links with expatriates 
such as the Maronite League and 
the Hariri Foundation, and World 
House of Lebanon, a non-profit that 
seeks to foster co-operation and 
unity among resident and non-
resident Lebanese). 
• Promoting projects in coordination 
with the Lebanese government and 
international organisations allowing 
for Diaspora involvement in the 
country's development. 
• Promoting projects so as to boost 
Lebanon’s economy (encourage 
tourism and increase real estate 
value in the country). 
• Mobilising expatriates in conflict 
periods so as to lobby the 
homeland’s or the host land’s 
governments (e.g. during the 2005 
Independence Intifada which was 
followed by the departure of 
Syrian troops in 2005 or during the 
2006 July War between Hezbollah 
and Israel). 
• Organising demonstrations in host 
lands (e.g. during the 
Independence Intifada in 2005) in 
order to show solidarity with 
political movements in the 
homeland or attempt to provide a 
political and confessional 
counterweight to opposing political 
movements. 
Initiatives in the associative sector 
(Lebanese and non-Lebanese) aimed at: 
• Improving the status as well as the civil 
and socio-economic rights of 
immigrants (e.g. The General 
Confederation of Lebanese Workers; 
the Beirut Bar Association). 
• Disseminating information on 
vulnerable migrant categories 
(Lebanese NGO Forum). 
• Improving the socio-economic 
conditions of vulnerable migrant 
groups such as undocumented 
workers and domestic workers (e.g. 
The Afro-Asian Migrant Center, Caritas 
Migration Centre, Council of Middle 
Eastern Churches, Najdeh). 
• Raising awareness as to the human 
rights of refugee communities (e.g. 
synergy between the Council of Middle 
Eastern Churches and the UNHCR); 
lobbying the government to waive 
restrictions on Palestinian refugees 
and to improve prevailing socio-
economic conditions within refugee 
camps (CEDAW, TADAMON). 
International 
Cooperation 
Lebanon is a member of several international organisations in which it actively 
works to address issues of migration, including: International Organization for 
Migration (IOM); International Labour Organization (ILO); UNHCR; Arab League, 
among others. Lebanon is a participant to the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP), and is a member of the Union for the Mediterranean (a multilateral 
partnership within the European Neighbourhood Policy).  
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The Demographic-Economic Framework of Migration 
The 2011 war in Libya had severe consequences for international migration movements as, since the 
1970s, Libya has been an important country of immigration in the framework of international south-south 
movements: 768,372 migrants fled the country in 2011.  
Historically, immigration flows into Libya began in the 1960s just after the discovery of oil and 
hydrocarbons there. In the following two decades, the rise in oil revenues together with ambitious economic 
and social programs and the country’s lack of sufficient indigenous manpower, continued to attract large 
numbers of immigrants, particularly those from neighbouring Arab countries, and especially Egypt and 
Tunisia. Meanwhile, a number of severe droughts and violent conflicts in the Sahel region triggered other 
refugee and migrant flows to Libya – mostly Nigerien Tuaregs and also Tubu refugees (Bredeloup and 
Pliez, 2011).  
An important change in the national composition of inward flows occurred, however, in the 1990s when 
Sub-Saharan nationals began to reach Libya in large numbers. Among various push factors,1 Col. 
Gaddafi’s disappointment in what he believed was a lack of support from other Arab regimes following the 
1992 UN embargo, led to the beginning of Libyan Pan Africanism, with its open-door policy towards 
nationals from the Sub-Saharan region. Finally, during the 2000s, with the desire to reach a balance 
between an open-door policy welcoming needed migrants from Sub-Saharan countries and Libya’s 
involvement in international discussions on illegal immigration control – a factor in the removal of the 
international embargo and a consequent return of foreign investments – (Bredeloup and Pliez, 2011), Libya 
started to cooperate with European countries over irregular migration. After years of an open door policy, in 
2007 Libya imposed visas on both Arabs and Africans and adopted normative changes concerning stay 
and labour, turning an unknown number of immigrants into ‘irregulars’ overnight2
Despite Libya being, first and foremost, a country of immigration, the deterioration of immigrants’ 
conditions in the country has also made it an important country for transit migration and particularly for the 
many migrants trying to reach Malta and the Italian Isle of Lampedusa. 
 (see Fargues, 2009). 
Large scale expulsions were carried out by the Libyan government in the 2000s, in order to adjust labour 
migrations to its labour-market needs with the aim too of pleasing Europe. Expulsions passed from 4,000 in 
2000 (official figure) to 43,000 in 2003 (EC, 2005), 54,000 in 2004 (EC, 2005), 84,000 in 2005 (according to 
the European Parliament), 64,330 in 2006 (official figure) and over 5,000 in the first two months of 2007 
(ECRE, 2007). Most of the expelled were Sub Saharan Africans (HRW, 2006).  
As to emigration patterns, Libya has never recorded significant outward migration flows. However, 
during the 2011 unrest, there was an upsurge of Libyan nationals fleeing the country. According, though, to 
the authorities in neighbouring countries, the great majority are believed to already have returned to Libya 
(IOM, 2012). 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1 The most important trigger to emigration for Sub Saharan nationals was the proliferation of conflicts in Western 
Africa and the Horn of Africa: Liberia, 1989–1996 and 1999–2003; Sierra Leone, 1991-2001; Congo, 1996-7 and 
again 1998-2003; Ethiopia-Eritrea 1998-2000; Sudan (the so-called Second Sudanese Civil War, 1983-2005; and 
the conflict in Darfur, 2003-present); Ivory Coast, 2002-onwards; Somalia (Pastore, 2007). 
2 It is worth mentioning as in the “2011-2013 EU/Libya - Strategy Paper” delivered by the European Commission (EC) 
in the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy (see the document at 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm), the EC states ‘In recent years, Libya has become a very 
important destination country for irregular migration, mostly originating from neighboring countries and sub-
Saharan countries […] In 2007, however, irregular migration flows through Libya started to increase substantially 
in an unprecedented manner.’ The failure to mention the normative change in 2007 should be a point for debate.  
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Outward migration Inward migration 
Stock 
Until the 2011 crisis, outward migration was not an 
issue for the Libyan population. The few Libyans 
abroad were mainly businessmen and students, who 
tended to emigrate on a temporary basis. Around 
2012, according to destination countries’ statistics, 
Libyan emigrants residing abroad stood at 100,565, or 
1.6% of the total resident population in Libya. 
 
They were mainly found in Italy (36.3%) and the 
UK (15.9%). Migrants from Libya to Israel (17.4% of 
the total) deserve a special mention: they are Jewish, 
Israeli citizens born in Libya, almost all of them (95%) 
aged 55 and above at the time of the survey. Migrants 
from Libya have gender parity (men equalled 51.1% 
of the total). In OECD countries, they were likely to 
have a medium level of education (62.6%), and to be 
employed in medium-highly-skilled jobs, particularly 
as professionals or technicians (18.2%), legislators, 
senior officials or managers (14.8%) and clerks 
(14.2%) (year 2006 - OECD.stat) 
Flows 
Intense movements between the country and 
neighbouring states were registered during the 
generalised unrest in 2011: the International 
Organization of Migration (IOM) estimates around 
768,372 foreign-nationals and 422,912 Libyan 
nationals fled the country during the crisis (as of 8 
June, 2011)3
In any case, a detailed analysis of these movements 
allows a better understanding of the impact that the 
2011 crisis had on Libyans and their families. 
. At present, most Libyans are, however, 
believed to have returned to Libya (IOM, 2012). 
Stock 
Like immigration policies, official statistics on the 
number of immigrants in Libya have been 
continuously manipulated and used by the Libyan 
government according to its changing (national 
and international) political and economic interests.  
Before the crisis, the most quoted figure was 
that of 600,000 regular plus between 750,000 and 
1.2 million irregular foreign workers living in 
Libya, as provided by official Libyan authorities to 
the European Commission delegation in 2004 
(EC, 2005). As of 28 March 2011, IOM estimated 
the total number of foreign nationals living in 
Libya before the crisis at 2.5 million including 1 
million Egyptians, 80,000 Pakistanis, 59,000 
Sudanese, 63,000 Bangladeshis, 26,000 
Filipinos, 10,500 Vietnamese and ‘a large 
population of Sub-Saharan Africans mainly from 
Niger, Chad, Mali, Nigeria and Ghana’ (IOM, 
2011a). Apart from the abovementioned and 
uncertain figures (given without clear 
foundations), data on migrants fleeing the crisis in 
Libya – as reported by international agencies 
allowed to work at the country borders – confirm 
the importance of Libya as an immigration 
country. Despite their partial and limited nature,4
According to IOM estimates, during the 2011 
crisis, 768,372 migrants fled violence in Libya.  
 
these figures are still today the only source of 
information on the consequences of the current 
crisis on immigrants in Libya. 
                                                          
3 On June 8, 2011, IOM stopped collecting data on Libyan nationals exiting the country.  
4 Even assuming that UNHCR and IOM figures are reliable, they certainly underestimate the total of migrants fleeing 
Libya since figures were collected at the main border points of transit, where international agencies worked. They 
thus exclude all migrants who entered neighboring countries from other border points.  
Country of residence
Definition 
(a)
Reference 
date (Jan 1st)
Source Number %
66,344 66.0
of which Italy (A) 2012 Population Register 36,475 36.3
             UK (A) 2012 Annual Population Survey 16,000 15.9
             Germany (B) 2012 Register of foreigners 4,901 4.9
             France (A) 2009 Population Census 1,755 1.7
9,824 9.8
of which Egypt (B) 2006 Population Census 3,720 3.7
24,397 24.3
of which Israel (A) 2006 Labour Force Survey 17,460 17.4
             Canada (A) 2006 Population Census 3,615 3.6
100,565 100.0
(b): Depending on data availability, SEM countries include Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and 
Turkey.
(c): "Other countries" include other European countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norw ay, Sw itzerland, Belarus, 
Russia and Ukraine), Canada, Australia, New  Zealand, Japan and Israel.
Sources: national statistics (Population Censuses, population registers, registers for foreigners, etc.)
Libyan emigration stocks by country of residence, most recent data (c. 2012)
European Union
Southern-Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries (b)
Other countries (c)
Main total
(a): Libyan migrants are defined according to the country of birth (A) or country of nationality criterion according to 
countries of residence.
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At the beginning of the unrest, the majority of 
these movements occurred on a temporary basis. For 
example, the main reasons Libyans came to Egypt 
included medical assistance, trade and ‘visiting 
relatives’ (UNHCR, 2011b). Moreover, very few 
Libyans asked for humanitarian assistance at the 
transit border areas because, unlike other migrants, 
they were allowed to enter Egypt and Tunisia without 
restrictions. 
Two major changes occurred mid-April 2011. First, 
a substantial increase was observed in Libyan families 
crossing both the Egyptian and the Tunisian borders. 
 
The average daily number of Libyans who crossed 
the two borders passed in fact from 3,165 individuals 
in the first 10 days of April reaching 6,019 individuals 
in the first 10 days of May and decreasing again to 
4,296 in the ten-day period 18-28 May. Among them, 
the vast majority still did not ask for humanitarian 
assistance, travelling to other cities in Egypt or 
Tunisia (UNHCR, various reports on ‘Humanitarian 
Situation in Libya and the Neighbouring Countries’), 
and waiting there for the conflict’s resolution.  
Second, a major change occurred at the southern 
Libyan-Tunisian border. In mid-April, numerous 
Libyans crossed this border, passing through the city 
of Deheba. Here, for the first time a significant 
proportion of Libyans asked to remain in border 
camps and asked for the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) assistance. 
Most were Berbers, from western mountain areas.  
 
Even if we allow the unrealistic hypothesis that 
these estimates are correct and that these migrants 
represent all foreign nationals living in Libya before 
the crisis, Libya can already be defined as a main 
country of immigration, close to the largest 
European receiving states in terms of immigrants’ 
share of the total population, i.e. 12.0%. 
Migrants fled mainly to Tunisia (44.9%) and 
Egypt (31.6%). The Nigerien and Chadian borders 
have also experienced waves of migrants with 
respectively 11.0% and 6.7% of the total flows. 
Algeria would seem to be the neighbouring country 
least touched by these movements – having 
received ‘only’ 13,962 migrants since the 
beginning of the crisis. However it should be noted 
that international agencies were only partially 
allowed to enter Algerian transit border areas.  
As to European neighbourhoods, only 27,465 
migrants (3.6%) reached the European coasts of 
Italy and Malta, dampening alarmism among 
European. 
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Daily arrivals of Libyan nationals at the Egyptian 
and Tunisian borders, 29th March-28th May
Tunisian border
Egyptian border
Arrivals of Libyans as a % of total arrivals (2nd axis)
Source: Author's elaboration on IOM data (as retrieved from the IOM website on 30th May, 2011)
Country of 
arrival
Country of 
nationality
Number %
Egypt 154,634 20.1
TCNs (*) 88,163 11.5
Total 242,797 31.6
Tunisia 136,749 17.8
TCNs 208,489 27.1
Total 345,238 44.9
Algeria 1,666 0.2
TCNs 12,296 1.6
Total 13,962 1.8
Niger 79,015 10.3
TCNs 5,413 0.7
Total 84,428 11.0
Chad 50,874 6.6
TCNs 808 0.1
Total 51,682 6.7
Sudan Total 2,800 0.4
Italy Total 25,935 3.4
Malta Total 1,530 0.2
768,372 100.0
315,169 41.0
Total
of which TCNs
(*) Third Country Nationals
Source: IOM
Foreign nationals fled from Libya during the 2011 unrest 
by country of arrival and country of nationality
Egypt
Tunisia
Algeria
Niger
Chad
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This is confirmed by the fact that the number of 
Libyan refugees and asylum seekers registered with 
UNHCR almost doubled in 2011 compared with 2010. 
Their numbers passed from 2,309 to 4,384. 
 
For the first time, in 2011, large numbers of forced 
Libyan migrants are found in neighbouring countries, 
especially in Tunisia (23.9%). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Flows 
As to the national composition of migrants fleeing 
the crisis, this changed rapidly after the beginning 
of the unrest. At the beginning, Egyptian and 
Tunisian male migrants represented the majority 
of these flows. Their governments immediately 
responded to the crisis by organizing large-scale 
repatriation programs. As of 22 March 2011, 
around 140,000 Egyptians and 20,000 Tunisians 
had made it back safely to their country of origin 
(IOM, 2011a). 
After Egyptians and Tunisians, a second wave 
of Asian and Sub-Saharan nationals followed. As 
of 8 March 2011, UNHCR declared that ‘the 
critical gap at present is in long haul flights to 
Bangladesh and to other countries in Asia and 
Sub Saharan Africans’ (UNHCR, 2011a).  
As to the former, contacts were gradually 
made with the origin countries’ authorities so that 
thanks to the repatriation of around 10,000 
Vietnamese and more than 30,000 Bangladeshi, 
the emergency had wound down by the end of 
March (IOM, 2011c), while Asian nationals’ 
arrivals fell significantly in April. 
0
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Daily arrivals of Libyans at the Tunisian and Egytpian 
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A brief note on migration from Egypt and 
Tunisia to Libya 
Egyptians and Tunisians are correctly 
considered two of the most important foreign 
communities in Libya. As to the former, 
according to Egyptian consular statistics, in 
2009, there were around 2 million Egyptian 
nationals living in Libya. The majority of 
them are estimated to work there irregularly: 
according to a recent survey on Egyptian 
youth (see IOM, 2011b), among those who 
had migrated to Libya in the past, the 
majority entered it without ‘a valid visa’ 
(56.0%) or ‘a work contract’ (8.0%). As to 
their profile, Egyptian workers tend be 
mainly employed in agriculture and teaching 
(Pliez, 2004) though the aforementioned 
IOM survey reveals that the great majority of 
young Egyptians in Libya are likely to 
experience a dramatic mismatch between 
their educational and occupational profile 
(IOM, 2011b). As to Tunisians, according to 
consular statistics their presence was 
estimated at 87,200 individuals in 2009. 
Given the poor diplomatic relations between 
the two states (between 1966 to 1985, 
Tunisians’ flows to Libya had been 
characterized by 8 waves of expulsion and 3 
waves of open-door policy, (see Bredeloup 
and Pliez, 2011), Tunisian emigration 
directed towards Libya has been historically 
quantitatively significant. 
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The most critical situation was instead linked to 
those migrants who ‘make it out of Libya but were 
unable to return to their countries of origin’ 
(UNHCR, 2011a), mainly Sub Saharan nationals, 
whose governments were not in the position to help 
them. Most of these were stranded in overcrowded 
transit areas in countries bordering Libya. 
Sub-Saharans, in particular, were in the most 
dangerous position being constantly threatened 
both by Col. Gaddafi’s forces and the opposition. 
At the end of March, Sub Saharan nationals who 
reached Dirkou reported that several thousand 
other African migrants were still trapped in 
Sabha, unable to leave Libya because of a lack of 
means to travel south towards the border (IOM, 
2011d). In the first week of May 2011, IOM was 
informed that around 4,000 Sub-Saharan Africans 
stranded in and around Misrata have no 
assistance or food.  
According to IOM data, a total of 62,058 Sub-
Saharan migrants were repatriated during the civil 
war in Libya from neighbouring countries. Among 
them, 1 out of 2 (50.4%) were repatriated to Chad, 
18.3% to Ghana, 16.0% to Mali and 14.4% to Niger.  
 
To conclude, two considerations can be made 
about the impact of the Libyan crisis on 
international migration movements. On the one 
hand, Sub Saharan nationals were without any 
doubt the people most at risk, both in Libya and 
at the borders (where repatriation activities led to 
an impasse). On the other hand, the capacity of 
neighbouring African countries to manage the 
crisis in terms of the reception of migrants was 
remarkable.  
References: Bredeloup, S. and O. Pliez. 2011. The Libyan Migration Corridor, EU-US Immigration Systems, 2011/03, 
Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole; European Commission (EC). 2005. 
Technical Mission to Libya on Illegal Immigration - 27 Nov-6 Dec 2004 – Report. Doc. N. 7753/05; European Council of 
Refugees and Exiles (ECRE). 2007, ECRAN Special Weekly Update of 19 March 2007; Fargues P. 2009. Work, Refuge, 
Transit: An Emerging Pattern of Irregular Immigration South and East of the Mediterranean, International Migration 
Review, Volume 43 Number 3 (Fall 2009); Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2006. Stemming the Flow: Abuses Against 
Migrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees, Volume 18, No. 5(E); International Organization of Migration (IOM). 2012. 
Migrants caught in crisis: The IOM Experience in Libya, Geneva; International Organization of Migration (IOM). 2011a. 
Country of 
nationality
Number %
Chad 31,279 50.4
Ghana 11,327 18.3
Mali 9,955 16.0
Niger 8,964 14.4
Nigeria 533 0.9
Total 62,058 100.0
Repatriations of Sub-Saharan migrants fled from 
Libya during the 2011 unrest by country of 
nationality 
Source: IOM
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Libyan Crisis One Month into IOM’s response, 28 March 2011; International Organization of Migration (IOM). 2011b. 
Egyptian Migration to Libya; International Organization of Migration (IOM). 2011c. IOM Dhaka Situation Report, 6 April, 
2011; International Organization of Migration (IOM). 2011d. IOM response to the Libyan crisis, External Situation Report, 
22 March 2011; Pastore F. 2007. Libya’s Entry into the Migration Great Game. Recent Developments and Critical Issues, 
background paper for the project “Managing Migration in the Neighbourhood of the EU and the US”, carried out by CeSPI 
with support from the German Marshall Fund of the United States; Pliez, O. 2004. De l'immigration au transit? La Libye, 
dans l'espace migratoire euro-africain in Pliez O. (ed.), La nouvelle Libye, Sociétés, espaces et géopolitique au 
lendemain de l'embargo, Karthala, Paris; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Humanitarian 
Situation in Libya and the Neighbouring Countries, various updates: 2 March 2011 (2011a); 22 March 2011 (2011b). 
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The Legal Framework of Migration 
The legal framework for foreign nationals saw its most important developments in the 1980s. Law n°6 of 
1987 stated the general conditions for foreigners to enter and stay in Libya, but a series of decisions and 
bilateral conventions demonstrated Qaddafi’s Pan-Arab policy with special preferences for Arab nationals.  
When Libya swapped Pan-Arabism for Pan-Africanism in response to more explicit support from the 
OAU5 against the international embargo, the diplomatic switch was introduced into law. Regulations were 
adapted to the official declarations calling for African manpower and advertising the end of visa 
requirements for Sub-Saharan Africans, as was foreseen in the objectives of CENSAD6
Important legal changes characterised 2004, when Decision n°1 related to the conditions of employing 
foreign manpower introduced a new distinction between nationals from countries with which Libya has 
concluded bilateral agreements and nationals from other countries. The former were given priority over the 
latter. Libya gave up a (pro)regional approach for a bilateral and case-by-case policy, but diplomacy has 
remained crucial in the creation and implementation of the law. 
, created in Tripoli in 
1998. From 2001, African manpower, claimed to be temporary and with low qualifications, was given 
access to the private and public sectors of agriculture, building and cleaning. 
When Libya began to be perceived as a transit zone for migrants and consequently as a priority for the 
European Union’s migration policy, it brought in a more rational and repressive law. From 2004, the 
vocabulary turned back to the 1970s, a vocabulary which distinguishes between Libyan and foreign 
nationals. In 2007, a visa requirement returned for all nationalities, except for the Maghreb nationalities. 
Also an ultimatum was set for regularising the employment of foreign nationals, who also lost free access to 
health and education public services.  
The multiplication of decisions regarding aliens, added to the absence of implementation, explains the 
legal insecurity and the risk of arbitrary treatment which weigh so heavily on migrants. Informality and easy 
access to the territory and work are matched by an absence of legal protection for immigrants, who may be 
arrested, expelled and locked up with relative ease. 
Several bilateral agreements have been made with EU Member States, particularly Italy, in order to 
combat irregular migration. In 2008, a “Friendship Pact” was signed between Italy and Libya, whereby Libya 
agreed to collaborate with Italy on the return of boats intercepted on international waters (or so-called 
‘pushed-backs’). Although the Transitional National Council, the ruling entity after the overthrow of Qaddafi, 
reaffirmed the Pact in December 2011, in February 2012 the European Court of Human Rights pronounced 
in the Hirsi case that the pact between Italy and Libya was unacceptable. The agreement, therefore, was 
suspended. Even so, in April 2012 Italy-Libya migration cooperation was reinforced with an agreement on 
training programs, the detention of migrants, and voluntary return programs. 
One of the top priorities for the new Libyan government is increasing border security in order to combat 
irregular migration, trafficking in arms and drugs, and organized crime. Throughout 2012, Libya increased 
cooperation with European countries to secure borders, and in December 2012, Libya made agreements 
with Algeria, Niger, Chad, and Sudan to secure borders and setup joint border forces. 
Like its neighbours, Libya is still without any national asylum procedure. UNHCR has been tolerated 
since 1991 and offers humanitarian aid to a few thousands of people under its informal mandate, with 
status certificates that are not always recognised by the official authorities. In April 2009, a plan for 
elaborating a national asylum system was launched. Following on from this agreement, UNHCR got the 
right to visit migrant detention camps to identify possible refugees. 
Although Libya has yet to draft a permanent constitution since the revolution, it is notable to mention that 
the interim constitution, promulgated by the Transitional National Council in August 2011, prohibits the 
extradition of political refugees 
 
                                                          
5 Organisation of African Unity, replaced by the African Union (AU) in 2002. 
6 The Community of Sahel-Saharan States. 
LIBYA 
136 Migration Policy Centre (www.migrationpolicycentre.eu) 
                                                          
7 Cline Center for Democracy (2011). Draft Constitutional Charter for the Transition Stage. Retrieved from 
http://portal.clinecenter.illinois.edu/REPOSITORYCACHE/114/w1R3bTIKElG95H3MH5nvrSxchm9QLb8T6EK87R
ZQ9pfnC4py47DaBn9jLA742IFN3d70VnOYueW7t67gWXEs3XiVJJxM8n18U9Wi8vAoO7_24166.pdf  
Legal 
Framework 
Outward migration Inward migration 
General Legal 
References 
• 2011 Draft Constitutional Charter for the Transition Stage7
• 2010 Law n°19 related to the combating of irregular migration  
 
• 2007 Decree n. 6 of 2007 regarding norms and rules for recruitment and 
employment of non-national manpower 
• 2007 Decree n. 98 of 2007 regarding norms and rules organizing work 
and residency of non-national manpower 
• 2005 Decree n° 125 of 2005 amending the implementation of Law n° 6 of 
1987 on admission and residency of foreigners 
• 1954 Law on Libyan Citizenship, amended in 1980 and 1984  
Entry and Exit Suppression of exit visas for 
nationals in 1991. 
To enter, foreign nationals must 
present passport and a Libyan 
invitation or, if not, 500 dinars. Border 
posts are specified (Ras Jdir from 
Tunisia, Salloum from Egypt). Access 
by land from Niger, Chad, Sudan and 
Algeria is reserved to nationals from 
these states, unless special 
authorisation is given.  
Exit visas are needed for foreign 
residents. 
Irregular 
Migration 
Facilitation of irregular exit from 
the territory penalised with prison 
penalty and fine. (Law n°02 of 2004, 
Law n°19 of 2010). 
Irregular entry or stay punished 
with prison penalty and fine of at 
least 1,000 dinars for preceding 
deportation.  
Facilitation of irregular entry 
penalised with prison penalty and fine. 
(Law n°02 of 2004, Law n°19 of 2010). 
The labour contract of an alien in an 
irregular situation is considered null. 
Agreements regarding irregular migration  
 Bilateral agreements: Libya-Italy agreement (2000) including cooperation 
against irregular migration, (2003) readmission agreement; and (2007) the 
two countries signed an agreement to conduct joint patrolling of maritime 
borders in order to reduce irregular migration; Italy-Algeria (2006) 
agreement on combating clandestine immigration; repatriation agreements 
with Niger, Chad and Egypt; Libya-France Framework Agreement of a 
Global Partnership (2007) including active cooperation to combat illegal 
immigration, border cooperation and migration management, and work 
towards the establishment of readmission; Joint Mali-Libya security 
committee for repatriation (2008); Libya-Italy Memorandum of 
Understanding (2012) on migration cooperation (agreement on training 
programs, the detention of migrants, and voluntary return programs); 
agreements with Algeria, Niger, Chad, and Sudan to secure borders and 
setup joint border forces (2012).  
 International Agreements: Palermo Protocols: Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, and Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and 
Air (both signed in 2001, ratified in 2004).  
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Rights and 
Settlement 
 
Five-year stay visa issued to persons 
residing regularly in the country for ten 
years; to students registered in a 
Libyan institution; to foreign nationals 
on an economic or State basis; to 
family members of foreign residents; 
to non-Libyan spouses and children of 
Libyan citizens. 
Arab nationals’ rights and duties 
defined by a series of decisions, 
including decision n°456 of 1988 and 
law n°10 of 1989. Subsequent and 
progressive disappearance of their 
privileges. 
Access to Employment: 
Ordinances n°238 and 260 of 1989 
on employment conditions of foreign 
workers: labour visa as long as there 
is a labour contract and a health 
card; employment has to be 
approved by the Central Bureau of 
Employment; national and Arab 
preference. Possibility of regularizing 
labour visa after the entry (Ordinance 
n°125 of 2005). 
Decision n°403 of 2001 on the 
employment of African manpower. 
List of non-qualified professions. 
Medical care and accommodation 
charged to the employer.  
Decree n°6 of 2007 listing 
professions open to foreigners, 
especially in the oil industry and the 
health sector. Suppression of 
commerce. Employment is allowed in 
highly qualified (consulting, expertise) 
or non-qualified professions (building, 
catering, agriculture). Decision 98 of 
2007: for nationals from states linked 
to Libya by a bilateral agreement, 
migrants can stay for three months 
while job searching (red card). 
70% cap on foreign manpower in the 
private and public sectors (GPC Letter 
to the Labour Ministry in March 2007). 
Labour Code Reform in 2010 
extending its scope to domestic and 
agriculture workers. 
Family reunification: recognised 
for spouses, children, non married 
adult daughters, parents, minor 
brothers and sisters, provided the 
foreign resident provides for their 
needs and host them.  
Access to public services: Yes. 
Theoretically paying since Ordinance 
n°98 of 2007. 
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8 Including conventions C111 concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation and C118 
Equality of Treatment of Nationals and Non-Nationals in Social Security, but excluding conventions C97 
concerning Migration for Employment, and C143 concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion 
of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers. 
Labour  Bilateral Agreements: agreements on agriculture manpower (1971) and 
circulation of persons and establishment (1988) with Niger; convention of 
establishment with Tunisia (1973); labour agreement with Morocco (1983); 
convention in the field of work and the use of human resources with 
Algeria (1987); labour agreement with Jordan (1998); convention for 
cooperation in the field of employment with Ukraine (2004); Libya-Yemen 
agreement (2013) to form a joint committee to develop procedures for the 
exchange of labour; among others.  
 International Agreements: 1990 Convention on the Protection of all Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Family; 29 ILO conventions ratified.8 
Citizenship Dual citizenship theoretically needs 
authorization. 
Law n°17 of 1954 on Libyan nationality: 
jus sanguinis by male descent. Libyan 
mothers transmit their nationality only in 
cases of an unknown or stateless 
father. Their child can be naturalized 
when of age if a 3-year residence in 
Libya is demonstrated. Till then, no free 
access to public services. No Jus soli. A 
foreign woman married to a Libyan man 
can get Libyan citizenship if she 
renounces her original nationality. 
Naturalisation, generally allowed after a 
ten-year-residence, possible for Arab 
descendants after a five-year residence 
or even without previous residence for 
scientists useful for the country.  
Law n°18 of 1980 on Arab 
nationality: extending Arab nationals’ 
privileges in acceding citizenship. 
Citizenship often offered as a political 
gesture towards Tuaregs or 
Chadians. 
International 
Protection 
 
Right of asylum guaranteed by 
virtue of the law. The extradition of 
political refugees shall be prohibited 
(Article 10, Interim Constitution).  
No formal agreement between 
Libya and UNHCR, yet UNHCR 
tolerated since 1991.  
In April 2009, agreement with 
UNHCR, the Libyan NGO IOPCR 
(International Organization for Peace, 
Care and Relief), CIR (Italian Council 
for Refugees) and ICMPD 
(International Centre for Migration 
Policy Development) with the objective 
of creating a national asylum policy. 
International agreements regarding 
international protection: 1969 OAU 
Convention governing specific aspects 
of refugees in Africa; and the Protocol 
for the Treatment of Palestinians in 
Arab States (with reservation: 
Palestinians considered as other Arab 
citizens residing in Libya). 
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The Socio-Political Framework of Migration 
The socio-political framework of migration to and through Libya raises various and complex issues in 
relation to Libyan migration policy and the control of the southern borders of the EU in the face of irregular 
migration. Moreover, Libyan out-migration is disregarded here because it represents a marginal 
phenomenon whose socio-political consequences are very limited.  
The evolution of Libyan migration policy depends, to a certain extent, on the need of workforce for an 
economy boosted by gigantic oil and gas wealth. During Qaddafi’s reign, hosting, or expelling, foreign 
workers was been one of the key instruments of Libyan foreign policy since the 1970s, in order to influence 
diplomatic relationships with Arab neighbours, then sub-Saharan neighbours, then later on, European 
neighbours. In other words, the Libyan migration policy, driven by multiple, and sometime contradictory 
interests and logics, was characterized by its versatility and by a large gap between strongly ideological 
political discourses, and the reality of migration to and through Libya. 
In the meantime, migration flows from the Sub Sahara to Libya were increasing significant: Malians and 
Nigeriens first, then Western and Central Africans afterwards (Senegalese, Ghanaians, Nigerians, etc.). 
This movement, along with the end of the Tuareg rebellions in Niger (1995) and Mali (1996), contributed to 
the augmentation of trans-Saharan migration and circulation, in other words the development of the trans-
Saharan migration system. Again, in 1995, the Libyan regime expelled foreign nationals on a massive 
scale, mainly because of the economic consequences of the international embargo, targeting in particular 
Palestinians and Mauritanians under the pretext of the normalization of the diplomatic ties between Israel 
and their countries in the framework of the peace process. 
In the second half of the 1990s, while the international community imposed a severe embargo on Libya, 
Muammar Gaddafi choose pan-Africanism as the new spearhead of his foreign policy. The CENSAD 
(Community of Sahelian-Saharan States) was created with the aim of suppressing all obstacles to African 
unity and, in particular, authorized the free circulation of persons. However, the venue and the stay of the 
migrants in Libya have remained largely informal and subject to the arbitrary decisions of the Libyan police.  
The year 2000 marked a new turn in Libya’s migration policy with the signature of an agreement with 
Italy to fight terrorism, drug trafficking and irregular migration, at a time when the relations between Libya 
and the international community was normalizing. This agreement responded to the interests of both the 
Libyan and the Italian government. In Italy, the centre-left government of Massimo d’Alema faced strong 
political and media pressure because of the arrival of increasing number of irregular migrants on the coast 
of Sicily. Then in Libya, inconstancy in migration policy and the presence of large numbers of foreign 
workers contributed to the deterioration of relations between the migrants and the locals, while 
unemployment was becoming more and more an issue among the second group. In the autumn of 2000, 
xenophobic unrest led to the death of hundreds of sub-Saharan migrants. In the following years, Italy 
signed several bilateral cooperation agreements with Libya. In 2003, an agreement dealt with the 
readmission of irregular migrants arriving on the island of Lampedusa, of whom 3,000 migrants were 
deported between 2006 and 2008. Then, in 2007, another agreement was signed to create a common 
maritime patrol, but only a few operations were held in 2009 resulting in the refoulement of 900 migrants. 
In parallel, Italy demanded that the EU assume a greater role in the fight against irregular migration. 
After the European summit of The Hague in 2004, which marked the beginning of the implementation of the 
European policy of externalization of border control, the European commission developed cooperation with 
Libya, focusing on the fight against irregular migration.9 Following the 2011 Libyan crisis, the EU renewed 
its interest to assist the Libyan authorities in migration management, especially securing Libyan borders, 
with increased aid packages and the approval of a crisis management concept for a possible civilian 
Common Security and Defence Policy mission to support border management in Libya.10
                                                          
9 See Technical mission to Libya in 2004; Conclusions of the Council of Justice and Home Affairs in June 2005; Euro-
African ministerial conference on development held in Tripoli in November 2006; Memorandum of Understanding 
in July 2007; first round of negotiations for the signature of a Framework agreement for Political dialogue and 
Cooperation in 2008. 
  
10 European Commission. (20 March 2013). ENP Package – Libya. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-250_en.htm  
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In July 2012, Libya held a nationwide election, which resulted in the formation of the General National 
Congress, and the election, later that year, of a President and Prime Minister. The current and most 
pressing migration policy issue for the fledgling regime is border management and security, especially as 
the deterioration of security following the crisis has led to an increase in irregular migration, smuggling and 
other trans-border crimes. Libya is also currently working with its neighbours Algeria and Tunisia, and 
others, on joint border security measures. As the fighting also resulted in hundreds of thousands of 
migrants fleeing towards Egypt and Tunisia, and, to a lesser extent, Chad, in addition to the internal 
displacement of migrants, the Libyan Government has worked with the IOM and UNHCR to organize their 
repatriation to their countries of origin, as well as the evacuation of other migrants trapped in Libya.  
                                                          
11 Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (10 February 2013). Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation 
speaking with the Foreign Affairs Minister of Malta for ways to support and strengthen the existing bilateral 
relations between the two countries. Retrieved from http://www.foreign.gov.ly/ar/news_details.php?id=7460  
12 Libyan Ministry of Justice. (3April 2013). Closure of workshops on capacity building of the judicial corps in the fight 
against human trafficking. Retrieved from  
http://www.aladel.gov.ly/main/modules/news/article.php?storyid=544  
13 For more information, see Libyan Ministry of Planning at http://www.planning.gov.ly/?cat=4  
Socio-Political 
Framework Outward migration Inward migration 
Governmental 
Institutions 
• Ministry of Interior 
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
International Cooperation 
• Ministry of Justice 
• Ministry of Defence  
• Ministry of Interior 
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
International Cooperation 
• Ministry of Justice 
• Ministry of Defence  
Governmental 
Strategy 
Facilitate outmigration of Libyan 
students for educational purposes 
(e.g., with Maltese universities,11
 
 
among others). 
 
 
Address concerns of displaced 
migrants and refugees within Libya (e.g., 
working with the UN Support Mission in 
Libya and other international organisations 
for protection and humanitarian 
assistance, and IOM for the repatriation 
and return of migrants –especially from 
Chad, Niger, Tunisia and Egypt).  
Combat human trafficking (e.g., recent 
joint IOM-Libyan Ministry of Justice 
workshop on combatting human 
trafficking, building capacity of judiciary12
Encourage foreign companies to 
engage in development projects within 
Libya (bringing in foreign workforce to 
carryout project, e.g., from India, China, 
Brazil among others
).  
13). 
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14 Libyan Ministry of Defence. (18 March 2013). Deputy Defence Minister meets EU delegation. Retrieved from 
http://www.defense.gov.ly/modules/publisher/category.php?categoryid=1  
15 Security and management of borders is one of the areas the UN Support Mission in Libya assists the Libyan 
Government. For more information, see http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3544&language=en-US  
16 Libyan Ministry of Defence. (1 January 2013). Meeting in London in preparation for the Ministerial Conference in 
Paris. Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov.ly/modules/publisher/category.php?categoryid=1  
17 Libyan Ministry of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (4 April 2013). Minister of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation receives British Minister of National Security Strategies. Retrieved from 
http://www.foreign.gov.ly/ar/news_details.php?id=7496  
18 Libyan Ministry of Defence. (2 February 2013). Defence Minister confirms the formation of the modern armed 
forces. Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov.ly/modules/publisher/category.php?categoryid=1  
19 Libyan Ministry of Defence. (10 April 2013). Defence Minister receives Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces. 
Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov.ly/modules/publisher/category.php?categoryid=1  
Irregular migration 
Limit irregular migration by working with EU14, the UN Support Mission in Libya15, 
and other international partners16 to increase capacity building to patrol land and 
maritime borders, and receive training for police and border forces (e.g., with Italy and 
UK17
Intensification of efforts within Ministry of Defense to combat irregular 
migration (e.g. intensification of reconnaissance and surveillance and the 
reorganization of border guards and strengthening personnel and equipment
). 
18
Increase border security with neighbouring countries to limit irregular migration 
and trans-border crimes (e.g., with Egypt
).  
19, and Tunisia and Algeria, among others).  
Civil Society   • LibAid (activities including provision of 
food and other services, mainly to 
IDPs)  
• Al-Wafa Charity Society (activities 
including assistance for refugees and 
asylum seekers) 
• Centre for Fact-finding and 
Monitoring of Human Rights 
Violations (activities including 
documenting abuse of migrants and 
IDPs in Libya)  
International 
Cooperation 
Libya is a member of several international organisations in which it actively works 
to address issues of migration, including: International Organization for Migration 
(IOM); International Labour Organization (ILO); UNHCR; Arab League; and 
Organization for African Union (OAU), among others. Libya is a participant to the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP); the Union for the Mediterranean (a 
multilateral partnership within the European Neighbourhood Policy); and participates 
in the 5 + 5 Dialogue.  
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The Demographic-Economic Framework of Migration  
Since its independence in 1960 Mauritania has seen intense migratory movements.  
Outward flows started in the 1970s due to an interplay of several factors, including the degradation of 
the agro-pastoral system caused by severe and frequent droughts, together with high levels of poverty and 
unemployment. Early flows were mainly directed towards African countries, such as Senegal, Mali, the 
Ivory Coast and Gambia. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, buoyed by the violent 1989 Mauritania-
Senegal conflict, outward flows were directed towards the oil-producing Gulf countries as well as to other 
areas, such as Libya and the European countries, where jobs were available.  
Inward flows have even more ancient roots. Coming mainly from neighbouring countries, immigrants’ 
flows should be understood against the background of state-building efforts in Mauritania. The arrival of 
labor migrants was, in fact, motivated by the need to fill gaps in the labour market and to address 
construction and infrastructure challenges. Later, while the 1990s had been characterized by large inward 
flows of refugees and asylum seekers due to civil conflicts in African countries (i.e. Liberia, Sierra Leone 
and the Ivory Coast), during the 2000s, Mauritania evolved into a transit country, attracting irregular 
migrants attempting to cross to Europe via the Canary Islands. 
Outward migration Inward migration 
Stock 
According to the combination of destination 
countries’ (c. 2012) and Mauritanian (2004) 
statistics1
 
, the number of Mauritanian emigrants 
stands at 198,307.  
Most (73.4%) live in other African countries and 
especially in the west, as in the Ivory Coast (25.2%), 
Mali (20.2%), and Gambia (10.1%). Important numbers 
are also found in Gulf States (12.1%) and in France 
(6.9%). It is worth mentioning that the numbers of 
Mauritanians residing abroad do not take into account 
the 25,000 or so refugees still living in Senegal. 
In OECD countries, Mauritanian emigrants are 
more likely to be men (67.6%), with a low level of 
education (59.2%). They are, likewise, employed in 
low skilled occupations, including elementary jobs 
Stock 
At the time of writing, the results of the 2011 
Mauritanian census are unfortunately not yet 
available.  
According to the 2000 census, 43,519 migrants 
resided in Mauritania, or 1.7% of the total resident 
population. These originated in Mali (38.4%) and 
Senegal (33.7%). This number has to be used 
carefully since it is out of date and the census took 
place in November 2000 just after new political 
tensions flared up between Mauritania and 
Senegal and the subsequent programme of return 
migration on the part of Senegalese residents in 
Mauritania. In this regard, it is worth mentioning 
that in 1988 (one year before the Mauritania-
Senegal Conflict), Senegalese immigrants 
accounted for 63.8% of the total migrant 
population, while after 1989 thousands of 
Senegalese residents in Mauritania had been 
repatriated, as well as their Mauritanian 
counterparts in Senegal.  
 
                                                          
1 Origin statistics (as derived from the Mauritanian Ministry of Foreign Affair and Cooperation) were used as they 
unable to capture the majority of Mauritanian migrants who live in both African and Gulf countries, where statistics 
on the population by country of nationality are well-known being scarcely available.  
Country of residence
Definition 
(a)
Reference 
date (Jan 1st)
Source Number %
African countries 145,500 73.4
of which Ivory Coast 50,000 25.2
             Mali 40,000 20.2
             Gambia 20,000 10.1
             Senegal 10,000 5.0
Gulf countries 24,000 12.1
of which Saudi Arabia 20,000 10.1
             UAE 4,000 2.0
28,807 14.5
of which France (A) 2009 Population Census 13,699 6.9
             Spain (A) 2012 Population Register 10,821 5.5
198,307 100.0
Mauritanian emigration stocks by country of residence, most recent data (c. 2012)
Other countries (b)
Main total
(a): Mauritanian migrants are defined according to the country of birth (A) or country of nationality criterion 
according to countries of residence.
(b): "Other countries" include European countries, Canada and Japan.
Sources: national statistics of destination countries (Population Censuses, population registers, registers for 
foreigners, etc.). As w ith Mauritanian emigrants residing in African and Gulf countries, data are taken from 
Mauritanian statistics (i.e. the Mauritanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation).
(B) 2004
Mauritanian statistics 
(see "sources")
Mauritanian statistics 
(see "sources")2004(B)
2010
Number % Number
Mali 16,712 38.4 n.a.
Senegal 14,681 33.7 n.a.
Guinea Conakry 1,651 3.8 n.a.
Ivory Coast 1,462 3.4 n.a.
Maghreb countries 1,721 4.0 n.a.
Other countries 7,292 16.8 n.a.
Total 43,519 100.0 99,229
% of the total resident 
population
3.01.7
Source: Mauritanian Census (2000), United Nations Population Division, 
UNDP (2010)
Born-abroad population residing in Mauritania by country of 
birth, 2000, 2010
Country of birth
2000
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(29.0%), as service workers and shop and market 
sales workers (15.9%), as craft and related trades 
workers (10.9%) and as plant and machine 
operators and assemblers (10.3%) (c. 2006, 
OECD.stat). As to their occupational profile in West 
Africa, they are, there, predominantly employed in 
the retail market, while in Gulf countries they have 
worked in well remunerated but temporary jobs, e.g. 
in the police and the security services.  
Many Mauritanian emigrants are refugees. They 
are concentrated in Senegal and Mali as a result of 
the 1989 Senegal-Mauritania conflict which 
ultimately led to the expulsion of around 53,000 
Mauritanian nationals with black-African origins and 
the contemporaneous repatriation of thousands of 
Mauritanians expelled by the Senegalese 
authorities. 
 
Flows  
According to the Mauritanian Ministry of Interior, in 
2007 the migratory balance for nationals was around 
(+) 1,700 (46,000 exits vs. 47,700 entries). An 
important characteristic of Mauritanian outward flows 
is the shift – during the 1990s – in the choice of 
destination from West Africa to the Gulf, to Libya as 
well as to Europe, a tendency which is likely to 
continue in the next years.  
As to the refugee repatriation programme, 24,000 
refugees returned home until March 2012 (United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees - 
UNHCR).  
 
For 2010, the UN Population Division provides 
an estimate of 99,229 migrants, representing 3.0% 
of the residing population. 
Besides labor migrants, Mauritania hosts large 
numbers of refugees who arrived during the 1990s 
as a consequence of internal conflicts in the 
neighbouring countries including Liberia, Sierra 
Leone and the Ivory Coast. In 2011, 26,535 
asylum seekers and refugees were registered with 
UNHCR there. 
Flows  
One of the most important feature characterizing 
Mauritanian inward flows is the complex 
phenomenon of irregular and transit immigration. 
For a long time, irregular migration was not 
considered a national issue but rather a structural 
phenomenon in Mauritanian society. The 
legislation on immigration has not been much 
applied and as a matter of fact being an irregular 
worker was almost ‘normal’. According to a survey 
carried out by the Ministry of Employment and 
Vocational Training in 2007, 80.0% of foreign 
workers do not have a work permit and 7.0% do 
not declare their legal status.  
During the mid 2000s due to the strengthening 
of Southern Europe’s border controls, together 
with the more severe migration norms put in place 
by Maghreb countries, Mauritania evolved into an 
important transit country towards the Canary 
Islands, which had become one of the major points 
of entry to Europe. However, its importance as a 
transit country considerably decreased starting 
from 2007. As to their profile, transit migrants 
come mainly from Senegal and Mali (72.8%) and 
tend to be men (88.0%). Finally, several surveys 
found that the main reason for taking this risky 
route to Europe was not the search for jobs, strictly 
speaking, but, rather, family pressure. 
In addition, as a result of the conflict that 
started in Mali in January 2012, hundreds of 
thousands of Malians were displaced within the 
country and across its borders. Indeed, more than 
100,000 Malians, mostly Tuaregs, had sought 
refuge in Mauritania by the end of August 2012 
(UNHCR).  
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The Legal Framework of Migration 
Mauritania has embarked on a global reform of its legal framework governing foreign nationals in the 
country. Legal updates have been related to: the repression of human trafficking (2003) and smuggling 
(2010); the status of the refugee (2005); and the employment conditions of foreign manpower (reforms in 
2008 and 2009). 
Foreign nationals’ entry and stay conditions are currently defined by two decrees from 1964 and 1965, 
but a reform is being discussed. As happened in neighbouring Maghreb countries, this reform may 
strengthen sanctions against irregularity, but also give protection to some categories of foreign nationals, 
especially protection from expulsion. It might also govern emigration. Whereas exit visas were suppressed 
in 1985 as part of the country’s democratisation, Mauritania has worked with Spain and FRONTEX since 
2006 to combat irregular emigration by readmitting foreign nationals who transited through the country and 
who are placed in detention camps before repatriation.  
The Nationality Code has not changed in thirty years. 
Mauritania has concluded a large number of bilateral agreements in order to facilitate circulation and the 
stay of people, and to regulate the use of manpower. It is also party to several international conventions. 
Legal 
Framework  
Outward migration Inward migration 
General Legal 
References 
• 2010 Law of 10 February 2010 related to combating the smuggling of migrants  
• 2009 Decree n° 224 repealing and replacing Decree No. 92 of 19 April 1974 
laying down the conditions employment of foreign labour and establishing a work 
permit for foreign workers 
• 2005 Decree of 3 March 2005 related to the implementation in Mauritania of 
International Conventions on refugees 
• 2003 Law 25-2003 of 17 July 2003 (human trafficking) 
• 1991 Mauritania Constitution of 12 July 1991 
• 1965 Law 65-046 (irregular entry) 
• 1961 Law n°1961-112 of June 20, 1961 enabling the Mauritanian Nationality 
Code, modified in 1962 and 1976 
Entry and Exit Suppression of exit visa for 
nationals in 1985. 
There are still exit visas for 
foreign nationals. 
The legal conditions to enter the 
country of destination may be 
checked by national authorities 
before leaving. 
No visa requirement for nationals of states 
linked to Mauritania by circulation or/and 
establishment conventions. Visa required for 
other foreign nationals. 
Distinction between non-immigrant and 
immigrant foreign nationals. 
The former have to present their 
passport and a return ticket. 
The latter have to present: passport/visa; 
vaccination certificate; medical certificate; 
police record; consignment receipt; labour 
contract or an authorization necessary for 
their planned activity. 
Irregular 
Migration  
 Irregular entry or stay (Law 65-046) 
punishes foreign nationals who irregularly 
enter or stay in Mauritania with a two-month 
to a two-year prison sentence. Involvement 
in fraud is also penalized. 
Enabling a non-legal resident to remain 
in Mauritania punished 1-4 years 
imprisonment and fine (2010 Law combating 
the smuggling of migrants) 
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Human trafficking punished by law 25-2003 with a five- to ten-year hard-labour 
confinement and a fine of between 500,000 and 1 million ouguiyas. 2010 Law on 
human trafficking aims at: preventing the smuggling of migrants; combating 
smuggling of migrants; protecting the rights of victims; and promoting cooperation. 
Punishments include: migrant smuggling (5-10 years imprisonment and fine); 
making false documents and (2-4 years imprisonment and fine); amongst others.  
Agreements regarding irregular migration 
 The Contonou Agreement (2000): the EU and Mauritania agree to readmit any 
of their nationals illegally present on the other’s territory, and to conclude 
agreements on the readmission of third-country nationals if deemed necessary. 
The parties agree to strengthen cooperation on illegal migration, including 
smuggling and trafficking.  
 Mauritania-Spain Agreement on the control of migratory flows and readmission 
in 2003 and 2006. Arrested transit migrants are detained and repatriated.  
 Palermo Protocols: Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children and the Protocol against the 
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (both accepted in 2005).  
Rights and 
settlement 
Mauritanian citizens have the right 
to leave the country (Article 10, 
1991 Constitution).  
Electoral representation of 
expatriates in the Senate and the 
Economic and Social Council.  
Expatriates’ right to 
parliamentary eligibility. 
 
Stay and residence: distinction between 
privileged (on an establishment convention 
basis) and ordinary foreign nationals. The 
former have the right to stay (with a resident 
card) indefinitely. The latter have to apply for 
a foreign-national identity card, for an 
indeterminate period, but which needs a 
visa every year. 
Family reunification: legal silence. 
Access to employment: Decree n° 224 of 
2009 lays out conditions for work permits for 
foreign nationals. Work Permit A (2-year 
work permit) is given to foreigners when no 
Mauritanian can fill the position; Work 
Permit B (4-year work permit) for any 
position, based on reciprocity or for 
foreigners living in Mauritania for 8 years 
without interruption. 
Equal access to public services and 
access to estate ownership. 
Labour 
 Bilateral agreements on circulation and establishment of people with Mali 
(1963) and Algeria (1996); on entry and stay with France (1992); on 
manpower with Senegal (1972), Algeria (2004), Spain (2007), and some 
Gulf countries. 
 International agreements: 1990 Convention on the protection of all migrant 
workers and members of their family ratified; 42 ILO conventions ratified2 
                                                          
2 Including convention C111 concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, but excluding 
conventions C118 Equality of Treatment of Nationals and Non-Nationals in Social Security, C97 concerning 
Migration for Employment and C143 concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality 
of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers. 
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Citizenship  Dual nationality prohibited. Law n°1961-112 of June 20, 1961 enabling 
the Mauritanian Nationality Code, modified 
in 1962 and 1976: jus sanguinis by descent 
of father or mother, though persisting sex 
discrimination. Children born to a 
Mauritanian mother in the country are given 
citizenship, but have the right to repudiate 
citizenship when they come of age; yet born 
abroad, they can opt for their mother’s 
nationality when they come of age. Jus 
soli : simple, with a declaration at age (birth 
+ 5 years residency); and double right of 
soil. Automatic acquisition of nationality 
through marriage with a male Mauritanian 
(unless otherwise requested). No right to 
nationality through marriage with a female 
Mauritanian. Possibility of naturalization 
without past residency requirement. Dual 
nationality prohibited. 
International 
Protection  
Tripartite agreement with Senegal 
and UNHCR for the voluntary return 
of Mauritanian refugees from 
Senegal (2007). 
Rights and obligations of refugees 
defined in 2005 Decree of 3 March 2005 
related to the implementation in Mauritania 
of International Conventions on refugees. 
National Consultative Commission on 
Refugees to the Ministry of Interior, in 
charge of eligibility to refugee status, based 
on UNHCR refugee status determination. 
(Conditions of implementation in decree 
2005 of 3 March 2005).  
International agreements regarding 
international protection: Mauritania has 
ratified the 1951 Convention relating to the 
status of refugees and the 1967 Protocol, 
and the 1969 OAU Convention governing 
specific aspects of refugees in Africa. 
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The Socio-Political Framework of Migration 
Depicted as an intersectional and multifunctional junction3
Notwithstanding the country’s diversity, ethnic divisions and confrontations, particularly during the 
1980s, have cast doubt on Mauritania’s stability and human-rights record. Illustrative of the country’s 
difficult migration legacy was the 1989 refugee crisis. Following Mauritania-Senegal border tensions, 
ethno-political upheavals culminated in the expulsion of Senegalese and Black Mauritanians from the 
country. In the wake of this crisis, Mauritanian-Senegalese relations degenerated and the balance of 
power in the country tipped.
 connecting various migratory corridors across the 
Sahel and the Mediterranean, Mauritania has an overburdened migration agenda where emigration, 
immigration and transit-migration imperatives converge.  
4
In the last decade, with a view to dealing with pressing migration matters, Mauritania has invested 
considerable effort in institutionalising its migration apparatus. Mauritania has, moreover, consolidated 
cooperation in the fields of irregular and transit migration with international stakeholders. Further, in the 
wake of Mauritania’s unconsolidated political opening,
 . 
5 the government has, since 2008, coordinated the 
return and reintegration of Mauritanian refugees from Sub-Saharan Africa (Senegal and Mali). Specialised 
committees formed to study the governance of migration and to oversee the return of Mauritanian refugees 
expelled from the country in 19896 have been set up. Mauritania is also a receiver of refugees, and the 
Government works with international organisations to address the inflows. Since 2012, the Malian refugee 
crisis has sent over 100,000 Malian refugees to Mauritania. The Mauritanian Government has been working 
with UNHCR to provide humanitarian assistance, and it has allowed the UNHCR to develop a refugee 
camp in Mbera7
Mauritania has also assumed an increasingly important role on the Euro-Mediterranean migration scene 
in the last years. A participant in the 5+5 Dialogue (2005) and a founding member of the Union for the 
Mediterranean (2008), the country has taken on a more visible role in the governance of migration flows 
from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe.  
.  
In an effort to boost the country’s development and alleviate unemployment, the government has 
consolidated temporary economic migration frameworks with the EU and its member states (e.g. Spain) 
and with Arab and Gulf countries.  
Despite these reforms, which should be read against the backdrop of Mauritania’s fragile political 
liberalisation, the country’s migration apparatus still lacks an integrative and strategic perspective to put 
emigration as well as immigration in the context of sustainable development. Emigration policies remain 
fragmented, and have so far not consolidated links with Mauritanian emigrants; nor have they developed 
adequate channels to ensure that remittances spur structural development. A case in point is the 
establishment of a transitory State Secretariat in charge of Mauritanians abroad in 2008, which was 
dissolved as a consequence of governmental change.  
It is also noteworthy that the country relies on some immigrants’ skills in certain sectors (education, 
services and the like). This need for professional immigrants can be partly explained by the lack of 
concentrated Diaspora groups of skilled Mauritanian professionals. The scarcity of Mauritanian skilled 
emigrants established abroad notwithstanding, the government has not devised action plans to incite these 
                                                          
3 See Ali Ben Saad “Mauritanie: la dimension politique et sociale des migrations”, Rapport sur les Migrations 
Méditerranéennes 2008-2009, sous la direction de Philippe Fargues, CARIM, RSCAS, p. 195.  
4 It was only in 1991 that an agreement was negotiated by the Senegalese President Abdou Diouf to reopen the 
borders between Senegal and Mauritania.  
5 In 2007, the election of the new president Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi marked the beginning of a new 
phase of political liberalization as well as the beginning of the refugee repatriation process. The Abdallahi 
government initiated measures so as to repatriate thousands of Mauritanian refugees in Mali and Senegal under 
UNHCR assistance programme.  
6 For instance, the National Agency ANAIR that supervised the repatriation of Mauritanian refugees.  
7 UNHCR. (2013). 2013 UNHCR country operations profile – Mauritania. Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486026.html  
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professionals to return and take up positions in their homeland.8
Due to Mauritania’s position as a juncture between Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa, its proximity with 
a peripheral part of EU territory (the Canary Islands) as well as its relatively lax border controls,
 In this context, it is also important to highlight 
the paucity of local knowledge regarding these professionals’ trends. 
9
                                                          
8 It is noteworthy that the issue of highly-skilled emigration is not central in Mauritania. Still, the educated Mauritanian 
religious elites in several Muslim countries as well as the skilled Mauritanian Diaspora in high-tech sectors in 
northern countries are worth mentioning. Statistical information for these trends remains nevertheless scarce. See 
Zekeria Ahmed Salem. “La migration hautement qualifiée: aspects et questions sociopolitiques en Mauritanie ». 
CARIM analytical note 2010.  
 today’s 
challenges include managing clandestine and transit migration, and sensitizing the local population and 
government officials to the human rights of asylum seekers and undocumented migrants. In spite of a 
flourishing civil society advocating democracy and a human-rightist approach towards migration 
governance, Mauritania has been severely criticized for its treatment of undocumented immigrants and 
refugees in the last years (Amnesty International Report 2008).  
9 Lax border controls are a question of a historical tradition of free circularity, largely due to Mauritania’s multi-ethnic 
and varied socio-economic structure.  
Socio-Political 
Framework Outward migration Inward migration 
Governmental 
Institutions 
• Ministry of Interior 
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Cooperation 
• Ministry of Employment 
• Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Development 
• Specific governmental committees 
dealing with migration management: 
e.g. the inter-ministerial committee 
overseeing the return and 
repatriation of Mauritanian refugees 
from Mali and Senegal; the study 
group on the management of 
migratory flows (GEFM) etc. 
• Ministry of Interior 
• Ministry of National Defense 
• Ministry of Employment; Ministry of 
Justice 
• Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Development 
• Specific governmental committees 
dealing with migration flows and 
migration management: e.g. the 
inter-ministerial committee, the study 
group on the management of 
migratory flows (GEFM), the 
Consultative Committee on Asylum. 
Governmental 
Strategy 
Development of policies regulating 
emigration and exit;  
Sustaining links with the 
Mauritanian Diaspora; encouraging 
remittances; spurring Mauritanians 
abroad to invest in the country; 
Monitoring bilateral agreements 
related to economic emigration; 
promoting temporary labour migration 
or circular migration schemes (mainly 
between Mauritania and Europe – e.g. 
Spain – as well as with the Gulf 
countries);  
Devising plans for the return and 
repatriation of Mauritanian refugees: 
e.g. the Mauritanian refugees in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Senegal and Mali) 
whose return has been monitored 
since 2008);  
Regulate immigration with regard to 
admission, residency and work permits of 
foreign nationals;  
Assess the labour market’s need for 
foreign labour; develop action plans for 
attracting economic immigrants in certain 
job sectors (services, fishery, education) 
and for ensuring that employment 
contributes to local economic 
development; 
Reinforcing border management and 
developing policy frameworks so as to 
deal with the increasing trends of irregular 
and transit immigration; reducing the 
number of undocumented immigrants by 
apprehending, regularising or deportation 
procedures; 
Identifying asylum seekers on 
Mauritanian territory and defining their 
status and rights as well as conditions for 
their stay; allowing UNHCR to operate 
refugee camp for Malians;  
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Multiplying bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation frameworks (e.g. with the 
EU and IOM) in migration-related fields 
so as to ensure that Mauritanian 
outward migration (particularly 
temporary migration) contributes to local 
economic and human development; 
cooperating with international 
organisms such as the IOM so as to 
craft a sustainable labour migration 
policy; consolidating cooperative 
mechanisms with international 
organisations (e.g. IOM ) with a view to 
mobilising Mauritanian expatriates' 
competencies abroad and facilitating 
their return; defining cooperation 
frameworks with external stakeholders 
(IOM, UNHCR, EU, Spain) with a view 
to identifying the root causes of irregular 
emigration and reinforcing border 
management (e.g. Mauritania-
FRONTEX cooperation); developing 
cooperative mechanisms with UNHCR 
and the UNDP so as to ensure the 
repatriation of Mauritanian refugees 
following the 1989 refugee crisis.  
Developing cooperative mechanisms 
with international and external parties (e.g. 
UNHCR, IOM, EU, Spain ) in order to 
mitigate the effects of irregular and transit 
immigration on Mauritanian territory and to 
reinforce sea and land control; 
consolidating national capacity-building in 
collaboration with international 
organisations (IOM) so as to craft labour-
migration policies; developing collaborative 
mechanisms with UNHCR so as to 
sensitise the population as well as 
governmental authorities regarding the 
human and socio-economic rights of 
refugees on Mauritanian territory. 
Civil Society 
Action 
Initiatives of Mauritanian migrant 
associations as well as professional 
and student transnational networks 
aimed at:  
− providing services for Mauritanians 
abroad and establishing links 
between them as well as 
maintaining ties with Mauritania 
(e.g. L’Association Culturelle des 
Etudiants Mauritaniens (ACEM)); 
− carrying out research studies on 
the potential role of Mauritanian 
expatriates in their country's 
development and collecting data on 
the Mauritanian Diaspora; 
− involving Mauritanian expatriates in 
local development or in homeland 
politics: e.g. the "For Mauritania 
initiative" created by Mauritanian 
expatriates in the US for endorsing 
democratic reform in the homeland; 
the Citizen Call for Recognising 
Mauritanians Abroad (L’Appel 
Citoyen pour la Reconnaissance des 
Mauritaniens de l’Etranger 
(ACREME)) 
Local Initiatives aimed at: 
− raising awareness against irregular 
emigration and dissuading potential 
irregular emigrants from moving 
(e.g. l’Association mauritanienne de 
lutte contre l’immigration illégale - 
AMLII); 
Civil society initiatives aimed at:  
− providing services and safeguarding 
the interests of immigrants and 
immigrant workers (La Confédération 
Générale des Travailleurs de 
Mauritanie); 
− encouraging a national debate on 
migration management (e.g. 
Association pour la Protection de 
l’Environnement et Action Humanitaire 
(APEAH), Le Centre Guide pour la 
Migration); 
− providing services and assistance to 
vulnerable migrant categories such as 
irregular migrants, refugees and 
asylum seekers (e.g. le Croissant 
rouge, le programme pour le 
développement durable et la réduction 
de la pauvreté de Dar Naim). 
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− sensitising the local population and 
governmental officials with the 
reinsertion of Mauritanian refugees 
into Mauritanian society. 
International 
Cooperation 
Mauritania is a member of several international organisations in which it actively 
works to address issues of migration, including: International Organization for 
Migration (IOM); International Labour Organization (ILO); UNHCR; Arab League; and 
Organization for African Union (OAU), among others. Mauritania receives funding 
through the EUs European Development Fund (EDF) where several migration-
related projects are financed (e.g., national migration strategies, integration, judicial 
training, etc.). Mauritania is a member of the Union for the Mediterranean and is a 
member of the 5+5 Dialogue.  
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The Demographic-Economic Framework of Migration  
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the military conflict in Transnistria in 1992, a wave of 
emigration was prompted from Moldova toward Russia and Ukraine. These trends were exacerbated during 
the Russian financial crisis in 1998. A major and consistent migration push factor is the high levels of 
extreme poverty within Moldova. In Europe, in terms of GDP and GDP p/c Moldova is the poorest country 
and has the highest share of GDP supported by remittances (year 2011). Emigrants comprise 17.3% of the 
total population residing in Moldova. 
In the short-term migration trends are motivated by employment to the Russian Federation and other 
CIS countries, where a predominance of males employed in the construction sector is found. Permanent 
emigration trends are directed instead towards the European Union; especially Italy, Poland and Romania, 
where a majority of females, mainly employed in family services are observed. 
Source countries for the small levels of immigration into Moldova are Israel and other CIS countries. 
Outward migration Inward migration 
Stock 
According to destination countries’ statistics, 
615,171 or 390,280 Moldovan migrants resided 
abroad in years around 2012 (table 1), who 
represent in both cases very high percentages of 
the total population residing in Moldova (17.3% and 
11.0%, respectively). The difference between the 
two estimates depends on whether migrants living 
in Russia are counted according respectively to the 
country of birth or citizenship criterion.  
 
Indeed, in Russia, while individuals born in 
Moldova are 277,527, Moldovan citizens stand only 
at 51,000. The former (largest) number is the result 
of massive ethnic repatriation waves which 
occurred just after the collapse of the USSR, 
according to which large numbers of people - born 
in the Moldovan territory before 1991 with Russian 
descent - decided to ‘return’ to their origin country. 
They are the so-called ethnic Russians who are 
generally not perceived as Moldovan emigrants, but 
Russian nationals. 
Stock 
In 2004, 259,368 individuals born abroad and 
17,846 foreign citizens resided in Moldova, or 7.7% 
and 0.5% of the total population, respectively. 
 
Again, this discrepancy is due to the fact that the 
majority of individuals born abroad are people born 
in the USSR with Moldovan descent who, after the 
dissolution of the USSR, ‘returned’ en masse to 
their parents’ home country. Rather than 
international migrants, they are today perceived as 
ethnic Moldovans. The majority of the born abroad 
population is indeed originating in CIS countries 
(95.6%) and especially in Ukraine (48.8%) and 
Russia (44.7%).  
 
Country of residence
Definition 
(a)
Reference date 
(Jan 1st)
Number Number %    %    
45.0 70.9
of which Italy (A) 2012 23.3 36.7
             Romania (A) 2012 8.0 12.6
             Spain (A) 2012 2.7 4.3
292,638 67,735 47.6 17.4
of which Russia (A) 2002 277,527 45.1 X
             Russia (B) 2010 50,988 X 13.1
         Ukraine (B) 2001 2.5 3.9
             Belarus (B) 2009 0.3 0.4
7.5 11.8
of which US (A) 2011 5.7 9.1
             Canada (A) 2006 0.9 1.4
             Turkey (B) 2011 0.5 0.7
615,171 390,268 100.0 100.0
5,505
2,854
Main total
(a): Moldovan migrants are defined according to the country of birth (A) or country of nationality (B) criterion 
according to countries of residence; in Russia both numbers are reported.
(b): "Other countries" include Iceland, Liechstein, Norw ay, Sw itzerland, Jordan, Turkey, Canada, US, Australia and 
Japan.
Sources: national statistics (Population Censuses, population registers, registers for foreigners, etc.)
CIS countries + Georgia
15,087
1,636
Other countries (b) 45,891
35,325
Table 1 - Moldovan emigration stocks by country of residence, most recent data (c. 2012)
European Union 276,642
143,174
49,020
16,704
Country of citizenship/country of birth Number 
(birth)
Number 
(citizenship)
CIS countries + Georgia 247,862 15,341
of which Ukraine 125,455 7,298
Russia 115,929 7,269
Uzbekistan 2,336 0
Turkmenistan 1,296 0
Georgia 1,185 0
Kyrgyzstan 916 0
Tajikistan 745 0
Belarus 0 271
Kazakhstan 0 194
Azerbaijan 0 154
Armenia 0 155
Other countries 11,506 2,505
of which Romania 4,071 462
Turkey 1,689 340
Total migrants 259,368 17,846
% of the total population 7.7 0.5
Stateless - 14,110
Country not declared 3,123 158,539
Total migrants + stateless + country not declared 262,491 190,495
% of the total population 7.8 5.6
Table 2 - Immigration stocks in Moldova according to different criteria, 
2004
Source: Population Census - 2004
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Stocks in Russia were also amassed in the 
aftermath of the 1998 financial crisis in the Russian 
Federation as the impact of the crisis was more 
widespread in Moldova than in Russia. This was 
especially the case for rural Moldovans who 
experienced the collapse of the agriculture industry.  
Apart from Russia, the largest emigrant stocks are 
found in Italy (143,174). Here, although the labour 
market is more difficult and costlier to access than that 
of Russia, remuneration is on average higher.  
Migrants’ characteristics tend to largely vary 
according to their destination point shedding light 
on two main migration strategies. Migration directed 
towards the West (mainly EU countries) is more 
likely to be characterised by a preponderance of 
females (60.1%), well-educated persons (53.2% 
have a tertiary education) but employed in low 
skilled jobs, including service (17.4%) and craft and 
related trades (15.2%) workers and, finally, to occur 
on a more permanent basis. On the contrary, 
migrants going to the ‘East’ (mainly to Russia) are 
more likely to be male (56.2%), with a medium level 
of education (58.4% hold a secondary diploma) and 
employed in construction (around 68%) (source: 
Moldovan Labour Force Survey) which occurs on a 
more temporary/circular basis (Ganta, 2012). 
Flows 
In 1991 there were large-scale industrial and 
agricultural sectors of the Moldovan economy that 
saw high levels of unemployment and 
underemployment. Both factors set up large scale 
labour emigration flows which continue to the 
present day. Occupational outflows are due to 
surpluses in highly educated fields such as 
economics and law as well as skilled crafts including 
electricians. These flows are attributed to a lack of 
synchronisation between education policy and the 
labour market. Outflow data (figure 1) confirm Italy 
as a preferred destination for recent Moldovan labour 
migrants. In 2011, 1 out of 2 Moldovans emigrated 
there, followed by Poland (21%). 
 
 
As with the foreign population, a very impressive 
number did not declare their country of citizenship 
(158,539) or were classified as stateless (14,110). 
As in other CIS countries, this depends on the fact 
that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, large 
number of people lost their citizenship as they were 
unable to confirm or acquire citizenship of any new-
born state. This was the result of cumbersome legal 
requirements adopted in new independent states 
(for more details, see the section on ‘citizenship’ in 
‘The Legal Framework’ below). Looking at 
numbers, this situation seems still to be unsolved. 
More recent data from the Population State 
Register (PSR) immigration data shows that in 
2012 there were 26,200 foreign citizens residing in 
Moldova, providing evidence of a slight rise in 
immigration trends.  
Flows 
Immigration flows to Moldova are small. Population 
State Register immigration data show that in the 
2000s there was an inflow of only 19,279 migrants 
to Moldova. The same data source signals that 
35% of migrants moved for work-related reasons, 
35% for family reunification and 30% to study. For 
the latter the main source country was Israel (59%), 
with Turkey and Syria being other major source 
countries. For family reunification the vast majority 
were from Ukraine, Russia and Romania – all three 
have strong cultural links with Moldova. Since the 
turn of the millennium the annual average flows of 
repatriation are 1,600. 
In 2010, 2,512 foreign citizens migrated to 
Moldova. Although Israelis constitute the largest 
share of immigrants there were only 482 entrants in 
the same year (figure 2).  
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Figure 1 - Outflows of Moldovan nationals to selected 
countries of destination – year 2011
Notes (*) Others include Australia, Belarus, Norway, United States and Ukraine.
Source: flow data are proxied by granted first residence permits (EU MS + 
Norway), issued visas (US + Australia) and the number of registrations to a 
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Figure 2 - Inflows of foreign citizens to Moldova, year 
2010
Source: flow data are proxied by the number of registrations to a place of 
permanent residence in Moldova (Population State Register - Moldova)
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Moldova, an increased reliance on remittances 
There are three major transfer mechanisms for remittances entering Moldova: (i) bank transfers; (ii) express 
money transfers and (iii) informal couriers (Lücke et al., 2007). The use of which mechanism is selected is 
dependent upon where migrants are located. Seasonal migrants such as those working in the agricultural 
sector in Russia tend to bring their remittances by hand, whereas those living from farther away tend to 
send remittances by method (i) and/or (ii).  
 
Over time, remittances have become an important source of income of emigrant’s families and a 
relevant factor of national economy development. According to World Bank data, they amounted to 1561.7 
million USD in 2011, considerably exceeding the FDI and ODA inflows that constituted, the respective and 
approximate totals of 274 million USD and 470.4 million USD (2010). Remittances form near 51% of FDI 
stock in the economy and 72.5% of earnings obtained from exports. A slight slowdown in remittances 
growth since the second half of the last decade caused a reduction of their share in GDP, from 34.7% in 
2006 to 22.3% in 2011, yet the Republic of Moldova ranks the third country in the region of Europe and 
Central Asia as regard remittances’ weight in GDP and their per capita value (Stratan et al., 2013). 
Over 30% of Moldova’s exports are tied to remittance based finances. Remittances therefore look set to 
play an increasingly important role in the Moldovan economy and may see an increase in the emigration 
flows of Moldovans in the foreseeable future. 
 
References: Ganta V. 2012. The demographic and economic framework of circular migration in Moldova, CARIM-East 
Explanatory Note 12/69, Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole; Lücke M.M., 
Mahmoud T.O., Pinger P. 2007. Patterns and Trends of Migration and Remittances in Moldova, International 
Organization for Migration. World Bank. 2011. Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011, Washington, DC; Stratan A., 
Chistruga M., Clipa V., Fala A., V. Septelici. 2013. Development and side effects of remittances in the CIS countries: the 
case of Republic of Moldova CARIM-East Research Report 2013/2, Migration Policy Centre, European University 
Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole. 
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The Legal Framework of Migration 
State migration policy is reflected in National Strategies, programs and plans and in domestic legislation of 
the Republic of Moldova (RM). The current legislative framework regulates the immigration of foreigners 
and strictly divides competences between responsible bodies and favours strengthening relations with 
Moldovan citizens residing abroad; providing services for returning migrants; and stimulating conditions to 
prevent the emigration of citizens. In September 2011, the National Strategy in the migration and asylum 
domain (2011-2020) was approved, providing the basis for a comprehensive regulation of migration and 
asylum management, the harmonization of the national legal framework with international and EU law, and 
the regulation of migration flows. This strategy is intended to contribute towards socio-economic 
development, state security and towards the achievement of European integration goals. In December 
2011, the Action Plan for 2011-2015 regarding the implementation of the Strategy was approved. The 
activities included a Plan describing how the state intends to improve migration management. The 
cooperation with the CIS countries is maintained within the framework of regional or bilateral agreements. 
The Moldova-EU Action Plan includes the strategic objectives in the domain of migration. Based on this 
document, Moldova adopted National Programs, where the European vector has become a must when 
implementing policies for all public authorities. 
Legal Framework Outward migration Inward migration 
General Legal 
References 
2013 Government Decision for the approval of the Regulation on issuing identity 
documents and evidence of the inhabitants of the Republic of Moldova (2nd 
generation of identity documents) 
2013 Government Decision on the approval of the Regulation regarding issuance 
of visas 
2011 Law on Integration of Foreigners in the Republic of Moldova 
2011 National Strategy in the Domain of Migration and Asylum (2011-2020) 
2011 National Action Plan for the Implementation of the National Strategy in the 
Domain of Migration and Asylum (2011-2015) 
2011 National Program for the implementation of the Moldova –EU Action Plan in 
the field of visa liberalization regime 
2010 Government Decision regarding the Commission for Coordination of Certain 
Activities Relating to Migration 
2010 Law on the Regime of Foreigners in the Republic of Moldova 
2008 Law on Labour Migration 
2008 Law on Asylum in the Republic of Moldova 
1994 Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons 
1994 Law on exit from and entry into the Republic of Moldova 
1994 Constitution of the Republic of Moldova  
Entry and Exit Visa 
The Republic of Moldova is a party to 
the 1992 Agreement on Visa-free 
Movement of Citizens of the CIS-
Countries on the Territory of the Member 
States, according to which the citizens of 
the RM are exempted from the visa 
requirements for the CIS countries 
(except Turkmenistan) and Georgia. 
In 2007, Moldova singed a Visa 
Facilitation Agreement with the EU 
(amended in 2012). The Agreement 
facilitates the issuance of visas to the 
citizens of the Republic of Moldova for a 
stay of no more than 90 days per period 
of 180 days.  
Visa 
Citizens of Canada, the CIS (except 
Turkmenistan with some exceptions), 
Georgia, EEA, the Holy See, Israel, 
Japan and the USA are exempted from 
the visa requirement for a period of stay 
until 90 days, during six months from the 
moment of the first entry. 
Under Art. 6(5) of the Law on the 
Regime for Foreigners, foreigners who 
reside in the Republic of Moldova legally 
and temporarily leave its territory are 
entitled to re-enter the country without 
an entry/exit visa during the whole 
validity period of their residence permit. 
4 types of visa are granted: 
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Cross-border mobility 
According to Art. 1 of the Law on Exit 
and Entry to the Republic of Moldova, 
citizens of the RM have the right to exit 
and enter the Republic of Moldova based 
on their passports. Art. 8 of the law sets 
out the conditions when issuance or 
extension of a new passport or travel 
document is refused, mainly referring to 
national security and public order. 
Since May 2012, citizens of the RM, 
regardless of their domicile or residence 
or legal status abroad, have the right to 
enter the country based on a travel 
authorization issued by the diplomatic 
missions or consular posts. 
The Regulation allows requesting 
travel authorization in cases of justified 
emergencies.  
Though legislation proclaims freedom 
of movement, the Law on Labour 
Migration of 10 July 2008 sets 
restrictions for the emigrations of 
citizens abroad in Art. 23 referring to:  
− a court decision in a criminal case;  
− a court decision regarding debtors;  
− a document regarding the 
established guardianship over the 
minors who remain within the 
country. 
“A” Type – airport transit visa. “B” 
Type – transit visa. “C” Type – short-term 
visa for the period of up to 90 days during 
6 months; “D” Type – long-term visa for a 
period not exceeding 12 months. 
The Regulation regarding issuance 
of visas which partially transposed the 
EU Visa Code entered into force on 1 
April; 2013.  
Cross-border mobility 
Foreigners can enter Moldova through 
state border crossing points with a valid 
passport, an entry visa or a document 
attesting the residence status. Foreign 
citizens, holders of a valid permanent 
residence permit are exempted from the 
visa requirement. 
According to Art. 1 of the national Law 
on Exit and Entry, stateless persons, 
refugees and beneficiaries of 
humanitarian protection have the right to 
exit and enter the RM based on their 
travel documents. Stateless persons and 
foreign citizens with permanent resident 
rights in the Republic of Moldova who are 
abroad and who have no valid travel 
documents for returning to the Republic 
of Moldova, have the right to enter based 
on a travel authorization issued by the 
diplomatic missions or consular posts of 
the Republic of Moldova. The exit of a 
foreigner may be prohibited in case of 
criminal charges or a court sentence. 
Irregular 
Migration 
In 2007, the Agreement between the 
EU and the Republic of Moldova on the 
readmission of persons residing without 
authorization was signed (entered into 
force 1 January 2008). Under Article 19 
of the 2007 Agreement, Moldova signed 
implementation protocols with the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Germany, 
Austria, Latvia, Bulgaria, Malta and 
Benelux. Moldova signed also the 
Agreement and implementation protocol 
with Switzerland and with Denmark 
following the joint declaration under the 
Agreement of 2007. 
Apart from the EU, readmission 
agreements are in place with Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Norway, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine.  
 
 
The Law on the Regime of Foreigners in 
the Republic of Moldova of 16 July 2010 
partially transposed the European 
legislation, including the Directive 
2008/115/CE (Return Directive). 
The Regulation on return, expulsion 
and readmission procedures of 
foreigners from the territory of the 
Republic of Moldova establishes the 
return, expulsion, and readmission 
procedures. The return measure applies 
to foreigners: 1) who entered illegally to 
the territory of the Republic of Moldova; 
2) whose stay became illegal; 3) whose 
visa/residence right was cancelled or 
revoked; 4) who were denied the 
extension of the temporary residence 
right; 5) whose permanent residence 
right has ceased; 6) whose application 
for recognition of stateless status was 
rejected, the procedure was ceased or 
the stateless status was cancelled; 7) 
who are former asylum seekers or 
whose refugee status or humanitarian 
protection was cancelled. 
162 Migration Policy Centre (www.migrationpolicycentre.eu) 
Agreement on cooperation between 
CIS Member States in combating 
illegal migration of 6 March 1998 
regulates cooperation between Moldova 
and other countries within the CIS area. 
On this basis, Moldova must develop 
instruments curbing irregular migration 
of its own nationals, in accordance with 
international law. 
 
Return (forced) decision is taken by 
the Bureau of Migration and Asylum in 
relation to the foreigner who entered 
illegally or lost the right to stay (including 
rejected asylum seekers). Foreign 
nationals have the obligation of 
independent departure (from 5 days to 
3 months depending upon the category 
of persons), non-compliance leads to 
removal. The right to appeal within 5 
days (no suspensory effect) is granted. 
Suspensory effect of the application for 
international protection has a 
suspensory effect upon the execution of 
the return decision. 1-5 year entry ban 
can be imposed.  
Removal under escort, i.e. when the 
personnel of the BMA accompanies a 
foreigner to the State Border, applies to 
those foreigners who have not departed 
independently; crossed illegally the state 
border; who have been declared 
persona non grata (i.e. pose a risk to 
national security and public order); who 
have mental or physical disabilities; who 
pose a risk for the public health. 
Removal is implemented within 24h if no 
further formalities are needed. 
Otherwise, the foreigners are placed into 
public custody (detention at the Centre 
for Temporary Placement of Foreigners, 
ordered by a court) for 30 days (can be 
extended by a court up to 6 months). 
The decision on removal can be 
appealed but with no suspensory effect. 
1.5 to 5.5 year entry ban is imposed on 
removed persons. If the removal is 
impossible, a tolerated status valid for 
6 months (renewable) is granted. 
Another form of forced return is 
Expulsion, i.e. removal as an additional 
measure ordered by a court in relation to 
foreigners who have committed criminal 
or administrative offences. Foreigners 
are taken into public custody by a court 
decision (the same rules as mentioned 
above), and an entry ban of 5 years or 
10 years is imposed if foreigners pose a 
serious danger to the public order or 
national security. Tolerated status is 
granted if the expulsion is impossible. 
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 Moldova ratified Palermo Protocols in 2005, with a reservation regarding the 
territorial applicability of the Protocol (excluding Transnistria).  
In 2011 Moldova approved the Agreement regarding collaboration between 
ministries of internal affairs (police) of the CIS countries in their fight against 
trafficking in human beings, signed in Saint Petersburg on 17 September 2010. 
Other relevant legal acts: 
1. Law no. 241 of 20 October 2005 on prevention and combating trafficking in 
human beings.  
2. Penal Code of 18 April 2002 sets the following actions as crimes: trafficking in 
human beings (Article 165), slavery and conditions similar to slavery (Article 
167), forced labour (Article 168), perverse actions (Article 175), approaching 
children for sexual purposes (Article 1751), trafficking in children (Article 206), 
illegal removal of children from the country (Article 207), attracting minors in 
criminal activity or their determination to commit immoral acts (Article 208), child 
pornography (Article 2081), use of child prostitution (Article 2082), pimping 
(Article 220), organization of illegal migration (Article 3621).  
3. Regulation on the repatriation procedure of children and adults – victims of 
trafficking in human beings, illegal trafficking of migrants, as well as of 
unaccompanied children, approved through the Government Decision no. 948 
of 7 August 2008.  
4. Law no. 105 of 16 May 2008 on the protection of witnesses and other 
participants of the penal process. 
5. Law introduced on the regime of foreigners was amended in December 2012 
granting an extension of temporary residence right for victims of human being 
trafficking in for a period of 6 months with the possibility of extension, being 
granted free of charge (Article 421). 
6. Regulation-framework for the organization and functioning of the centres for the 
assistance and protection of victims of trafficking in human beings, approved 
through the Government Decision no. 1362 of 29 November 2006.  
Rights and 
Settlement 
Article 27.2 of the Constitution stipulates 
that the citizens of Moldova enjoy the 
protection of their State both at home 
and abroad, as well as the right to exit, 
to emigrate and to return to the country.  
 
 
 
According to Article 19 para.1 of the 
Constitution and Article 5 of the 1994 
Law on Legal Status of Foreign 
Citizens and Stateless Persons, 
foreign citizens and stateless persons 
have same rights and duties as the 
citizens of the Republic of Moldova, with 
exceptions established by the law, for 
the most part relating to political rights.  
Law on the Regime for Foreigners 
in the Republic of Moldova (in force 
since December 2010) regulates 
foreigners’ entry into, stay on and 
departure from the territory of the RM, 
the granting and extension of the 
residence right, the repatriation and 
documentation thereof; specifies 
enforcement measures in case of 
violation of the residence regime and 
immigration registration measures.  
Holders of temporary/permanent 
resident rights cannot be subject to 
any restrictions regarding their 
freedom of movement during the 
validity of their permit.  
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The right to temporary residence is 
granted up to 5 years.  
The right to permanent residence 
can be granted, as a rule, after 5 years 
of temporary residence. 
The Law on integration of foreigners 
in the Republic of Moldova was adopted 
on 27 December 2011 and entered into 
force only on 1 July 2012.  
The Law establishes the categories 
of foreigners who have access to 
integration activities namely temporary 
and permanent residents; stateless 
persons; persons under international 
protection.  
The Law on integration set that these 
foreigners have access to the preschool, 
primary and secondary general 
education, public system of social 
insurance and to the national system of 
social assistance in the same conditions 
established by the law as for citizens of 
the Republic of Moldova. Access to the 
compulsory health insurance system for 
foreigners is conditioned by one of the 
following criteria: 1) residence on the 
territory of the Republic of Moldova and 
employment based on an individual 
employment contract; 2) domicile in the 
Republic of Moldova. 
Labour The Law on Labour migration of 10 July 
2008 regulates the conditions for the 
temporary employment of RM citizens 
abroad. The Law defines emigrant 
workers as citizens of the Republic of 
Moldova, with permanent domicile on its 
territory, who voluntarily left the country 
to go to another country in order to 
perform a temporary labour activity. 
There are five criteria set in legislation 
for examining emigration cases: 
Moldovan citizenship, permanent 
domicile in Moldova, voluntary departure 
from the country, a state of destination 
different from Moldova and performance 
of a temporary labour activity. The Law 
also defines 2 categories of workers: the 
seasonal worker, namely, a citizen of the 
Republic of Moldova employed within 
the territory of another state based on an 
individual employment contract for a 
determined period of time or for 
determined work performed within a 
certain period of the calendar year; and 
a border worker, namely, a citizen of the 
Republic of Moldova employed in a 
From 2008 onwards, labour migration 
has been regulated by a special Law on 
labour migration, according to which the 
responsibilities on regulating labour 
migration are divided between the 
Bureau of Migration and Asylum under 
the Ministry of Interior and the National 
Agency of Employment (Law No. 691 of 
27 August 1991) under the Ministry of 
Labour, Social Protection and Family. 
There is a strict distinction between the 
right to work and the right to stay for the 
purpose of work.  
Labour immigration is possible only 
when the vacancies cannot be filled from 
domestic human resources.  
The right to work is conferred by the 
decision of the National Employment 
Agency, based on which the Bureau of 
Migration and Asylum grants the 
temporary residence right for the 
purpose of work and issues the 
temporary residence permit. Foreigners 
holding permanent resident permit or 
temporary residence right for family 
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border zone of the state who returns at 
least once per week to the Republic of 
Moldova where he/she is a citizen. 
Practically, the Law provides for the 
following forms of temporary 
employment abroad for Moldovan 
nationals: 1) on a voluntary basis, based 
on an individual employment contract 
concluded with the employer before 
exiting the country; 2) through private 
employment agencies, which have 
licenses; 3) according to the provisions 
of bilateral agreements.  
The licensing of private recruitment 
agencies is provided for in the Law no. 
180 and Law no. 451 regarding the 
licensing of business activity of 30 July 
2001. In order to protect the citizens who 
work abroad, the Law on the labour 
migration was modified in 2013 with a 
special focus on the regulation of the 
activity of the private agencies.  
On 5 July 2011, the Government of 
Moldova signed an Agreement on 
Labour Migration and an 
Implementation Protocol thereof with 
the Government of Italy. With this 
agreement the Italian Government 
grants the RM citizens a special entry 
quota. The Agreement specifies that a 
quarter of this quota will be managed by 
the relevant Moldovan Ministry. The 
agreement provides for: the 
development of circular migration 
schemes for Moldovan workers, joint 
projects for technical assistance, the 
implementation of common initiatives for 
Moldovans staying in Italy, the 
organization of vocational training and 
Italian language courses, offered by 
Italian institutions in Moldova.  
Moreover, the Republic of Moldova 
has concluded agreements in the field of 
social security / protection with Austria, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Luxembourg, Romania, Portugal, the 
Russian Federation, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan.  
reunification have been excluded from 
the provision under the law on labour 
migration as of 29 March 2013. 
Students can perform a labour 
activity on the territory of the country for 
a period of time that won’t exceed 10 
hours per week or the equivalent in days 
in one year (Article 5 para. (4) of the 
Law on labour migration).  
Moldova introduced a new category 
of beneficiaries of residence right in 
2013, namely foreign investors. Thus 
according to Article 36 of the law on 
the regime of foreigners the temporary 
residence right for foreign investors is 
granted to foreigners to make 
investments into the Republic of 
Moldova. It is mentioned in Article 8 
para. (4), which sets the amount of 
said investments, which was modified 
in 2013.  
 
 Moldova is a party to following multilateral agreements within the framework of the CIS: 
− Convention on the legal status of migrant workers and their families, adopted by 
CIS Member States of 14 November 2008; 
− Agreement on cooperation within the field of labour migration and social 
protection for migrant workers of 15 April 1994; 
− Protocol on amendments to the Agreement on cooperation within the field of 
labour migration and social protection for migrant workers of 25 November 2005. 
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Citizenship According to the Constitution (Art. 17), 
the citizenship of the Republic of 
Moldova can be acquired, retained or 
lost only under the conditions provided 
for by the basic law, and no one may be 
deprived arbitrarily of his or her 
citizenship or the right to change it. 
Citizens of the Republic of Moldova shall 
enjoy the protection of their State both at 
home and abroad. 
Until 2002, the Constitution contained 
in Article 18 restrictions regarding 
possession of non-Moldovan citizenship. 
In 2002, by the Law No. 1469 of 21 
November 2002, this Article was 
modified. Art. 24 of the Law On 
Citizenship authorizes the plurality of 
citizenship.  
According to the Law on 
Citizenship, citizens of the Republic of 
Moldova, who reside lawfully and 
habitually in the territory of the Republic 
of Moldova and are in legal possession 
of the citizenship of another state, shall 
enjoy the same rights and duties as 
other citizens of the Republic of Moldova 
(Art. 25). 
An RM citizen who is in legal 
possession of the citizenship of another 
state shall be subject to military service 
by the Republic of Moldova, if that 
person resides lawfully and habitually in 
its territory, irrespective of exemption 
from military service in the other state 
(Article 26). RM citizens who are at the 
same time the citizens of other states 
are recognized in relation to the RM only 
as its citizens.  
Moldovan citizens have the right to 
apply for Romanian citizenship.  
Under Article 88 of the Constitution, the 
President of the Republic of Moldova is 
empowered to solve the issues relating 
to citizenship. 
Law on Citizenship (entry into force: 
10 August 2000) stipulates that foreigners 
can acquire the citizenship of the RM by: 
birth (Article 11), adoption (Article 13), 
naturalization (Article 17). Citizenship of 
the Republic of Moldova may also be 
acquired on the basis of international 
agreements to which the Republic of 
Moldova is a party (Article 10.2). 
Citizenship may be lost by 
renunciation, deprivation or on grounds 
deriving from international agreements 
to which the Republic of Moldova is a 
Party (Article 21). 
Chapter VI of the Law establishes the 
procedure for citizenship acquisition and 
loss for the Republic of Moldova.  
Preconditions for the naturalization 
are: 10 years of lawful and habitual 
residence (8 years for refugees and 
stateless persons, 3 years for persons 
married to RM citizens); knowledge and 
observance of the constitution, knowledge 
of the state language; having legal 
sources of subsistence; loss or 
renunciation to another citizenship, if it is 
possible. Due to the fact that beneficiaries 
of humanitarian protection have the same 
rights and duties as refugees according to 
Article 33 of the Law on asylum, the 
provisions relating to refugees on 
citizenship are applied to them. 
In 2011, the Republic of Moldova 
acceded to the Conventions regulating 
the statelessness from 1954 and 1961. 
The Law on the Republic of Moldova's 
accession to the Convention on the 
Status of Stateless Persons was 
adopted on 27 December 2011. 
International 
Protection 
Moldovan legislation in the area of refugee protection is largely in line with 
international standards. The Law on asylum in the Republic of Moldova of 2008 
replaced the former Law on the status of refugees, partially transposing the 
European legislation on asylum.  
In 2002, Moldova ratified The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. UN High Commissioner for Refugees has a national office in Moldova.  
Forms of protection granted in Moldova are:  
− refugee status: in compliance with Geneva Convention;  
− humanitarian protection,  
− temporary protection,  
− political asylum: granted by the President.  
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The Law on Asylum differentiates between the status of refugees and the status 
of beneficiaries of humanitarian protection. For a recognized refugee, holding an ID 
valid for five years there is no restriction of movement within this period of time. In 
case of a beneficiary of humanitarian protection, his/her situation is limited to ID 
validity for one year. The rights of asylum seekers are set in Article 28-31 of the 
Law, and the rights of refugees and beneficiaries of humanitarian protection in 
Article 33, 35-38. The beneficiaries of political asylum have the same rights and 
duties as the refugees.  
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The Socio-Political Framework of Migration 
Since its independence, the Republic of Moldova has been strongly affected by emigration for labour 
purposes. Well into the new millennium the Moldovan authorities were not paying due attention to this 
phenomena as emigration reduced the acuteness of ethnic, economic and social clashes within the 
country. The growing labour migration brought about multimillion financial transfers into the country from 
migrants, thereby economically facilitating the remaining population. The government found this situation 
convenient and satisfactory. In the new millennium, under the influence of international organizations and 
the European Union institutions, the attitude of Moldovan authorities to emigration started to change. Trying 
to minimize negative effects and risks associated with mass emigration, the Moldovan government began 
to undertake certain measures. International organizations and national institutions began working together 
on the development and implementation of appropriate policies in order to decrease the negative impact of 
temporary and permanent emigration.  
After a decade of vacillation, the relations between the RM and the EU have started to be been seen as 
a priority. The National Strategy in the Migration and Asylum Domain (2011-2020) sets out the main 
priorities regarding emigration and circular migration. The Action Plan for 2011-2015 for the implementation 
of the National Strategy in the Migration and Asylum Domain (2011-2020) stipulates the importance of the 
compatibility of skills and qualifications of migrants. The recognition, evaluation and certification of 
competences and skills acquired by Moldovan migrants abroad are seen as vital.  
Despite the presence of some contradictions between the various political actors in Moldova regarding 
the paths of the national social development, Moldovan migration policy of the last decade is characterized 
by a certain degree of continuity, accumulation and use of conceptual and practical experience, both 
international and national. 
Socio-Political 
Framework Outward migration Inward migration 
Governmental 
Institutions 
The Ministry of Labour, Social 
Protection and Family (MLSPF) 
promotes and assures migrants’ rights. 
It is responsible for (re)integration, 
labour migration, granting migrant 
worker status and the organization of 
employment abroad. 
The Commission for the 
Coordination of Activities relating to 
the Migration Process is a permanent 
advisory body under the Government. 
The Commission was created for the 
coordination and monitoring of activities 
in the migration domain.  
The National Employment Agency 
is responsible for the implementation of 
state policy and intergovernmental 
agreements regarding labour activity and 
the social protection of migrant workers, 
the elaboration of employment 
mechanisms abroad for the citizens of 
the Republic of Moldova 
The Ministry of Education is 
responsible for the recognition of 
qualifications in secondary vocational 
education, specialized secondary and 
high education, obtained abroad by the 
RM citizens and other persons with 
domicile and/or with permanent places of 
work in Moldova.  
The President participates in shaping the 
migration policy (legislative initiative, 
signing of laws, veto right, management of 
foreign affairs). He/she takes decisions 
regarding acquisition of citizenship, 
granting of political asylum in the RM, etc. 
The Ministry of La bour, Social 
Protection and Family (MLSPF) is 
responsible for the elaboration and 
implementation of policies in the 
labour migration domain and 
integration, the issuance of work 
permits to foreign citizens and 
granting of migrant worker status.  
The Ministry of Interior is 
responsible for management of the entry 
flow of foreigners, issuance and 
extension of visas, granting of 
repatriation and immigrant statuses, 
asylum and refugees, and for border 
management.  
Bureau of Migration and Asylum (a 
subdivision of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs) inter alia coordinates integration 
of foreigners. 
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Bureau for Diaspora Relations in 
the structure of the State Chancellery 
develops relations with the Moldovan 
communities abroad 
The National Agency of 
Employment is responsible for issuance, 
extension and cancellation of work 
permits of foreign citizens and stateless 
persons. 
The Asylum and Integration 
Directorate (former Refugee 
Directorate) of the Bureau of Migration 
and Asylum under the Ministry of Interior 
is responsible for asylum procedure and 
implementation of the integration 
legislation.  
Governmental 
Strategy 
In 2011, the National Strategy in the 
migration and asylum domain (2011-
2020) and the Action Plan for 2011-
2015 regarding the implementation of the 
Strategy were approved. The activities 
included in the Plan describe how the 
state intends to improve migration 
management, focusing mainly on: the 
implementation of present initiatives; the 
strengthening of legal migration 
mechanisms; the promotion of circular 
migration; the assurance of social 
protection for Moldovan migrants; the 
assurance of the compatibility of 
the skills and qualifications of migrants; 
reintegration.  
Overall, the migration policy is 
directed towards work with Moldovan 
diaspora; development of policies that 
would stimulate the migrants’ desire to 
return home; interacting with different 
international organizations and creating a 
visa-free regime between Moldova and 
the European Union. 
The National Strategy in the migration 
and asylum domain (2011-2020) and 
the Action Plan for 2011-2015 foresee 
as main priorities the regulation of 
migration flows to and through Moldova; 
the creation of facilities for foreign 
investors; and the admission of 
foreigners, for working purposes 
according to necessities identified within 
the internal labour market, particularly 
persons with high levels of qualification 
who would have a direct impact upon the 
economic development. 
Civil Society  Coordination Council of Persons 
Originating from the Republic of Moldova 
and Residing Abroad;  
Scientific Diaspora of the RM (the 
Academy of Sciences of Moldova); 
 
La Strada,  
Centre for Prevention of Trafficking in 
Women (CPTW),  
Medicine du Monde,  
Terre des Hommes,  
Stimul,  
CNPAC.  
Migration and 
Economic 
Growth  
Within the existing framework for their cooperation, in particular the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed on 28 
November 1994, as well as the EU/Republic of Moldova European Neighbourhood 
Policy Action Plan agreed on the 22 February 2005, the Joint Declaration on a 
Mobility Partnership between Moldova and the EU was sighed on May 21, 2008. 
Taking into consideration the European integration as a political priority for the 
development of the RM, the mobility facilitation of people and stimulation of contacts 
between the RM citizens and the EU are set as goals. 
The Moldovan government strongly promotes and facilitates mobilizing of migrants’ 
assets to the development of the economy of the country. A pilot program PARE 1+1 
was implemented in 2010-2012 and then extended in 2013 until 2015. The purpose 
behind the pilot program is to mobilize human and financial resources of people going 
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abroad voluntarily to perform labour activities, for sustainable economic development 
of the country. The rule 1+1 of the program means that the applicant will pay 50% of 
the price of the entrepreneurial training. The program gives priority to creation of work 
places, export orientation, replacement of imports, implementation of energy-efficiency 
projects, creation and development of businesses in areas and application of modern 
technologies, know-how transfer, innovations.  
Since 2008, the Government developed and started to implement the action plan to 
stimulate the return of Moldovan labour migrants. The plan envisages complex 
measures to inform migrants about employment opportunities in the home country, 
repatriation procedures, founding their own business, expanding employment 
opportunities for young people, social protection, etc. So far the effect of such actions 
is not large, which is associated primarily with socio-economic situation in the country.  
The government further strengthens complex, strategic and future-oriented 
approach to migration issues that are included in a number of national programs and 
strategies (Strategy in Workforce Employment Area (2007-2015), Strategy of Youth 
Affairs (2009-2013), Strategy in Migration and Asylum (2011-2020), Strategic program 
in demographic security (2011-2025), Action plan in the field of human rights (2011-
2014), Plan of protection of children left without parental care (2010-2011) etc.).  
 
International 
Cooperation 
Republic of Moldova is a member of the following: IOM, Council of Europe, 
Commonwealth of Independent States, OSCE, ILO and BSEC. It participates in the 
following regional processes: Budapest Process, Prague Process, Eastern 
Partnership, European Neighbourhood Policy and Black Sea Synergy. 
Partially ratified the revised European Social Charter in 2001. 
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The Demographic-Economic Framework of Migration  
Today, Morocco remains a major sender of migrants with annual flows towards OECD countries estimated 
at 123,754 individuals in 2010 (OECD.stat). It has been continuously so since the 1960s. At that time, 
emigration from Morocco was mainly directed towards France, Belgium and the Netherlands. In the 1980s, 
however, after limitations had been put in place by the traditional receiving countries in Europe, Moroccan 
low–skilled, often irregular migration, instead increased in Spain and Italy. In North America, the United 
States and Canada currently play an important role in attracting highly-skilled Moroccans.  
Since 1990s, Morocco has also evolved into an important transit and immigration country, receiving 
migration flows mainly from Sub-Saharan countries. Sub-Saharan migrants generally attempt to cross to 
Europe illegally, but many of them also tend to stay in Morocco to improve their life conditions.  
Outward migration Inward migration 
Stock 
Data from Moroccan Consulates shows evidence of 
a rising propensity to emigrate: Moroccans residing 
abroad more than doubled from 1993 (1.5 million) 
to 2012 (3.4 million), with an average annual 
growth rate of 9.9% (compared with a 2.2% 
population growth rate in Morocco).  
 
In 2012, 90.6% of Moroccans abroad lived in 
Europe, mainly in France (35.4%), Spain (19.9%) 
and Italy (14.4%). Since 1981, about 445,000 
Moroccans have been regularized in four EU 
countries (France, Belgium, Italy and Spain), 
highlighting Moroccan irregular migration. Gender 
parity has been attained through family reunification 
in the traditional receiving countries. For example, 
in France 56.0% of Moroccan migrants are male, 
while women are underrepresented in the new 
destinations: 64.9% of Moroccan migrants in Spain 
and 63.2% in Italy are male.  
As to their socio-economic profile, Moroccan 
emigrants in OECD countries are more likely to 
have a low level of education (59.3%), especially in 
Italy (76.6%) and Spain (78.6%), and to be 
Stock 
In 2012, 77,798 foreign nationals held a valid 
residence permit, or 0.2% of the total population 
living in Morocco. Most of them came from France 
(29.2%) and Algeria (13.4%).  
 
Flows 
Besides regular migrants, Morocco has received 
large irregular flows from sub-Saharan African 
countries. 2000-2009, 136,603 foreign nationals 
were apprehended at Morocco’s borders. 
 
 
1993 2012
Europe 1,275,567 3,056,109 2,320,262
of which France 678,917 1,193,540 663,985
             Spain 65,847 671,628 759,590
             Italy 91,699 486,558 402,318
Arab countries 196,017 214,438 27,834
of which Libya 102,413 69,276 n.a.
             Algeria 54,576 45,451 18,661
North America 70,000 86,843 109,453
of which Canada 40,000 53,707 40,570
Other countries 3,452 14,589 158,088
Total 1,545,036 3,371,979 2,615,637
Source: Moroccan consular records and destination countries' 
statistics (population censuses, population registers, register 
of foreigners, etc.).
Moroccan emigration stocks by country of residence 
according to Moroccan consular statistics (1993, 2012) 
and destination countries' statistics (years around 2012)
Country of 
residence
Moroccan consular 
statistics
Destination 
countries'  
statistics
Country of nationality Number % 
African countries 29,650 38.1
of which Algeria 10,424 13.4
  Senegal 2,889 3.7
  Mauritania 1,956 2.5
European countries 31,483 40.5
of which France 22,683 29.2
             Italy 1,595 2.1
             Turkey 1,524 2.0
Other countries 16,665 21.4
of which US 1,648 2.1
             China 1,319 1.7
Total 77,798 100.0
% of the total resident population 0.2
Foreign population holding residence permits in Morocco by 
country of nationality, 2012
Source: Direction Générale de la Sûreté Nationale  - Morocco
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Source: Ministry of Interior - Morocco
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employed in low-skilled occupations: plant and 
machine operators, assemblers or elementary 
occupations (27.0%), craft and related trades 
workers (13.4%), service, shop and market sales 
workers (13.1%) and plant and machine operators. 
In North America, 51.7% of Moroccan emigrants 
are tertiary-educated (44.9% in the US and 62.7% 
in Canada) showing how selective migration 
policies adopted in these countries have helped in 
progressively building a skilled profile of Moroccans 
(year 2006 - OECD.stat.) 
Flows 
In 2010, the flow of Moroccan emigrants towards 
OECD countries was 123,754 (against 52,300 in 
2000). The highest annual growth rates have been 
registered in Spain (63.7%, from 10,600 to 71,400) 
and Italy (34.2%, from 7,300 to 29,800) confirming 
the continual and growing importance of these 
destinations. In Canada too the growth rate is 
notable (24.1% from 1,200 to 3,800) (OECD.stat). 
Emigration brings important resources to 
Morocco. These financial transfers, in fact, 
represent the second source of hard currency after 
tourism receipts, themselves brought by Moroccan 
expatriates spending the summer break in 
Morocco. In 2011, transfers amounted to 6,877.4 
million USD, 6.9% of GDP (source: Office des 
changes – Maroc).  
 
Remittances mainly arrived from France 
(40.4%), Spain (10.8%) and Italy (10.7%). 
The number of apprehended migrants and 
dismantled trafficking networks has, however, 
decreased. After 23,851 apprehended migrants in 
2003 – the highest to date – the number went down 
to 2,877 in 2009. A survey conducted by the 
Association Marocaine d’Etudes et de Recherches 
sur les Migrations drew an interesting profile for the 
sub-Saharan migrant: male (79.7%), relatively 
young (mean age 27.7 years old), single (82.2%) 
with a medium-high level of education (48.5%).  
Morocco is a transit and immigration country for 
asylum seekers and refugees as well as normal 
migrants. At present, it plays host to 1,351 
individuals. These come mainly from sub-Saharan 
and Middle Eastern countries: 25.0% are minors 
and, among the adult population, 17.0% are 
women. After a peak in 2001 (2,540), this 
population has fallen, mainly due to border control 
measures and the difficulty involved in obtaining 
refugee status.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Country of origin Number %
France 2,781.5 40.4
Spain 740.0 10.8
Italy 734.2 10.7
Belgium 417.7 6.1
US 343.3 5.0
Others 1,860.7 27.1
Total 6,877.4 100.0
Remittances sent to Morocco by country 
of origin of remittances, 2011
Source: Office des changes  - Morocco
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The Legal Framework of Migration 
In recent years Morocco has seen intense legislative activity, a large part of which has affected migratory 
issues. Six months after adopting a law related to struggle against terrorism, the government issued its law 
n°02-03 of November 11, 2003 on the “entry and stay of foreigners in Morocco, irregular emigration and 
immigration”. This new regulation amounted to a comprehensive reform of the legal framework governing 
migration, previously adopted under the French Protectorate. It aims at ruling every aspects of migration. 
Besides clarifying the rules concerning the entry and stay of foreign nationals in Morocco, the new law sets 
conditions and sanctions regarding irregular emigration and immigration. It strengthens sanctions against 
irregular migration, but also guarantees some rights. 
The revision of the family Code in 2004 was followed by the 2007 reform of the nationality Code, which 
enables women to transmit their nationality to their children. 
Managing opportunities of employment abroad and maintaining a strong link with Moroccan expatriates 
is a priority for the Kingdom, as evidenced by Morocco’s long history of establishing governmental 
institutions to address the issue. Beginning in 1949, Royal Decree of 8 November created a service to 
centralize applications of Moroccan workers for employment abroad, and during the 1990s several royal 
decrees established the Ministry for the Moroccan Community Residing Abroad and the Hassan II 
Foundation for Moroccans Living Abroad. Most recently, in December 2007 a royal decree established the 
Council for the Moroccan Community Abroad. 
In the past, Morocco was reluctant to conclude international agreements on human trafficking as well as 
a general readmission agreement with the European Union. On 25 April 2011, however, Morocco accepted 
the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
and in 2013, after multiple rounds of negotiations, Morocco and the EU signed a political agreement 
agreeing to the text of a Mobility Partnership between the two parties which would include readmission. 
In the wake of the Arab Spring, and following protests for democratic reform, the Moroccan Kingdom 
promulgated a new constitution in July 2011. Whereas the 1996 Constitution made no reference to 
Moroccan citizens abroad or foreigners within the Kingdom, the 2011 Constitution guarantees protection of 
rights for Moroccans abroad and foreigners within the country, as well as the right for Moroccans abroad to 
participate in Moroccan elections.  
Currently, Morocco does not have a national procedure for asylum, yet it has in recent years requested 
UNHCR assistance in developing and establishing a national asylum system.1
 
 
                                                          
1 UNHCR (2013). 2013 UNHCR Regional Operations Profile – North Africa. Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e4860d6.html  
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2 Kingdom of Morocco General Secretariat of the Government. (2011). La Constitution Edition 2011. 
http://www.sgg.gov.ma/constitution_2011_Fr.pdf 
3 CARIM. Legal Database – Morocco. Retrieved from 
http://www.carim.org/index.php?callContent=400&callCountry=1310 
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid.  
Legal 
Framework 
Outward migration Inward migration 
General Legal 
References 
• 2011 Moroccan Constitution2
• 2004 Judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tetouan on the crime of illegal 
immigration and emigration and encouraging illegal immigration
  
3
• 2003 Law n°02-03 on the entry and stay of foreign nationals into Morocco, 
emigration and irregular immigration
 
4
• 2003 
 
Law n° 65-69 on the Labour Code5  
• 1958 Code of Moroccan nationality modified in 20076 
Entry and Exit Visa 
Even if not required by law, the 
authorities expect foreign and national 
citizens leaving the country to show an 
entry visa for the country of destination. 
Since 1994, the border with Algeria 
has been officially closed. 
Visa 
Foreigners may be asked for means of 
living, reasons for entering, and 
repatriation guarantees. 
Visa exemption for citizens from 
Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal, Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville, 
Ivory Coast; the European Union, the 
United States, Mexico, among others. 
Irregular 
Migration  
Law n°02-03 strengthens repression against people who, even without taking 
advantage of this opportunity, facilitate or organize irregular entry into or exit from 
the country. It also penalizes irregular immigrants or emigrants, should they be 
foreign or national citizens. 
Retention of foreign nationals waiting for deportation or being readmitted after a 
transit through the country (15 days, possible extension to 10 more days). Protection 
of some foreign national categories from deportation (pregnant women or minors). 
Agreements regarding irregular migration 
 Readmission agreements (for Moroccan nationals only)  
• Spain (1992, 2003, as well as 2007 agreement on cooperation to prevent 
the illegal emigration of unaccompanied minors, for their protection and 
their concerted return). 
• France (1993, 2001) 
• Germany (1998) 
• Italy (1998, 1999) 
• Portugal (1999) 
 Other 
• EU-Morocco Association Agreement (1996, entering into force in 
2000): parties agree to a dialogue on illegal immigration and the 
conditions governing the return of irregular immigrants. 
• Palermo Protocols: in 2011, Morocco accepted the Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children. 
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7 Including convention C111 concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, but excluding 
conventions C118 Equality of Treatment of Nationals and Non-Nationals in Social Security, C97 concerning 
Migration for Employment and C143 concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality 
of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers. 
Rights and 
Settlement 
Right of foreigners to leave the 
country when and where they want (Law 
n°02-03). 
Protection of the rights of 
Moroccan citizens abroad and 
encourage their contribution to 
development of Morocco (Article 16 
and 163, Constitution). 
Full rights of citizenship granted 
to residents abroad including the right to 
vote and run as candidates to the 
elections at the local, regional and 
national electoral levels (Article 17, 
Constitution). 
Foreigners enjoy fundamental 
freedoms recognised to Moroccan 
citizens; those who reside in Morocco 
can participate in local elections by 
virtue of the law, application of 
international conventions or reciprocity 
(Article 30, Constitution). 
Family reunification: with card of 
residence (Law n°02-03). 
Access to Employment: labour 
contract submitted for work 
authorization. No access to the liberal 
professions, except through bilateral 
agreements. 
Equal access to public services: 
Yes. 
Labour 
 Bilateral agreements regarding labour migration 
• Morocco-Jordan (1983) on manpower  
• Morocco-France (1987) regarding stay and employment of Moroccans in 
France 
• Morocco-Spain (2001 and 2005) regarding employment of Moroccan 
seasonal agricultural workers 
 International agreements regarding labour migration 
• 1990 Convention on the protection of all migrant workers and members 
of their family (ratified in 1993) 
• Several ILO conventions ratified (49 conventions total)7 
Citizenship Dual citizenship allowed by Moroccan 
legislation. Dual citizenship granted at 
birth from children born to a Moroccan 
father and foreign woman or Moroccan 
mother and foreign man (provided that 
the law of the foreigners’ country of 
origin enables them to pass on their 
nationality). 
Nationality Code 2007: jus sanguinis 
by descent of a father and a mother, 
whatever the birthplace (optional right 
for children of a Moroccan mother). 
Double jus soli (nationality at the age of 
majority for resident children born in 
Morocco from parents born in Morocco; 
nationality of origin for children born in 
Morocco from resident parents if the 
father born in Morocco belongs to an 
Arab or a Muslim country). The time 
needed for a foreign woman married to 
a Moroccan citizen to apply for 
Moroccan nationality has been 
extended from 2 to 5 years. A foreign 
man married to a Moroccan woman 
does not gain any specific right in 
applying for Moroccan nationality. 
 
 
MOROCCO 
178 Migration Policy Centre (www.migrationpolicycentre.eu) 
International 
Protection 
 
No national procedure for refugees 
and asylum.  
Country agreement with UNHCR in 
2008. Recognition of the UNHCR 
refugee status determination, granting 
of a residence permit, though a previous 
regular entry is required. 
International agreements: 1951 
Convention relating to the status of 
refugees (succession in 1956) and 1967 
Protocol relating to the status of 
refugees (accession in 1971). 
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The Socio-Political Framework of Migration 
While emigration is still high on the Moroccan government’s political agenda, new forms of migration, 
namely transit and irregular migration patterns, have gained importance, requiring the government to 
redefine its policy-making imperatives. Notwithstanding the uneasy relationship between governmental 
policies and immigrant status in Morocco, a vibrant associative sector - consolidating links with Moroccan 
Diaspora communities and safeguarding undocumented immigrants and asylum-seekers’ rights in the 
country - has flourished.  
In regional terms, Morocco has, since the 1990s, acquired a pivotal role in border management and 
control. This status has conferred a key position for Morocco in Euro-Mediterranean migration 
governance, while leading to significant controversies regarding Morocco’s regional role in the 
management of migration flows.  
Socio-Political 
Framework Outward migration Inward migration 
Governmental 
Institutions 
• Ministry of the Interior 
• Ministry of Labour 
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Cooperation 
• Ministry of Justice 
• Delegated Ministry in Charge of 
Moroccans Residing Abroad (MRE) 
• Council of the Moroccan Community 
Residing Abroad (CCME) 
• Advisory Council on Human Rights 
• Ministry of the Interior 
• Ministry of Labour 
• Ministry of Justice 
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Cooperation 
• Ministry of Justice  
Governmental 
Strategy  
Devising policies for successful 
Moroccan emigration; passing 
bilateral agreements for economic 
emigration. 
Establishing and enhancing links 
with Moroccan Diaspora 
communities; devising action plans 
for the socio-economic, cultural and 
political integration of Moroccans 
abroad; devising policies facilitating 
remittances and return.  
Fighting irregular emigration; 
combating the long-term causes of 
irregular emigration; assisting 
Moroccan institutions in creating 
awareness as to the negative effects of 
irregular emigration.  
Launching and sustaining an 
active regional and international 
cooperation on outward migration; 
consolidating cooperative mechanisms 
with international organisations (e.g. 
IOM) with a view to mobilising 
Moroccan expatriate competencies 
abroad and facilitating participation in 
development (e.g.,Mobilization of 
Moroccans residing in Belgium for the 
Development of Morocco two-year pilot 
project started in August 2012), and 
their return and reintegration; 
facilitating cooperation between 
Regulate the entrance, residence and 
departure of foreign nationals  
Regulating the status of foreign 
workers; issuing permission for the 
recruitment of foreign workers. 
Fighting irregular immigration and 
transit migration through various 
practices such as frontier control, 
expulsion, and increasing cooperation with 
neighboring countries (e.g., Morocco 
convened the International Conference on 
Cooperation in the field of border control in 
the Sahel and the Maghreb in March 2013 
to cooperate with neighbouring countries 
to fight against cross-border terrorist 
threats and criminal). 
Combat trafficking and smuggling 
through development of cooperative 
mechanisms with international 
organisations (e.g. IOM) and with the EU. 
Identifying asylum seekers and 
refugees; defining their status as well as 
conditions for their stay; engaging in 
Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) 
with the Polisario Front such as 
expanded family visits programme bringing 
via aircraft Sahrawi refugees in Tindouf 
(Algeria) and their families in Western 
Sahara; providing humanitarian 
assistance to refugee populations 
(recently Mali and Syria).  
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national institutions and international 
organisations so as to identify the root 
causes of irregular emigration, finding 
common ground for action and 
facilitating the reintegration of irregular 
migrants in Morocco (e.g., the IOM 
Assisted Voluntary Return and 
Reintegration Project of 2010 followed 
by a new Assisted Voluntary Return 
and Reintegration Project in 2013, and 
projects with Italy, Spain and Belgium 
to return minor Moroccan migrants); 
enhancing cooperation with the EU in 
mobility partnership and circular 
migration; exploring with the EU – in 
addition to the migration dialogue – 
alternative ways in order to enhance 
development in Morocco (e.g. EU-
Moroccan cooperation in the field of 
economic liberalisation and transition). 
Engaging in consultative processes 
on migration such as the 5+5 Dialogue in 
order to promote more efficient migration 
governance in the Euro-Mediterranean area. 
Strengthening partnerships with 
international organizations dealing with 
immigration issues such as UNHCR and 
IOM – e.g. signing the accord de siège 
with UNHCR in 2007 which gives the 
international organisation full-fledged 
representation and which has various 
implications for improving the situation of 
asylum seekers and refugees in Morocco.  
 
 
Civil Society  Initiatives of civil society groups 
and transnational associations 
focusing on: 
• Fostering and consolidating links 
among Moroccan Diaspora 
communities; safeguarding their 
rights; providing them with services; 
ensuring their socio-economic 
integration; and contributing to 
development in the homeland (e.g. 
Association des Jeunes Marocains 
de France (AJMF), Migrations et 
Développement, Club des 
investisseurs des Marocains 
Résidant à l’Étranger (CIMRE) 
• Sensitising the population to the 
negative effects of irregular 
emigration through awareness 
raising and advocacy. 
Initiatives in the associative sector 
aimed at: 
• Providing immigrants with services as 
well as safeguarding and enhancing 
their socio-economic and human rights 
(Groupe Antiraciste 
d'Accompagnement de Défense des 
Etrangers et des Migrants (GADEM); 
Association Beni Znassen pour la 
Culture, le Développement et la 
Solidarité) 
• Safeguarding the rights of immigrant 
categories, especially undocumented 
ones (e.g. Association des Amis et 
Familles des Victimes de l'Immigration 
Clandestine (AFVIC), Organisation 
Marocaine des Droits de l'Homme 
(OMDH), Association Marocaine des 
Droits Humains (AMDH), ASILMAROC, 
CARITAS)  
International 
Cooperation 
Morocco is a member of several international organisations in which it actively 
works to address issues of migration, including: International Organization for 
Migration (IOM); International Labour Organization (ILO); UNHCR; Arab League; and 
Organization for African Union (OAU), among others. Morocco is a participant to the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Morocco is a member of the Union for the 
Mediterranean (a multilateral partnership within the European Neighbourhood Policy) 
and participates in the 5 + 5 Dialogue.  
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The Demographic-Economic Framework of Migration  
The Israeli-Arab wars in 1948-49 and 1967 caused the Palestinian exodus which saw respectively about 
725,000 and 250,000 Palestinians fleeing their homes seeking refuge from the Israel army, mainly in 
neighbouring countries (Kossaifi, 1989). The precarious living conditions of displaced people as well as 
some other events (including the expulsion of Palestine Liberation Organization – PLO from Jordan in 
1970, the Israel invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the first Gulf war in 1990-1991 together with the recent 
expulsion of Palestinians from Iraq in 2006) sent out additional waves of Palestinian refugees around the 
world, and sometimes saw these refugees return home.  
As well as forced migration, Palestinians have experienced increasingly high rates of outward labour 
migration, too. In the 1960s, searching for jobs and aiming at improving their overall living conditions, 
Palestinians from the West Bank started to emigrate towards the East Bank (especially to the capital 
Amman) in the period when the West Bank was annexed by Jordan (1949-1988): they also traveled to the 
oil-producing Gulf countries. After 1967, Palestinians from Gaza were also involved in large scale 
emigration movements to the Gulf and – a minor part – to Europe and North America (Fargues, 2000). 
These labour migration flows were largely composed of medium and highly-skilled individuals, often 
accompanied by their families. Later, in the 1990s, this form of emigration was gradually reduced as a 
consequence of the closure of the Gulf labour markets. By the end of these migration movements, the Oslo 
agreements resulted in the opposite phenomenon: namely, the return of around 100,000 dispersed 
Palestinians to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) in the 1990s. However, the political impasse, the 
security chaos and the worsening of socio-economic conditions, which followed these negotiations, led to 
new waves of outward flows – particularly of young and well educated individuals, in the 2000s. 
A large number of Palestinian commuters used to go on a daily basis to Israel in order to cover unskilled 
and semi-skilled jobs in the construction, agriculture and basic services. In the early 2000s, following the 
eruption of the second Intifada and the construction of the Separation Wall, these movements were stopped 
by Israel, thus causing additional pressures on the Palestinian labour market.  
As to immigration patterns, nationals born abroad living in the oPt include both first-generation refugees 
forced to emigrate from Israel in 1948 and returnees, i.e. the descendants of Palestinian refugees born 
abroad who returned during the Oslo process between 1993 and 2000 and, to a lesser extent, expelled 
Palestinians from the Gulf States – especially Kuwait – in 1991. Palestine has also been, in the last 
decades, the destination of Israeli settlers whose number – almost half a million − represents 12.7% of the 
population of the oPt in 2008. 
  
PALESTINE 
184 Migration Policy Centre (www.migrationpolicycentre.eu) 
 
Outward migration Inward migration 
Stock 
‘Counting’ Palestinian emigrants abroad is not 
straightforward. To the voluntary emigrants, one 
should add the total of Palestinian refugees around 
the world – as registered by the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) – and in 
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria – as registered by the 
UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). As to the 
latter, depending on UNRWA’s operative definition,1
 
 
Palestine refugees include both post-48 refugees 
and their descendants, i.e. persons of Palestinian 
origin born outside the oPt. As a matter of fact, 
second and third generation migrants represent the 
great majority of these and consequently any 
estimates of Palestinians living abroad depends on 
which Palestine refugees are considered. For 
example, official estimates provided by the 
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) put 
the number of Palestinians abroad at 7 million in 
2010, mainly composed of Palestinian 
descendants. 
According to statistics provided by destination 
countries (see figure above), c. 2012, the number of 
Palestinians residing abroad was, instead, very 
much lower: 871,924. Unlike the PCBS’s estimates, 
this figure does not include either Palestinians 
residing in the Gulf States (because of data 
unavailability), or persons of Palestinian origins with 
another nationality (especially in Jordan). Indeed, it 
Stock 
In the oPt, the population born abroad includes 
both first-generation refugees forced to emigrate 
from Israel in 1948 and returnees. The latter group 
is composed of Palestinian refugees born abroad 
who returned during the Oslo process between 
1993 and 2000 – and who were mainly employed 
by various civilian and military institutions of the 
PLO – as well as other returnees, especially those 
who were expelled from Kuwait in 1991. 
 
According to census data, in 2007 there were 
230,930 individuals born abroad, or 6.1% of the 
total population residing in Palestine. As to their 
provenance, they were mainly born in the Gulf 
countries (30.4%), Jordan (21.8%), and the 1948 
Areas (20.3%).  
By comparing the 1997 and 2007 censuses, 
because of the high mortality rates of those coming 
from 1948 Areas (who were all aged 60 or more), 
the total number of the total population born abroad 
decreased from 1997 to 2007 at an annual average 
rate of -0.7%. Without considering the first-
generation refugees born in 1948 Areas, foreign 
born nationals are, instead, a very young 
population with 81.0% aged 10-39.  
 
                                                          
1 Under UNRWA, a Palestine refugee is any person whose ‘normal place of residence was Palestine during the 
period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 
conflict […] Palestine Refugees, and descendants of Palestine refugee males, including legally adopted children, 
are eligible to register for UNRWA services’. This definition, beyond implying that all descendants of 1948 
refugees would automatically be granted a refugee status, leads to the paradoxical consequence that this 
population increases over time because of natural demography (not of political events) while the number of 
migrants among them decreases (see Fargues, 2006). 
Country of residence
Definition 
(*)
Reference 
date (Jan 1st)
Source Number %
14,627 1.7
of which UK (A) 2012 Annual Population Survey 8,000 0.9
             Sweden (A) 2012 Population register 3,843 0.4
844,063 96.8
of which Syria (B) 2009 PCBS (Damascus) 467,596 53.6
 Lebanon (B) 2007 ACS Survey 198,258 22.7
 Jordan (B) 2004 Population Census 115,190 13.2
 Egypt (B) 2006 Population Census 31,900 3.7
13,234 1.5
of which Canada (A) 2006 Population Census 6,565 0.8
             Norway (A) 2012 Population register 3,150 0.4
871,924 100.0
94,150
1,979,580
2,945,654
Palestinian emigration stocks by country of residence, most recent data (c. 2012)
European Union
Southern-Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries (**)
Other countries (***)
Total (a)
(*): Palestinian migrants are defined according to the country of birth (A) or country of nationality criterion according 
to countries of residence.
(**): Depending on data availability, SEM countries include Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.
(***): "Other countries" include other European countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norw ay, Sw itzerland, Belarus, 
Russia and Ukraine), Canada, Australia and New  Zealand.
Sources: national statistics (Population Censuses, population registers, registers for foreigners, etc.)
UNHCR refugees - 2011 (b)
UNRWA refugees in Jordan - 2012 (c)
Grand total (a+b+c)
Number % Number %
Gulf Countries 65,708 26.3 70,297 30.4 0.7
Jordan 47,865 19.2 50,350 21.8 0.5
1948 Areas (*) 76,955 30.8 46,976 20.3 -3.9
Egypt 15,517 6.2 16,676 7.2 0.7
Israel 8,129 3.3 9,868 4.3 2.1
Syria 4,522 1.8 4,223 1.8 -0.7
Lebanon 2,027 0.8 2,993 1.3 4.8
Yemen 1,287 0.5 1,326 0.6 0.3
Tunisia 735 0.3 542 0.2 -2.6
Other Arab Countries 13,243 5.3 13,351 5.8 0.1
USA 7,299 2.9 7,074 3.1 -0.3
Others 6,275 2.5 6,854 3.0 0.9
Not Stated 0 0.0 400 0.2
Total 249,562 100.0 230,930 100.0 -0.7
% on the total 
resident population
Average 
annual growth 
rate (%)
Population born abroad residing in Palestine by country of birth, 1997, 2007
9.6
Notes: (*): 1948 Areas include the parts of historical Palestine now  know n as Israel, as defined after 
the 1948 w ar.
Source: Population Censuses - 1997, 2007
6.1
Country of birth
1997 2007
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is worth mentioning that UNRWA refugees have 
been subjected to different regulatory systems 
according to which, in Syria and Lebanon, they are 
considered ‘stateless’ (until a solution to the 
Palestine cause is found), while in Jordan all of the 
1948-refugees were granted nationality (and so 
they are not counted as Palestinians by official 
statistics).2 Consequently, if we add to this total the 
figure provided by UNRWA in Jordan (1,979,580 
Palestine refugees) and by UNHCR (94,150 
Palestinian refugees)3
As to their characteristics, in OECD countries 
women represent 44.8% of Palestinian migrants. As 
a whole, they show an extremely high socio-
economic profile, their education being historically 
considered as the main tool of empowerment within 
the Palestinian community. c. 2006, 49.2% had a 
university degree or higher while 30.2% had a 
medium level of education. Their educational profile 
matches their occupational one: they are mainly 
employed as professionals (21.9%), legislators, 
senior officials and managers (17.6%), and 
technicians (10.8%). 
, the number would be much 
larger, i.e. 2.9 million, a number which fits much 
better with the reality of the Palestinian Diaspora. 
Again, figures on the numbers of Palestinians in the 
Gulf States are unknown. 
Further, the living conditions of Palestinian 
refugees deserve attention. Their integration varies 
by country of settlement, ranging from a quasi-
parity condition in Syria to an institutional 
discriminatory regime in Lebanon. This depends, 
above all, on demographic4 and internal political 
pressures related to the presence of Palestinians. 
According to two surveys conducted by FAFO in 
2000, despite the fact that the unemployment rate 
of Palestinians is not that different from natives in 
both countries (8.7% in Syria and 10.0% in 
Lebanon), what emerges strikingly is their very low 
participation in the labour market (respectively 
49.3% and 42.2%), especially among women 
(respectively 18.0% and 16.8%). These figures are 
likely to suggest that a high number of Palestinians 
work in the informal sector and demonstrate as well 
the existence of a strong gender dimension in 
Palestinians’ propensity to work. 
Another important component of the immigrant 
population residing in the oPt is represented by 
Israeli settlers. In 2011, there were 337,285 in the 
West Bank, among whom a large majority lived 
between the Green Line and the Separation Wall. 
Moreover, 199,647 Israelis lived in East Jerusalem, 
meaning a total number of 536,932 Israeli settlers 
living in the oPt (including annexed East 
Jerusalem) in 2011. 
 
                                                          
2 While in Jordan, it is strictly important to highlight the difference encountered between UNRWA estimates and 
official ones in order to consider the large number of Jordanians with Palestinian origins, figures provided by 
destination countries statistics in Syria and Lebanon are instead more reliable than UNRWA estimates. As to the 
former, Palestinian refugees are counted on an annual basis by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and 
Natural Resources of Damascus (and published by the Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics). In Lebanon, the 
Enquête Conditions de vie de Ménages conducted by the Lebanese Central Administration of Statistics allows us 
to exclude a large number of Palestinians who were initially registered under UNRWA in Lebanon but who are not 
currently residing there but who are still registered under UNRWA (see Fargues, 2006). 
3 UNHCR refugees should be added to the total since in many developing countries refugees are not included in 
censuses or population registers (see http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/data-and-resources/data-
sources-and-limitations/undp-international-migrant-stock-data). 
4 It is worth mentioning that while in Syria Palestinians account for 1.7% of the total resident population, in Lebanon 
the same value equals 5.0%. 
Year West Bank Gaza Strip East 
Jerusalem 
Total
1983 22,800 900 76,095 99,795
1984 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1985 44,100 1,900 n.a. 46,000
1986 n.a. n.a. 103,900 n.a.
1987 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1988 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1989 69,800 3,000 117,100 189,900
1990 78,600 3,300 135,000 216,900
1991 90,300 3,800 137,300 231,400
1992 101,100 4,300 141,000 246,400
1993 111,600 4,800 152,800 269,200
1994 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1995 133,200 5,300 157,300 295,800
1996 142,700 5,600 160,400 308,700
1997 154,400 5,700 161,416 321,516
1998 163,300 6,100 165,967 335,367
1999 177,411 6,337 170,123 353,871
2000 192,976 6,678 172,250 371,904
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2002 214,722 7,277 175,617 397,616
2003 224,669 7,556 178,601 410,826
2004 234,487 7,826 181,587 423,900
2005 258,988 0 184,057 443,045
2006 268,400 0 186,857 455,257
2007 276,462 0 189,708 466,170
2008 295,380 0 193,091 488,471
2009 299,440 0 n.a. 299,440
2010 322,796 0 196,178 518,974
2011 337,285 0 199,647 536,932
Source: Statistical Abstracts of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics; 
Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, Jerusalem institute for Israel studies (in 
Foundation for the Middle East Peace's w ebsite); Palestinian Central Bureau 
of Statistics, 2011. Israeli Settlements in the Palestinian Territory, Annual 
Statistical Report 2010- 2011.
Israeli settlers in the oPt, 1983-2011
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Flows  
From 1960 to 1967 around 140,000 Palestinians 
emigrated from the West Bank towards the East 
Bank (25,000) and other Arab countries (115,000) 
(Kossaifi, 1989). According to Israeli statistics, from 
1967 to 2003, the net migration balance of the 
Palestinian territories was negative, apart from the 
period 1990-1994, during which many Palestinians 
returned home following the Oslo agreements. 
 
In recent years, migration has continued as a 
consequence of the second Intifada (2000) and the 
associated worsening socio-economic conditions. 
Among other problems there is the rise in 
unemployment, especially for the most educated 
individuals, the political impasse in peace 
negotiations and the shrinking chances of the 
establishment of an independent Palestinian state: 
all these have triggered intense outward emigration 
flows from the oPt. For example, the unemployment 
rate increased from 14.3% in 2000 to 26.2% in 
2008. Among the youngest population, the same 
value passed from 20.0% to 40.2% for those aged 
15-24 and from 14.8% to 25.5% for the 25-34 
population. Moreover, the unemployment rate of 
university graduates reached, in 2008, 27.2% 
(source: Labour Force Survey). 
 
Emigration has, thus, become a serious option 
for a worrying percentage of the young and 
educated people living in Palestine. According to a 
recent survey conducted by the PCBS in 2009, an 
average number of 6,570 Palestinians left the 
country each year 2005-2009. These emigrants 
Flows  
According to the Migration’s Survey - 2010, from 
2005 to 2009 an annual average number of 6,082 
migrants returned in the oPt (PCBS, 2010). 
 
The survey investigated the profile of all return 
migrants living in the oPt (stock). It is shown that 
one out of four return migrants had come back 
before 1990 (25.5%), while one out of two had 
done the same 1991-1999. The rest (24.4%) 
returned home in the 2000s, a period when the 
number of returnees declined sharply as a result of 
the refusal of Israel to accept their return and the 
dangerous living conditions in Palestine.  
 
As expected, 79.1% returned from Arab 
countries, especially from Jordan (36.1%) and the 
Gulf countries (29.0%). A significant proportion 
came back also from the US (9.5%). Moreover, 
more than half (54.5%) returned aged between 15 
and 44 years old, while an important percent came 
back when younger than 14 years old.  
If we compare the main reason why returnees 
emigrated in the past and the reasons declared by 
recent emigrants (see ‘outward migration’ section), 
a raw proxy of the evolution of the reasons to 
emigrate can be drawn.  
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-20,000
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1967-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-03
Net migration balance, oPt, 1967-2003
Source: Statistical Abstracts, various years, State of Israel
 
Source: Labour Force Survey - Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) 
Unemployment rate by age group (2000, 2008) and level 
of education (2008), oPt 
Age group Level of education 
 
7,077
6,054
5,000
5,854
6,426
0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Return migrants in the oPt, 2005-2009
Source: Migration Survey-2010, PCBS 
Last country of 
residence abroad
% Age at 
return
% Main reason of 
migration abroad
%
Arab countries 79.1 "0-14" 38.5 Family reasons 33.2
of which Jordan 36.1 "15-29" 36.4 Education and study 21.7
Gulf c. 29.0 "30-44" 18.1 Improving living standards 15.0
Egypt 5.1 "45-59" 5.6 Unemployed/lack of 
opportunities in the oPt
9.7
Other countries 20.6 "60+" 1.3 Others 20.4
of which USA 9.5 Not stated 0.1 Not stated 0.0
Not stated 0.3
Total 100.0
Return migrants by some characteristics, oPt, 2010
Source: Migration Survey-2010, PCBS
Total 100.0Total 100.0
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were more likely to be: 1) young (33.0% aged 15-
29), 2) male (sex ratio equals 152.2), 3) directed to 
non-Arab countries (46.6%, among which 21.6% to 
the US), Jordan (23.5%) and the Gulf countries 
(20.4%) and 4) well educated (35.7% have a 
bachelor degree or above and 41.9% have a 
secondary degree) (source: Migration’s Survey–
2010, PCBS, 2010). 
As to the reason for emigration, most left the 
country to study abroad (34.4%), for family reasons 
(21.9%, especially women, 64.0%), improving their 
standards of living (14.6%) or the hunt for a job 
(13.7%) (ibid.).  
 
Another survey, conducted by PCBS in 2005 on 
the wish to migrate among university graduates in 
the oPt, shows that while the majority of men 
(69.0%) would hypothetically accept work abroad at 
any or no conditions, only 14.9% of women would 
do the same (PCBS, 2006). 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from the 
recent emigration tendencies from Palestine. First, 
the reasons which trigger individuals to leave the 
country are similar to those of other countries in the 
region (studying, unemployment, etc.) so that less 
importance is attributed to the specific political 
situation of the oPt. Second, both the 
preponderance of family reasons among female 
emigrants and the scarce propensity to leave the 
country among female university graduates suggest 
that emigration is still largely seen as a ‘male 
activity’. Notwithstanding the overall worsening of 
living conditions, the existence of family networks 
around the world and the improvement of the 
Palestinian educational profile regardless of sex, 
women still face strong cultural constraints. These 
mean that it is not easy for them to work, to be 
socially emancipated or to think about migration as 
a way of improving their socio-economic status.  
First, return migrants had a higher propensity to 
emigrate for family reasons (33.2% vs 21.9%) 
highlighting the family framework under which labour 
migration from the Palestinian territories took place. 
Second, recent emigrants tend to emigrate more for 
education and study reasons (34.4% vs 21.7%) or 
because they are unemployed, perceiving lack of 
opportunities at home or simply because they aim to 
improve their living conditions (28.3% vs 24.7%), 
shedding light on the difficult conditions that young 
people face in Palestine today. 
To conclude, it seems that the choice to migrate 
to work abroad has gradually shifted from a family 
framework to an individual one, involving increasing 
numbers of young (male) Palestinians affected by 
negative socio-economic conditions at home. 
 
References: Fargues P. 2000. “Protracted National Conflict and Fertility Change: Palestinians and Israelis in the 
Twentieth Century”, Population and Development Review, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 441-482; Fargues P. 2006. International 
migration in the Arab region: trends and policies, paper presented at the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on 
International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, Beirut, 15-17 May 2006; Kossaifi, G. 1989. L’enjeu 
démographique en Palestine in Mansour C. (eds.), Les Palestiniens de l’intérieur, Washington, DC: Les livres de la 
revue des études Palestiniennes; Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics – PCBS. 2006. Conditions of Graduates From 
High Education and Vocational Training Survey (December, 2005 – January, 2006), Press Conference on the Survey 
Preliminary Results Ramallah; Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics – PCBS. 2010. Migration’s Survey in the 
Palestinian Territory 2010, Press Release, Ramallah. 
 
  
Country of residence % Educational level % Main reason to emigrate %
Arab countries 52,0 Illiterate 1,3 Studying abroad 34,4
of which Jordan 23,5 Elementary 4,9 Family reasons 21,9
Gulf countries 20,4 Preparatory 15,4 Improving living standards 14,6
Egypt 4,0 Secondary 35,7 Searching for a job 13,7
Other countries 47,6 Associate Diploma 6,2 Others 15,2
of which USA 21,6 Bachelor and above 35,7 Not stated 0,2
Not stated 0,4 Not stated 0,8
Total 100,0 Total 100,0
Palestinians emigrating during the period 2005-2009 by some characteristics
Source: Migration Survey 2010, PCBS
Total 43,7
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The Legal Framework of Migration 
After more than forty years of Israeli occupation, Palestine has few means to impact migration in the 
territory which the international community recognized as being its own. The Oslo peace agreements 
through which the PLO and Israel recognized each other in 1993 included some interim arrangements as to 
the division of competences between the two entities on the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, prior to further 
negotiations towards the creation of a Palestinian state. The Palestinian territories were divided into three 
areas: Area A under Palestinian control, Area B under Palestinian civil control and Israeli military control, 
Area C under Israeli control. 
The legal situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (oPt) is extremely complex. Beyond the 
distinction between administrative statuses stipulated by the Oslo agreements, the Gaza Strip is still regulated 
by some Egyptian laws and the West Bank by some Jordanian laws. Besides this, while the Oslo agreements 
consider the Gaza Strip and the West Bank as one sole unit, they have been administrated as two separate 
entities since 1948. Consequently, circulation is discontinuous between both, as well as between each of 
them and Israel, Jerusalem included, not mentioning of course the external countries. Hence the oPt are 
characterized by a multiplicity of borders, obstacles and statuses. To this imbroglio has to be added the 
constant violation of rules and limits for determined competences as a result of the Israeli occupation. 
The commonly used distinction between citizens and non-citizens, propping up rules governing migration, 
entry, stay and exit, does not apply to the oPt. The Palestinian Authority (PA) generally considers the persons 
considered as foreign by Israel as Palestinian. The “Palestinian citizens” of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank 
who hold the corresponding identity card are thus considered “foreign residents” by Israel and come under PA 
jurisdiction. Any other individual, be s/he of Palestinian origin, refugee or of another nationality, if s/he does 
not hold an identity card of the Gaza Strip or the West Bank, is considered a “non-citizen”. Entry, stay and exit 
from the Palestinian Territories are dependent on the Israeli authorities, but are also subject to the PA 
regulations in area A. Israeli citizens fall under Israeli jurisdiction, wherever they are. The Palestinians from 
East-Jerusalem are considered as foreign residents in Israel and hold special identity cards. 
The Palestinians who fled the 1948 war were not readmitted afterwards, since they had not been 
counted among the citizens when the state of Israel was created. Likewise, the “Displaced” of 1967 were 
not readmitted, as they had not been registered by the Israeli census of Palestinians in the West Bank of 
1967. The Palestinians who had been registered by the census have been considered regular residents 
and got an identification number. Some of them had their resident status revoked after too long spent 
abroad (6 years). All the others had then to obtain a resident permit as foreign citizens, as well as 
authorizations to work or to have a commercial activity. 
The Palestinian Authority has no power over the Territories’ external borders and cannot hand out visas. 
Israel retains full control over borders, civil registry, family reunification and entry and stay visa issuance. It 
also controls the circulation of residents and non-residents between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. 
Hence it is difficult to talk of a Palestinian migratory policy. 
Refugees in the oPt come under the mandate of UNRWA, which was created in 1949 when it became 
apparent that Israel would be opposed to the return of Palestinian refugees. Recognized Palestinian 
refugees are people whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the two years before the 1948 
conflict, who lost both their home and means of livelihood and then came back. Their descendants are 
eligible for services from UNRWA, which is also competent in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The 1951 
convention on the status of refugees was not supposed to apply to Palestinians, insofar as a collective 
repatriation right had been recognized for them.  
Since Palestine is not a fully constituted state – though the Palestinian state was proclaimed in 1988, 
and the UN granted the “State of Palestine” ‘non-member observer state’ status in 2012– its adhesions to 
international conventions beg some questions. Nevertheless, as an occupying power, Israel is constrained 
to respect, in the Palestinian Territories as well as vis-à-vis people living there, the international 
conventions it has ratified. This was stated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its advisory opinion 
in 2004, which concluded that the wall built by Israel was illegal. The Court indicated that the wall impeded 
Palestinians’ liberty of movement as guaranteed under article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. In the exercise of its competences, Israel is obliged to comply with the provisions of the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, those of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
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those of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Moreover, Israel is also under obligation not to raise 
any obstacle to the exercise of such rights in those fields where competence has been transferred to the 
Palestinian authorities. 
The part of the West Bank lying between the Green Line and the wall is considered a "Closed Area". 
Residents of this area may no longer remain in it, nor may non-residents enter it, unless they hold a permit 
or identity card issued by the Israeli authorities. According to the report of the UN Secretary-General, most 
residents have received permits for a limited period. Israeli citizens, Israeli permanent residents and those 
eligible to immigrate to Israel in accordance with the Law of Return may remain in, or move freely to, from 
and within the Closed Area without a permit. Access to and exit from the Closed Area can only be made 
through access gates, which are opened infrequently and then only for short periods5
Moreover, the Separation Wall being constructed around the West Bank by Israel – beginning in 2000 
and continuing through present –severely restricts the movement inside or outside of the West Bank.  
. 
                                                          
5 ICJ Report, Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, advisory opinion 
of 9 July 2004, retrieved from http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pr=71&code=mwp&p1=3&p2=4&p3=6.  
Legal Framework  Outward migration Inward migration 
General Legal 
References 
• 2009 Israeli Military Order n°1650 
• 2006 Presidential Decree n°16 Concerning the Regulation of the Public 
Administration of the Crossing Points and Border 
• 2004 Council of Ministers' Decision n°45 on work permits 
• 2003 Basic Law 
• 2000 Labour Law n°7 
• 1995 Interim Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the West Bank 
• 1994 Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area  
Entry and Exit Each Palestinian has to have an identity number (issued by Israel) and a travel 
document (issued by the PA). The Palestinian passport for people from the Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank is recognized by Israel and internationally, but it has to 
include the identity numbers issued by the Israeli authorities to enable entry into the 
territory (2005 Council of Ministers' Decision n°244 on "VIP" Passports). 
Entry and exit visas delivered by the Israeli authorities. 
Palestinians need a permit handed out by the Israeli authorities to stay in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
Non-residents need a temporary visitor permit to enter. 
The Territories’ border crossing for Palestinians is by land. Palestinian holders 
of an identity document, including those with foreign citizenship, must pass through 
border posts reserved to Palestinians. West Bank Palestinians wishing to reach 
Jordan and travel further afield have only the Allenby bridge (Jericho) as crossing 
point. It is fully and exclusively controlled by Israel. Gaza Strip Palestinians have 
two crossing points: the first one links the Gaza Strip to Israel (Eretz) and a permit 
has to be issued by Israel, also for a possible transit by the West Bank; the second 
one is Rafah from where Palestinians can get to Egypt. Since 2006, Egypt has 
severely limited access, in both directions. 
The Palestinian 2003 Basic Law stipulates that no Palestinian may be deported 
from the homeland, prevented or prohibited from returning to it (Article 28).  
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Irregular 
Migration 
 
Israeli Military Order n°1650 of 2009: 
any person who irregularly enters into or 
stays without permit in the West Bank 
will be considered an infiltrator and may 
be punished with a seven-year prison 
sentence. 
Rights and 
Settlement 
Palestinians’ rights and stay 
conditions vary considerably in time 
and space. In Syria, they enjoy equal 
rights with nationals, except regarding 
estate ownership and political matters, 
but the Palestinians who fled from Iraq 
after 2003 do not enjoy the same 
treatment. In Jordan, Palestinians from 
the West Bank got citizenship till 1988. 
Palestinians from the Gaza Strip who 
fled after 1967 were not treated though 
in the same fashion. 
Generally, Palestinians enjoy the 
same rights as foreign nationals, with 
some variances either more favourable 
(e.g, in Egypt till 1978), or less favourable 
(e.g, access to work in Lebanon till the 
2010 reform; access to citizenship in 
Egypt despite the 2004 reform). 
 
Residence: the right of residence is 
transmitted by one of both resident 
parents, upon registration. Those not 
considered as residents since 1967 or 
after Oslo (on the basis of the 
negotiated returnees list) can become 
residents only through family 
reunification if agreed to by Israel. 
Access to Employment: Based on 
article 15 of the Labour Code, the council 
of ministers issued Decision n° 45/2004 
on granting work permits to non-
Palestinian workers. Four conditions: 1) 
the absence of competition with national 
workers; 2) the need for a foreign worker 
instead of a national; 3) the relevant 
qualifications and experience for the job 
for which the license is requested; 4) a 
condition of reciprocity may be imposed 
by the Ministry of Labour. No grounds 
need be given for rejection. If the 
application is accepted, a license is 
granted for one year. 
Non-residents have to obtain Israeli 
authorization to exercise a commercial 
activity. 
Domestic workers are not covered 
by Labour Law. 
Family reunification: this is 
dependent on Israeli measures, though 
it theoretically falls under the general 
jurisdiction of Palestinian civil affairs. 
Reunification for first degree relatives 
(spouses and minor children) of 
residents (with ID number).  
Access to estate ownership: 
submitted to administrative 
authorization and a reciprocity 
condition (1996 Case-Law). 
Citizenship The PA has not adopted a nationality law yet. The Palestinian Charter and the 
Declaration of Principles recognize that any Palestinian has the right to (later) 
Palestinian citizenship whose consequences on the right to return, refused by Israel, 
is an issue. A number of Arab states within the Arab League proclaimed their wish to 
preserve the right to return and, to do so, adopted the Casablanca Protocol for the 
treatment of Palestinians in Arab States which contains the commitment to ensure 
Palestinians the same rights as nationals without granting them citizenship. Although 
the PA and some stakeholders argue that granting a second citizenship would not 
impede the right to return, the question of extending citizenship to Palestinians is a 
very delicate issue. Yet, a large part of the Palestinian diaspora has got effective 
second citizenship. 
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International 
Protection 
Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Syria 
and Lebanon fall under the UNRWA 
mandate. In October 2002, UNHCR 
stated that the 1951 Geneva 
Convention would apply to Palestinians 
outside UNRWA zones, such as Egypt 
and Libya. Palestinians are thus 
considered as refugees by both 
UNRWA and UNHCR. 
 
Palestinian refugees come under the 
UNRWA mandate and are granted 
identity documents. They are subject to 
Israeli occupation. They enjoy equal 
rights to other Palestinians. The refugee 
status is transmitted by descent. Till 
2006, a female refugee marrying a male 
non-refugee would lose her status. She 
also could not transmit her status to her 
children – unlike a male refugee. These 
discriminatory laws ended in 2006. 
Case-Law related to refugees in the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank 
considers that they do not have a right 
of estate ownership in camps. They lose 
the use of housing if they leave. 
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The Socio-Political Framework of Migration 
The sociopolitical framework of migration from, to and through the occupied Palestinian territory raises 
issues different from those in the other countries of the Southern and the Eastern Mediterranean. These 
issues are related to the different nature of migration from and to Palestine since the end of the nineteenth 
century, and the inability of the Palestinian authority (PA) to implement any migration policy given Israel’s 
control over migration and circulation. 
The oPt was divided into three areas after the Oslo agreements. The administration of areas A and B, 
which include the main towns and the refugee camps, has been transferred to the PA, while Israel has 
retained control over area C. In 2005, Israel unilaterally retired from the Gaza Strip, but the fragmentation of 
the West Bank and Israel’s colonization there make the creation of a sustainable and independent 
Palestinian state within the 1967 borders all but impossible. 
Moreover, the history of migration from and to Palestine is deeply rooted in the Arab-Israeli conflict. After 
a first wave of migration during the Ottoman Empire and the British mandate, Palestine has witnessed two 
major waves of forced migration toward neighbouring countries as a consequence of the 1948 and 1967 
wars. Since then, while economic migration from the oPt continued toward the Gulf and the West, Israel 
progressively built up Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Today, the 
Palestinian diaspora actively supports the Palestinian cause and maintains strong ties with Palestine, 
though the circulation of Palestinians there is extremely difficult. 
Given that the PA is unable to implement any migration policy, and ignoring here the numerous 
initiatives of the international community and civil society in relation to migration, the following focuses on 
the political dimensions of three main issues: (1) out-migration and circulation in the oPt; (2) the right of 
return for Palestinian refugees; and (3) the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. 
(1) After the beginning of the second Intifada, the Israeli state put strong limits on the employment of 
Palestinians workers from the oPt, who have been, in the meantime, replaced by Asian and African 
migrants, while the construction of the Separation Wall also stopped irregular migration. Since then, while 
the socioeconomic and the security situation had deteriorated dramatically in the oPt, migration to the Arab 
states seems to have risen, despite the numerous difficulties in leaving the West Bank and, a fortiori, the 
Gaza Strip. Indeed, Palestinians are not allowed to access Ben Gurioun airport in Tel Aviv; Jordan carefully 
controls the transit of Palestinians through its territory; and Egypt closed until recently its borders with the 
Gaza Strip (Rafah) following the conflict between Hamas and Fatah (2006), and authorizes only a few 
humanitarian convoys, and tries to destroy any communicating tunnels. Furthermore, circulating within the 
oPt is extremely difficult: both because of the lack of territorial continuity between the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip, and because of the numerous checkpoints between areas A, B and C on the West Bank. 
Therefore, in the face of the blockade of Gaza and the untimely closing of the checkpoints on the West 
Bank according to the evolution of the political situation, the oPt resembles so many Bantustans where it is 
impossible for the PA to develop any policy for managing and valorizing the mobility of its population. 
(2) The return of the refugees who fled Palestine in 1948 and of the displaced persons who fled the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, and their descendants, also illustrates the lack of sovereignty of the 
PA over the oPt. The population registry remains at the Israeli Ministry of Interior which, therefore, controls 
who can and who cannot reside in the oPt. After the Oslo agreement, the Israeli state authorized the return 
of tens of thousands of Palestinians, among whom many who were enrolled in the PA civil service and 
security forces. However, Israel did not fulfill its engagements, though limited, regarding family reunification 
and temporary visits to the oPt, interpreting, in the strictest possible way, the agreements negotiated after 
the Madrid conference (1991), and systematically expelling illegal residents in the oPt. 
The right of the 1948 refugees to return to their towns and villages of origin (in Israel) and for the 1967 
displaced persons to be able to return to the oPt – one of the main Palestinian and Arab demands – is 
mentioned in resolution 194 of the United Nations General Assembly (for the first) and in resolution 242 of 
the UN Security Council (for the second). In the Palestinian refugee camps, the right to return and the 
crucial role of UNRWA helped preserve the sense of a common faith and belonging. Then, the 
determination of the Arab League to maintain the stateless condition of displaced and refugee Palestinians, 
officially to guarantee their right to return, responded to the concerns of the Arab states given the likely 
social and political consequences of any assimilation of Palestinians residing in their lands. Given this, it 
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should be recalled that the frame (bilateral) of negotiations between Israel and the PA prevents any Arab 
state hosting Palestinians from making their positions felt, and that the search for a solution to the 
Palestinian refugee problem should not be limited to the payment of financial compensation which would, in 
any case, be difficult to implement. 
(3) The development of Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem and on the West Bank shows again the 
lack of sovereignty of the PA over its own territory. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) protect the settlements 
and the Israeli Ministry of Housing and Construction is in charge of planning and carrying out projects. In 
addition, numerous legal and illegal settlements have been created by settlers’ organizations. Colonization 
has accelerated since the Oslo agreements and Israel accepted only a limited moratorium under pressure 
from the United States. In addition, Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip, and the dismantlement of 
the settlements there, supervised by the former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, notwithstanding strong internal 
opposition, appeared a strategic move aimed at concentrating colonization on the West Bank. Last, but not 
least, the construction of the Separation Wall, whose route does not respect the 1967 border and that 
penetrates deeply into the West Bank, clearly aims at confirming the fait accompli of colonization to the 
detriment of oPt territorial unity. 
The sociopolitical analysis of migration from, to and through the oPt shows that the creation of a 
sustainable Palestinian state demands, in political and economic terms, significant concessions on the part 
of Israel, in particular concerning the territorial unity of the oPt, which would entail the dismantlement of the 
settlements and the transfer of the administration and the security of area C to the PA. Ultimately, the 
negotiations for a global solution to the problem of refugees should include the Arab states.  
 
Sociopolitical 
framework  
Out-migration In-migration 
Forced 
migration 
Voluntary 
migrations  
Return 
migration Colonization 
Government 
Institutions 
PA − Department 
of Refugees 
Affairs  
− Ministry of 
Interior 
− Ministry of 
Labour 
− Ministry of 
Health 
− Ministry of 
Planning  
− Ministry of 
Education 
CAC 
(Committee for 
Civil Affairs) 
N/A 
Israel N/A − IDF (Israeli 
Defense 
Forces) 
− Ministry of 
Interior 
− IDF (Israeli 
Defense 
Forces) 
− Ministry of 
Interior 
− DCO 
(District 
Coordination 
Office) 
− IDF (Israeli 
Defense Forces) 
− Ministry of 
Housing and 
Construction 
− Jew Agency 
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Government 
Strategy 
PA Work with 
Israel to uphold 
the rights of 
refugees in 
accordance 
with resolution 
194, which 
guarantees 
them the right 
of return and 
compensation.  
Limit brain drain 
and increase 
links with 
Diaspora (e.g., 
previous 
collaboration 
with UNDP 
TOKTEN 
program - 
‘Transfer of 
Knowledge 
through 
Expatriate 
Nationals’).  
Obtain from 
Israel the 
fulfillment of its 
engagements 
regarding 
family 
reunification 
and temporary 
visits. 
Work towards: 
Full Israeli 
withdrawal to the 
borders of June 
1967 pursuant to 
Security Council 
resolution 242; 
Full Israeli 
evacuation of it so 
as to return to Arab 
Jerusalem to 
Palestinian 
sovereignty as the 
capital of the future 
state of Palestine; 
Termination of 
settlement 
structures pursuant 
to Security Council 
resolution No. 465 
of 1980, and all 
other 
relevant United 
Nations resolutions. 
Israel Reject the right 
to return, in 
particular for 
the 1948 
refugees. 
Limit the 
migration of 
Palestinian 
workers to 
Israel. 
Strictly limit 
family 
reunification 
and temporary 
visits 
Carry on the 
colonization of the 
West Bank and 
East Jerusalem. 
Civil Society Because of the international dimension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
actions of civil society are numerous. The following associations are cited as 
examples:  
− BADIL (Resource centre for Palestinian Residency and Refuge) 
− Al-Awda (Palestinian Right to Return Coalition) 
− Welfare Association (Ta’aoun) 
International 
Cooperation 
− UNRWA 
− UNHCR 
− Numerous 
grants (from 
Arab and 
Western 
states) to 
support 
Palestinians 
studying 
abroad. 
− RWG (Refugee 
Working 
Group, after 
the Madrid 
conference in 
1991) 
N/A 
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The Demographic-Economic Framework of Migration 
Today, Russia has the largest regional pool of attraction for labour migrants from the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) countries, primarily from Central Asian countries. Its labour market demands 
migrants with high and low qualifications for employment and given the imperfection of migration legislation, 
the overwhelming majority of unskilled migrants work in Russia irregularly. 
As to emigration patterns, since 1991, when citizens of the Russian Federation became relatively free to 
travel abroad following from the fall of the ‘iron curtain’, the country has witnessed significant population 
outflows i.e. in 1991 over 676,000 persons left Russia. In the 1990’s Germany, Israel and the US were the 
major destination countries of Russian emigrants, whereas from 2000 onwards patterns diversified to many 
other countries whilst outflows significantly diminished. A more recent major stimulus for out-migration is 
temporary paid employment. 
Outward migration Inward migration 
Stock 
In 2011, consular statistics estimated 1,706,103 
Russian citizens residing permanently abroad and 
162,301 living abroad on a temporary basis, 
equalling a total of 1,868,404 migrants. These 
numbers are confirmed by looking at destination 
countries’ statistics, according to which 2,149,607 
Russian migrants lived abroad in years around 
2012 (table 1).  
 
By looking at preferred destinations, both 
sources report that at least 1 out of 2 Russian 
migrants lives in the European Union, with 
Germany hosting the largest number, followed by 
Estonia and Latvia1
 
. Other countries which host 
significant numbers of Russian migrants are 
Ukraine, Israel, and the US. 
Stock 
Since 1991 Russia has become one of the largest 
receivers of migrants in the world, with the majority 
having migrated from former USSR countries. That 
being said, answering the question “how many 
migrants live in Russia today?” is not 
straightforward, for a variety of reasons. First, data 
based on only one criterion (country of birth vs 
country of citizenship) are usually unsatisfactory for 
capturing international migrants in Russia. The total 
obtained by the country of birth criterion includes 
indeed a large majority of people who are 
individuals born in the USSR with Russian descent 
who, after the dissolution of the USSR, ‘returned’ 
en masse to their parents’ home country. Rather 
than international migrants, they are today 
perceived as ethnic Russians. Moreover, according 
to the country of birth criterion, all people born in 
the post-Soviet zone and migrated within the USSR 
before 1991 are counted as international migrants’ 
even though they were internal migrants. According 
to the country of nationality criterion, all people 
migrated to Russia with the USSR nationality who 
soon acquired the Russian nationality or fell into the 
category stateless are here counted regardless of 
the period of emigration.  
Table 3 shows immigration stocks in Russia 
according to both criteria shedding light on the huge 
discrepancy between estimates. 
In 2002, the population census recorded almost 
12 mln individuals born abroad and around 1 mln of 
foreign citizens in Russia (8.3% and 0.7% of the 
total resident population, respectively). In both 
cases, the very large majority is originating in other 
CIS states (94.0% and 88.4% respectively) 
confirming the exceptional importance of Russia 
within the CIS migratory area for cultural, historical 
and language affinities as well as its scarce 
attractiveness with respect to the rest of the world. 
                                                          
1 The majority of population considered as Russian immigrants in the Baltic states are Russian-speakers who moved 
there in the Soviet times. They faced considerable difficulties obtaining local citizenships after 1991 but qualified 
for the Russian passport (avoiding thus statelessness). 
Number % Number %
European Union 1,172,850 54.6 934,030 50.0 1.3
of which Germany 238,503 11.1 553,686 29.6 0.4
             Estonia 190,599 8.9 127,291 6.8 1.5
             Latvia 172,336 8.0 53,549 2.9 3.2
CIS countries + Georgia 205,245 9.5 557,137 29.8 0.4
of which Ukraine 103,728 4.8 102,075 5.5 1.0
Belarus 83,561 3.9 55,692 3.0 1.5
             Armenia 7,623 0.4 17,738 0.9 0.4
Other countries 771,512 35.9 377,237 20.2 2.0
of which US 415,438 19.3 123,022 6.6 3.4
             Israel 268,375 12.5 161,957 8.7 1.7
             Switzerland 17,509 0.8 3,298 0.2 5.3
Main total 2,149,607 100.0 1,868,404 100.0 1.2
Destination countries' 
statistics (A)
Consular statistics 
(2011) (B) Ratio A/BCountry of residence
Table 1 - Russian emigration stocks by country of residence according to 
different sources, most recent data, c.2012 (a)
(a): In destination countries' statistics (c. 2012), Russian migrants are defined according to the country 
of birth (A) or country of citizenship (B) criterion according to countries of residence. The used 
sources are population censuses, population registers, registers for foreigners. In consular statistcs 
(2011), Russian migrants are defined according to the country of citizenship criterion.
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However, by comparing destination and 
consular statistics, some differences are found 
according to destinations. Indeed, in non-CIS 
countries, consular statistics seem to underestimate 
Russian migrants mainly because registering is not 
compulsory: in the European Union, the ratio 
between destination and consular statistics stands 
at 1.3, while in the US and Israel, the same value 
stand respectively at 3.4 and 1.7. On the contrary, 
in the post-Soviet area, consular statistics seem to 
give better (and larger) estimates of Russian 
migrants as they probably capture a portion of 
temporary migrants who are here not counted by 
official statistics: in CIS countries, the ratio between 
destination and consular statistics stands in fact at 
0.4 (table 1). 
Overall, Russian migrants have an intermediate 
skill profile with 70.0% persons with a medium-high 
level of education (c. 2006) with no significant 
differences according to destinations. In OECD 
countries, a huge mismatch between educational 
and occupational level is observed: 2 out of 3 
(65.9%) of Russian migrants were indeed employed 
in low-skilled jobs, such as ‘service, shop, craft and 
related trade workers’ as well as ‘plant and machine 
operators or assemblers’ or simply in ‘elementary 
occupations’. 
 
Stocks of Russian refugees continues to be one 
of the largest in the European Union. In 2011 there 
were 109,785 refugees in the area with almost one 
half based in German speaking countries.  
Flows 
Between 1991 and 2011 roughly 4 million persons 
permanently emigrated from the Russian 
Federation, with the majority of moves occurring in 
the early 1990s. 
 
By comparing the size and origins of the foreign 
population in 2002 and 2010 (columns 2 and 3, 
table 3), some interesting points deserve to be 
highlighted.  
First, rapid decreases in immigration were seen 
in nearly all countries, except for most central Asian 
countries (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). 
For example, in 2002, 22.5% of migrants were from 
Ukraine, which has fallen to 13.6% in 2010. In the 
same time period the share of Uzbekistani’s 
increased from 6.9% to 19.1%. Hence immigration 
stocks in Russia have seen significant changes in 8 
years - a relatively short period of time.  
Another telling statistic is the falling yet 
significant number of stateless persons residing in 
Russia. Although the figure has fallen from 429,891 
to 178,245, the latter number is still relatively high. 
These huge numbers reflect a situation shared by 
most CIS countries. After the USSR dissolution, 
large number of people lost their citizenship as they 
were unable to confirm or acquire citizenship of any 
new-born state. This was the result of cumbersome 
legal requirements adopted in new independent 
states (for more details, see the section on 
‘citizenship’ in ‘The Legal Framework’ below). As a 
result, all these people fell in the category of ‘non 
status migrants’. Over time, thanks also to the 
interest and support of several human rights 
organizations some regularization procedures and 
legislation modifications were adopted. However, 
as shown by the huge numbers stateless people in 
2010, this is still a ‘hot issue’.2 
                                                          
2 It is worth mentioning that in 2002, an impressive number of people (1,269,023) did not indicate their citizenship. 
This number is not available for the 2010 Census impeding to observe the evolution of this phenomenon over the 
last decade.  
Country of 
asylum
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Germany 0 0 44,284 45,568 45,030 41,732 25,347 30,424 35,505 37,642 39,460 39,816
Austria 201 186 150 911 4,152 6,438 8,723 11,571 14,122 15,828 17,229 18,473
Poland 37 244 469 674 1,671 3,785 6,024 8,987 12,034 14,510 14,730 14,897
France 499 718 1,794 2,613 3,991 5,292 5,945 6,613 7,615 8,942 9,858 10,882
USA 11,916 16,294 18,499 18,964 15,891 18,812 86,914 7,915 7,652 7,434 7,043 6,863
Norway 104 245 457 1,204 2,249 2,694 3,034 3,552 3,790 3,969 4,104 4,056
Belgium 35 107 112 168 1,081 3,899 5,425 5,150 3,981 3,428 2,964 2,894
Canada 1,694 2,196 1,990 1,994 2,118 2,073 1,916 2,960 2,770 2,612 2,311 1,931
Sweden 1,490 996 978 1,017 1,078 1,178 1,493 1,488 1,583 1,705 1,739 1,786
Others 24,334 24,170 22,878 23,307 30,839 17,134 14,561 14,196 14,009 13,385 12,510 8,187
Total 40,310 45,156 91,611 96,420 108,100 103,037 159,382 92,856 103,061 109,455 111,948 109,785
Table 2 - Russian refugees by country of asylum, 2000-2011
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Country of citizenship/     
country of birth
2002       
(birth)
2002 
(citizenship)
2010 
(citizenship)
CIS countries 11,254,511 906,314 686,993
of which Ukraine 3,559,975 230,558 93,390
Kazakhstan 2,584,955 69,472 28,060
Belarus 935,782 40,330 27,668
Uzbekistan 918,037 70,871 131,062
Azerbaijan 846,104 154,911 67,947
Georgia 628,973 52,918 (a)
Armenia 481,328 136,841 59,351
Kyrgyzstan 463,521 28,843 44,611
Tajikistan 383,057 64,165 87,123
Moldova 277,527 50,988 33,884
Turkmenistan 175,252 6,417 5,575
Other countries 722,311 119,099 106,245
Stateless - 429,891 178,245
Total 11,976,822 1,455,304 971,483
% of the total population 8.3 1.0 0.6
Source: Population Censuses
Table 3 - Immigrants stocks in Russia according to different 
criteria, 2002-2010
(a): Georgia is not included as it withdrew from CIS in August 2009
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Between 1991 and 2010 the destination of 
emigrants has notably transformed. In the early 
1990s the main destination countries were Germany, 
Israel and the US, all were noted for open 
immigration policies towards individuals with a given 
ethnic background: over 60% of emigrants were 
ethnically either German or Jewish. Between 2000 
and 2010 – when emigration significantly reduced - 
although Germany, Israel and the US still comprised 
over half of all destinations. Neighbouring states took 
a higher share of emigrants, especially Kazakhstan 
and Ukraine. 
Temporary labour emigration is an increasingly 
important flow from Russia. In 1994 there were 8,000 
Russians employed abroad, in 2008 this figure rose 
to 73,100. Official labour migration statistics are also 
only valid for persons that are employed via licensed 
mediation companies which link migrants to jobs. 
Hence the real figure is likely to be significantly 
higher than those recorded by official statistics. In 
accordance with expert estimations, the annual 
number of labour migrants leaving Russia in this 
period range from 120,000 to 160,000 persons 
(Ivakhnyuk, 2005; Topilin and Parfentseva, 2008).  
As table 2 emphasises, Russian labour migrants 
are spread across the globe. Over a short period of 
time there has been a substantial shift in the major 
destinations. For example, from 2000 to 2008 the 
percentage of migrants leaving for Europe and Asia 
fell from 86.2% to 52.8%. Correlatively, North 
America became a major destination passing from 
10.4% in 2000 to 35.9% in 2008.  
 
Flows 
Between 1993 and 2011, more than 13 million 
individuals arrived in Russia for permanent 
residence as a result of ethnic repatriation waves.  
The most numerous inflow were the immigrants 
in the early 1990s, for the most part, ethnic 
Russians coming back to Russia from the former 
Soviet republics. In the 2000s, 90% of the 
immigration flow also comprised migrants from the 
CIS countries yet the share of the titular nations 
increased. While in 1991-1992 the share of 
Russians in the total migration growth in Russia 
constituted 81%, in 2007 it went as low as 32%. 
Furthermore, Russian immigration flows since 
have fallen sharply since 1994, as figure 2 
illustrates. 
Immigration has been the major compensatory 
factor in buoying Russia’s population. With 
immigration the Russian population is currently 
142,800,000 (2010), without immigration this figure 
would be 130,000,000. Figure 3 provides a detailed 
picture of Russia’s reliance upon immigration. 
When flows fell from 2001 to 2006 the impact was 
significant, natural decline increased whilst total 
population growth fell. This very clear correlation 
signals Russia’s considerable dependence upon 
immigration for population growth/stability.  
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Figure 1 - Permanent outward migration flows from Russia 
(in thousands), 1991-2010
Source: Federal Statistical Service of Russia (Rosstat)
Year
Total          
(abs. values)
Europe           
(% by row)
Asia               
(% by row)
North 
America (% 
by row)
Africa             
(% by row)
Oceania         
(% by row)
2000 45,760 48.3 37.9 10.4 3.3 0.1
… … … … … … …
2003 47,637 34.2 44.8 14.5 5.5 1.0
2004 56,290 30.1 37.6 20.6 10.4 1.4
2005 60,926 36.0 31.4 23.5 7.3 1.8
2006 65,747 30.1 25.9 35.1 6.8 2.1
2007 69,866 30.2 24.0 33.9 6.7 5.2
2008 73,130 28.5 24.3 35.9 6.6 4.7
Table 2 - Outflows of Russian labour migrants by area of destination, 2000-2008
Source: Federal Statistical Service of Russia (Rosstat)
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Figure 3 - Population growth components        
(in thousands), 1993-2010 
Natural 
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Source: Federal Statistical Service of Russia (Rosstat) 
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Figure 2 - Permanent inward migration flows to Russia    
(in thousands), 1991-2010
Source: Federal Statistical Service of Russia (Rosstat)
RUSSIA 
200 Migration Policy Centre (www.migrationpolicycentre.eu) 
Russian Immigration, the Labour Market and Remittances 
A major attraction of immigration in Russia is temporary labour migration. The Russian labour market 
includes migrants from over 100 countries; however 80% of the labour force are citizens of CIS countries – 
especially those originating from central Asia. Within the Russian quota system in 2011 half of all migrants 
that were granted work were from Uzbekistan (343,000), Tajikistan (188,000) and Kyrgyzstan (58,000). 
However 13% (153,000) of labour migrants originated from China.  
Figure 4 shows the trend of work permits granted to foreign citizens in 1994-2011. Here, two main points 
deserve attention: (1) the huge increase observed in the period 2007-2009 which is largely dependent on 
new legal procedures put in place by Russian authorities in 2006, which aimed at simplifying the obtaining of 
work permits for CIS citizens; (2) the drop observed since 2009, related to the global economic recession. 
 
Since 2010 Russia has carried out the policy of stimulating the inflow of highly-qualified labour migrants. 
Within 2010-2011, 12,500 work permits were issued to highly-qualified experts on preferential terms. Yet, a 
somewhat unknown but large proportion of labour migration to Russia is unregistered. Estimates are 
therefore difficult. Riazantsev (2007) and Vishnevskii (2011) estimate labour migration to be between 3 and 
7 million per annum. Taking into account the irregular counterpart of labour migration, the share of foreign 
labour would constitute up to 10% of all the employed in the Russian economy. 
For CIS countries, labour migrants working in the Russian Federation play a crucial role. Remittances 
provide stability on the CIS territory, promoting social stability and economic development. In 2012 alone 
$20.9 billion US dollars were sent from Russia, of which 87.1% to the CIS area. Major recipient countries 
were Uzbekistan (27.3%), Tajikistan (17.2%), Ukraine (12.9%) and Kyrgyzstan (8.6%). Although the level of 
remittances fell during the world economic crisis in 2009, the levels both returned and exceeded those 
previous recorded in 2011-2012.  
 
References: Ivakhniuk I.V. 2005. International Labour Migration. Moscow: TEIS; Riazantsev S.V. 2007. Labour Migration 
in CIS and Baltic Countries: Trends, Outcomes, Management. Moscow: Formula Prava; Topilin A.V., Parfentseva O.A. 
2008. Perspectives of Labour Migration in Russia: from Quantitative to Qualitative Criteria. Moscow: MAKS Press. 
Vishnevskii A.G. (ed.) 2011. Population of Russia 2009. Seventeenth Annual Demography Report.  
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Figure 4 - Work permits granted to foreign citizens in 
Russia by area of origin, 1994-2011 (*)
Cis countries Other countries
(*) 2011 data cover only work permits issued within the quota.
Source: Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation
Country of reception 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
CIS countries 8.6 12.6 8.9 11.1 15.1 18.2
of which Uzbekistan 1.7 3 2 2.8 4.3 5.7
 Tajikistan 1.6 2.5 1.7 2.2 3 3.6
 Ukraine 1.4 1.7 1.3 1.8 2.4 2.7
 Kyrgzystan 0.7 1.2 0.9 1.1 1.6 1.8
Other countries 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.7 2.4 2.7
Total 9.7 13.7 10 12.8 17.5 20.9
Source: Central Bank of the Russian Federation
Table 4 - Remittances sent by migrants from Russia by country of reception 
(billion dollars), 2007-2012
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The Legal Framework of Migration 
Migration legislation of the Russian Federation began to form in the early 1990s. Foundations for the 
regulation of migration processes were laid when the Federal Migration Service (FMS Russia) was set up, 
fundamental laws ‘On the Right of Nationals of the Russian Federation to the Freedom of Movement, 
Choice of Place of Residence and Abode within the Russian Federation’, ‘On Refugees’, ‘On Forced 
Migrants’ were adopted, and the Federal Migration Programme was accepted and financed by a separate 
budget line. In the second half of the 1990s, the formation of legislation regulating forced migration was 
completed (new editions of the laws ‘On Forced Migrants’ (1995) and ‘On Refugees’ (1997).  
The major driving force behind these developments was the dissolution of the USSR and subsequent 
mass migrations across the formerly single country. Peculiarities of Russian migration legislation can to a 
large extent be explained by the fact that citizens of neighbouring countries – former USSR republics – do 
not require a visa to enter the Russian Federation (except for the Baltic States, the Republic of Georgia and 
Turkmenistan). Meanwhile, major immigration flows to the RF originate from these very countries, and they 
are largely spontaneous in nature. At the moment migration legislation does not contain provisions which 
facilitate back-and-forth mobility of migrants. Moreover, Russian rules are not flexible in terms of work and 
residence permits, which is a serious obstacle for natural development of circular migration. As regards 
international protection, the Russian law ‘On Refugees’ in terms of its principles and key provisions 
complies with the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Still, this general compliance has turned 
out to be insufficient for the institution of asylum to operate effectively in the Russian Federation. The 
unsettled nature of the procedure of determining refugee status and the lack of procedural guarantees for 
asylum-seekers creates the possibility for denials of granting asylum, on the grounds of political rationale.  
Legal 
Framework Outward migration Inward migration 
General legal 
references 
Legal framework governing migration and mobility 
2011 Law on Ratification of Agreement on the Legal Status of Labour Migrants 
and their Family Members 
2006 Presidential Decree on Regulation of the Procedure for Granting Political 
Asylum in the RF  
2006 Law on Migration Registration of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation 
(amended in 2012) 
2002 Law on Legal Status Foreign citizens in the Russian Federation (amended 
in 2007, 2010, 2012) 
2002 Law on Citizenship (amended in 2012) 
1999 Law on the State Policy of the Russian Federation towards Compatriots 
Living Abroad 
1996 Law on the Procedure of Exit from the RF and Entry to the RF (amended in 
2012) 
1993 Federal Law No. 4528-1 ‘On Refugees’  
1993 Constitution of Russian Federation 
 
Entry and Exit 
Visa 
− Relations with the EU, the EFTA and 
their Member States: Russia has a 
bilateral visa facilitation agreement with 
the European Union signed in 2006, as 
well as with Denmark, Switzerland, 
Norway and Iceland. Currently, Russia 
is negotiating amendments to the EU-
Russia visa facilitation agreement and 
is engaged in the EU-Russia visa 
dialogue aimed at visa liberalization. 
Visa 
− There are 5 types of visa that could be 
issued for foreigners willing to enter 
Russia: ‘DP’ - diplomatic visa (up to 1 
year); ‘SL’ – service visa (up to 1 year); 
‘O’ – regular visa (7 categories: private, 
business, tourist, study, work, 
humanitarian, and visa for the purpose 
of obtaining refugee status in the RF): 
‘TR1’ and ‘TR2’ - transit visa (up to 10 
days); and ‘VP’ – visa for temporary 
residence (up to 4 months, renewable). 
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Moreover, Russia signed special Local 
Border Traffic Agreements with Latvia 
(2010), Norway (2010) and Poland 
(2011).  
− Russian citizens are exempted from 
visa requirements in the CIS 
countries, Albania, Argentina, 
Barbados, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Brazil, Brunei, China, Columbia, 
Croatia (tourist voucher), Chile, Cuba, 
Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Philippines, 
Georgia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Laos, Hong-Kong, Israel, Macao, 
Macedonia, Malaysia, Maldives, 
Morocco, Micronesia, Mongolia 
(restrictions), Montenegro, Namibia, 
Nicaragua, Peru, Salvador, Samoa, 
Seychelles, Serbia, Sri-Lanka, 
Thailand, Tonga, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Venezuela, Vietnam 
and Uruguay. 
− Russia has bilateral visa facilitation 
agreements with Egypt, Japan, South 
Korea, and the USA.  
Cross-border mobility 
In accordance with the Federal Law 114-
№ 114-FZ "On the Procedure for Exit 
from the Russian Federation and Entry 
into the Russian Federation" of 15 
August 1996, a citizen of the Russian 
Federation cannot be limited in his right 
to leave the country, except in cases 
that are defined by the law (Article 2). 
The limitations are set by Art.15-23 
(carriers of information that is related to 
state secrets, unaccompanied minors, 
etc.). Chapter II (Articles 7-23) 
determines the order of registration and 
the issuance of the documents required 
for the exit from the Russian Federation 
such as the general civil and service 
passports as well as diplomatic 
passports. 
− Citizens of CIS states, Argentina, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, 
Chile, Columbia, Cuba, Israel, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Nicaragua, 
Serbia, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay 
and Venezuela are exempted from 
visa requirements. 
Cross-border mobility 
The conditions for entry of foreign 
citizens into the RF are following: 
1. a valid travel document; 
2. a visa, unless otherwise provided by 
federal law, international agreement 
or decree of the President; 
3. there are no grounds for barring 
entry into the Russian Federation. 
Entry to the Russian Federation of 
foreign citizens with a visa is regulated by 
chapters IV and V of the Federal law No. 
114-ФЗ ‘On the Procedure of Exit from 
the Russian Federation and Entry to the 
Russian Federation’ of 15.08.1996. 
Following the approval of the Federal law 
‘On the Legal Status of Foreign citizens 
in the Russian Federation’, these 
chapters were considerably amended 
(first amendments were introduced by the 
Law No. 7-FZ of 10.01.2003, the latest 
amendments were introduced in 2012). 
Apart from a visa, a foreign citizen shall 
present a completed migration card upon 
entry – a document used for control over 
his/her temporary stay and required for 
his/her migration registration. 
A foreign citizen who does not need 
a visa must present a migration card and 
documents whose list is established on 
the basis of bilateral agreements on 
mutual visa-free trips. 
Foreigners can enter the Russian 
Federation only through the Border 
Crossing points, but the border with 
Belarus can be crossed at any place, 
because of the absence of border 
control between the two states. 
Irregular 
migration 
Russia has signed readmission 
agreements with the EU (2006), 
Lithuania (2003, was in force until the 
ratification of the RF-Lithuania EU-RF 
Implementation protocol to the RF-EU 
readmission agreement), Denmark, 
Lichtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, 
Iceland. By March 2013 Russia has 
signed implementation protocols with all 
EU Member States covered by the EU-
Russia readmission agreement.  
The legal definition of illegal migration is 
contained in the Criminal Code (art. 
322.1. Organization of Illegal Migration). 
According to this Article illegal 
migration is defined as illegal entry into 
the Russian Federation of foreign 
citizens or stateless persons, or their 
illegal stay in the Russian Federation, or 
illegal transit through the territory of the 
Russian Federation. 
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In 1998, Russia signed the 
Agreement on Cooperation of the CIS 
member states to combat illegal 
migration (ratified in 2000). 
The most recent development in this 
regard is the signature by Russia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan of the EurAsEC 
‘Cooperation Agreement on countering 
illegal labour migration from third 
countries’ (19.11.2010, in force since 
01.01.2012).  
Russia ratified UN Convention on the 
fight against organised crime in 2004. 
There are two main types of illegal 
migration: illegal entry and illegal stay. 
Illegal entry and stay on the territory of 
Russian Federation can be punished in 
accordance with the Administrative 
Code or the Criminal Code.  
Criminal liability is incurred in case of 
illegal border crossing, which is the 
Crossing of the State Border of the 
Russian Federation without valid 
documents for entering the Russian 
Federation and exit from the Russian 
Federation or without proper 
authorization obtained in accordance with 
the legislation of the Russian Federation 
(art. 322 of the Criminal Code). 
Administrative liability is incurred in 
case of violation by foreign citizen or 
stateless person of the rules on entry or 
procedure of stay in the Russian 
Federation (art. 18.8. of the Code on 
Administrative Offences). 
In case of illegal stay the foreign citizen 
or stateless person can be deported. 
Decision on deportation is taken by the 
regional branch of the Federal Migration 
Service (FMS), or the FMS director. The 
decision on administrative expulsion is 
taken by the court. 
Since 2007 Russia has signed 
readmission agreements with some 
major countries of origin and transit 
of irregular migrants to its territory, 
among which are Armenia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Turkey, Vietnam, 
Ukraine (not yet ratified) and 
Uzbekistan. 
 The Criminal Code contains several articles criminalizing offenses related to trafficking 
in persons: Article 127.1. provides penalties for trafficking, Article 127.2. provides 
liability for the use of slave labour. Russia ratified Palermo Protocols in 2004. 
Rights and 
settlement 
According to the Constitution, Russian 
citizens enjoy the protection of their 
State both at home and abroad, as well 
as the right to freedom of movement, 
unless law provisions state the opposite. 
The Russian legislation doesn’t 
contain any restrictions concerning 
emigration from the Russian Federation. 
Since 2012, Russian citizens residing 
abroad are no longer obliged to receive 
permanent consular registration at the 
Russian Consulate or Embassy. 
The Federal law ‘On the Legal Status of 
Foreign Citizens in the Russian 
Federation’ as of 25.07.2002 No. 115-FZ 
defines the legal status of foreign 
citizens in the RF and regulates their 
relations with state authorities emerging 
upon their stay or residence on the RF 
territory as well as their labour, 
entrepreneurial or other activities (Art. 
1). In accordance with Art. 2(2), for the 
purpose of the Law, the notion of ‘a 
foreign citizen’ includes also a stateless 
person (with some exceptions). 
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The main legal act concerning the 
Russian emigrants is the Federal law of 
May 24, 1999 N 99-FZ ‘On the State 
Policy of the Russian Federation 
towards Compatriots living Abroad’. 
Compatriots, apart from Russian 
citizens permanently residing abroad are 
individuals and their descendants 
‘belonging, as a rule, to the nations that 
historically occupied the RF territory and 
who have made a free choice to keep 
spiritual, cultural and legal links with the 
RF, individuals, whose relatives in the 
direct ascending line earlier resided on 
the RF territory’, including individuals 
who were citizens of the USSR and 
resided in the states that used to be a 
part of the USSR, whether or not having 
citizenship of these states, as well as 
emigrants for the Russian empire, 
RSFSR, USSR and RF with respective 
citizenships, regardless of the fact 
whether they currently have citizenship 
of another state or not. 
2010 amendment abolished special 
compatriots’ identity documents. It also 
gave same rights and obligations to 
Russian citizens living abroad and in the 
country (Art.7). New resettlement 
measures were introduced together with 
the enhanced role of the Orthodox 
church ion building links with ethnic 
communities abroad (Art. 13). At the 
same time certain obligations of the 
state regarding the provision of benefits 
have been removed.  
 
As determined by Art. 4 of the Law, 
foreign citizens in the RF enjoy the same 
rights and bear the same responsibilities 
as RF citizens, unless the federal law 
provides otherwise. Such exceptions are 
mainly related to political freedoms and 
freedom of residence and employment.  
Since 2002 numerous amendments 
have been introduced into the initial text 
of the Law (27 altogether). Some of 
them are fundamental in nature and are 
directed at partial liberalization of 
regulation. They include supplements 
concerning temporary residence and 
labour activity of foreign citizens arriving 
in the RF without the visa requirement 
(Art. 6.1 and 13.1, respectively) as well 
as peculiarities in regulating labour 
market participation of migrant workers 
(Art. 18.1); supplements that refer to 
peculiarities of conducting labour activity 
by foreign citizens – highly-qualified 
specialists (Art. 13.2) and possibility for 
foreign citizens exempted from the visa 
requirement to carry out paid 
employment at natural person’s based 
on a license and without a work permit 
(Art. 13.3).  
Foreign citizens staying in the RF are 
divided into three categories: temporary 
stayers (up to 90 days), temporary 
residents (up to 3 years) and 
permanent residents (over 5 years). 
A foreign national, lawfully staying on 
the RF territory, may submit an 
application for a temporary residence 
permit, which is issued to an individual 
within a quota annually established by 
the Government on the basis of 
proposals from the Subjects of 
Federation (Art. 6). 
Certain categories of foreigners 
receive a temporary residence permit 
outside the quota. They include, in 
particular, spouses of RF citizens 
permanently residing on the RF territory; 
disabled parents of legally capable 
Russian citizens; foreign citizens with at 
least one disabled parent who is RF 
citizen; foreign citizens with minor 
children or children aged 18 yet 
regarded disabled or with limited legal 
capacity (Art. 6 part 3). This preferential 
norm can be considered an indication of 
partial recognition of the principle of 
family unity; yet explicitly this principle is 
not fixed in the Law. 
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Law of 2006 (Art. 6.1) establishes a 
preferential procedure for a temporary 
residence permit within the quota for 
foreign citizens entering the RF following 
the visa-free regime. 
 A temporary residence permit can 
be refused or revoked on the grounds 
listed in Art. 7 of the Law, e.g. in 
particular, in some cases of previous 
binding court sentence; in the absence 
of means of subsistence; in the case of 
a medical condition (e.g. HIV-infection); 
in case of breaching administrative rules 
on immigration twice in one year. 
Foreign citizens with a temporary 
residence permit have limited freedom of 
movement: they are not entitled to 
change their place of residence upon 
their own discretion and have to reside 
in the region where their temporary 
residence permit has been issued. 
After the expiry of annual residence 
based on a temporary residence permit, 
a foreign national is entitled to apply for 
a permanent residence permit. 
Labour Art. 10 of the Federal Law of April 19, 
1991 № 1032-1 «On the employment of 
population in the Russian Federation", 
amended on April 20, 1996 № 36-FZ, 
provides for the right of citizens of the 
Russian Federation to search for work 
independently and to be employed 
outside of the Russian Federation. 
Russian citizens may realize this right 
directly or with the help of intermediary 
organizations.  
As for the employment of Russians 
through the intermediary organizations, 
private employment agencies (PEA) play 
the key role. The state regulates their 
activity through licensing and monitoring 
by means of controls and checks in the 
framework of the Federal Law of 26 
December 2008 № 294-FZ "On the 
protection of rights of legal entities and 
entrepreneurs during the performance of 
state and municipal control (supervision)." 
The Administrative Code contains Art. 
18.13 "The illegal activity on the 
employment of Russian nationals abroad”, 
stipulating the administrative responsibility 
for the performance of activity on the 
employment of Russian nationals abroad 
without a license or in violation of 
conditions specified in the license. 
 
Provisions regulating labour 
immigration/employment of foreigners in 
Russia were initially included into Art. 13 
‘Conditions of Participation of 
Foreign Citizens in Labour Relations’ 
of the Federal law ‘On the Legal Status 
of Foreign citizens in the Russian 
Federation’. In accordance with this 
article, foreign citizens (except for those 
in possession of a permanent residence 
permit) have been entitled to work only 
with employers granted a permission to 
attract and employ foreign workers. 
Subsequently (in 2010), an amendment 
was introduced into the Law that 
provided for an exception from the rule 
as regards hiring migrant workers 
entering the country within a visa-free 
regime as well as highly-qualified 
specialist and their family members (Art. 
6.1, Art. 6.2). 
As regards foreign citizens 
themselves (apart from those with a 
permanent residence permit), they are 
obliged to first obtain a work permit for 
employment of individual entrepreneurial 
activity. A work permit is issued taking 
into account the quota annually 
established by the RF Government with 
regional distribution. At the same time, 
temporarily staying foreign citizens shall 
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work in the same region where a work 
permit was issued. Exceptions are 
provided only for a number of 
occupations. 
One of the latest novelties as 
regards regulation of work of ‘foreign 
workers’ has been the introduction of a 
licence which gives them the right to 
work at natural persons’ under an 
agreement without a work permit (Art. 
13.3). The licence is issued to an 
individual under the condition of a fixed 
advance payment for a period of one up 
to 3 months. This period can be extended 
several times for a period up to 3 months. 
The total period of licence validity 
including extensions cannot be longer 
than 12 months since the day of issuing 
the licence. After the expiry of 12 months 
since the day of issuing the licence a 
foreigner may apply for a new licence. 
− Russia partially ratified the European Social Charter (revised in 1996). 
− Russia is a party of the following multilateral agreements in the framework of CIS: 
− Agreement on cooperation in the field of labour migration and social protection 
for migrant workers of 15 April 1994 
− 1999 Treaty on Customs Union and Common Economic Space between the 
RF, BY, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
− Protocol on amendments to the Agreement on cooperation in the field of labour 
migration and social protection for migrant workers of 25 November 2005 
− Convention on the legal status of migrant workers and their families, adopted by 
CIS Member States of 14 November 2008 
− 2010 Agreement between the RF, BY and Kazakhstan, regulating labour 
migration and legal status of labour migrants/their family members, and 
combating illegal migration; 
Moreover, Russia has bilateral agreements with Uzbekistan (2007) and 
Kyrgyzstan (2012) providing their citizens with preferential treatment in terms of 
access to Russian labour market and settlement rights. (reciprocally for Russian 
citizens in UZ and KG). 
Citizenship According to Article 6 of the Federal Law 
of May 31, 2002 № 62-FZ "On 
Citizenship of the Russian Federation", 
a Russian citizen, who also has another 
citizenship, is considered by the Russian 
Federation only as a citizen of the 
Russian Federation. The acquisition by 
a Russian citizen of another citizenship 
doesn’t mean the termination of the 
citizenship of the Russian Federation.  
According to Article 62 of the 
Constitution, citizens of the Russian 
Federation may have citizenship of a 
foreign state (dual citizenship) according 
The grounds, conditions and procedures 
for acquiring and terminating of the 
citizenship of the Russian Federation 
are determined by the Federal Law of 
May 31, 2002 № 62-FZ "On 
Citizenship of the Russian 
Federation" and the Decree of the 
President of 14 November 2002 № 
1325 on the procedure of the 
examination of issues of citizenship 
of the Russian Federation. 
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to the federal law or an international 
agreement of the Russian Federation 
(such an agreement exists with Tajikistan). 
Multiple citizenships are allowed.  
The decree of RF President of 
22.06.2006 No. 637 ‘On Measures for 
Assisting Voluntary Resettlement in the 
Russian Federation of Compatriots 
Living Abroad’ that approves the 
National Programme to Assist Voluntary 
Resettlement of Compatriots for the 
period 2006-2012. The program 
establishes the simplified procedure for 
returning to the Russian Federation and 
acquiring the Russian Citizenship (see 
the socio-political framework below for 
more details). 
 
 
The Federal Law on Citizenship 
establishes, that citizenship in the 
Russian Federation is acquired: a) as 
the result of recognition; b) by birth; c) 
by registration; d) by admission to 
citizenship; e) by restoration of 
citizenship. A person can be admitted to 
citizenship according to ordinary 
procedure (article 13) and simplified 
procedure (article 14). 
The conditions of admission to 
Russian citizenship according to the 
ordinary procedure are established by 
Article 13 of Federal Law. One of the 
main conditions is min 5 years of 
permanent lawful residence (1 year for 
refugees, 3 years for persons married to 
RF citizens). The other preconditions for 
naturalization are: knowledge and 
observance of the constitution and laws; 
knowledge of the state (Russian) 
language; lawful sources of subsistence; 
renunciation of the other citizenship.  
Decree of the President of the 
Russian Federation No. 1325 of 
November 14, 2002 “On the approval of 
the Regulation on the procedure for the 
consideration of the issues connected 
with citizenship of the Russian 
Federation” specifies the provisions of 
the Law on Citizenship, and, in some 
cases, clarifies their content.  
International 
Protection 
The Russian Federation joined the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees on 02.02.1993. 
The following forms of international protection exist in the Russian Federation:  
− refugee status: in compliance with the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. The procedure of 
determining refugee status established by the Federal Law on Refugees 
comprises two stages – preliminary examination of an application for granting 
refugee status (the admissibility of the claim, Arts. 4-5) and examination of an 
application on the merits (substantive examination, Art. 7). Art. 8 of the Federal 
Law on Refugees enumerates the list of rights and obligations of recognized 
refugees, including social rights which include the right to medical and medicinal 
help; right to paid employment and self-employed economic activities; right to 
social protection, including social security.  
− temporary asylum: possibility of temporary legal residence on the territory of the 
RF that is granted to a foreigner citizen or stateless person who does not have 
grounds for recognition as a refugee but cannot be expelled from the RF for 
humanitarian reasons.  
− political asylum: granted based on Art. 63 of the Constitution. Political asylum is 
granted to individuals seeking protection from persecution ‘for socio-political 
activity and beliefs that do not contradict democratic principles shared by the 
world community’, taking into account public interests of the Russian Federation 
and based on the norms of the international law. 
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The Socio-Political Framework of Migration 
In the 1990s, the fundamental priority of migration policy was the reception and settlement of forced 
migrants (whose inflow, incidentally, gradually lowered). In the early 2000s, the aims, objectives and 
priorities of state migration policy were revised, and migration policy was reoriented to a war on illegal 
migration. For a decade, Russian migration policy was formally guided by the State Migration Policy 
Concept adopted in 2003. FMS Russia was transferred to the Ministry of Interior, and the Institute of 
Federal Migration Programmes was liquidated. Migration policy became less transparent and predictable, 
and under the flag of a war, a war was waged on immigration as a whole; anti-migration propaganda was 
deployed. However, the tendencies toward domestic political fluctuation and the country’s undefined 
development strategy have defined inconsistency and reversibility of migration strategies proclaimed in the 
Concept. By 2005, the inefficacy of the chosen course became apparent: the number of illegal migrants 
rose constantly, at the same time problems with demographic development became apparent, which to 
date the authorities have ignored. The changes, aiming at liberalization of migration legislation in late 2005 
and early 2006 to overcome inefficacy of migration policy of the early 2000s and the worsening problems of 
demographic development, were not systematic. Migration policy-making gained new dynamics after 2007 
with plenty of new regulations adopted in various migration-related spheres.  
Some progress was noted in 2010. Firstly, licensing for labour migrants employed by individuals was 
introduced, which allowed 516,000 migrants to be legalized in January-July 2011. Another area, also 
successfully implemented since 2010, is the solution to the problem of attracting highly-qualified specialists, 
granting them resident permits according to the simplified procedure. Finally, in June 2012, the new 
Concept of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation for the Period to 2025 was adopted by the 
decree of the President of the Russian Federation. The Concept provides analysis of the recent migration 
processes in the Russian Federation and the strategy of the development of migration policy of Russia, 
defining competences of the Russian state authorities in the field of migration. Most importantly, the 
Concept declares that Russia is becoming an immigration country. Consequently, one of the main priorities 
for the state migration policy in the Russian Federation is introduction of differentiated programs for short 
and long-term labour migration, which includes the use of different mechanisms of selection, conditions of 
entry, residence and employment. 
  
Socio-Political 
Framework Outward migration Inward migration 
Governmental 
Institutions 
Central state authorities responsible for 
the implementation of state 
programmes on cooperation with 
Diaspora: 
− Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
- protects the rights of citizens 
abroad; ensures development of 
ties with ‘compatriots’ abroad;  
− Russian Ministry of Culture 
reaches out to Russian diasporas 
and communities abroad.  
 
The President of the Russian Federation 
shapes Russian migration policy 
(legislative initiative, signing of laws, veto 
right, management of foreign affairs). He 
decides on citizenship and political 
asylum.  
Federal Migration Service (FMS) and 
its territorial bodies implement immigration 
and legislation. 
Other relevant authorities: 
− Commission on Citizenship under the 
President; 
− Ministry of Interior and its territorial 
bodies; 
− Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its 
missions abroad;  
− Federal Security Service and Federal 
Border Service (as part of the former); 
− Ministry of Health and Social 
Development (defines the immigration 
quota to be approved by the 
Government) 
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Governmental 
Strategy 
Emigration from Russia is not 
regulated. Firstly, for humanitarian 
reasons, and secondly, the issue of 
emigration has lost its topicality in 
recent times, after the scale of 
emigration has sharply reduced in 
comparison with the 1990s. 
Russia has been developing an 
active Diaspora policy, addressing 
especially ethnic Russians and highly-
skilled emigrants (see below).  
Following the intensive post-Soviet 
economic growth based on natural 
resources combined with demographic 
decline, RF pursues an active immigration 
policy, attracting both skilled and unskilled 
migrants. 
Currently, national migration policy 
framework of Russia is defined by the 
following policy documents:  
Concept of National Migration Policy of 
Russia till 2025 (adopted in June 2012) 
Concept of State Nationality Policy of 
Russia 
Concept of National Demographic 
Policy of Russia till 2025 (adopted in 2007) 
Strategy of National Security of the 
Russian Federation till 2020 
Strategy 2020: New Growth Model - 
New Social Policy  
Strategic goals:  
a) to ensure the national security of the 
Russian Federation, the maximum 
protection, comfort and well-being of 
the population of the Russian 
Federation; 
b) to stabilize and increase the resident 
population of the Russian Federation; 
c) to promote the satisfaction of the 
needs of the Russian economy in the 
labour force, modernization, innovation 
and to increase the competitiveness of 
its industries. 
Major principles of migration policy:  
a) the observation of human/citizen rights 
and freedoms; 
b) the unacceptability of any form of 
discrimination; 
c) the compliance with the national and 
international law; 
d) the harmonization of the interests of 
individuals, society and the state; 
e) the interaction of federal bodies of 
state power, bodies of state power of 
subjects of the Russian Federation and 
bodies of local self-government, the 
development of institutions of social 
partnership and civil society; 
f) the protection of the national labour 
market; 
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g) a differentiated approach to the 
regulation of migration flows 
depending on the purpose and 
duration of stay, the socio-
demographic and professional 
qualifications of migrants; 
h) the consideration of the specificity of 
regional development; 
i) the access to information on migration 
and decisions taken in the process of 
implementation of the state migration 
policy of the Russian Federation; 
j) the scientific validity of the decisions. 
Main objectives:  
a) creation of conditions and incentives 
for compatriots living abroad, 
immigrants and certain categories of 
foreign nationals, for relocation to 
Russia for permanent residence; 
b) development of differentiated 
mechanisms of attraction, selection 
and use of foreign labour; 
c) promotion and development of internal 
migration; 
d) promotion of educational migration and 
support of the academic mobility; 
e) implementation of humanitarian 
commitments towards the forced 
migrants; 
f) assistance in the process of adaptation 
and integration of migrants, 
establishment of constructive 
interaction between migrants and the 
host community; 
g) combating the illegal migration. 
Civil Society  Targeting Russian ‘compatriots’: world 
congress of compatriots every three 
years.  
NGOs related to and/or co-funded 
by the “Russian World” foundation 
(promotion of Russian language and 
culture abroad).  
− Civil Assistance Committee for 
refugees and IDPs;; 
− Consultation network for refugees and 
displaced persons "Migration and Law"; 
− International Volunteer Public 
Organization “MEMORIAL Historical, 
Educational, Human Rights And 
Charitable Society”  
− The trade union of migrant workers. 
An extensive network of NGOs in the 
regions implements the mediatory role 
between the migrants and the official 
bodies of power. These NGOs provide 
legal advice and assistance as well as 
material and other humanitarian help to 
the most vulnerable individuals. 
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Migration and 
economic 
development 
The National Programme to Assist 
Voluntary Resettlement of 
Compatriots was launched in 2006. It 
constitutes an attempt to solve the 
problem of attracting additional labour 
force to certain regions via purposefully 
directed migration flows. For this 
purpose, interested regions design 
their resettlement programmes which 
are then put together and presented to 
the representations of the Russian 
FMS in CIS countries or diplomatic 
representations.  
Some regions (in particular, Moscow, 
St. Petersburg) actively support 
compatriots abroad. In some regions of 
Russia - the national republics – passed 
a large number of laws and regulations 
regarding specific Diaspora (Tatar, 
Circassia, Dagestan, etc.). 
‘The concept of the demographic policy of 
the Russian Federation up to 2025’, 
adopted by the Decree of the President of 
the Russian Federation as of October 9, 
2007, No. 1351 states that active 
recruitment and integration of permanent 
immigrants is one of the leading principles 
of demographic policy and, hence, of 
socio-economic development. 
Potential immigrants are encouraged to 
take up education in Russian institutions 
abroad (or supported by Russia) to gain 
skills necessary on the Russian labour 
market. 
International 
Cooperation 
Russia is a member or an observer of the following international organisations actively 
working on migration issues: IOM, Council of Europe, Commonwealth of Independent 
States, and OSCE. Russia also cooperates with the relevant UN bodies on migration 
issues: UNHCR, UNCHR, UNDP, UN Women, and UNESCO.  
Russia participates in the following regional consultative processes: Budapest 
Process, Prague Process. It also actively promotes regional cooperation on migration 
in Central Asia, namely within CSTO and SCO.  
The Concept of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation for the 
Period to 2025 defines that Russia’s international cooperation on migration should 
aim at more freedom of movement and employability of Russian citizens abroad; 
cooperation on migration management, including return and readmission; active 
recruitment of immigrants. 
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The Demographic-Economic Framework of Migration 
Starting in 2011, the on-going Syrian civil war has seen large numbers of Syrian nationals fleeing to 
neighbouring states. As of 23 April 2013, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), 1,387,806 Syrian nationals fled the country and reached neighbouring (and more distant) 
countries. These have included Jordan (32.0%), Lebanon (31.2%), Turkey (22.6%), Iraq (9.8%), Egypt 
(3.6%) and other North African countries (0.7%). 84.4% of these forced migrants registered with UNHCR. 
The highest registration rates were observed in Iraq (100%), Turkey (89.4%) and Jordan (87.6%). It is 
worth mentioning that these outflows increased strikingly in the last 6 months: 23 October 2012, registered 
refugees were ‘only’ 281,144, confirming a further recent escalation of violence in Syria and a consequent 
aggravation of the refuge crisis.  
Historically, Syria experienced several waves of emigration due to socio-political events, economic 
fluctuations and high rates of unemployment. Most outward flows have been directed towards other Arab 
countries, despite the Syrian emigrant profile often differing according to destination country, the type of 
move envisaged and the period of emigration. At the end of the 1950s, a first wave of emigration was 
observed among the Syrian elite – including entrepreneurs and professionals – aimed at avoiding the rigid 
regulations implemented by the socialist regime at home and benefiting from job market opportunities in 
certain Arab countries and, to a lesser extent, in the US. In the mid-1970s, expanding economic 
opportunities in the Gulf as well as the labour shortages created in Lebanon as a result of the civil war 
(1975-1989) resulted in a second big wave of emigration, this time of low skilled Syrians. While outward 
flows to the Gulf slowed in the 1980s after the implementation of policies limiting Arab immigrants, Syrian 
unskilled emigration to Lebanon continued in large numbers until 2005. In that year, the assassination of 
the former Lebanese Prime Minister Raﬁc Hariri and the withdrawal of the Syrian Army from Lebanon 
undermined the already precarious living conditions of Syrian workers in Lebanon, so that large numbers of 
returned home (Mehchy and Mahadi Doko, 2011; Kawakibi, 2009; Fargues, 2009), though many are 
believed today to be back in Lebanon (Fargues, 2009). 
As to immigration patterns, despite the absence of reliable and official statistics, Syria was considered 
an important receiver until the civil war broke out in 2011. Immigrants in Syria could be grouped into three 
main groups: refugees; labour migrants; and transit migrants. Refugees were by far the largest group. 
Labour migrants include domestic workers, originating mainly in Southeast Asia and highly-skilled 
employees, who started to arrive in concomitance with the economic and legal reforms accompanying the 
recent transition of Syria to a social market economy in 2005. Finally, there are transit migrants who enter 
Syria, mainly from Asia. 
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1 Data refer to 23/04/2013. 
2 According to a survey managed by the Fafo Foundation and the Damascus-based Palestinian Central Bureau of 
Statistics, in 2001 only 27,000 first-generation Palestinian refugees were living in Syria (Tiltnes, 2007).  
3 Palestinians in Syria either live in camps or outside of camps. Among the latter, they can be distinguished as those 
living in ‘gatherings’ – clusters of households – and those who live isolated from others. The survey focused on 
Palestinians living in camps and in gatherings of more than 25 Palestinian refugee households, the other group 
being nearly impossible to reach. 
Outward migration Inward migration 
Stock 
Today, there are 1,643,747 Syrian nationals 
abroad, most of them having fled from the current 
civil war. Indeed, 1,387,806 Syrians fled the war to 
local neighbouring countries: Jordan (444,268), 
Lebanon (433,467), Turkey (313,679), Iraq 
(135,842), Egypt (50,498) and other north African 
countries (10,052).1
 
 Other Syrian migrants reside in 
European Union countries (8.0%) and in other parts 
of the world (7.6%).  
Without taking the recent events in Syria into 
account, there are two main reasons why these 
estimates are not able to explain the whole 
phenomenon and why interpretations must be 
made with caution.  
First, numbers for Syrian migrants living in the 
Gulf countries are not available. Syrian statistics 
cannot help here, since no estimate of Syrian 
citizens living abroad is given out by the authorities. 
 
  
Stock 
According to census data, in 2004, 102,396 
foreign nationals resided in Syria, or 0.6% of the 
total population. The majority of these were other 
Arab nationals (86.5%) and non-Arab Asian 
nationals (9.4%). 
 
Such figures, however, did not include either 
Palestinian or Iraqi refugees. Immigrants in Syria 
can, in fact, be categorized into three main groups: 
refugees; labour migrants; and transit migrants.  
The first category is by far the more relevant from 
a quantitative perspective. Among refugees, 
Palestinians and Iraqis form the largest groups. 
According to estimates made by the Palestinian 
Bureau of Statistics and Natural Resources of 
Damascus, in 2009, there were 467,956 
Palestinians, the vast majority being, however, not 
migrants but second and now third generation 
Palestinian refugees, refugees in relation to 1948.2
Until the on-going civil war, the socio-economic 
conditions of Palestinians in Syria were relatively 
better than in Lebanon and Jordan as confirmed by 
a 2001 ad hoc survey (see note 1). This allowed the 
detection of various aspects of Palestinians’ living 
conditions in Syria,
  
3 as well as in Jordan and 
Lebanon.  
Country of 
residence/asylum
Definition 
(a)
Reference 
date 
Source Number %
1,387,806 84.4
Jordan (B) 23/04/2013 UNHCR 444,268 27.0
Lebanon (B) 22/04/2013 UNHCR 433,467 26.4
Turkey (B) 23/04/2013 UNHCR 313,679 19.1
Iraq (B) 22/04/2013 UNHCR 135,842 8.3
Egypt (B) 22/04/2013 UNHCR 50,498 3.1
Other north African 
countries
(B) 23/04/2013 UNHCR 10,052 0.6
131,108 8.0
of which Germany (B) 2012 Reg. foreigners 34,229 2.1
             Sweden (A) 2012 Pop. Register 22,357 1.4
             France (A) 2009 Pop. Census 15,510 0.9
             UK (A) 2012 APS 11,000 0.7
124,833 7.6
of which US (A) 2011 ACS 71,394 4.3
             Canada (A) 2006 Pop. Census 19,405 1.2
1,643,747 100.0
(b): "Other countries" include other European countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norw ay, 
Sw itzerland, Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine), Palestine, Canada, US, Australia, New  
Zealand, Chile, Japan, Mexico and Israel.
Sources: UNHCR; national statistics (Population Censuses, population registers, registers for 
foreigners, etc.)
Local neighbouring countries
Syrian emigration stocks by country of residence, most recent data (c. 
2012/13)
European Union
Other countries (b)
Main total
(a): Syrian migrants are defined according to the country of birth (A) or country of nationality 
criterion according to countries of residence.
Number %
Other-Arab Countries 46,167 42,399 88,566 86.5
Europe 1,165 1,915 3,080 3.0
Non-Arab African Countries 356 200 556 0.5
Non-Arab Asian Countries 4,364 5,274 9,638 9.4
Oceania 28 19 47 0.0
America 250 259 509 0.5
Total n.a. n.a. 102,396 100.0
Foreign nationals residing in Syria by country of citizenship and sex, 2004
Source: 2004 Syrian population census 
Country of citizenship Males Females
Total
% on the total resident population 0.6
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4 UNRWA, “UNRWA condemns mass displacement of Palestine refugees in Syria”, 30/04/2013, available at 
http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=1735  
5 Press conference with Filippo Grandi, Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), March 11, 2013, available at 
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/unifeed/2013/03/un-palestinians-in-syria/, (date of access: 30/04/2013).  
Second, these figures do not include a 
significant group, Syrian migrants working in 
Lebanon who, despite the absence of statistical 
data on back-and-forth mobility, are known to move 
on a circular or temporary basis. Also before the 
Lebanese Civil war (early 1970s), Syrian workers 
were estimated at more than 200,000 (Fargues, 
2009). During the Civil War (1975-1989) their 
numbers peaked due to the presence of labour 
shortages left open by hundreds of thousands 
Lebanese emigrants and given too Syrian control of 
Lebanese territory and the Lebanese border which 
eased Syrian entries and exits (Fargues, 2009). 
After the war, these movements continued and 
flourished, pushed up by reconstruction works and 
thanks to visa facilitation agreements. Syrian 
workers in Lebanon have never been counted and 
estimates range from 300,000 to 500,000 
individuals (Mehchy and Mahadi Doko, 2011); i.e. 
from 5.5% to 9.2% of the working age population 
living in Syria in 2010. According to a recent study 
conducted by Infopro in 2008, these migrants tend 
to be male, poorly educated and employed in low 
skilled and scarcely protected jobs: three out of four 
Syrians in Lebanon work in the construction sector, 
while the rest are employed in agriculture and 
cleaning services. Family migration seems, instead, 
to be related to concierge jobs, for which housing is 
guaranteed free of charge (Balanche, 2007).  
Overall, in OECD countries (years around 2006), 
Syrian emigrants have an intermediate skilled 
profile: respectively 30.1%, 33.7%, and 36.1% hold 
a low, medium and high level of education. As to 
their occupational profile, Syrian emigrants tend to 
be employed at high occupational levels: 53.9% are 
employed in highly-skilled jobs – such as 
legislators, managers, professionals, etc 
(OECD.stat). 
Flows 
UNHCR data on registered Syrian refugees in local 
neighbouring countries reflect the deterioration of 
the situation in Syria within the last six months as 
refugee numbers passed from 281,144 as of 23 
October 2012 to 1,171,230.  
 
At that time, poor households, defined as families 
who earn less than 2 US dollars per day, represented 
23% of Palestinian households in Syria, vs. 35% and 
31% in Lebanon and Jordan, respectively. Extremely 
poor households, for whom the poverty threshold is 
fixed at 1 US dollar per day, accounted for 5% of all 
Palestinian households in Syria vs. 15% and 9% 
respectively in Lebanon and Jordan (Hanssen-Bauer 
and Jacobsen, 2007). So, despite Syria being, 
generally speaking, poorer than Lebanon and Jordan, 
Palestinians tended to perform better because they 
were more likely to be included in the labour market: 
the adult labour force participation rate was 48%, i.e. 
75% for males (vs. less than 70% both in Lebanon 
and Jordan) and 21% for females (vs. 16% in 
Lebanon and 13% in Jordan). As to employment 
performances, differences were, instead, not so 
pronounced: the unemployment rate ranged, indeed, 
from 9% in Syria to 10% in Lebanon and Jordan. 
Nevertheless, if we consider only refugees living in the 
camps, Palestinians in Syria registered an 
unemployment rate of 9%, vs. 13% in Jordan and 
17% in Lebanon. These positive outcomes were 
largely the result of indiscriminate access conditions to 
employment enjoyed by Palestinians in Syria, 
including access to its large public sector in which 
around 36% of Palestinians were employed (Egset 
and al-Madi, 2007).  
The current civil war has, however, increasingly 
threatened the lives of Palestinians in Syria. As of 
30 April 2013, the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) 
estimated that approximately 235,000 Palestine 
refugees have been internally displaced in Syria4. 
They include around 130,000 persons displaced 
from the Yarmouk refugee camp in Syria, where, at 
the time of writing, 20,000 Palestinians ‘remain and 
are trapped in the area amid fighting between the 
opposition and government forces’5. 
Males Females Total
Syria (2001) 23.0 9.0 75.0 21.0 48.0
Jordan (2001) 31.0 10.0 <70.0 13.0 n.a.
Lebanon (1998) 35.0 10.0 <70.0 16.0 n.a.
Selected socio-economic indicators of Palestinians residing in Syria, Jordan, and 
Lebanon, years around 2000
(*) The poverty rate is defined as the percentage of households earning less than 2 US 
dollars per day.
Source: Fafo surveys (cited in Hanssen-Bauer and Jacobsen, 2007, and Egset and al-Madi, 
2007.
Labour market participation ratePoverty rate 
(*)
Unemployment 
rate
Country of 
residence
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6 UNHCR. 2012. Syria Region: focus on enrolling refugee children in schools, Iraq border crossing opens at Al 
Qaem, UNHCR Briefing Notes, 21 September 2012, available at http://www.unhcr.org/505c46759.html (date of 
access: 30/04/2013) 
 
This growth occurred in all local neighbouring 
countries, confirming a recent escalation of 
violence in Syria and a consequent aggravation of 
the refuge crisis.  
A continued rise in Syrians’ asylum applications 
has been observed in the EU, especially from the 
third quarter of 2012. 
 
Since April 2011, the main recipient countries 
have been Germany and Sweden. 
 
Furthermore, large numbers are trying to reach 
neighbouring countries. However, reception 
attitudes vary, dramatically, according to 
destination. The Jordanian authorities, which claim 
to have provided assistance to around 5,000 
Palestinians fleeing Syria – recently declared that 
the country can no longer accept Palestinians. 
Palestinians fleeing to Turkey and Iraq have faced 
additional challenges as no UNRWA office operates 
there. Another 32,000 Palestinians have fled Syria 
to Lebanon, where life conditions for Palestinians 
are already very difficult. 
Despite Syria being considered the most 
significant receiver of Iraqi refugees, they have 
never been properly counted. Estimates range from 
103,200 (UNHCR estimates) to 480,000 (Syrian 
government’s estimates) in 2013: these figures are, 
of course, controversial. Like their true size, the 
living conditions of Iraqis are largely unknown. 
Nevertheless, unlike Palestinians, they are not 
permitted to work or open their own business so 
they are dependent on external financial support, 
including their savings, remittances and 
humanitarian assistance, and participation in 
informal market activities (Mehchy and Mahadi 
Doko, 2011).  
As a consequence of the Syrian civil war, 
UNHCR estimates that – as of 19 September 2012 
– 37,358 Iraqis fled the country to return to Iraq.6
In 2013, other refugees registered with UNHCR 
included 2,400 Somalis and 1,740 Afghanis 
(source: UNHCR). Moreover, Syria hosts around 
300,000 stateless Kurds who have been living 
without Syrian citizenship, and, thus, without 
fundamental civil rights, since 1962 (Mehchy and 
Mahadi Doko, 2011). 
 
The second group of immigrants living in Syria 
includes highly-skilled employees and domestic 
workers. As to the former, they have recently been 
attracted by the need for foreign experts in the 
Syrian economy especially in certain sectors 
(telecommunications, banking, insurance, etc.) a 
result of the rise of foreign and local investments 
following the transition to a social-market economy. 
Their employment status is specifically regulated by 
a recent labor law 17/2010, according to which they 
are 1. required to have specific expertise that is not 
available among Syrians and 2. to train Syrian 
workers in order to make them rapidly obtain the 
0
200,000
400,000
600,000
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1,000,000
1,200,000
1,400,000
Registered Syrian refugees in local neighboring 
countries, Dec 2011/Apr 2013
Jordan Lebanon Others
Source: UNHCR
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Cumulated number of Syrian nationals applying for asylum 
in the European Union, April 2011-February 2013
Germany Sweden
United Kingdom Belgium
Austria + Denmark + France Cyprus + Italy + Bulgaria
Other EU
Source: Eurostat
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References: Balanche F. 2007. Les travailleurs syriens au Liban ou la complémentarité de deux systèmes d’oppression, 
Le Monde Diplomatique – Editions Arabe; Egset W. and al-Madi. 2007. Work and working conditions, in Tiltnes A.A. 
(eds.), Palestinian Refugees in Syria: Human Capital, Economic Resources and Living Conditions, Fafo Report 514; 
Fargues P. 2009. Work, Refugee, Transit: An Emerging Pattern of Irregular Immigration South and East of the 
Mediterranean, International Migration Review, Volume 43, Number 3: 544-577; Government of Turkey. 2011. Report: 
necessary experience. Following these legal 
provisions, the Syrian authorities started in 2010 to 
record foreign employees. In June 2010, their 
number was estimated at 995 by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Labour (MOSAL), despite there 
being a general consensus that larger numbers of 
foreign experts, particularly from Russia, have long 
been living in Syria with their families. The press 
estimates from 5,000 to 7,500 foreign workers (see 
Mehchy and Mahadi Doko, 2011). 
The presence of domestic workers has been, 
instead, on the rise since 2001, following the 
legalization of foreign nationals as domestic 
workers. It peaked after 2006, as a result of the 
organization of work under specific manpower 
agencies. In 2010, Syrian manpower agencies 
estimated their number at around 75,000-100,000 
individuals mainly women from Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Ethiopia. According to many 
experts, they represent a particular vulnerable 
group since they are de facto excluded from 
Syrian labour law and subjected to poor working 
conditions and abuse. 
Finally, a third group of immigrants includes 
transit migrants, who mainly originate in Asia and 
the CIS countries (Sørensen, 2006). 
Flows 
No official statistics are currently available on legal 
inward migration flows entering Syria. According to 
the United Nations Department of Social Affairs, the 
net migration rate was substantially negative in the 
period 1955-2010, except for a five-year period 
2000-2005, when, they estimate, a positive rate 
was observed, due to the massive influx of Iraqis 
following the US invasion in 2003. 
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The Legal Framework of Migration 
The conditions for aliens to enter, stay, and exit from the country were defined in a presidential decree of 
1970, and some ministerial decisions complement and fill out its provisions. Arab nationals are favoured as 
regards access to the territory, to work and to nationality. A recent regulation tends to frame and protect the 
most vulnerable migrants - mainly domestic workers, as well as a decree against trafficking in persons.  
No overall law deals with Syrian emigration but a series of measures adopted since the beginning of the 
2000s aim at enhancing links with expatriates. Notably, the conditions for exemption from military service 
have been progressively relaxed to remove what was an obstacle to the return – temporary or more long-
lasting – of Syrian emigrants and their descendants. Regarding domestic workers, the Syrian Interior 
ministry has regulated their recruitment with a special agency. For domestic workers, it imposed the 
contracting of accident insurance, days off, holidays, and suitable living conditions. These regulations 
strictly forbid marriage between a Syrian and a foreign domestic, in order to limit trafficking in women. 
Furthermore, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour adopted a law (n°2040, February 6th 2007) to 
‘organise the agencies specialized in the recruitment and employment of foreign labourers and domestics’. 
This law strengthen the domestic’s rights and insists that the salary be written into the contract and that 
there be suitable housing. It entitles the domestics to medical care, it defines a set of sanctions in cases of 
violence or discrimination on the basis of nationality, race, or gender. Moreover, the law restricts the 
creation of new agencies, imposes the payment of significant taxes, limit the agencies’ fees (a percentage 
of the domestic’s salary), and notes that the agencies have the responsibility of repatriating the domestics 
in cases of problem. 
Syria is the country where the situation of Palestinians is reputed to be the most favourable. Palestinian 
issues are ruled by Law n°260 of 10 July 1956 dedicated to those Palestinian refugees from the 1948 
exodus. It is stipulated that Palestinians who reside in the country when the law is promulgated will be 
considered as Syrian citizens of origin as regards employment, work, trade and military service. 
Palestinians are thus granted the same rights and duties as national citizens, with the exception of political 
rights and access to real estate. Unlike other Arab nationals, Palestinians do not need a work permit. They 
are constrained to compulsory military service in the Palestine’s Liberation Army created in 1964, they can 
work in the public service, occupy a political position and travel with a Syrian laissez-passer valid for six 
years, just as national citizens can. 
The Palestinians who came from the 1956 and 1967 wars were registered with a service created in 1949 
and were granted the same rights as the 1948 refugees, with some exceptions: they are hired on the basis 
of temporary work contracts, they cannot benefit from hierarchical advancement in the public services and 
they do not carry out military service. All the Palestinians are assimilated to nationals regarding access to 
work (Law n°17 of 2010) and passport issuance (Law n°42 of 1975). Though they are considered as Syrian 
citizens by the law of 1956, Palestinian refugees resident in Syria are not given the right to be naturalised 
as people with Arab origin can be, which means with privileges stipulated in the nationality law. As in Egypt, 
Syria invokes its solidarity towards the Palestinian people’s fight. This policy has resulted in abandoning 
many Palestinians to statelessness in the name of preserving their future. 
Kurds are also affected by statelessness. Decree n°93 of 23 August 1962 called for an exceptional 
census in the province and tens of thousands and maybe hundreds of thousands of Kurds were deprived of 
their Syrian nationality as a result. Nothing was done till a Presidential decree dated 7 April 2011, which 
granted citizenship to over 100,000 of them.  
Syria has no law on refugees except for Constitutional mention prohibiting extradition of political 
refugees. UNHCR deals with refugee-status determination procedure and their protection, while UNRWA is 
in charge of Palestinian refugees. On 26 February 2012, the State approved a new constitution adopting all 
articles regarding migration within the previous 1973 Constitution. However, the 2012 version includes new 
stipulations such as the right for every citizen to leave the country, to return to the country, as well 
prohibiting the extradition of any citizen to any foreign entity. 
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7 SANA. (18 February 2012). Draft Constitution for the Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from 
http://sana.sy/eng/337/2012/02/18/401178.htm 
8 CARIM. Legal Database – Syria. Retrieved from 
http://www.carim.org/index.php?callContent=400&callCountry=2470  
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid.  
Legal 
Framework  
Outward migration Inward migration 
General Legal 
References 
• 2012 Constitution of Syrian Arab Republic 7
• 2010 Presidential decree n°3 against trafficking in persons
 
8
• 2010 Law n°17 and 2004 Law n°50 (employment of foreigners)
 
9
• 1975 Law n°42 on passport issuance
 
10
• 1970 Presidential decree n°29 related to aliens’ entry, stay, and exit
 
11
• 1970 Presidential decree n°1623 regulating Syrians’ exit and entry
 
12
• 1969 Legislative decree n°276 on the Syrian Arab nationality
 
13 
Entry and Exit The emigration of civil servants is 
subject to authorisation and an exit visa. 
A wife should generally follow her 
husband in emigration (family code, 
1953) and can be prevented from 
emigrating alone by her husband 
(decision n°876 of 1979). 
A medical certificate indicating the 
absence of contagious disease should 
be presented at entry.  
Decision n°1350 of 15 August 1984: 
entry without visa for nationals from all 
Arab states, from the Gulf, from the 
Emirates and from the Sultanates.  
Entry visa requirement re-
established for Iraqis in 2007 (decision 
n°30 of 2007). 
Decision n°205 of 24 April 1972: 
Definition of entry and exit points. 
Exit visa for aliens. Presidential 
decree n°67 of 2005 related to the exit 
tax for foreign and national citizens. 
Irregular 
Migration 
Irregular exit: 3 months in prison and/or 
500 Syrian pounds (Law n°42 of 1975). 
Human trafficking: 7 years in 
prison, 1 to 3 million Syrian pounds 
(Presidential decree n°3 of 2010 against 
trafficking in persons). 
 
 
 
Decree n°29 of 1970: 
Irregular entry: 3 months to 1 year in 
prison and/or 500 to 1,000 Syrian pounds. 
2 to 5 years in prison and/or 2,000 to 
4,000 Syrian pounds if the alien is a 
national from a country at war with Syria.  
False documents at entry: 2 years 
in prison and/or 300 to 2,000 Syrian 
pounds. 
Irregular stay: 3 months in prison 
and/or 100 to 500 Syrian pounds. 
Work without permit: 6 months in 
prison and/or 500 Syrian pounds. 
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International agreements regarding irregular migration 
 Palermo Protocols: in 2000, Syria signed both UN Protocols to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea 
and Air (both ratified in 2009).  
Rights and 
Settlement 
Right to enter for every citizen (Article 
38, Constitution). 
Civil service and emigration (Law 
n°50 of 2004). 
Syrian expatriates’ associations 
(Ministerial decree n°16 of 2007). 
Emigrants’ military service: Law 
n°36 of 2009: payment to be exempted 
from military service reduced (6,500$ 
after 5 years abroad). Law n°30 of 2007: 
Syrian emigrants with another nationality 
can avoid their military service in Syria if 
they do it in their other country.  
 
Right of citizens not to be deported 
from the country, or prevented from 
returning to it (Article 38, Constitution). 
Right of citizens not to be 
extradited to any foreign entity (Article 
38, Constitution). 
Right to leave the territory of the 
state for every citizen, unless prevented 
by a decision from the competent court 
or the public prosecution office or in 
accordance with the laws of public 
health and safety (Article 38, 
Constitution).  
Stay permits (3 categories): 5 year-
permit for people residing for 15 years, 
or for 5 years if they are carrying out a 
useful activity for the country, or for 
wives of Syrian citizens after 2 years; a 
3 year-permit for people born in Syria 
and living there for 3 years, or aliens 
residing for 5 years; 1 year-permit in 
other cases (Decree n°29 of 1970 and 
decree n°30 of 2007). 
Access to Employment: Laws n°50 
of 2004 and n°17 of 2010: a ministerial 
authorisation is needed, based on the 
list of professions open to aliens and if 
there is reciprocity with the origin 
country. Work permit required. Arab 
nationals have facilitated access to most 
of professions. Decree of the Labour 
ministry n°2137/2009 of 21/07/2009 
modifying article 20 of ministerial decree 
n°2040/2005: the percentage of 
foreigners in private financial 
establishments is limited to 3% provided 
their qualification is not locally available. 
The percentage of non-Arab workers in 
a company not to exceed 10% (and 
30% of the payroll).  
Domestic workers are not covered by 
the labour law but by a series of 
decisions since the Prime Minister’s 
decree n°81 of 2006 which imposed a 
working contract. Decree of the Interior 
Ministry n°29 (12/03/2007) related to the 
entry of female migrant workers and 
their stay as domestics, and Arab and 
foreign nannies; decree n°62 of 2007 
related to sanctions for contract 
SYRIA 
224 Migration Policy Centre (www.migrationpolicycentre.eu) 
                                                          
14 Including conventions C111 concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation and C118 
Equality of Treatment of Nationals and Non-Nationals in Social Security, but excluding conventions C97 
concerning Migration for Employment, and C143 concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the 
Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers. 
violation; decision n°27 of 2009 
governing recruitment offices. Artists are 
governed by decision n°81 of 2008. 
Civil service open to Palestinians. 
Jobs there are also open to Arab 
nationals if the Prime minister considers 
it a national necessity (law n°50 of 2004). 
Family reunification: legal silence. 
Access to public services: access 
to food aid and public hospitals is not 
given to aliens. Iraqis have free access 
to health and education. Other aliens 
enjoy free access to education and 
quasi-free access to health services.  
Access to real estate ownership: 
excluded with some exceptions. 
Labour  Bilateral agreements regarding labour migration include: Syria-Lebanon 
agreement (1995) on mutual employment of their nationals; Syria-Qatar 
agreements on Syrian workers in Qatar (2003 and 2008); Syria-Tunisia (2004) 
on labour exchange; manpower agreements with Jordan (2007) and Kuwait 
(2008); Syria-United Arab Emirates on Syrian workers in the UAE (2008); 
among others. 
 International agreements regarding labour migration include the 1990 
Convention on the Protection of all Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Family, and 49 International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions.14 
Citizenship Dual nationality is tolerated.  
Penal sanctions exist in the case of 
the acquisition of another nationality 
without authorisation from the Syrian 
authorities. Authorisation is given only if 
the military service obligations have 
been fulfilled.  
Jus sanguinis through paternal descent. 
A Syrian mother does not transmit her 
nationality, unless her child is born in the 
country without recognised paternity. 
There is no jus soli. Naturalisation is 
possible after a five year-residency in 
the country, unless one has a 
contagious disease. Arab fellows benefit 
from a facilitated access to nationality, 
being emigrants in a third country 
without any Arab nationality, or 
immigrants in Syria. Foreign women can 
obtain the nationality of her Syrian 
spouse after a two-year marriage and 
residence in the country or she will 
become a citizen immediately if she is 
an Arab. The Syrian women cannot 
transmit nationality to a foreign husband. 
(Legislative decree n°276 on the Syrian 
Arab nationality; Regulation on 
application for naturalisation, withdrawal, 
renunciation and forfeit of nationality, 
decision n°92 of 22 June 1976). 
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International 
Protection 
 
Political refugees have the right not 
to be extradited because of their 
political beliefs or for their defense of 
freedom (Article 39, Constitution). 
No national law on asylum or 
refugee status determination procedure. 
Palestinian refugees are under 
UNRWA’s mandate. Decision n°1531 of 
6 September 1980 governs issuance of 
stay visas to Palestinian refugees. Non-
Palestinian refugees fall under 
UNHCR’s mandate.  
Syria accepted the 1965 Protocol for 
the Treatment of Palestinians in Arab 
States. 
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The Socio-Political Framework of Migration 
Originally a receiver of refugees, especially Palestinians and Iraqis, Syria has recently become a refugee 
sending country. Since spring 2011, the violent repression against the protests and subsequent civil war 
has caused a significant movement of refugees towards neighbouring countries and North Africa, as well as 
internal displacement. While host governments work with UNHCR and other organisations to provide basic 
assistance to Syrian refugees, the Syrian government has worked with the Syrian Red Crescent and 
UNHCR, amongst others, in attempts to provide assistance to internally displaced Syrians and other 
populations.15
With the exception of Lebanon, and a series of administrative measures created to limit brain drain, the 
Syrian regime has not intervened in the management of labour migration. Regarding domestic workers, 
however, the Syrian Interior ministry has regulated their recruitment with a special agency. In contrast, the 
Ba’ath party tried to organize and control Syrians abroad for political and economic reasons. Indeed, Syrians 
abroad, in particular those settled in Europe, have played a significant role in the opposition against the Syrian 
regime. In 2013, however, the Syrian Government welcomed the opposition, as well Syrian citizens, who have 
the left the country to return in order to participate in a national dialogue to resolve the crisis.
  
16
Before the 2011 crisis, Syria’s international cooperation on migration included membership in several 
international organisations and regional processes. As a result of the violence and the Syrian regime’s 
unwillingness to abdicate, however, the State’s participation in the Arab League as well as bilateral EU-
Syrian cooperation programmes have been suspended.  
  
                                                          
15 UNHCR. (2013). 2013 UNHCR Country Operation Profile – Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486a76.html  
16 Syrian Ministry of Interior. (24 January 2013). The Interior Ministry calls on citizens who have left the border to 
return. Retrieved from 
http://syriamoi.gov.sy/new/index.php?req=5612&nid=455&First=0&Last=308&CurrentPage=1&ARC=&order=1&sr
c=all& 
17 Syrian Ministry of Interior. (11 October 2012). Mr. Interior Minister discusses with Mr. Sagios Deputy Interior 
Minister of the Philippines on developing bilateral relations. Retrieved from 
http://syriamoi.gov.sy/new/index.php?req=5612&nid=433&First=0&Last=308&CurrentPage=2&ARC=&order=1&sr
c=all&; and Syrian Ministry of the Interior. (4 June 2012). Foiled infiltration of terrorists from Lebanon to Syria. 
Retrieved from 
http://syriamoi.gov.sy/new/index.php?req=5612&nid=389&First=0&Last=308&CurrentPage=6&ARC=&order=1&src=all&  
18 Syrian Ministry of Interior. (9 August 2012). Mr. Interior Minister during his meeting with the United Nations Under-
Secretary for Peace and Security. Retrieved from 
http://syriamoi.gov.sy/new/index.php?req=5612&nid=421&First=0&Last=308&CurrentPage=3&ARC=&order=1&src=all&  
Socio-Political 
Framework Outward migration Inward migration 
Governmental 
Institutions 
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Emigrants 
• Security apparatus 
• Syrian Army 
• Ministry of Interior 
• Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour 
• GAPAR (General Authority for 
Palestinian Arab Refugees) 
Governmental 
Strategy 
Facilitate temporary low-skilled 
labour migration, in particular toward 
Lebanon. 
Limit brain drain. 
Control the departure of Syrian 
refugees (since Spring 2011). 
Engage with Diaspora for their 
return for dialogue to resolve the 
crisis (citizens, including the opposition).  
Regulate the employment of foreign 
domestic workers and guarantee their 
rights (e.g., workers from the 
Philippines17
Protecting borders from “terrorist” 
groups intent on entering Syria.
).  
18
Support the rights of Palestinian 
refugees, while controlling the Palestinian 
social and political organizations. 
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Coordinate with international 
organisations and provide humanitarian 
assistance to needy Syrians within 
Syria (especially with assistance of Syrian 
Red Crescent, IOM and UNHCR). 
Coordinate with international 
organisations to resettle/repatriate 
refugees and migrants within Syria 
(e.g., IOM efforts to resettle Iraqi 
refugees in Syria). 
Civil Society   FEARAB (Federation of the Arab 
Entities)  
 Opposition groups: Syrian National 
Coalition; OSDH (Syrian 
Observatory for the Human Rights) 
 Unions 
 Human Rights Organizations 
Communal Organisations (national, 
sectarian, ethnic) 
International 
Cooperation 
Regarding international cooperation on migration-related issues, since 2011 the Syrian 
Government’s participation in the Arab League as well as bilateral cooperation 
programs between the EU and Syria (including MEDA/ENPI instruments) have been 
suspended. Syria is a member of the Union for the Mediterranean and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy.  
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The Demographic-Economic Framework of Migration  
The labour market’s poor performance together with a stalled democratization process have been the 
main determinants of persisting labour emigration flows from Tunisia. In contrast with the sustained 
economic growth of Tunisia over the last decades, unemployment has never dampened down and more 
recently has affected the most educated too. Tunisian emigration was traditionally directed towards 
Western European countries – especially France, Germany and Belgium – and to a lesser extent to 
Libya. After the limits put in place by European countries in the 1970s and the mass expulsion of 
Tunisian nationals from Libya in 1985, Tunisians resorted to family settlement in Europe, a diversification 
in the choice of destination countries, together with significant inflows of return migrants. Today, new 
European destinations (e.g. Italy and Spain) are attracting more and more Tunisian migrants, especially 
their irregular component. Finally, as a consequence of the 2011 revolts, both regular and irregular 
emigration from Tunisia has substantially increased. 
As to inward migration, Tunisia does not host large numbers of regular migrants. Indeed, their (low) 
proportion of the total resident population (less than 1%) has not changed greatly since the 1970s. 
However, since the 1990s, Tunisia has evolved into an important transit country receiving flows – 
mainly from Sub-Saharan countries – attempting to reach southern Italy from the Tunisian coasts. In 
addition, Tunisia was the country most affected by the 2011 Libyan Civil war with almost 350,000 
migrants arriving from Libya. 
Outward migration Inward migration 
Stock 
In 2009, Tunisians recorded in Tunisian consulates 
abroad stood at 1,098,200, or 10.6% of the Tunisian 
population. In the last decade, consular records show 
a rise in the propensity to leave the country: from 2001 
to 2009, the number of Tunisians abroad increased 
from almost 764,000 to more than 1 million, at an 
annual average growth rate of 6.2% (compared to the 
Tunisian population growth rate equal to 1.1% in the 
same period). 
 
In 2009, 83.0% of Tunisians abroad lived in 
Europe, mainly in France (54.5%), Italy (13.9%) and 
Germany (7.8%). Important numbers are also found in 
Arab countries (14.5%) especially in Libya (7.9%), 
even if an unknown proportion of them returned home 
as a consequence of the 2011 Libyan civil war. 
Stock 
In 2004, 35,192 foreign nationals were recorded 
as residing in Tunisia. They represent a very 
small proportion of the total resident population 
(0.4%), i.e. the same value registered at the 1994 
Census. Irregular migrants are also living in the 
country, but no solid estimate of their number has 
been provided. 
The majority of recorded immigrants comes 
from other Maghreb countries (27.3% and 18.1% 
from Algeria and Morocco, respectively) and 
Europe (27.5%), especially from France (13.1%) 
and Italy (4.4%).  
2001 2009
Europe 642,541 911,400 414,077
of which France 470,459 598,500 236,480
             Italy 78,581 152,700 109,371
             Germany 44,143 85,500 21,161
Arab countries 102,725 154,900 12,077
of which Libya 47,751 87,200 n.a.
North America 17,351 29,000 8,175
Other countries 1,363 2,900 32,266
Total 763,980 1,098,200 466,595
Destination 
countries'  
statistics
Source: Tunisian consular records and destination countries' 
statistics (population censuses, population registers, register 
of foreigners, etc.).
Tunisian emigration stocks by country of residence 
according to Tunisian consular statistics (2001, 2009) and 
destination countries' statistics (years around 2012)
Country of 
residence
Tunisian consular 
statistics
Number %
Arab countries 10,603 10,597 21,200 60.2
of which Algeria 3,835 5,777 9,612 27.3
            Morocco 3,757 2,606 6,363 18.1
            Libya 860 878 1,738 4.9
European countries 3,775 5,892 9,667 27.5
of which France 1,750 2,862 4,612 13.1
             Italy 867 693 1,560 4.4
            Germany 317 683 1,000 2.8
African countries 1,906 1,111 3,017 8.6
of which Ivory Coast 338 271 609 1.7
Asian countries 245 185 430 1.2
America 98 163 261 0.7
Other countries 226 391 617 1.8
Total 16,853 18,339 35,192 100.0
Source: Tunisian Census, 2004
Males Females
Total
Country of citizenship
Resident foreign population in Tunisia by sex and country of 
citizenship, 2004
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 From 2001 to 2009, Italy and Germany registered 
the highest annual average growth rates of Tunisian 
emigration stocks, equal to respectively 13.5% and 
13.4%. The lower rate registered in France (3.9%) 
confirms the rising diversification of destinations for 
Tunisian migrants.  
If we look at destination country’ statistics, smaller 
numbers are found: 466,595 Tunisian migrants 
resided abroad c. 2012. The discrepancy between 
consular and destination countries’ statistics depends 
on a variety of factors. First, unlike destination 
sources, consular records include second and third 
generation migrants. Second, destination country’ 
statistics are not available for a number of countries 
(e.g. Libya), since their authorities do not release data 
on their populations by nationality. 
As to their gender profile, most Tunisians 
registered at the Consulates are men (64.7%). In 
OECD countries, Tunisians have, on average, a low 
level of education (50.5%) and are employed in low-
skilled jobs, mainly as plant and machine operators 
and other elementary jobs (22.0%), as craft and 
related trades workers (17.5%), as service, shop and 
market sales workers (12.7%) and as plant and 
machine operators (year 2006 - OECD.stat.) 
Flows 
As a consequence of the 2011 revolts, in 2011-12 the 
annual number of migrants almost doubled with respect 
to 2005-2010 outflows. The total passed from 26,085 
(average value – 2005-2010) to 50,391 (2011-12).  
 
The socio-political situation has not only affected 
the size but also the characteristics of emigrants.  
As a whole, in the last decade, the socio-economic 
profile of Tunisian migrants improved. Highly-skilled 
outward flows (i.e. those with a university degree or 
more) evolved into an important proportion of the total of 
As to their profile, immigrants have a high level 
of education (58.1% are graduate or more). Indeed, 
they tend to be employed in highly-skilled 
occupations (65.1%), mainly as legislators, senior 
officials and managers (28.0%) and professionals 
(19.8%). 
Flows 
In the last decade, the African presence in Tunisia 
has become more important for various reasons. On 
the one hand, the large investments of Tunisian 
authorities in the education system has tended to 
attract more and more students from the whole 
continent; on the other hand, the displacement of the 
African Development Bank (ADB) from Abidjan (Ivory 
Coast) to Tunis in 2003 has gradually led to a rise in 
highly-skilled immigration from other African States. 
However, the largest inflows from other African 
states transit through Tunisia, waiting to cross the 
Mediterranean and reach Southern Italy. According 
to a declaration of the former Minister of Interior 
Hedi Mhenni, more than 40,000intercepted 
irregular migrants had been registered in Tunisia –
from 1998 to 2003. They were mainly Maghreb 
and Sub-Saharan nationals, even if 52 nationalities 
had been counted. 
Finally, in 2011, Tunisia received the largest 
number of migrants fleeing the Libyan civil war. 
According to IOM data, 345,238 migrants reached 
Tunisian borders, among whom 136,749 were 
Tunisian nationals. Of the remaining 208,489 third-
country nationals, 115,516 were repatriated through 
IOM schemes. 
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registered outflows: from 14.1% in 2005/6 to 22.9% in 
2009/10. The high investments aimed at improving the 
Tunisian educational system (as a percentage of GDP, 
educational expenditure rose from 4.0% in 2001 to 6.1% 
in 2011) has not coincided with a parallel development 
in highly-skilled job opportunities. From 2004 to 2010, 
the unemployment rate of highly-skilled persons rose 
from 8.6% in 1999 to 22.9% in 2010, while the total 
unemployment rate remained stable at c. 13.3%.  
 
In 2011, the deteriorating social, economic and 
political conditions which fueled emigration increases 
affected, instead, all population categories. In this 
year, the total unemployment rate skyrocketed, 
indeed, for tertiary educated people (from 22.9% in 
2010 to 29.2% in 2011) as well as for secondary 
educated individuals (from 13.7% to 20.6%) and for 
persons with only primary education (from 9.2% to 
12.4%). As a result, the proportion of migrants with 
tertiary education, 2011-2012 was lower (16.5%) than 
that recorded previously. 
Another major consequence of the 2011 revolts 
was the increase of harragas attempting to cross the 
Mediterranean and reach, especially, the Italian isle of 
Lampedusa. In 2011, 28,047 Tunisians were detected 
at Italian sea borders (vs. an average annual value of 
1,702 arrivals 2000-2010). In 2012, as of 1 November, 
the same value stood at 2,025.  
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2012 
(*)
337 522 607 1,183 591 307 1,596 2,312 1,417 7,633 1,522 650 28,047 2,025
Tunisian arrivals at sea in Italy, 1999-2012
Source: Italian Ministry of Interior
Notes: (*) 2012 statistics refer to the period January 1st - September 20th
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The Legal Framework of Migration 
On 3 February 2004, three months after its Moroccan neighbour and two months after promulgating a new 
law to combat terrorism, Tunisia reformed its migration law. However, unlike other states in the region it 
limited its reform to reinforcing penal sentences against assistance to irregular migration.  
The law of May 14, 1975 on passports and travel documents, modified in 2004, governs nationals’ as 
well as foreign nationals’ entry and exit. It remains in force, as does the law of March 8, 1968 concerning 
foreign nationals in Tunisia. 
The 2004 reform, which implemented the Palermo Protocol against the smuggling of migrants, 
toughened sanctions against any contribution – organised or otherwise, with or without profit – to irregular 
migration of foreign as well as of Tunisian citizens. The 1968 and 1975 laws already provided for the 
penalisation of irregular – foreign or national – migrants, and sentences remain the same. All these 
sanctions are consistent with the practice in Europe and the Maghreb, including in the way they affect non-
profit assistance, or sentence migrants, and so overstep the Palermo Protocols.  
This legislative arsenal organises temporary labour migration in a strict fashion and suffers from a 
number of lacunae as far as foreign nationals’ rights are concerned (e.g., protection from expulsion, legal 
appeal, family reunification and refugee status). Tunisia is reluctant to sign the Convention on the 
Protection of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Family, but has committed itself at international and 
bilateral levels concerning circulation advantages as well as readmission and border control, attempting to 
combine its interest in favouring its citizens’ mobility with its will to control them.  
Following the uprisings in Tunisia and subsequent election of a new government, a Draft Constitution 
was first created in August 2012, followed by presentation of the latest version in December 2012. Due to 
various political disputes, however, the adoption of the constitution has been delayed. The current draft 
keeps all articles regarding migration from the 1959 Constitution (e.g., freedom to leave and return to 
Tunisia for Tunisian citizens), yet removes the previous Constitution’s reference to prohibition on extradition 
of political refugees. The Draft also includes a new article stipulating that no Tunisian citizen shall have his 
or her nationality revoked.  
In November 2012, the European Union and Tunisia signed an Action Plan for 2013-2017 that granted 
Tunisia Privileged Partnership status and aims at strengthening financial support, trade openings and 
improved mobility. The two parties agree to a dialogue on migration with the objective of concluding a 
Mobility Partnership for cooperation on: movement of people, management of legal migration, migration 
and development, protection of the rights of migrants, fight against illegal migration, and readmission.1
Although Tunisia currently lacks a legal framework regarding refugees and asylum, in August 2011, the 
Tunisian authorities approached UNHCR for assistance in the development of a national asylum law,
  
2 and 
in July 2011 Tunisia signed a cooperation agreement with UNHCR.3
 
 
                                                          
1 Tunisia Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (April 2013). Relations Tunise - Union européenne: Un partenariat axé Plan 
D’Action 2013-2017. Retrieved from http://www.diplomatie.gov.tn/fileadmin/_temp_/Tunisie%20-UE-Plan-
Action.pdf  
2 UNHCR. (2013). 2013 UNHCR regional operations profile - North Africa. Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486166.html  
3 Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. UNHCHR: agreement to open Tunis office signed. Retrieved from  
http://www.diplomatie.gov.tn/index.php?id=42&L=2&tx_ttnews[arc]=1&tx_ttnews[backPid]=42&tx_ttnews[cat]=13&
tx_ttnews[pL]=2678399&tx_ttnews[pS]=1309471200&tx_ttnews[pointer]=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=310&cHash=f3afa
9fdb76c6bdafa4c8018f6158262  
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4 CARIM. Legal Database – Tunisia. Retrieved from 
http://www.carim.org/index.php?callContent=400&callCountry=1330  
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid.  
Legal 
Framework  
Outward migration Inward migration 
General Legal 
References 
• 2012 Draft Constitution of 14 December 20124
• 1975 Law n°40 of 14 May 1975, regarding passports and travel documents, 
modified in 1998, 2004 (Law n° 6) and 2008
 
5
• 1968 Law 68-07 on foreign nationals
 
6
• 1968 Decree 198 regulating the entry and stay of foreign nationals in Tunisia
 
7 
Entry and Exit Tunisians are exempted from a visa 
requirement for entrance to Maghreb 
countries. 
European and Maghreb nationals are 
exempted from visa requirements, so are 
nationals from Niger, Senegal, Guinea, 
Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana and Liberia, 
among others. 
Irregular 
Migration 
Irregular exit from the territory is 
punished with one-month to one-year 
prison sentence and a 6 to 120-dinar 
fine (1968 Law). 
Irregular exit for national citizens 
is punished with a 15-day to 6-month 
prison sentence and/or a 30 to 120 dinar 
fine (1975 Law). 
Irregular entry or stay is punished with a 
one-month to one-year prison sentence 
and a 6 to 120-dinar fine, also with 
deportation and possible prohibition from 
return (1968 Law).  
 
Facilitation of irregular migration punished with up to 3 years in prison and 8,000-
dinar fine; up to 4 years in prison for hosting a ’clandestine’. Aggravated sentences in 
case of organization. Non-denouncement is also punished (Law 2004-6). 
 Bilateral agreements regarding irregular migration 
• Tunisia-Italy (1998) on entry and readmission of Tunisian nationals and third- 
country nationals 
• Tunisia-France readmission agreement (2008) of Tunisian nationals only 
 International agreements regarding irregular migration 
• EU-Tunisia Association Agreement (1995): Tunisia and the EU agree to 
engage in a dialogue regarding illegal immigration and the conditions 
governing the return of irregular migrants. 
• Palermo Protocols: in 2000, Tunisia signed the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and the 
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (both 
entering into force in 2003). 
• EU-Tunisia Action Plan 2013-2017 (signed in November 2012): includes 
dialogue on fight against illegal migration, organized crime-related immigration 
and readmission.  
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Rights and 
Settlement 
Freedom to leave the territory for 
Tunisian citizens (Article 18, Draft 
Constitution).  
The state shall not revoke the 
nationality of any Tunisian citizen 
(Article 19, Draft Constitution). 
The State shall not extradite nor 
expatriate any Tunisian citizen (Article 
19, Draft Constitution).  
Voting and eligibility rights for 
expatriates.  
Tax advantages for temporary or 
definitive return. Stay abroad is to be 
temporary when within technical 
cooperation, or for students who have a 
grant to study in the EU and have to 
return after 3 years to work in Tunisia 
(Decree of the Minister of Higher 
Education, 31 October 2001).  
The State shall not deny repatriation of 
any Tunisian citizen (Article 19, Draft 
Constitution).  
Permits: one-year temporary stay 
permit, renewable once, except for 
nationals from countries linked to Tunisia 
by bilateral conventions (France, Algeria, 
Morocco, etc.). Renewable two-year 
ordinary stay permit for people who have 
regularly resided in the country for 5 years, 
or who are born and have constantly lived 
in Tunisia, or with Tunisian children, and for 
foreign women married to Tunisian men.  
Access to Employment: work if 
previous delivery of a contract approved 
by the Labour Minister, and a stay permit 
with authorisation to work (double 
ministerial visa). National preference. 
One-year contract, renewable once. 
Employment contract renewed perhaps 
more than once when is in the use of 
foreign companies operating in Tunisia as 
part of the implementation of 
development projects approved by the 
competent authorities. This contract and 
its renewal must be referred by the 
Minister for Employment Labour Law 
dispositions regarding foreign workforce 
(Law n°66-27 of 30 April 1966, last 
amendment by Law n°96-62 of 15 July 
1996). Derogations for export companies 
and development projects. Civil service 
reserved for nationals, as well as most of 
liberal professions except special 
authorisation on the basis of bilateral 
agreements and the principle of 
reciprocity. 
Family reunification: absence of legal 
provisions.  
Access to public services: yes. 
Access to estate ownership: forbidden in 
agricultural zone, subject to authorisation 
in urban zones unless a bilateral 
agreement exists (e.g, Morocco, Algeria, 
Libya), and reciprocity is respected, free in 
tourist zone (+ tax advantages). 
Labour  Bilateral agreements regarding labour migration: Convention relating to property 
rights, labour rights, the exercise of professions and trades, the right of 
establishment and freedom of movement with Libya (1973); with Italy on stay and 
work (1995) and on seasonal workers (2000); conventions on labour force with Libya 
(2003) and Syria (2004); with France on stay and labour (1988), young 
professionals’ exchanges (2004) and joint management of migration (2008). 
 International agreements regarding labour migration: 59 ILO conventions 
ratified1. 
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Citizenship Dual citizenship is allowed. Decree-Law n°63-6 of 28 February 1963 
Jus sanguinis by descent of father or 
mother. Discrimination: children born 
abroad to a Tunisian mother and a foreign 
father are Tunisian if they opt to be when 
coming of age or if their parents request 
nationality during their minority. Jus soli: 
triple - nationality of origin for the child 
born in Tunisia to a father and a 
grandfather also born there, with 
renunciation right at majority unless the 
child has an army commitment. A foreign 
woman can obtain nationality after two 
years of marriage with a Tunisian man and 
two years of residence in the country. 
Easier access to naturalization for a 
foreign man married to a Tunisian woman. 
International 
Protection 
 
No national refugee status determination 
procedure. No legal reference to a stay 
permit. UNHCR-Tunisia cooperation 
agreement in 2011.  
International agreements: 1951 
Convention relating to the status of 
refugees (succession in 1957); 1967 
Protocol relating to the status of refugees 
(accession in 1968); and the 1969 OAU 
Convention governing specific aspects of 
refugees in Africa (signed in 1969, ratified 
in 1989).  
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The Socio-Political Framework of Migration 
In the last years, Tunisia has made great efforts to promote the concerted and global governance of 
irregular and regular emigration. This approach, which rests on cooperation with destination countries – 
notably those across the Western shore of the Mediterranean – is based on the following axes: putting 
migration policies in a more global context, embedded in the partnership process with the EU (the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership);8
Indeed, the newly-elected Government developed a strong interest in linking with Tunisians abroad after 
the revolution in 2011. Out of the 217 Constituent Assembly members, 18 MPs were elected to represent 
Tunisians abroad. In October 2011, furthermore, a Secretary of State for Tunisian Expatriates was created 
under the Ministry for Social Affairs. One of its first initiatives was to conduct a survey among Tunisian 
consulates on clandestine migrants, in particular those missing or dead who fled during the crisis. Newly 
elected political parties, moreover, are in favour of greater political participation seats in the Parliament for 
Tunisians abroad, and some parties have strengthened their engagement with expatriates (e.g., Ettakattol 
by opening an agency for Tunisians abroad to invest in Tunisia, located in Paris; and Ennahda, by creating 
cultural programmes for reviving the Arab and Muslim identity of Tunisians abroad
 multiplying options and routes for legal emigration with immigration countries 
(e.g. Italy and France); transcending a security-based perspective in the management of irregular 
emigration; and seeking to ensure the better integration of Tunisian citizens living in European countries.  
9). Civil society also 
generated new organisations - e.g., the Haut Conseil des Tunisiens à l’étranger - to sustain links with 
Tunisian expatriates and to ensure that the new government takes into consideration the demands and 
aspirations of its citizens abroad.10
Notwithstanding governmental efforts to manage legal emigration and reform Tunisian legislation along 
these lines, there has been an upsurge in irregular emigration flows from Tunisia as well as efforts to 
control such migration. Following the Tunisian uprisings in 2011, cooperation between Tunisia and the EU, 
and particularly Italy, regarding irregular migration increased as thousands of Tunisians reached Italian 
shores. The EU has offered Tunisia a Mobility Partnership, which would include readmission of irregular 
migrants, and Italy has worked with Tunisia on strengthening Tunisia’s coastal patrols. Civil-society actors 
have consequently called for the balanced and human-centred governance of clandestine emigration, and 
many associations have highlighted the need to map out the real causes underlying the phenomenon.
 
11
Following the outbreak of violence in Libya, Tunisia opened the Shousha refugee camp to accommodate 
those fleeing the Libyan border into Tunisia. The country has also recently agreed to work with Algeria and 
Libya in enhancing security in the border areas between the countries in order to secure borders, fight 
illegal immigration, and other crimes following the deterioration of security in the wake of the revolutions.  
  
 
                                                          
 8 See Abdelrazak Bel Hadj Zekri, « La dimension politique de la migration irrégulière en Tunisie », CARIM Analytical 
Note 2008/53, p. 8, r etrieved from 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/10098/CARIM_AS%26N_2008_53.pdf?sequence=1.  
9 Boubakri, H. (2013). Revolution and International Migration in Tunisia. Migration Policy Centre – European 
University Institute. Retrieved from http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/MPC-RR-2013-04.pdf  
10 See for example, Le Haut Conseil des Tunisiens à l'Etranger webstie at http://www.atf-federation.org/article-le-
haut-conseil-des-tunisiens-a-l-etranger-hcte-108679034.html  
11 See for example the speech hosted by the Tunisian League of Human Rights Defence at the migration forum 
organised by Social Watch in Rome, 2004 quoted in Zekri, « La dimension politique de la migration irrégulière 
en Tunisie », p. 16.  
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12 Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Tunisian-Italian talks on migration. Retrieved from 
http://www.diplomatie.gov.tn/index.php?id=27&L=2&tx_ttnews[backPid]=27&tx_ttnews[pointer]=2&tx_ttnews[tt_ne
ws]=1216&cHash=555b01c752f35c5f513ebba4bbccc219  
13 Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Priority co-operation fields, focus of Tunisian-Libyan working session. 
Retrieved from  
http://www.diplomatie.gov.tn/index.php?id=27&L=2&tx_ttnews[backPid]=27&tx_ttnews[pointer]=12&tx_ttnews[tt_n
ews]=605&cHash=528bb871d5bf29394505cc7516888ca4  
14United States Department of State. (2012). Trafficking in Persons Report 2012. Retrieved from 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/192598.pdf  
Socio-Political 
Framework Outward migration Inward migration 
Governmental 
Institutions 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Ministry of Social Affairs, Solidarity 
and Tunisians Abroad 
Secretary of State for Tunisian 
Expatriates  
Ministry of Labour 
Ministry of Interior 
Ministry of Labour 
Ministry of Social Affairs, Solidarity and 
Tunisians Abroad  
Ministry of Women’s Affairs 
Governmental 
Strategy 
Develop Diaspora links: develop 
national policies to support the 
Tunisian Diaspora; promulgate 
legislation encouraging remittances 
and investments; carry out a census of 
Tunisian professionals abroad 
(repertory of Tunisian professionals 
abroad); benefit from Tunisian potential 
abroad in higher education and 
research; develop a strategy for 
disseminating information to the 
Tunisian Diaspora communities; 
elaborate a cultural program 
consolidating the attachment of 
Tunisian emigrants and their families to 
the homeland; launch negotiations with 
destination countries on entry and 
residence conditions for Tunisian 
emigrants. 
Encourage and regulate the 
recruitment of Tunisian nationals 
abroad by launching negotiations and 
devise bilateral accords (e.g., with 
Italy12 and discussions on employment 
with Libya13); and conduct 
investigations and background checks 
of recruitment agencies operating in 
Tunisia and ensure recruitment 
agencies sign contracts with the 
Ministry of Employment before they 
can recruit workers to work in Gulf 
countries.14
 
 
Set up rules concerning the entry and 
residence of foreign nationals. 
Develop government policies on 
economic immigration and recruitment 
procedures for economic migrants.  
Curbing irregular immigration, transit 
migration, and trans-border crime (e.g., 
working with neighbouring countries – 
especially Algeria and Libya - regarding 
border controls to decrease irregular 
migration and trans-border crime).  
Organise migratory flows in the 
Maghreb region by establishing 
frameworks and/or bilateral and regional 
agreements so as to better. 
Assist vulnerable migrant categories by 
developing cooperative mechanisms with 
international organisations such as 
UNHCR and foreign governments; create 
refugee camp for those fleeing the Libyan 
crisis, and work with international 
organisations towards their resettlement to 
third countries.  
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15 Opening remarks by Khalil Amiri Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State for Immigration and Tunisians Abroad. 
(February 2012). Conference on Cooperation to prevent trafficking of Human Beings in the Mediterranean 
Region. Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/cthb/99726  
16 In April 2008, France and Tunisia signed an agreement on the concerted governance of migration and solidarity 
development. See CARIM’s socio-political database.  
Dissuade Tunisians from 
irregular emigration by multiplying 
information and awareness raising 
campaigns (e.g., campaigns in the 
primary school curriculum to dissuade 
teenagers and young adults from illegal 
emigration and potentially becoming 
victims of trafficking, and IOM backed 
human trafficking awareness campaign 
in refugee camps);15
Tackle migration governance in 
the context of political dialogue 
frameworks (5+5 dialogue); establish 
bilateral and multilateral agreements in 
such a way as to organise legal 
emigration flows to European countries 
(particularly Italy and France)
 and reform 
Tunisian legislation and policies in 
order to contain irregular emigration. 
16; 
cooperate with the International 
Organisation of Migration (IOM) in 
order to favour the integration of 
Tunisian nationals abroad or to 
facilitate their return (professional 
reintegration). 
Civil Society  Initiatives in the associative sector 
aimed at:  
− Promoting and defending the rights 
of Tunisian nationals abroad (e.g., 
CETUMA - Centre de Tunis pour la 
Migration et l'Asile; and Haut Conseil 
des Tunisiens à l’étranger ); The 
Tunisian Association for the Defense 
of Tunisians abroad (ADTE); the 
Trade Union for Arab Maghreb 
Workers (USTMA); Union for 
Tunisian Immigrant Workers (UTIT), 
the Tunisians’ Federation for a Two-
shore Citizenship (Fédération des 
Tunisiens pour une Citoyenneté des 
Deux Rives, FRCR)  
− Finding the underlying causes of 
irregular emigration and promoting 
an understanding of irregular 
emigration based on human and not 
solely security considerations;  
− Consolidating Tunisian expatriates’ 
contributions to local development.  
Initiatives of migrant associations, 
professional and student Diaspora 
networks for reinforcing links among 
Tunisian Diaspora communities (e.g. 
ATUGE) 
Civil-society networks and initiatives 
aimed at:  
− Sensitising institutions and structures to 
migrants’ rights (e.g. the Tunisian 
League of Human Rights (LTDH); the 
Tunisian Association of Female 
Democrats (ATFD) 
− Improving the socio-economic and 
cultural rights of vulnerable immigrant 
categories (e.g. the General Union for 
Workers in Tunisia (UGTT), the Tunisian 
Red Crescent; CARITAS). 
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International 
Cooperation 
Tunisia is a member of several international organisations in which it actively works 
to address issues of migration, including: International Organization for Migration 
(IOM); International Labour Organization (ILO); UNHCR; Arab League; and 
Organization for African Union (OAU), among others. Tunisia is a participant to the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Tunisia is a member of the Union for the 
Mediterranean (a multilateral partnership within the European Neighbourhood Policy) 
and participates in the 5 + 5 Dialogue.  
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The Demographic-Economic Framework of Migration  
In the last decades, emigration from Turkey has diversified with the movement of family members of labour 
migrants to Europe, with asylum flows in the 1980s and 1990s and with movements of professionals and 
students. Destinations also diversified as people moved from Turkey to the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) and especially after the dissolution of the USSR, to the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) countries. Emigration increasingly becomes an issue of transnational diaspora communities. For the 
first time in 2010, fifty years past the beginning of extensive migration from Turkey to Europe, the number of 
migrants to Turkey exceeds that of the number of migrants from Turkey. Added to this is an increase in the 
number of returnees.1
                                                          
1 Içduygu, A. 2010. International Migration and Turkey, 2010 OECD SOPEMI Report, Istanbul.  
 Turkey’s former role as a “migrant-sending country” is now supplemented with the 
role of a “migrant-receiving country”. International migratory movements to Turkey since the end of 1970s 
have included the migration of transit migrants, irregular migrant workers (mostly from the former USSR 
and Eastern European countries), asylum-seekers and refugees (from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and various 
other Asian and African countries). The migration of professionals and retirees are also taking place. In 
sum, a migratory transition has taken place in Turkey in the last decades. Turkey, in addition to its role as a 
country of emigration and “transit” has increasingly become a country of immigration. The factual transition 
in migration is accompanied by discursive and policy developments that take place on a terrain wrought 
with tension between nationalist legacies, that is, the politics of the past and current worldviews based on 
globalism, transnationalism, and EU-zation. As such, the Turkish state steadily adopts itself to the role the 
country plays in emigration and immigration in a globalized world. 
2 See various issues of the OECD SOPEMI Reports for Turkey prepared by A. İçduygu since 2000. 
Outward migration Inward migration 
Stock 
In 2005, an estimated 3 million Turkish citizens were 
living in Europe, approximately 105,000 Turkish 
workers in the Middle East countries and 75,000 
workers in the CIS states.2
Turkish Migrant Stock Abroad in 1995, 2005 and 2010 
 Some 350,000 Turkish 
citizens were reported in other countries such as 
Australia, Canada and the USA. The total number of 
expatriates equalled 3.3 million (which excludes the 
number of emigrants from Turkey who were 
naturalized in receiving countries). This number 
implies 5% of the nation’s total population living 
outside of Turkey. By 2010, the number has 
increased to 3.7 million, while the migrant stock in 
Germany has decreased over the years. 
 1995 2005 2010 
 # (x 1000) % # (x 1000) % # (x 1000) % 
Germany 
2 049.9 62.0 1 912.0 57.9 1 629.4 43.2 
Total 
Europe 2 841.3 85.9 2 714.3 82.1 3 052.1 81.0 
The ME 
Countries 127.0 3.8 105.0 3.2 162.6 4.3 
Australia 
45.0 1.4 60.0 1.8 71.0 1.8 
CIS 
Countries 50.0 1.4 75.0 2.3 104.9 2.7 
Other 
Countries 245.0 7.4 350.0 10.6 375.5 9.9 
Total 3 308.3 100 3 304.3 100 3 765.1 100 
Source: Figures are compiled from various files of the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security. 
Stock 
The most recent reliable data on the foreign-born 
population in Turkey is taken from the 2000 Census; 
data was disseminated by the State Institute of 
Statistics in 2002. According to the Census, 
1,278,671 foreign-born persons were in Turkey in 
2000 which is less than 2% of the Turkish 
population. First five foreign-born groups were 
Bulgarian-, German-, Greek-, Macedonian- and 
Romanian-born.  
Turkey- and Foreign country-born Population in Turkey 
Place of 
Birth 
Male Female Total 
Turkey 33 732 479 32 793 638 66 525 256 
Outside 
Turkey – 
Total 
614 256 663 554 1 278 671 
Bulgaria 228 363 252 454 480 817 
Germany 132 937 140 598 273 535 
Greece 26 967 32 250 59 217 
Romania 8 330 12 356 20 736 
Total 34 346 735 33 457 192 67 803 927 
Source: ‘2000 Census of Population Social and Economic 
Characteristics of Population’, State Institute of Statistics (SIS) 
Printing Division, Ankara, March 2003. 
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3 Akçapar, Şebnem (2009). “Turkish Brain Drain to the USA”, in İçduygu, A and Kirişçi, K. Lands of Diverse Migration, 
Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Yayınları pp.109-248. 
Emigration and the Labour Market  
The proportion of Turkish migrant labourers abroad 
has steadily increased from the mid-1970s to the 
mid-2000s. 5-6% of the total Turkish labour force 
has been employed abroad in the last three 
decades. The nature of emigration has changed 
over the decades. While emigrant labour mostly 
consisted of unskilled workers in the 1960s and 
1970s, in the last two decades, emigrant labour 
has become highly qualified, university trained and 
internationally oriented. Indirect evidence of this 
change is derived from a number of statistics.3
Remittances have become an important 
element of the Turkish economy. In the 1980s, 
remittances helped cover, on average, 50% of the 
balance of trade deficits and 35% in the 1990s. As 
Turkey integrated with the world economy, the 
relative size of remittances declined. The decline 
could be related to the fact that more Turkish 
migrants are becoming permanent settlers in 
countries abroad. Significant increases were 
observed in the amount of remittances in 2006 
followed by a considerable decline in 2009. 
Remittances equalled US$ 1 million in 2011, 
indicating a rise. The revenue from the “suitcase 
trade” of migrants, especially from former 
communist countries, is significantly higher when 
compared to the total remittance income in Turkey. 
In 1996-2003, the amount gained from the former 
was always higher. The revenues from the 
“suitcase trade” were nearly US$ 3.5 billion in 2005 
and US$6.0 billion in 2007. Remittances as a 
percentage of the “suitcase trade” declined at a 
rapid pace but fluctuated from 154.7% in 2000 to 
18.4% in 2003, 23% in 2008, and 16.7% in 2010 
and finally increase to 23.6% in 2011. 
  
Export, Workers’ Remittances and Luggage Trade 
Revenues (million US$), and Share of Worker’s 
Remittances in Exports and Luggage Trade 
Year Export Luggage trade 
Workers’ 
remittances 
As a % of 
exports 
As a % of 
luggage 
trade 
2001 31 334 3 039 2 786 8.9 91.3 
2003 47 253 3 953 729 1.5 18.4 
2006 85 535 6 408 1 111 1.3 17.3 
2009 102 128 4 783 934 0.9 19.5 
2010 113 889 4 951 829 0.7 16.7 
2011 132 027 4 424 1 045 0.7 23.6 
Source: http:// hazine.gov.tr/yayinhazineistatistikleri/6-1-Dev.xls May 
10, 2004; Central Bank of Turkey (2011). 
Residence permits (issued by the General 
Directorate of Security) are an indirect source of stock 
data. Foreign nationals who hold a residence permit 
are registered to the System of Address-based 
Population Register run by the Ministry of Interior. 
The table below shows the number of non-nationals 
who were living in Turkey for one year or more. In 
2011, there were 241,128 foreign nationals registered 
in the system, their ratio to the total population was 
0,32%. 
The Number of Foreign Nationals with Residence Permits 
and Their Ratio to the Total Population 
Years Total Population Non-nationals 
Ratio of Non-
nationals to the Total 
Population 
2007 70 586 256 272 803 0,14 
2008 71 517 100 104 441 0,15 
2009 72 561 312 167 344 0,23 
2010 73 722 988 190 531 0,26 
2011 74 724 269 242 128 0,32 
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) based on data 
compiled from the Ministry of Interior (The System of Address-
based Population Register) 
Immigration and the Labour Market 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security provides work 
permit data since 2003. Most recent statistics reveal 
a striking jump in numbers from 2003 to 2004. The 
numbers of issued work permits continued to 
increase with some fluctuations in 2011, and 
reached nearly 17,000. In 2011, almost 67% of total 
issues work permits were granted for a definite time, 
while 30% were extensions of previous permits. The 
use of illegal migrant labour is rapidly increasing in 
Turkey. Domestic work and employment sectors are 
the largest employers of illegal migrant female 
workers while construction and agriculture sectors 
employ large number of illegal migrant male 
workers. A rough estimate of 20,000-40,000 foreign 
workers is illegally employed in Turkey. 
Number of Work Permits Issued to Foreign Nationals by 
Types of Permission and Years 
Years Definite Extension Indefinite Independent Total 
2003 509 295 50 1 855 
2005 5484 3764 159 31 9438 
2007 5816 3007 96 11 8930 
2008 6999 3583 107 16 10705 
2009 9238 4693 83 9 14023 
2010 9338 4760 101 2 14201 
2011 11634 5073 161 22 16890 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Security 
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4 Emigration estimates are derived from Ministry of Labour and Social Security, the Ministry of Interior, OECD 
SOPEMI, Eurostat, UNHCR, UNFPA, and country-specific reports and documents.  
5 İçduygu, A. 2012. Turkey and International Migration, 2011 OECD SOPEMI Report, Istanbul. 
6 Içduygu, A. 2012. Turkey and International Migration, 2011 OECD SOPEMI Report, Istanbul. 
10 Içduygu, A. 2012. Turkey and International Migration, 2011 OECD SOPEMI Report, Istanbul. 
Flow  
In Turkey, the lack of direct and reliable data 
sources concerning total emigration and 
immigration flows has to be noted. Variety of 
sources needs to be consulted for a general picture 
of overall emigration.4 Emigration has, in recent 
decades, taken on five forms: family-related 
emigration, asylum seeking, irregular 
(undocumented or clandestine) labour emigration, 
contract-related (low-skilled) labour emigration, and 
emigration of professionals and high-skilled 
people.5
Contract-dependent labour migration 
constitutes the largest part of Turkish emigration. 
In 2000, 13,645 workers obtained employment via 
the Turkish Employment Office (TEO). The 
numbers reached 81,000 in 2006, dropped to 
57,000 in 2008 and continued to fall until 2011 In 
2009, nearly 60,000 workers were sent abroad via 
contract-based schemes. The share of workers 
sent to MENA countries increased in 2009 and 
while a visible decline was noted in the outflows to 
CIS countries. In 2011, the number of Turkish 
workers sent to the Middle East dropped while 
those sent to CIS countries increased. Major 
political determinants of migration-related practices 
and policies in Turkey in this period are associated 
with the Arab Spring.
  
6
Number of Workers Sent Abroad by the Turkish 
Employment Office (TEO) 
 In 2011, the top five 
destination countries of workers from Turkey were 
Iraq, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan and 
Qatar.  
Receiving 
country 2000 2006 2009 2010 2011 
European 
Union 
countries 
2 264 1 330 1 637 1 323 1619 
The ME 
countries 2 507 39 823 32 546 33 993 28 331 
CIS 7 145 36 898 17 264 14 307 18 235 
Australia, 
Canada, 
USA 
51 59 97 27 21 
Israel 1 322 602 541 401 50 
Other 273 2 635 5 628 4 718 5 526 
Total 13 645 81 379 59 479 54 847 53 828 
Source: Turkish Employment Office (TEO), http://iskur.gov.tr, 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security. 
 
 
Flow  
Until recently, immigration to Turkey was constituted 
exclusively by an ethnically Turkish population. In 
recent decades, however, Turkey has experienced 
the immigration of transit migrants, clandestine 
labourers, asylum-seekers and refugees. The influx 
of foreign nationals mostly from bordering and 
neighbouring countries has continued to increase. 
Added to this are the more recent legal migrations of 
professionals and skilled migrants and the ongoing 
immigration of foreign-national ethnic-Turks living in 
other countries.10
Total Number of Arrivals and Departures of Non-nationals 
by Year 
 Arrival and departure statistics 
provide a basis for estimating people’s mobility in 
and out of Turkey. From 2006 to 2011, the number 
of non-nationals arriving in Turkey (one third from 
neighbouring regions, the Middle East, EU and CIS 
countries) increased to over 52%. Arrivals from CIS 
countries were markedly higher in 2010 and 2011. 
 Arrivals Departures 
2001 11 619 909 11 276 531 
2005 21 124 886 20 522 621 
2009 27 077 114 27 347 977 
2010 28 632 204 28 510 852 
2011 29 956 591 31 324 528  
Source: Turkish Statistics Institute (TURKSTAT). 
Main types of inflows are the migration of 
ethnic-Turks in the form of asylum, transit migration 
flows, illegal labour migration and registered 
migration of non-nationals (first three types often 
overlap).  
Indicative Number of Migration to Turkey 
  2001 2003 2006 2009 2010 2011 
Undocumented  
Migration 92 400 56 200 51 983 34 345 32 667 42 576 
Illegal entries 57 300 30 348 18 876 22 975 25 637 30 700 
Overstays 35 100 25 852 33 107 11 370 7 030 11 876 
Asylum application 5 200 3 966 4 548 7 834 9 226 16 020 
Residence Permit 161254 152203 186586 163326 176944 219. 217 
Source: UNHCR Ankara Office (2000-2011), Bureau of Foreigners, 
Borders and Asylum at the Directorate of General Security of the 
Ministry of Interior 
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7 İçduygu, A. 2012. Turkey and International Migration, 2011 OECD SOPEMI Report, Istanbul. 
8 UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, available online at http://www.unhrc.ch. 
9 Figures obtained from the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) 
There has also been a considerable outflow of 
university graduates and skilled labour 
(computer sciences, finance, and management) of 
4000-5000 individuals annually in the late 2000s. 
The main destination countries are Australia, 
Canada, the USA and some European countries.  
Family-related migration continues due to 
active networks between the sizeable migrant 
Turkish community in migrant-receiving countries 
and their families in Turkey. A rough estimate 
derived from the number of arrivals of Turkish 
citizens in migrant-receiving countries shows an 
annual number of 100,000 emigrants leaving 
Turkey in the mid-1990s (nearly half due to family 
ties). After the mid-1990s a considerable decline 
took place in the total number of emigrants to 
Europe, with numbers falling to less than 50,000 
per year in the early 2000s and nearly one third 
are family-related flows.7
UNHCR data shows the annual flows of 
asylum-seekers from Turkey to Europe to be 
around 28,000 in 2000 steadily decreasing in the 
last 10 years.
  
8
Irregular labour migration includes “illegal 
entries”, “overstayers” and “rejected asylum-
seekers”, thus estimating is difficult. In 2008-2009, 
the number of Turkish citizens arriving in Central 
and Eastern European countries as irregular 
migrants declined to around 1,000 annually. As of 
2004, the number of apprehended Turkish 
irregular migrants in Central and Eastern Europe 
was 2,350. This figure dropped to 1,400 in 2008.
 Turkey generates asylum-seekers 
to Europe directly, or indirectly as a transit country.  
9
 
  
In 2001, over 258,000 foreign nationals were 
recorded as migrants in Turkey. Less than two-thirds 
were legal immigrants, and 92,000 irregular and/or 
transit migrants. 2009 figures show 205,500 
regular/irregular migrants and asylum-seekers. An 
indirect measure of regular immigration to Turkey is 
the number of residence permits issued by the 
Directorate of General Security. In 2009, there were 
over 118,000 foreign nationals and 163,326 non-
nationals holding residence permits. 17,483 were 
those with work permits, 27,063 with study permits, 
and the remainder were dependants of the former 
two groups. In 2011, the number jumped to 273,000 
due to a marked increase in residence permit figures 
(220,000 regular migrants with residence permit). Top 
ten source countries of non-nationals with residence 
permits are Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, Russian Federation, 
Germany, United Kingdom, Iraq, Kazakhstan, 
Afghanistan, Iran and Greece. The vast majority of 
the remaining residence permits were issued to 
ethnic-Turk foreign nationals. Other groups are high-
skilled workers employed in Turkish companies or 
foreign investment projects located in Turkey. 
Number of First-time Issued Resident Permits* 
CITIZENSHIP 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TOTAL 19300 20821 22470 29905 
AFGHANISTAN 935 772 1008 2188 
IRAQ  902 1802 462 1165 
KAZAKHSTAN  855 687 1642 1365 
RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION  1351 1051 1412 1778 
TURKMENISTAN  340 602 1211 1186 
*Issued to foreign nationals who intend to stay 12 months and 
longer in Turkey 
Source : TurkStat, based on data compiled by the Ministry of 
Interior, General Directorate of Security  
Turkey has become a major country of 
asylum since the 1980s. From late 1990s to the 
early 2000s, Turkey received approximately 5000-
6000 asylum applications a year. The number 
reached 16,000 in 2011 leading UNHCR to 
announce Turkey as among the top five asylum-
receiving countries in the world. Mass migration 
from Syria triggered by the uprisings and the civil 
war, started in spring 2011, has made of Turkey the 
third largest receiver of Syrian refugees after 
Lebanon and Jordan.  
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11 UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal (data retrieved on 29 Apr 
2013), http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php 
At the time of writing (26 April 2013) UNHCR 
estimated that Turkey is sheltering some 313,872 
Syrian refugees, or 280,687 registered refugees 
and 33,185 persons awaiting registration, living 
both in camps and in normal neighbourhoods.11
Irregular migration flows consist of the flows of 
clandestine workers, transit migrants, and rejected 
asylum-seekers. Clandestine workers are mostly 
foreign nationals from Eastern European countries 
(Moldova, Ukraine, Romania and CIS countries) in 
search of employment in various economic sectors 
that rely on cheap labour such as textile making, 
sex, entertainment and construction. Upper and 
middle-class families employ female domestic 
helpers as babysitters and carers for the sick and 
elderly. Most enter Turkey legally with a visa and 
overstay, thus becoming illegal in the country. 
Transit migrants mostly come from the Middle East 
(Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan) and from Asia and 
Africa (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, 
Somalia and Congo). Rejected asylum-seekers, 
who are reluctant to go home, are illegally employed 
in Turkey. There is no direct, reliable data on 
undocumented migration aside from some indicative 
numbers available from the reports of the Bureau of 
Foreigners, Borders, and Asylum at the Directorate 
of General Security of the Ministry of Interior. In 
2000, there were 95,000 reported cases and the 
numbers are steadily declining.  
 
The Turkish government estimates the number of 
Syrians in Turkey at 400,000 as a result of the 
war in Syria. 
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The Legal Framework of Migration 
Turkish migration law is currently governed by a series of codes such as the Passport Law and the Law on 
Residence and Travel of Aliens in Turkey, which date back to the 1950s. This system lacked coherence, 
institutional capacity and human rights safeguards. These were all necessary for Turkey, given that the 
country has recently become the most prominent transit point for migration in the Euro-Mediterranean 
zone.12 The Turkish authorities have been under pressure from the European Union as well as the Council 
of Europe to reform its migration and asylum regime. Although, the Government had earlier undertaken to 
adopt laws on foreigners and asylum before 2006,13 such plans were, however, delayed until 2013, due to 
burden-sharing concerns on the Turkish side. The conclusion of a readmission agreement between Turkey 
and the Union, which was set as a condition for full membership by the European Union14, also resulted in 
a deadlock between the parties due to the same concern.15 Turkey fears that accepting these kinds of legal 
commitments might result in a huge burden of irregular migrants from Africa and Asia for itself.16 Despite 
this fact, the Government negotiated and initialled the text of a draft readmission agreement with the Union 
in June 2012, on condition of visa liberalization for Turkish citizens at EU borders.17 Turkey requested a 
roadmap for visa liberalization before putting the readmission agreement into force. The Commission 
finalized the drafting of the said road map in December 2012 and delivered it to the Turkish Government. 
The Government however, found the conditions such as would require the modification of “its entire asylum 
system”, “[changing] its visa system towards non-EU countries” and “ratification of the additional Protocols 
of the European Convention on Human Rights to which not even all EU Member States are party”. The 
Turkish state judged these unacceptable18 and insisted that the implementation of the readmission 
agreement and visa exemption should be simultaneous.19 No further steps could be taken for putting the 
said agreement into force in this political environment. On the other hand, there has been ample 
improvement with regard to replacing the out dated Turkish migration and asylum legislation. A bureau was 
commissioned, 15 October 2008, in order to work on drafting laws on asylum and migration under the 
supervision of the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior.20
                                                          
12 Tineke Strik, ‘Migration and asylum: mounting tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean’, Report Presented to the 
Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe, 23 January 2013, 
 The Law on Foreigners and International 
Protection (Law No. 6458) was adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 4 April, 2013, and 
published in the Official Gazette, 11 April, 2013, upon approval of the President. The Law is going to cause 
fundamental changes in the practice of Turkish migration and asylum law as it repeals the provisions of the 
Law on Residence and Travel of Aliens in Turkey (Law No. 5683) entirely and the Passport Law (Law No. 
5682) partially. In this regard, an entirely new entry and residence regime is going to be established for 
foreign nationals in Turkey. In addition to these changes, the Law contains a comprehensive section on 
international protection, which is going to change the existing Turkish international protection regime 
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewPDF.asp?FileID=19349&Language=en 
13 Council of Ministers Decree on the National Program For Acquiring EU Acquis, Bakanlar Kurulu Kararı (Resmi 
Gazete Tarihi: 24 Temmuz 2003 Sayısı: 25178 Mükerrer ) Karar Sayısı : 2003/5930 
14 See Council Decision 2001/235/EC, 8 March 2001, on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and 
conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey, [OJ L 85/13], 24.03.2001; Council 
Decision 2003/398/EC of 19 May 2003 on the Principles, Priorities, Intermediate Objectives and Conditions in the 
Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey, [OJ L145], 12.06.2003.; Council Decision 2008/157/EC, 18 
February 2008 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the 
Republic of Turkey [OJ L51], 26.02.2008.  
15 Lami Bertan Tokuzlu, ‘Burden--‐sharing Games for Asylum Seekers between Turkey and the European Union’, 
2010, EUI Working Papers: RSCAS 2010/05, European University Institute, Florence, pp. 15-16. 
16 See Tokuzlu, passim. 
17 Statement by EU Commissioner Cecilia Malmström on the initialling of the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement, 21 
June, 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-477_en.htm [access date: 28 May, 2013]; See also 
Cutting the Visa Knot How Turks can travel freely to Europe, European Stability Initiative, 21 May, 2013, p. 5. 
http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=139 [access date: 25.05.2013]  
18 Cutting the Visa Knot How Turks can travel freely to Europe, op. cit., p. 5. 
19 Statement by Egemen Bagis, 50th session of the Association Council, Brussels, 22 June 2012. http://www.europa-
nu.nl/id/vj0w4jq6s6zn/50th_meeting_of_the_eu_turkey [access date: 29.05.2013]. 
20 http://gib.icisleri.gov.tr/default_B0.aspx?content=1001 
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radically. Finally, a General Directorate of Migration Administration has been established under the Ministry 
of Interior. This is a civillian and expert body dealing with migration and international protection affairs. 
Article 125 of the Law provides that the provisions of the Law are going to come into force one year after 
the Law is published in the Official Gazette, except for Chapter Five which regulates the status of General 
Directorate of Migration Administration which came into force, instead, at the date of publication.21
                                                          
21 Articles 122, 124 and the 1st, 2nd., 5th and 7th paragraphs of Article 123 of Chapter Five are going to come into 
force one year after publication. 
 
22 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/visa-information-for-foreigners.en.mfa [access date: 19 April, 2013] 
23 See https://www.evisa.gov.tr/en/ [access date: 19 April, 2013] 
Legal 
Framework  
Outward migration Inward migration 
General Legal 
References 
• Law on Foreigners and International Protection, Law No. 6458 of 4 April, 2013, 
Official Gazette, No. 28615, dated 11 April, 2013. 
• Law on Work Permits for Aliens, Law No. 4817 of 27 Feb. 2003, Official Gazette No. 
25040 of 6 March 2003. 
• Passport Law, Law No. 5682 of 15.07.1950, Official Gazette No.7564 of 24.07.1950. 
• Law on Residence and Travel of Aliens in Turkey, Law No. 5683 of 15 July, 1950, 
Offical Gazette No. 7564 dated 24 July, 1950. 
• Settlement Law, Law No. 5543, 19 September, 2006, Official Gazette No. 26301, 
dated 26 September, 2006.  
• Turkish Citizenship Law, Law No 5901 of 29 May, 2009, Official Gazette 27256 
dated 12 June, 2009. 
• Law on the Establishment and Duties of the Directorate on Turks and Relative 
Communities Living Abroad, Law No. 5978 of 24 March 2010, published in the 
Official Gazette No. 27544, dated 6 April, 2010. 
Entry and Exit Visa 
Article 7 of Law No. 5682 provides that 
no exit visa is required in order to leave 
Turkey. On the other hand, holders of 
those passports granted to foreign 
nationals by Turkish authorities are 
subject to an exit visa in the event that 
such passport is not used to leave 
Turkish territory within one month of the 
date of issue.  
This Article is going to be repealed 
by Law No. 6458 on 11 April 2014, as it 
does not address exit visa requirement. 
Visa 
Citizens of the Republic of Turkey are not 
subject to any visa requirement in order to 
return to Turkey according to the Article 5 of 
the Law No. 5682.  
Under the current law, there are three 
types of regimes for visits, up to 90 days, 
which are generally regulated by bilateral 
treaties. The type of treatment varies from 
country to country and also according to the 
type of travel document held by the traveller.  
1. Article 5 of Law No 5682 stipulates that, 
unless otherwise provided, foreigners 
who are willing to come to Turkey shall 
obtain a visa at Turkish consulates 
before arriving in Turkish territory.  
2. The second option is to provide visa 
immunity to the citizens of a specific 
country.22
3. The third option is to provide the right to 
obtain a sticker visa at the border gates 
or an e-visa, which has recently been 
endorsed.
  
23
The Law No. 6458 is going to repeal 
Articles 4 (Foreign nationals who arrive 
without holding a passport or travel 
document), 6 (Visa immunity), 7 (Exit visa), 
8 (Persons who are prohibited to enter 
Turkey), 9 (Reciprocity principle), 10 
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24 Council of Ministers Decree 2003/5329, 26 February, 2003, Official Gazette dated 18 March, 2003. 
25 See Case of Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey (Application no. 30471/08) Judgment 22 September 2009; Case 
of Charahili v. Turkey (Application no. 46605/07) Judgment 13 April 2010; Case of Keshmiri v. Turkey (Application 
no. 36370/08) Judgment 13 April 2010; Case of M.B. and Others v. Turkey (Application no. 36009/08) Judgment 
15 June 2010; Case of Ranjbar and Others v. Turkey (Application no. 37040/07) J Judgment 13 April 2010; Case 
of Tehrani and Others v. Turkey (Applications nos. 32940/08, 41626/08, 43616/08) Judgment 13 April 2010; Cae 
of Z.N.S. v. Turkey (Application no. 21896/08) Judgment 19 January 2010; Case of Ahmadpour v. Turkey 
(Application no. 12717/08) Judgment 15 June 2010; Case of Alipour and Hosseinzadgan v. Turkey (Applications 
nos. 6909/08, 12792/08 and 28960/08) Judgment 13 July 2010; Case of D.B. v. Turkey (Application no. 
33526/08) Judgment 13 July 2010. 
(Exceptional passport and visa facilitation) 
and 11 (Exceptional measures in cases of 
war or emergency) of the Passport Law 
which relate to the visa regime. Article 13 of 
the new law is among several noteworthy 
amendments as it is going to confine the 
term of the sticker visa to 15 days, which 
may be extended by the Council of 
Ministers. In this regard, the law is going to 
bring a more restrictive approach compared 
to the current practice that allows a right to 
stay of between one and three months. 
Despite that, amendments relating to the 
visa regime are comparably less important 
than the ones under some other areas, such 
as the residence permits. As with the current 
system, the visa regime is going to be 
administered by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs outside of Turkey (Turkish 
Consulates) and the Ministry of Interior 
within or at the borders of Turkey. The new 
Law allows Turkey to continue with its 
current flexible visa regime, which has been 
subject to criticism by the European Union 
as it does not require visas from countries 
for which the EU requires visas. 
Irregular 
Migration 
Irregular exit:  
Turkey is party to the Protocol Against 
the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea 
and Air, Supplementing the United 
Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime24
Article 79 of the Turkish Penal Code 
(Law No:5237) which came into force, 1 
June, 2005, and which defines migrant 
smuggling including irregular exit. This 
article stipulates penalties of 3 to 8 
years of imprisonment and judicial fines 
corresponding to 10000 days for those 
who commit the crime of migrant 
smuggling. If perpetrators acting as an 
organization commit the crime, the 
penalty to be imposed shall be 
increased by half. Article 79 also 
provides for coercive measures 
(confiscation of assets, etc.) on legal 
entities involved in migrant smuggling. 
 
Irregular entry:  
Article 79 of the Turkish Penal Code, which 
penalizes migrant smuggling, also applies to 
irregular entry.  
Article 34 of the Law No. 5682 stipulates a 
specific fine for Turkish nationals and foreign 
nationals who enter Turkish territory illegally. 
These persons shall be fined between 1000 
to 3000TL. The Article further indicates that 
those foreigners who get apprehended as 
such shall be deported. Although the second 
sentence of the Article is going to be repealed 
by Law No. 6458, the new law also lists 
violation of the entry rules among deportation 
grounds in its Article 54(h). The new law is 
going to bring a comprehensive 
administrative detention mechanism for 
deportation purposes under which detention 
and deportation decisions can be challenged 
by the judiciary. In the past, Turkey faced a 
number of violation orders by the European 
Court of Human Rights for lack of proper 
legal framework in this respect.25  
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According to Article 33 of the Law 
No. 5682, those who exit or attempt to 
exit Turkish territory without a valid 
passport or any other travel document, 
shall be fined 1000 to 3000TL. This 
article however, is going to be repealed 
by Law No. 6458. The new Law does 
not contain a penalty correllating to this 
one, but lists violation of the exit rules, 
among the deportation grounds in its 
Article 54(h). 
Article 36 of the Law No. 5682 
stipulates a crime for drivers or pilots of 
land, sea, air vehicles who deliberately 
carry passengers to places other than 
those determined for document control. 
These persons shall be penalised with 1 
month to 2 years imprisonment. This 
Article, however, is going to be repealed 
by Law No. 5682. No correllating 
penalty exits in the new law. 
Deportation orders may be rendered by 
the Provincial Directorates ex officio or by a 
directive of the General Directorate of 
Migration Administation.  
The person who is handed a deportation 
order may challenge this order at the 
Administrative Courts within 15 days. The 
decision of the first instance Administrative 
Court is final.  
According to the second paragraph of 
Article 57 of the Law, those foreign nationals 
who are subject to a deportation measure, 
shall be detained by the Provincial Directorate 
if: there is a risk of evasion or getting lost; or 
the person concerned violates entry or exit 
rules; uses forged documents; does not leave 
Turkish territory witinin the provided time limit 
despite not having an acceptible excuse; 
poses a threat to public order, public security 
and public health. Detention measures will be 
enforced at Deportation Centers. The 
Detention period shall not exceed six months, 
subject to monthly perodic review, except for 
those cases where the procedure cannot be 
completed due to lack of cooperation of the 
person with the authorities or to provide 
correct information and documents 
concerning the country of origin. In this case, 
the detention measure can be extended for 
another six months. It is possible to challenge 
the detention order in the Criminal Courts.  
Human Trafficking 
Penalisations:  
− Turkey is a party to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime and its additional Protocol on Trafficking in Human Beings.  
− Article 80 of the new Criminal Code which came into force, 1 June 2005, defines 
human trafficking as a crime and stipulates between 8 to 12 years of imprisonment 
and judicial fines up to 10,000 lira for those who commit human trafficking crime.  
− 19 December 2006 “forced into prostitution” was included in the description of crime 
of human trafficking in article 80 of Turkish Criminal Code. Thus, forced prostitution, 
the most important dimension of human trafficking, has become a crime punishable 
under this article.  
− The Ministry of Transportation adopted a Road Transport By-law in 2004 (published 
in the Official Gazette No. 25384, dated 25 February, 2004), which prohibits 
extension of transportation permits for three years if the carrier is sentenced for 
committing the crimes of human trafficking or human smuggling. 
Protection of victims  
− The current human trafficking protection regime lacks an effective legal background. 
The Turkish authorities, however, make use of their extensive discretionary powers 
in order to protect trafficking victims.  
− Humanitarian visa and short-term residence permits are going to be issued to victims 
in order to enable them to stay legally in Turkey during their rehabilitation period. 
The Ministry of Health adopted a decree in January 2004, in order to extend free 
medical care to victims of trafficking.  
− Protection of the victims of trafficking is not a focus of the Law on Foreigners and 
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26 See http://gib.icisleri.gov.tr/default_B0.aspx?id=177 [access date: 22 April, 2013] 
27 http://www.euractiv.com.tr/politika-000110/article/belarus-ile-vizeler-kalkiyor-027478 [access date: 22 April, 2013] 
International Protection, Law No. 6458 as another draft law is in the process of been 
prepared concerning the fight against human trafficking.26 Yet, there are noteworthy 
provisions in this law that concern the victims of human trafficking. Among these is 
the establishment of the Chamber for Protection of Human Trafficking Victims under 
the General Directorate of Migration Administration. Moreover, the General 
Directorate has been commissioned to establish and operate shelters for human 
trafficking victims under Article 108. Article 48 of the Law provides that Provincial 
Directorates shall grant 30 days of residence permit to foreigners who are strongly 
suspected to be victims of human trafficking in order to help them to release 
themselves from the effects of this experience and decide whether or not they intend 
to cooperate with the authorites. Obtaining this type of residence permit is immune 
from the conditions required for other residence permits. Article 49 further indicates 
that a human-trafficking victim’s residence permit may be extended by, six months 
intervals for safety, health and for the special circumstances of the victim. In no 
circumstances, however, may this period exceed three years in total. The residence 
permit in question shall be cancelled if the protected human trafficking victim keeps 
in contact with the perpetrators of the human trafficking crime on his/her own 
initiative. Article 55 contains a provision indicating that victims of human trafficking 
shall not be deported while they receive services under the victim support program. 
Finally, the Law stipulates that victims of human trafficking should be immune from 
residence permit fees. 
Agreements regarding irregular migration 
Readmission Agreements: 
− Ukraine, Council of Ministers Decree 2005/9535 of 17 October 2005, R.G. No. 
25996, 17.11.2005. 
− Greece, Council of Ministers Decree 2002/3914 of 12 March 2002, R.G. No. 24735, 
24.03.2002. 
− Syria, Law No. 4901 of 17 June 2003, R.G. No. 25148, 24.06.2003. 
− Kirghizstan, Law No. 5097 of 12 February 2004, R.G. No 25376, 17.02.2004. 
− Romania, Law No. 5249 of 21 October 2004, R.G. No. 25626, 27.11.2004. 
− Readmission agreements with the following countries are at the ratification stage: 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (2012), Moldova (2012), Nigeria (2011), Pakistan (2010), 
Russian Federation (2011),Yemen (2011), Belarus (2013) .27 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_nin-yasadisi-gocle-mucadelesi-.tr.mfa [access date: 20 
April, 2013] 
Rights and 
Settlement 
Right to exit 
Although no exit visa is required for 
Turkish citizens to leave Turkey, the right 
to exit has become a controversial issue 
under the Turkish Law due to the 
restrictions imposed under Articles 22, 
23 and 24 of the Law No. 5682. Article 
22 provides that no passport or travel 
document shall be granted to those 
persons prohibited to travel abroad by 
the courts or considered to be prejudicial 
to general safety by the Ministry of 
Interior. This Article used to contain an 
additional reference to tax evaders, 
without clarifying the amount and type of 
debt. Moreover, Article 15 of the Banks 
Act, Law No. 4389 contained a similar 
provision that broadened the scope of 
Right to return: Article 23 of the 
Constitution stipulates that no citizen may be 
deprived of the right to return to the country.  
Residence permits:  
A noteworthy aspect of Law No. 6458 is 
that it is going to change the decision making 
process with regard to the granting of 
residence permits. Under the current system, 
the responsibility for granting residence 
permits is granted to the Ministry of Interior. In 
this respect, residence permit applications 
shall be filed at this Ministry. This can be 
effected by coming to Turkey with a visa or 
under a visa immunity scheme. The new Law 
is going to reverse this system and require 
residence permit applications to be filed at the 
Turkish Consulates abroad. (Article 21). 
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28 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey, Judgment E. 2007/4, K. 2007/81, dated 18 October, 2007. Official 
Gazette No. 26724, dated 8 December, 2007. Original text of the Article had contained a further restriction 
ground, namely the “economic well-being of the Country”. This ground however, was deleted from Article 23 by 
the Constitutional Amendment dated 1 October 2001 by Law No. 4709 No. 24600 1 December, 2001. 
29 Law No. 5982, dated 7 May, 2010, Official Gazette No. 27580, dated 13 May, 2010. 
30 See Article 124 of Law No. 6458 on the acquis to be repealed. 
the prohibition above in order to cover 
legal representatives of entities which 
owed debts to a Savings and Insurance 
Fund (TMSF) established by law. These 
provisions were brought to the 
Constitutional Court by four different 
Courts based in Istanbul and Ankara. 
The Court quashed the rule concerning 
tax evasion on proportionality grounds 
and the later restriction on the grounds 
that it was contrary to Article 23 of the 
Constitution, on the right to travel, 
according to which such travel 
restrictions should have been imposed in 
the interests of a civic obligation, a 
criminal investigation or a prosecution.28 
This ruling of the Constitutional Court led 
to the amendment of Article 23 of the 
Constitution in 2010. According to the 
new article, the right of a Turkish citizen 
to travel abroad may only be restricted 
by a court ruling, on account of a criminal 
investigation or a prosecution.29
Article 23 of the Passport Law 
contains further restrictions on the right 
to travel abroad in cases of emergency. 
Accordingly, the Council of Ministers 
may impose partial or total bans on 
traveling abroad or permit issuance of 
passports or travel documents only 
covering certain countries, in the events 
of threat of war or emergency cases 
relating to the health or safety of the 
Country. Article 23 is also going to 
remain in force after Law No. 6458 
comes into force.  
 It 
appears that Article 22 of the Passport 
Law still conflicts with Article 23 of the 
Constitution, since the latter article does 
not allow any restrictions on the right to 
travel abroad, other than the ones 
imposed by a court order. The Passport 
Law, on the contrary, allows restrictions 
to be imposed by the Ministry of Interior 
on the basis of general safety. Law No. 
6458 has not solved this conflict, as it 
does not amend Article 22 of the 
Passport Law. 
On the other hand, the new law 
repeals Article 24 which allows certain 
restrictions on special passports or 
service passports30
 
.  
Consulates which receive such applications 
shall forward the files to the General 
Directorate of Migration Administration. The 
Directorate will then make a decision and 
forward it back to the Consulate in question. 
In this respect, contrary to the current system, 
no residence permit applications will be filed 
in Turkey except for cases listed numerus 
clausus in Article 22 of the Law. Accordingly, 
it is going to be possible to apply for a 
residence permit on Turkish territory, for 
instance, if “requested by judicial or 
administrative authorities”, “it is not 
reasonable or possible to expect the foreigner 
to leave Turkey”, “a long-term residence 
permit application is made” or “a person who 
has completed his/her higher education in 
Turkey applies for a short-term residence 
permit” etc. 
The new law stipulates the types of 
resdience permits as follows (Article 30): 
− short-term residence permit (one year 
max.; renewable); 
− family residence permit (two years 
max.; renewable); 
− student residence permit (enrolment 
period); 
− long-term residence permit (infinite); 
− humanitarian residence permit; (one 
year; renewable) 
− human-trafficking victim residence 
permit. (30 days; renewable in 6 
months intervals, up to 3 years) 
 
Short-term residence permit:  
Short-term residence permits may be 
granted, for instance, in the event of “real 
estate owners”, “to establish commercial 
partnerships or networks”, “visits for touristic 
purposes” etc. 
Family residence permit: 
The new law is going to fill an important gap 
under the Turkish law with regard to family re-
unification, since currently there are no rules 
governing this issue at the legislative level.  
According to Article 34, the foreigner’s 
spouse, his/her or spouse’s foreigner minor 
child, his/her or spouse’s foreigner 
dependent child of Turkish citizens; persons 
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who, having acquired Turkish citizenship by 
birth, had to resume it by permission; 
holders of one of the residence permit types; 
refugees and subsidiary protection status 
holders may be granted family residence.  
In order to be eligible for being granted a 
family residence permit under Article 35, a 
sponsor shall be required to satisfy 
“income”, “residence”, “public safety”, 
“temporal” and “registry” standards. 
Student residence permit: 
According to Article 38, foreigners who 
enrol in higher education institutions in their 
pre-undergraduate, undergraduate, masters 
or doctorate programs may be granted a 
student residence permit.  
Long-term residence permit: 
According to the Article 42 foreigners who 
have resided in Turkey, continuously for 8 
years may be granted a long-term residence 
permit. The long-term residence permit 
provides rights that are akin to the Turkish 
citizenship except military service, the right to 
vote and be elected, the right to have access 
to public service, and a vehicle importing 
immunity by reserving certain rules under 
specific laws. 
Humanitarian residence permit: 
Article 46 of the Law stipulates a 
humanitarian residence permit for conditions 
such as “cases that a foreigner cannot be 
deported due to personal risks of potential 
death penalty, torture or inhuman treatment or 
punishment”, “serious health problems, age or 
pregnancy, as well as not having any 
opportunity for cure at the receiving country 
for life threatening diseases” or “a judicial 
challenge against a deportation decision” etc. 
Human trafficking victims residence 
permit:  
Conditions for this type of residence permit 
is dealt with above under the Title “Human 
Trafficking”. 
Access to estate ownership:  
The Law regarding Amendment of the 
Land Registry Law, Law No. 6302, published 
in the Official Gazette No. 28296, dated 18 
May, 2012 has resulted in noteworthy 
improvements in the status of foreigners with 
regard to the acquisition of real estate in 
Turkey. The most prominent improvement in 
this regard is that it lifted the reciprocity 
requirement for acquiring real estates, a rule 
which had been applied since 1934. 
According to Article 35 of the amended Land 
Registry Law, subject to the restrictions 
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31 See http://www.csgb.gov.tr/csgbPortal/diyih.portal?page=yv&id=2 [access date: 23 April, 2013]. 
32 Case C‑37/98 Savas [2000] ECR I‑2927, paragraphs 46 to 54; Joined Cases C‑317/01 and C‑369/01 Abatay and 
Others [2003] ECR I‑12301, paragraphs 58 and 59; Case C‑16/05 Tum and Dari [2007] ECR I‑7415, paragraph 
46; Case C-228/06 Mehmet Soysal, Ibrahim Savatli v Germany [2009] ECR 2009 I-01031, paragraph 62; Case 
C‑186/10 Oguz [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 23; and Case C‑256/11 Dereci and Others [2011] ECR I‑0000, 
paragraph 87. 
33 http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2013-04/cp130037en.pdf [access date: 27 may, 2013]. 
determined by law, the Council of Ministers, 
by due consideration of bilateral relations and 
the interest of the Country, may decide which 
country’s citizens are fit to acquire real estate 
in Turkey. The right to acquire property is 
limited to 10% of the district where the 
property is situated and to 300.000m2 
nationwide. 
The Constitution stipulates that freedom of movement and settlement shall be 
safeguarded (Article 23).  
Labour Bilateral agreements related to labor include: Turkey-Germany Work Force Treaty, 
20 May 1964; Turkey- Australia Work Force Treaty, 5 October, 1967; Turkey-Austria 
Work Force Treaty 15 May, 1964; Turkey- Belgium Work Force Treaty, 16 July, 1964; 
Turkey- France Work Force Treaty, 8 April, 1965; Turkey-Netherlands Work Force 
Treaty, 19 August,1964; Turkey-Sweden Work Force Treaty, 10 March, 1967; Turkey-
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Work Force Treaty, 9 March, 1987; Turkey-Qatar 
Work Force Treaty, 1 April, 1986; Turkey- Libya Work Force Treaty, 5 January, 1975; 
Turkey-Jordan Work Force Treaty, 8 July, 1982.31
International agreements related to labor include: - International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, G.A. res. 
45/158, annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 262, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990), 
entered into force 1 July 2003; - European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant 
Workers, 24 November, 1977. 
 
Association Agreements with the European Union: -Agreement Establishing an 
Association Between the European Economic Community and Turkey (Signed at Ankara, 
1 September 1963) (OJ L 217, 29.12.1964.) - Additional Protocol to the Agreement 
establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey 
(OJ L 361/1, 31.12.77.) - Council Decision of 13 June 2005 on the signature of the 
Additional Protocol to the Agreement establishing an Association between the European 
Economic Community and Turkey following the enlargement of the European Union (OJ 
L 254/57, 30.9.2005.) 
Article 41 Paragraph 1 of the Additional Protocol which contains a standstill clause on 
freedom of establishment and to provide services has been a matter of dispute on the 
entry of Turkish citizens to the EU Member States, before the European Court of Justice. 
The Court has a well settled case-law on the point that a Member State shall not subject 
a Turkish national to freedom of establishment and to provide services on the territory of 
that Member State to stricter conditions other than those which applied at the time when 
the Additional Protocol entered into force with regard to the Member State concerned.32 
A more recent debate came up with the Demirkan Case, where a Turkish citizen argued 
that the standstill clause could be invoked not only by those wishing to provide services 
themselves (“active” freedom to provide services) but also by those wishing to receive 
services (“passive” freedom to provide services). Advocate General Pedro Cruz Villalón 
refused to apply the broad interpretation of “freedom to provide services” under the 
European Union Treaties and took the view that the standstill clause of the Additional 
Protocol to the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement does not apply in respect of the 
passive freedom to provide services.33 The Court’s ruling is still to be published. 
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Citizenship Dual citizenship: Turkish Citizenship 
Law, Law No 5901, which was adopted 
on 29 May, 2009 does not categorically 
prohibit dual citizenship. According to 
Article 11 paragraph 2 of the Law, 
however, foreign nationals who wish to 
acquire Turkish citizenship may be 
required to relinquish previous 
citizenship.  
Dual citizenship has appeared as a 
problematic issue under Turkish Law, 
as a result of the legal status of the 
Turkish diaspora that were forced to 
relinquish their Turkish citizenship by 
virtue of the restrictive laws of the 
Western countries. Law No. 6304, 
which amended the Turkish Citizenship 
Law, in 2012, and broadened an 
already existing special status (so called 
“blue card” system) for those Turks who 
had to relinquish Turkish citizenship. 
Such amendment was seen in line with 
the Article 62 of the Constitution which 
obliges the State to “take the necessary 
measures to ensure the family unity, the 
education of the children, the cultural 
needs, and the social security of Turkish 
nationals working abroad, and […] take 
the necessary measures to safeguard 
their ties with the home country and to 
help them on their return home.” 34 Law 
on the Establishment and Duties of the 
Directorate on Turks and Relative 
Communities Living Abroad35 was 
another example of the State’s interest 
in the Turkish diaspora. Amendment of 
Article 29 of the Turkish Citizenship Law 
by Law No. 6304 shall be seen as a 
reflection of this tendency as well. 
According to this provision “persons 
who had acquired Turkish citizenship by 
birth and relinquished it by receiving a 
permission for obtaining a foreign 
country’s citizenship and their legal 
inheritors, shall continue to benefit the 
right to residence, travel, work, 
inheritance, acquire movable and 
immovable property akin to Turkish 
citizens, subject to the rules concerning 
national security and public order.” 
Law No. 5901 governs the conditions for 
acquiring Turkish citizenship. Accordingly, 
Turkish citizenship may be acquired by 
birth or after birth. Turkish citizenship by 
birth is automatically acquired when a 
child is born from a mother or father who is 
a Turkish citizen. Second, the Law allows 
a child to be granted Turkish citizenship if 
a child is born in Turkish territory and 
unable to receive any other citizenship 
through his/her mother or father. 
Turkish citizenship may be acquired after 
birth either by a decision of a competent 
authority or by adoption or on the basis of 
marriage. 
Stateless Persons: 
One noteworthy aspect of the Law No. 6458 
is its provisions concerning statelessness 
namely the Articles 50 and 51. The Law fills 
a big gap in Turkish law by providing a 
definition, decision making procedure and 
rights and safeguards concerning 
statelessmess. 
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International 
Protection 
 Turkey is a State party to the 1951 Geneva 
Convention on the Status of Refugees and 
the New York Protocol of 1967 however, 
with a geographical limitation. Law No. 6458 
poses a step forward for Turkey in 
international protection terms as it contains a 
comprehensive section devoted to this 
issue. Turkish international protection 
practice is going to have a proper legal 
framework when the relevant sections of the 
Law comes into force, one year after the 
date of publication. However, the Law does 
not lift the geographical limitation of the 
Turkish Government under the Geneva 
Convention which limits refugee status to 
events that took place in European 
Countries. In this respect the Law repeats 
the definition of the Geneva Convention. For 
those asylum seekers arriving in Turkish 
territory from non-European Countries are 
regulated under a so called “conditional 
refugee” status who shall be allowed to 
reside in Turkey until they are resettled to a 
third country. The Law provides a 
“subsidiary protection” status for those 
protection seekers who are not considered 
to be refugees or conditional refugees but 
would be facing certains risks at the country 
of origin. The definition of this status is 
adapted from the Qualification Directive of 
the European Union. Moreover, the Law 
contains a “temporary protection” status for 
those foreigners who were forced to leave 
their country of origin in masses, in order to 
find urgent and temporary protection at the 
Turkish borders and can not return to their 
country of origin. Considering how pressing 
the problem of temporary protection is for 
Turkey, one single article that lacks 
protection standards and procedures is less 
than satisfactory. The provision indicates 
that this issue is going to be governed by a 
by-law which will be adopted by the Council 
of Ministers. Additionally, the Law adopts a 
number of mechanisms that are peculiar to 
the European Union’s asylum acquis such 
as the “first country of asylum”, “safe third 
countries”, rules, “accelerated procedures” 
and “reception centres”. 
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The Socio-Political Framework of Migration 
Located at the junction of Europe, Asia and MENA (Middle East and North Africa), with Mediterranean 
and Black sea coasts, Turkey has always been one of the most important paths for large migration 
movements. Due to its geo-political significance, Turkey became the nexus of emigration, immigration 
and transit migration36. Closeness both to the EU Area and MENA made Turkey a crucial player in terms 
of migratory regimes. Turkey’s role became even more important in the aftermath of the Arab Spring 
which led to Syrian migration37 to Turkey. Turkey’s migration policy has changed considerably since the 
early 2000s in attempts to satisfy EU membership criteria.38
Despite the steps undertaken, there are three unresolved critical issues. First, Turkey applies a 
geographical limitation to refugees and does not recognize the status of refugees to persons from non-
European countries. To solve this dilemma, UNHCR intervenes to identify third country resettlement 
opportunities for non-European asylum seekers whose applications are approved. Without the guarantee of 
full-membership, Turkey is reluctant to lift the geographical limitation because of the fear of becoming a buffer 
zone. Second, due to her stable political atmosphere and Steady economic growth, Turkey became a magnet 
country pulling migrants from neighboring regions. The EU’s fear is not for Turkish nationals who may migrate 
to Europe following accession, but, instead, the irregular flow of third-country nationals who use Turkey as a 
transit country. Turkey’s visa-free policy with some of its neighbors (Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Egypt etc.) have 
caused serious concerns in the EU with respect to border management, especially since the crisis in Syria. 
According to the 2012 Progress Report
 Among the reforms harmonizing Turkey’s 
legislation in the justice, freedom and security area with the EU acquis, the most important step was the 
Law on Foreigners and International Protection which has recently been approved by the Grand National 
Assembly. It will introduce a new legal and institutional framework for migration and asylum and was 
welcomed by the EU as a clear sign of Turkey’s efforts to establish an effective migration management 
system in line with EU standards. 
39, the number of third-country nationals detected in 2011 by EU 
Member States when entering or attempting to enter the EU illegally and coming directly from or transiting 
through Turkish territory stood at 55,630. A readmission Agreement and a Visa Facilitation agreements 
scheme are under discussion. In June 2012, Turkey and the EU finalized the Readmission Agreement; 
however, it has yet to be signed due to Turkey’s understandable concerns at unfair burden sharing. The 
agreement’s ratification implies Turkey’s and the EU’s agreement to readmit illegal aliens within their borders. 
The EU, in turn, promises to lighten visa requirements for Turkish nationals40
In addition to these constraints, Turkey faces a major challenge in the field of migration. Since the 
foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, migration policy has been designed within the context of 
nation building with the intention of establishing a homogeneous identity
.  
41.Hence, immigrants without 
Turkish descent and culture are seen as a threat to Turkish and Muslim identity. Turkey’s current ambition 
to become an EU member and the accompanying political liberalization is straining the state’s traditional 
concept of national identity42
 
. 
                                                          
36 See Kemal Kirisci, “Turkey: A Transformation from Emigration to Immigration”, Migration Information Source 2003, 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?id=176 
37 See Şenay Özden , “Syrian Refugees in Turkey”, Migration Policy Center (MPC) Research Report 2013/05, 
http://www.migrationpolicycentre.edu/docs/MPC_RR_2013-05.pdf 
38 See Seçil Paçacı Elitok, “Turkey’s Negotiations on Migration: One-on-One or One-on-Twenty Seven?”, IPC-
Mercator Policy Brief 2013  
http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2013/04/secilelitok_TR_EU_migration.pdf 
The same report shows that between 1 January and 15 July 2012 the number of irregular migrants coming or 
crossing Turkey and being intercepted by EU Member States amounted to 25,944. In 2011, the number of 
irregular migrants apprehended in Turkey reached 44,415, an increase of 26% on the 2010 figures.  
40 See Zeynep Özler, “Breaking the Vicious Circle in EU-Turkey Relations: Visa Negotiations’’, Turkish Policy 
Quarterly, Spring 2012. http://www.turkishpolicy.com/dosyalar/files/2012-1-ZeynepOzler.pdf 
41 See Icduygu, A. and S. Deniz. (2009): Turkey. Focus Migration Country Profile, Nr.5., April 2009, http://focus-
migration.hwwi.de/uploads/tx_wilpubdb/CP_05_Turkey_2009.pdf,  
42 See Kemal Kirisci, “Turkey: A Transformation from Emigration to Immigration”, Migration Information Source 2003, 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?id=176 
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43The Turkish Constitution, Article 62, relating to Turkish nationals working Abroad. 
http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/images/loaded/pdf_dosyalari/THE_CONSTITUTION_OF_THE_REPUBLIC_OF_TURK
EY.pdf  
44 See Kemal Kirişçi,“ Three Way Approach” to Meeting the Challenges of Migrant Incorporation in the European 
Union: Reflections from a Turkish Perspective”, CARIM Research Report 2008/3 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/8291/CARIM_RR_2008_03.pdf?sequence=1 
Socio-Political 
Framework Outward migration Inward migration 
Governmental 
Institutions 
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
• The Presidency of Turks Abroad 
and Kin Communities 
• Office of Public Diplomacy under 
the office of Prime Minister 
Turkish National Police 
• Director of Religious Affairs 
Ministry of Customs and Trade 
TIKA (Turkish International 
Cooperation and Coordination 
Agency) 
• Directorate General for Consular 
Affairs 
• Ministry of Justice, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
• Ministry for EU Affairs, Delegation of 
EU to Turkey 
• European Council-Turkey 
• General Command of Gendarmerie 
Turkish Coast Guard Command 
• Turkish National Police 
• Border Management Bureau 
• Asylum and Migration Bureau under 
Ministry of Interior 
• Provinces 
• Ministry of Labour and social 
Security Homeland Advice Bureau 
under Foreign Relations and 
Workers Abroad Services General 
Directorate 
Governmental 
Strategy 
Government strategy is to take the 
necessary measures to ensure 
family unity, the education of the 
children, the cultural needs, and the 
social security of Turkish nationals 
working abroad. The government 
will also take the necessary 
measures to safeguard ties with 
their home country and to help them 
on their return home43;utilizing social 
capital and experience to contribute 
to EU efforts to develop better 
integration policies and to cooperate 
with host countries, involving them 
in the dialogue process as a 
partner44; undertaking policy 
measures to manage legal and 
regular Turkish emigration; initiating 
dialogue and strengthening bonds 
with the Turkish Diaspora; providing 
legal support to Turkish emigrants; 
attracting remittances; improving the 
database on Turkish nationals living 
abroad; setting-up labour 
recruitment agreements; promoting 
Turkish entrepreneurship abroad; 
providing Turkish migrants with 
necessary mechanisms for 
transferring their skills as a 
contribution to the development of 
the Turkish economy; and 
developing strategies for Turkish 
communities to better cope with 
their integration process in relation 
to their host countries. 
Government strategy is to adopt a 
single, coherent legislative framework 
governing rights of legal and illegal 
migrants, as well as refugees in 
accordance with the EU acquis and 
international standards: e.g new Law 
on Foreigners and International 
Protection. Governmental strategy is 
also to develop a humanitarian 
approach towards migration and 
asylum to combat illegal migration and 
human trafficking; to improve living 
standards in removal centers and 
satellite cities to better fulfill the needs 
of asylum seekers; to strengthen 
institutional capacity; to assist voluntary 
return, training of staff working in 
migration management; to ensure 
humanitarian aid to Syrian citizens; to 
establish a new civilian authority 
coordinating the overall asylum and 
migration issues; to develop a visa 
policy that is consistent with the visa 
obligations imposed by the EU; 
alignment border management policy 
with Integrated Border Management 
System of the EU; and to foster entry 
and work permit procedures of highly 
skilled workers. 
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45 See Nermin Abadan-Unat “Turks in Europe From Guest Worker to Transnational Citizen”, Berghahn Books, 2011, 
pp.124-130. 
Civil Society  a) 
− attempts to protect rights of 
Turkish migrants in legal, social, 
political, economic and cultural 
fields: e.g. the Turkish 
Community in Germany. 
Turkish migrant associations 
b) Religious Associations and 
Communities45
− caters to the religious needs of 
its members, the establishment 
of mosques, conduct integration 
projects and socio-cultural 
activities (e.g. Religious Affairs 
Turkish Islamic Union (DİTİB) 
functions as an umbrella 
organization and has 896 
branches in Germany). 
 
c) 
− upports and consults Turkish 
migrant entrepreneurs (e.g. The 
Association of Turkish 
Entrepreneurs (ATU) in 
Germany). 
Professional Diaspora Networks 
d) 
− conducts research into the 
improved promotion and 
teaching of Turkish culture, 
history, language and literature, 
supporting scientific studies by 
cooperating with various 
organizations (e.g. The Yunus 
Emre Institute). 
Research Institutions and 
Academic Platforms 
− functions as a network for 
researchers and students 
interested in migration issues in, 
from, and through Turkey and its 
neighborhood: e.g. The Turkish 
Migration Studies Group 
(TurkMiS) at the University of 
Oxford. 
a) 
− serving and protecting refugees, 
asylum seekers and irregular 
migrants: e.g. International 
Catholic Migration Commission 
(ICMC), Association for Solidarity 
with Asylum Seekers and 
Migrants, Helsinki Citizens 
Assembly, Human Rights 
Associations (IHD), Human 
Resource Development 
Foundation (IKGV), Amnesty 
International, Mülteci-Der. 
Civil society organizations  
− assisting victims of human 
trafficking: IKGV. 
− supporting internally displaced: 
ICMC,IHD, Göç-Der, Mazlum-Der. 
b) 
− Informal organizations advocating 
a rights-based approach: e.g. 
Migrant Solidarity Network.  
Migrant Networks 
− Informal networks of international 
migrants: e.g. network of Afghan 
refugees or Union of the Young 
Refugees in Turkey. 
− Centers for refugee children: e.g. 
Yeldeğirmeni Children and Youth 
Center.  
c) 
− connecting the migration debate in 
Turkey to ongoing debates, 
developing collaboration between 
migration scholars, civil society 
organizations and policy makers: 
e.g. the Migration Research 
Center at Koç University, MireKoc. 
Migration Research Centers 
− producing reliable information 
based on research findings that 
can contribute to realistic policy 
and decision-making processes: 
Center for Migration Research at 
Bilgi University. 
− conducting national and foreign 
researches regarding internal and 
external migrations: e.g. 
Hacettepe University Migration 
and Politics research center 
(HUGO). 
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46 Turkey has chaired the Budapest Process since 2006, an inter-governmental unofficial cooperation dialogue forum 
involving 53 countries’ governments and 21 International Organizations. Turkey has also led the creation of Silk 
Route Working Group in order to develop active cooperation with source countries for regular and irregular 
migration 
International 
Cooperation 
− Signing bilateral social security 
agreements with countries where 
Turkish citizens live (currently 28 
countries) 
− Establishing readmission 
agreements so as to tackle the 
issue of illegal migration and to 
encourage states to fight against 
the same:.e.g. readmission 
Agreements with Syria, 
Kyrgyzstan, Romania, Ukraine, 
Greece , Bosnia, Herzegovina, 
Pakistan, Yemen, Russia, Nigeria, 
Moldova.  
− Working in cooperation with 
receiving countries in order to 
collect better statistics on Turkish 
emigration 
− Collaborating with international 
organizations (UNHCR and IOM) 
for asylum and human trafficking. 
− Implementing Twinning Projects: 
e.g. on “Migration and Asylum” in 
2004-2005 with the cooperation of 
Denmark and UK and on 
Integrated Border Management 
with the cooperation of France 
and UK. 
− Cooperating dialogue with other 
countries to establish sustainable 
mechanisms in the field of 
migration management: e.g. the 
Presidency of the Budapest 
Process since2006.46
− Alignment with the EU framework 
in the field of Justice, Freedom 
and Security: e.g. Migration 
Strategy Document, Asylum 
Strategy Document, National 
Action Plan for Asylum and 
Migration. 
 
− Facilitating visa liberalization and 
visa facilitation agreements. 
− Becoming party to international 
agreements: e.g. UN Convention 
Against Transnational Organized 
Crime and of its two Additional 
Protocols (Palermo Convention), 
UN International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Member of 
Their Families. 
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The Demographic-Economic Framework of Migration  
Since the fall of the ‘iron curtain’ in 1991 a set of complicated migration patterns transpired in Ukraine. 
With Russia, Ukraine has the second largest migration corridor in the world (the US-Mexico corridor 
being the largest). Keeping this is mind Ukraine had and continues to have the difficult task of building 
migration systems with large and frequently used borders. Ukraine’s demographic mosaic is beset by 
relatively high mortality rates (especially for males), falling fertility rates and significant net migration 
outflows. For example the population fell from 51,944,000 million persons in 1991 to 45,533,000 million 
persons in 2013.  
In addition, since 1991, Ukraine has gradually become a major transit country for reaching Western 
states through its large borders. Based on this complex picture, it is clear that Ukraine will continue to 
become an increasingly important country in world migration patterns and networks. 
Outward migration Inward migration 
Stocks 
According to destination countries’ statistics, 
5,335,840 or 1,869,255 Ukrainian migrants resided 
abroad in years around 2012 (table 1), who represent 
respectively 11.7% or 4.1% of the total population 
residing in Ukraine. The huge difference between the 
two estimates depends on whether migrants living in 
Russia are counted according respectively to the 
country of birth or citizenship criterion.  
 
Indeed, in Russia, while individuals born in 
Ukraine are almost 3.6 million, Ukrainian citizens 
stand only at 93,390. The former (largest) number 
is the result of massive migration during Soviet 
period and massive ethnic repatriation waves 
occurred just after the collapse of the USSR, 
according to which millions of people - born in the 
Ukrainian territory before 1991 with Russian 
descent - decided to ‘return’ their origin country. 
They are the so-called ethnic Russians who are 
generally not perceived as Ukrainian emigrants, but 
Russian nationals. 
 
 
 
Stocks 
An accurate and up-to-date estimation of 
immigration stocks in Ukraine will be available after 
the 2013 Census is complete. At present the most 
accurate data is from 2001 (table 2).  
 
 
 
 
Country of residence
Definition 
(a)
Reference date 
(Jan 1st)
Number Number %    %    
19.7 56.3
of which Poland (A) 2012 4.3 12.2
             Italy (A) 2012 3.8 10.8
             Germany (B) 2012 2.9 8.2
3,581,104 114,519 67.1 6.1
of which Russia (A) 2002 3,559,975 X 66.7 X
             Russia (B) 2010 X 93,390 X 5.0
         Belarus (B) 2009 0.3 0.9
             Moldova (B) 2010 0.1 0.2
13.2 37.6
of which US (A) 2011 6.6 18.8
             Israel (A) 2005 4.9 13.8
             Canada (A) 2006 1.1 3.2
5,335,840 1,869,255 100.0 100.0
(b): "Other countries" include Iceland, Liechstein, Norw ay, Sw itzerland, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Canada,  US, 
Australia, New  Zealand, Chile, Japan, Mexico and Israel.
Sources: national statistics (Population Censuses, population registers, registers for foreigners, etc.)
Table 1 - Ukrainian emigration stocks by country of residence, most recent data (c. 2012)
European Union
CIS countries + Georgia
Other countries (b)
Main total
(a): Ukrainian migrants are defined according to the country of birth (A) or country of nationality (B) criterion 
according to countries of residence, in Russia both numbers are reported.
1,052,184
227,446
258,793
59,460
201,830
153,393
16,874
3,291
702,552
351,793
Country of citizenship/     
country of birth
Number    
(birth)
Number 
(citizenship)
CIS countries + Georgia 4,837,303 163,464
of which Russia 3,613,240 103,728
Belarus 270,751 5,872
Kazakhstan 245,072 5,175
Uzbekistan 242,390 5,444
Moldova 165,126 15,087
Azerbaijan 90,753 8,479
Georgia 71,015 6,446
Armenia 52,168 10,686
Tajikistan 32,386 1,090
Kyrgyzstan 29,476 635
Turkmenistan 24,926 822
Other countries 494,125 66,608
of which Poland 145,106 1,091
 Germany 64,015 517
 Vietnam 3,399 4,970
 China 5,015 2,999
Total migrants 5,331,428 230,072
% of the total population 11.1 0.5
Stateless - 84,047
Total migrants + stateless 5,331,428 314,119
% of the total population 11.1 0.7
Table 2 - Immigration stocks in Ukraine according to different 
criteria, 2001
Source: Population Census - 2001
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A peculiar characteristic of Ukrainian migrants is 
that they are widespread all over the world. Very 
high numbers are indeed found in the EU (around 1 
million – among which Poland 227,446, Italy 
201,380 and Germany 153,393), North American 
countries (411,253 - the US 351,793 and Canada 
59,460), as well as in Israel (258,793). 
It is important to note that both sexes have been 
heavily involved in Ukrainian migration patterns. 
Still, patterns and characteristics of movements 
largely differ by sex. The 2008 “Modular Population 
Survey of Labour Migration Issues” (hereafter ‘the 
2008 Survey’) gives a picture of recent labour 
emigration from Ukraine by shedding light on the 
abovementioned gender peculiarities.1
Around two thirds of migrants are male but large 
differences are observed according to destinations. 
For example, Italy, Germany and Greece hold a 
higher share of females. Even though there are 
more males than females, in Poland, Spain and 
Portugal the percentage of Ukrainian females 
residing there are higher than the overall average 
of female labour force migrants. This is clearly 
related to different labour market structures of host 
societies. Migrants in Italy mainly employed in 
caregiving household services while in Spain in 
construction and touristic service sectors – at least 
until the 2008 crisis. Indeed, male labour migrants 
from Ukraine are mostly employed in construction 
and female migrants work as domestic helps and 
retail. Males are more heavily stocked in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and especially Russia (source: 
the 2008 Survey). 
  
As to their age profile, the absolute majority of 
labour migrants are 20-49 years old. While there is 
a sharp drop in migration in males after the age of 
50, whereas females retain relatively high migration 
activity even in the years preceding retirement. 
Moreover, the share of rural migrants in labour 
migration is greater than that of migrants from an 
urban background: while urban labour migrants go 
to make up 3.9% of working age population, for 
rural areas this figure stands at 7.9%. As to gender 
specificities, around 78% of female labour migrants 
were from urban areas which had lower levels of 
unemployment, possibly indicating the attraction of 
foreign labour markets (source: the 2008 Survey).  
Another telling statistic is the average level of 
education of migrant stocks being lower than the 
average for Ukraine. As of 2008 the average 
number of years of education for non-migrants was 
15.3 years and for migrants 11.8 years. For the 
same respective groups 23.2% and 13.5% received 
a higher education degree. Moreover, migrants to 
In 2001, more than 5 million individuals born 
abroad and 230,072 foreign citizens resided in 
Ukraine (11.1% and 0.5% of the total population, 
respectively). Again, this discrepancy is due to the 
fact that the majority of 5.3 million individuals born 
abroad are individuals born in the USSR with 
Ukrainian descent who, after the dissolution of the 
USSR, ‘returned’ en masse to their parents’ home 
country as well as other ethnic groups who 
migrated during the Soviet period. Rather than 
international migrants, they are today perceived as 
ethnic Ukrainians.  
The majority of immigrants originated from other 
former Soviet Republics (90.7% and 71.0% 
according to country of birth and country of 
citizenship criterion, respectively) and especially 
from Russia (67.8% and 45.1%, respectively).  
Other important stocks are comprised of persons 
from Germany, Vietnam and China but also Poland. 
The latter subgroup are mostly ethnic Ukrainians 
who were resettled from Poland to Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic after World War II. 
It is worth noting the high number of stateless 
people (84,047). This reflects a situation shared by 
most CIS countries. After the USSR dissolution, 
large numbers of people lost their citizenship as 
they were unable to confirm or acquire citizenship 
of any new-born state. This was the result of 
cumbersome legal requirements adopted in new 
independent states (for more details, see the 
section on ‘citizenship’ in ‘The Legal Framework’ 
below). As a result, all these people fell in the 
category of ‘non status migrants’.  
The age distribution of immigrant stocks is 
skewed towards the working age population, 
especially the younger and middle aged groups. 
There is a slight gender difference with 53.2% being 
male, whereas in the Ukrainian population men only 
constitute 46.3%. However for stocks from non-
former USSR states the male-female ratio is 3.4. 
As of the end of 2011, 313,000 foreign nationals 
were registered with the Ministry of Interior. 
Evidently the stocks of immigrants have remained 
consistent since 2001. They were mostly from 
Russia (147,000), Azerbaijan (15,700), Moldova 
(15,400), Armenia (11,800), Georgia (11,500), 
Uzbekistan (10,100), Turkmenistan (8,700), Belarus 
(7,900), China (7,400), stateless individuals (6,400) 
and Vietnam (5,700).  
 
                                                          
1 The Modular Population Survey of Labour Migration Issues was carried out by the State Statistics Service of 
Ukraine in 2008 and represents the first representative survey on labour migration issues from Ukraine. Labour 
migrants are here defined as “Ukrainian citizens of working age (women 15-54 years, men 15-59 years) who have 
been abroad for employment at least once from January 2005 to the interview date in May-June 2008”. 
EU Neighbourhood Migration Report 2013 
Migration Policy Centre (www.migrationpolicycentre.eu) 269 
neighbouring countries (Russia, Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary) take periodic short trips 
returning constantly to Ukraine. Those headed to 
southern European countries tend, on the other 
hand, to stay there for extended periods of time – 
or permanently. The same survey found that 
roughly two out of three migrants were found to be 
without residence and work permits. In the Czech 
Republic, Spain and Portugal migrants were more 
likely to have legal means of residence and work. 
Whereas for Poland and Italy the converse was the 
case (source: the 2008 Survey). 
Remittances are a central source of foreign 
currency in Ukraine, with 4.67 and 4.43 billion ($US) 
dollars sent in 2007 and 2010 (Ptukha Institute of 
Demography and Social Research, 2011). 
Flows 
In the space of 10 years migration flows from 
Ukraine have consistently fallen and remained 
consistent from 2010 to 2012 (see figure 1). 
However, these statistics taken from official 
registrations and deregistrations at a place of 
permanent residence tend to underestimate real 
flows for two series of reasons: (1) outgoing 
persons are not incentivized to deregister; (2) 
temporary flows are not recorded. 
 
From 2001-2009 the known major destination of 
over half of all Ukrainian emigrants was Russia 
This figure fell to 40.4% in 2010 and to 35.3% in 
2011. All other former Soviet states consistently 
account for 10-11% of all emigration flows from 
Ukraine. There has also been a continual increase 
of emigration flows to non-former Soviet states, 
especially Israel, Germany and the US. This 
percentage of flows to these states peaked in 2011 
at 54.2%. Each country at some point being top of 
this category in the past 10 years. The Czech 
Republic, Spain, Italy, Poland, Hungary and 
Canada are other popular destinations. 
The number of officially registered labour 
immigrants were 7,800 in early 2011. The largest 
groups of them are employed in retail, service and 
the repair of automobiles, household items and 
items of personal use (22.7%), processing (18.9%), 
and construction (18.1%). The crisis has decreased 
the share working in construction, while the other 
two sectors have grown. A sharp increase is 
evident in the number of those employed in real 
estate, rental and engineering, in the Business-to-
Business sector (from 5.0% in early 2006 up to 
14.1% in early 2011).  
Educational enrolment by foreigners in tertiary 
education continues to rise. In the academic year of 
2012/2013 49,000 non-Ukrainians enrolled. Major 
stocks are from Turkmenistan (10,500), China 
(3,200) and Russia (2,900). Within the previous five 
years, the number of Russians and Chinese fell by 
a third with the number of Turkmens increasing by 
sixfold. 
On first day of 2011 there were 2,345 registered 
refugees in Ukraine from over 40 countries. 
Although over half were Afghani citizens this 
percentage has fallen from 86% in 1996. Males 
hold higher shares with three quarters of all refuges 
of working age, less than 3% at retirement ages. 
Flows 
According to the Ukrainian State Statistics Service, 
the number of incomers to Ukraine in recent years 
(2008-2012) has been stable at 30,000-37,000 a 
year with an evident peak in 2012 (figure 1). The 
latter peak is however due to improving of 
foreigners residence registration after the adoption 
of the new Law of Ukraine "On Immigration". As a 
whole this source of information does not show the 
year of arrival of migrants but the year of their 
residence registration. 
Prior to 2012 the flows remained consistent with 
42-46% originating from Russia. Around 40% of 
flows are from other from former USSR-states. 
Flows from wider afield are from Israel, the US, 
Germany, Turkey and China – providing around 
18% of annual flows. 
For the 2012/2013 academic year, flows to 
Ukraine by international students stood at 9,300, 
with one-third being citizens of China, Russia and 
Turkmenistan. Although the world financial 
recession saw admissions fall by one sixth flows 
have returned to former levels and are increasing. 
Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, 
Ukraine has effectively had open borders with CIS 
countries and a facilitated border crossing regime 
with its western neighbours. As such, it has become 
a major transit country for irregular migrants to 
Western Europe.  
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Figure 1 - Inward and outward permanent 
migration flows to and from Ukraine, 2003-2012
Arrivals Departures Net Migration
Source: registrations and deregistrations to place of permanent 
residence - State Statistics Service of Ukraine
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For example, agencies of the Ukrainian Ministry 
of Interior annually detain 14,000-15,000 irregular 
migrants, the majority of which emanate from 
former USSR states i.e. Russia, Uzbekistan, 
Azerbaijan, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia. 
Overall, the number of migrants who have been 
refused entry to Ukraine, in 2008 increased by a 
factor of 2.8 vis-a-vis the figures from 2002. Finally, 
in 2011, one in six migrants were charged with 
administrative offences that punished overstaying 
on a visa with a fine (under article 203 of the 
Ukrainian Administrative Code). A further 13,000 
were deported (1,800 forcibly) and 10,400 were 
forbidden any return to Ukraine. 
 
Ukrainian Remittance Flows 
There are two telling statistics of Ukrainian remittance inflows in figure 2. First the Ukrainian economy 
receives significant credit from remittances. Second, these flows look set to rise, particularly over the last 
five years. According to World Bank data, remittance inflows to Ukraine increased by a factor of almost 
seven between 2006 and 2010 (from US$ 829 million to US$ 5,607 million). This huge increase in 
remittances may, of course, reflect improvements in the central bank’s remittance recording system, rather 
than changes in migrants’ remittance behaviour. And data on remittances in the CIS region is generally 
criticized for the poor reliability of said information (Shelburne and Palacin, 2008). However, it is an 
undeniable fact that migrant remittances contribute to family welfare as an extra source of income, and a 
booster to higher living standards and human capital formation, particularly by improving access to 
education and health (Kupets, 2010).  
Official recorded remittances of Ukrainian expatriates constitute between 0.1% (2000) to 3.0% (2010) of total 
GDP. If non-recorded remittance flows are included in this statistic this figure is most likely to be larger. Although 
this figure is not recorded and difficult to estimate, estimates of families with family members employed abroad 
show their income up to be up to nominally one 
third in comparison to the Ukrainian familial 
average. Finally, a European Training 
Foundation study (2008) found expenditures to 
mainly focus on consumption – 73% for living 
expenses, 26% for consumable items and 
furniture and 3.3% on business start-ups.  
One in six Ukrainians employed abroad 
regularly send official remittances to Ukraine 
(61.1%). A higher percentage of migrants 
transfer money from countries further away 
i.e. Spain (81.8%), Italy (78.6%), and 
Portugal (71.3%). It is likely that migrants 
from neighbouring countries (i.e. Russia, 
Hungary and Poland) are likely transporting 
remittances either by person or via personal acquaintances. Legal migrants tend to send larger amounts 
than irregular and ‘not defined’ migrants - $2,831 USD and $2,551 (US dollars) respectively.  
References: Kupets O. 2012. The Development and the Side Effects of Remittances in the CIS Countries: the Case of 
Ukraine, CARIM-East Research Report 2012/02, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI); Ptukha Institute of Demography and Social Research. 2011. Evaluation of labour 
migrants' income and development of fiscal mechanisms for their channeling into the national economy, National 
Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kiev; Shelburne R., Palacin J. 2008. "Remittance Flows in the Transition Economies: 
Levels, Trends, and Determinants," ECE Discussion Papers Series 2008_5, UNECE. 
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The Legal Framework of Migration 
Ukraine has been an active legislator in the field of immigration control and management since the late 
1990s. The activities were related mainly to the Ukrainian participation in regional consultative processes 
as well as changing migration patterns. International organizations underscore that since state 
independence, Ukraine has made tangible progress towards bringing its migration legislation and advocacy 
practice in line with international human rights standards. It adopted modern migration legislation, created a 
State Migration Service, incorporated international agreements on human rights into its national legislature 
and developed international cooperation in the area of migration. 
Ukraine’s migration legislation has recently undergone serious reforms mainly due to the implementation 
of the EU Visa Liberalization Action Plan presented by the EU to Ukraine in November 2010. This 
document is a road map for complex reforms in migration, visa, asylum and some other policies of Ukraine 
(e.g. document security, public order and security, personal data protection, etc.). It consists of two main 
phases – legislative (drafting and adopting of new national legislative acts) and implementing 
(implementation of new legislation). On 22 April 2011, National Plan on Implementation of the EU-Ukraine 
Action Plan on visa liberalization was adopted. This document sketches a clear list of legislative changes 
and amendments Ukraine will adopt in the years to come in the field of migration. 
 
Legal Framework Outward migration Inward migration 
General legal 
references 
Legal and political framework governing migration and mobility 
2012 Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons 
2012 Law on Refugees and Persons in Need of Subsidiary and Temporary  
Protection 
2012 Action Plan on Integration of Refugees until 2020 
2011 Law on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings 
2001 Law on Immigration 
2001 (amended in 2005) Law on Citizenship of Ukraine  
1996 Constitution of Ukraine  
Entry and Exit 
Visa 
Ukraine (UA) has concluded the Visa 
Facilitation Agreement with the EU, 
which is in force since 2008 and which 
was amended in 2012. Moreover, it has 
signed special Local Border Traffic 
Agreements with its EU neighbours: 
Poland in 2009, Slovak Republic in 
2008, and Hungary in 2007. 
Ukrainian citizens are exempted 
from the visa requirements in the CIS 
countries (1992 Agreement), Albania, 
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei, China, 
Columbia, Ecuador, Georgia, 
Guatemala, Hong-Kong, Israel, 
Macedonia, Malaysia, Micronesia, 
Mongolia, Montenegro, Namibia, 
Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Salvador, Seychelles, Serbia, 
Swaziland, and Uruguay. 
Visa 
As of November 2012 in accordance 
with the national legislation of Ukraine 
and its bilateral agreements, citizens of: 
Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, 
Croatia, Canada, the European Union, 
The Holy See, Israel, Georgia, Japan, 
Republic of Korea, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Paraguay, Tajikistan, United States of 
America, do not need short – stay visas 
for the period of stay that does not 
exceed 90 days in 180 days. 
Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Brunei Darussalam, Serbia and Turkey 
may enter Ukraine without a visa for the 
period of stay that does not exceed 30 
days, while for the residents of Hong-
Kong (China) the period is up to 14 days.  
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Cross-border mobility 
According to the Law of 21 January 
1994 № 3857- XII on the “Rules of exit 
of the territory of Ukraine and entry to 
the UA territory by the citizens of 
Ukraine” 2 UA citizens have the right to 
exit and enter the territory of Ukraine. 
The right of the citizens of Ukraine to 
exit Ukraine may be restricted if subject 
to criminal inquiry or already sentenced.  
Cross-border mobility 
The Law “On the legal status of 
foreigners and stateless persons”3
Article 8 of the ‘Law on Border 
Control’ stipulates the conditions to enter 
Ukraine: a valid travel document; a valid 
visa; a valid purpose of stay; proof of 
sufficient means of subsistence for the 
duration of the stay and for the return.  
 
stipulates that foreigners and stateless 
persons may enter the territory of Ukraine 
with a valid travel document.  
Asylum seekers are exempted from 
these entry conditions (see below).  
Irregular 
migration 
Ukraine has signed readmission 
agreements and agreements on the 
transfer and admission of persons 
across the common state border or 
persons illegally staying on the territory 
of the states. As of November 2012 
Ukraine has agreements on 
readmission with Armenia, EU, Georgia, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, 
Turkmenistan, Vietnam, and 
Uzbekistan. 
Agreement on cooperation between 
CIS Member States in combating illegal 
migration of 6 March 1998 regulates 
cooperation between Ukraine and other 
countries in the CIS area. On this basis 
Ukraine must develop instruments 
curbing irregular migration of its own 
nationals, in accordance with 
international law. 
Ukraine ratified Palermo Protocols in 
2004. 
The Law “On the Legal status of 
foreigners and stateless persons” 
defines as an irregular immigrant a 
foreigner or stateless person who 
crossed the border avoiding the border 
crossing or border control and failed to 
promptly apply for refugee status or 
asylum in Ukraine, as well as a 
foreigner who overstayed the visa or 
residence permit. 
Rejected asylum seekers, as well as 
over-stayers or those who cannot depart 
due to lack of funds or loss of passport, 
can apply for Voluntary Return to their 
countries of origin at the State Migration 
Service (SMS). The latter issues a 
certificate of the voluntarily returning 
person, serving as a temporary 
residence permit. Voluntary Return has 
to take place within 60 d ays after 
application. The returnees are not 
detained but have to report the place 
of stay at the SMS once a week. 
Forced return is ordered by the 
SMS, the State Security Service or the 
border agency (subsequent notification 
of a prosecutor within 24 h) in relation to 
the foreigners who violate the legislation 
on the legal status of foreigners; are 
detained in controlled border areas 
because of the unlawful border 
crossing; pose risk for national 
security/public order/public health. The 
persons in question are given up to 30 
days for an independent departure. The 
non-compliance leads to forced 
expulsion. 3 year entry ban is possible 
in case of forced return. Foreigners are 
not detained but can be accompanied 
by representatives of the competent 
authorities. 
                                                          
2 the Law dated from January, 21, 1994 № 3857- XII on the “Rules of exit of the territory of Ukraine and entry to the 
territory of Ukraine by the citizens of Ukraine” is available at http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3857-12  
3 The Law “On the legal status of foreigners and stateless persons”, adopted on September, 22, 20113, № 3773-VI is 
available at http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3773-17  
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Forced expulsion is ordered by an 
administrative court at the request of the 
competent authorities in case of non-
compliance with the decision on voluntary 
departure or if there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that foreigners or 
stateless persons will avoid fulfilment of 
this decision. The court defines the period 
of entry ban. Its decision on forced 
expulsion can be appealed. Foreigners 
are placed by SMS or border agency 
(with subsequent notification of a 
prosecutor within 24 h) in Centres of 
Temporary Stay up to 12 months. 
Article 332 of the Criminal Code of 
Ukraine4 the illegal transfer through 
the state border of Ukraine, organizing 
of illegal transfer through the state 
border of Ukraine, presiding of illegal 
transfer or assistance in the illegal 
transfer through the state border of 
Ukraine are criminal offences (subject 
to imprisonment for 3-9 years). 
 According to Article 149 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine human trafficking or the 
unlawful treatment against human beings, as well as any kind of assistance in 
human trafficking is a grave criminal offence (subject to imprisonment for 3-15 years). 
The Law on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, adopted in 2011, establishes 
organisational and legal principles of combating trafficking in human beings, the main 
strands of the state policy and the basis for international cooperation in this field, the 
powers of executive authorities, the procedure to declare the status of victims of 
trafficking in human beings as well as the procedure for the provision of assistance to 
such persons. 
Ukraine ratified Palermo Protocols in 2004. 
Rights and 
settlement 
Citizens of Ukraine who have decided to 
reside permanently in another country 
have to receive a permit on permanent 
residence abroad. The issuance of 
such permits is within the competence 
of the State Migration Service of 
Ukraine. 
Moreover, Ukrainian citizens 
permanently residing abroad have to 
receive permanent consular registration 
at the Ukrainian Consulate or Embassy. 
The Law of 4 March 2004, № 1582-
VI “On legal Status of Foreign 
Ukrainians”5 citizens of other countries 
or stateless persons that have Ukrainian 
ethnical origin are considered Foreign 
Ukrainians. 
Before obtaining permanent or temporary 
residence permits, foreign nationals and 
stateless persons have to obtain a long-
stay “D” visas which are issued by 
Ukrainian Embassies and Consulates 
abroad. There is no way to obtain a long-
stay visa in Ukraine or at the border. The 
long-stay visas are single-entry visas and 
are valid for 45 days.  
The Ukrainian long-stay visas are 
issued for the purpose of: 
employment immigration; study; 
international technical assistance; 
religious mission; work at the branch of 
foreign company; work at the branch of 
foreign bank; mass-media; cultural and 
sport exchange; volunteer work; family 
reunification. 
                                                          
4 The Criminal Code of Ukraine is available at http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2341-14  
5 The Law on dated March 4, 2004, № 1582-VI “On legal Status of Foreign Ukrainians” is available at 
http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1582-15  
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Foreign Ukrainians have 
preferences as regards entry and stay, 
work and study in Ukraine: in case of 
necessity, visas for foreign Ukrainians 
may be issued as multiple with a term of 
validity up to 5 years; issuance of visas 
for foreign Ukrainians is free of charge; 
there is no need for foreign Ukrainian to 
present to the consulate of Ukraine 
abroad any invitation or other proving 
the purpose of his travel when applying 
for a visa; foreign Ukrainians have the 
right to work in Ukraine without work 
permit and to immigrate to Ukraine 
outside of the immigration quotas (see 
below); foreign Ukrainians also have 
reserved quotas in Ukrainian high 
schools and Universities. 
 
The Law “On the legal status of 
foreigners and stateless persons” the 
Law “On Immigration” stipulate that the 
permanent residence permit may be 
issued to the foreigners or stateless 
persons that received an immigration 
permit. Foreigners may immigrate to 
Ukraine within the ‘immigration quota’ 
set up by the Government of Ukraine. 
The ‘immigration quota’ includes the 
following categories of immigrants: 1) 
persons working in the field of science 
and culture, whose immigration to 
Ukraine is within Ukrainian national 
interests; 2) highly qualified specialists 
and workers, whose specialties and 
skills are urgently needed for the 
national economy; 3) investors that 
have made a registered investment into 
the national economy (not less than 
USD 100.000); 4) brothers, sisters, 
grandmothers and grandfathers as well 
as grandsons and granddaughters of 
the citizens of Ukraine; persons that 
have held Ukrainian citizenship before; 
5) parents, spouses and minor children 
of the immigrant; 6) persons that have 
been residing within the territory of 
Ukraine permanently from the day of 
granting them the status of a victim of 
human trafficking.  
Outside the immigration quota the 
permanent residence permit is issued 
to: 1) spouse (in case of being married 
for 2 years or more), minor children and 
parents of the UA citizen; 2) persons 
that are legal guardians of the citizens 
of Ukraine or persons that are under the 
legal guardianship of the UA citizens; 3) 
persons that have the right to obtain UA 
citizenship; 4) persons whose 
immigration presents a state interest for 
Ukraine; 5) foreign Ukrainians, their 
spouses and children; 6) Former 
citizens of Ukraine who stay 
permanently in Ukraine after the 
decision to terminate the citizenship. 
In all other cases a temporary 
residence permit is issued whose 
validity period is linked to the purpose of 
stay. Article 24 of the Law ‘On legal 
status of foreign citizens and stateless 
persons’ provides that the term of 
validity of temporary residence permit 
may be shortened by the State 
Migration Service of Ukraine in case if 
the legal basis for the foreigner to stay 
in Ukraine no longer exists. 
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The work permit is obligatory in all 
cases, except: the foreign citizen is 
invited to work at a branch of a foreign 
company or a foreign bank or to fulfil 
non-profit activities (e.g. volunteers etc). 
Work permits are issued by the State 
Centre of Employment of Ukraine or by 
its regional divisions for one year 
(initially). Work permits are issued only 
on the request of the employer that has 
been registered at the State Centre of 
Employment as the taxpayer to the 
State Obligatory Social Insurance Fund 
and is not indebted to it. 
The temporary residence permit 
issued to workers allows entry and exit 
from the UA territory. 
Labour Ukraine has concluded bilateral 
agreements on Social Security with 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia, Hungary and Czech Republic.  
Article 9 para 32 of the Law on 
licensing certain types of economic 
activity regulates activities of the 
recruitment agencies. The license for 
private employment agency is issued 
by the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Policy according to the conditions 
stipulated by the regulation № 272 of 
6 September 2010.  
 
Labour migration of foreigners is 
regulated by the Constitution of Ukraine, 
the Law ‘On legal status of foreigners 
and stateless persons’, the Labour 
Code of Ukraine and the Decree of the 
Government of Ukraine № 322 of 8 April 
2009 ‘On The Rules of issuance, 
extending and cancellation of the work 
permits of foreigners and stateless 
persons’6
The enterprises, state authorities 
and organizations have the right to 
invite foreigners and stateless persons 
to work in UA (see above). 
. 
As of 1 January 2013, new 
legislation is in force. It closed some 
important gaps in the field of labour 
migration. Consequently, foreigners 
covered by various forms of 
international protection (see below) as 
well as permanent immigrants are 
entitled to employment on the same 
conditions as Ukrainians. However, the 
right to work for temporary migrants is 
limited: it still depends on the employer 
and there are no state-level solutions to 
recruitment. 
                                                          
6 the Decree of the Government of Ukraine № 322, dated April, 8, 2009 ‘On The Rules of issuance, prolonging and 
cancellation of the work permits foreigners and stateless persons’ is available at 
http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/322-2009-%D0%BF 
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Ukraine concluded bilateral agreements on labour activities and social security of 
migrant workers with Russian Federation, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan.  
Ukraine is a party of following multilateral agreements in the framework of CIS: 
2008 CIS Convention on the legal status of migrant workers and members of 
their families, coming from the CIS participating states, which apart from Ukraine has 
been ratified by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus Agreement on cooperation in the 
field of labour migration and social protection for migrant workers of 15 April 1994 
and the 2005 Protocol thereof. 
Citizenship Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees 
that UA citizens of Ukraine cannot be 
deprived of UA citizenship or of the right 
to change it. However dual or multiple 
citizenships are not allowed for the 
citizens of Ukraine.  
If a citizen of Ukraine simultaneously 
becomes a citizen of another country 
(such cases often happen if according 
to the law of the second country the 
foreigner that acquires its citizenship 
does not have to renounce to his/her 
previous citizenship) in the legal 
relations with Ukraine he/she is 
recognized only as a citizen of Ukraine.  
Article 19 of the Law “On the 
Citizenship of Ukraine”7
1. a citizen of Ukraine has voluntary 
acquired the citizenship of another 
state after attaining his/her majority. 
 stipulates that 
the UA citizenship is lost if: 
2. a foreigner acquired the citizenship 
of Ukraine and has not submitted a 
document certifying the termination 
of foreign citizenship or a 
declaration of its renunciation; 
3. a foreigner has acquired the 
citizenship of Ukraine and used 
rights or fulfilled obligations 
provided or imposed on him/her by 
the foreign citizenship; 
4. a person has acquired the 
citizenship of Ukraine to 
deliberately present false 
information or falsified documents; 
5. a citizen of Ukraine has voluntarily 
entered military service, security 
service, law enforcement agencies, 
justice or state authorities or bodies 
of local self-government of another 
state without the permission of UA 
authorities. 
The Law “On the Citizenship of 
Ukraine”8
According to Article 6 of the Law 
Ukrainian citizenship may be acquired: 
1) by birth (to Ukrainian parents or in 
cases where the child would be 
stateless according to the legislation of 
the country of parents’ citizenship); 2) 
by territorial origin; 3) due to admission 
to the citizenship; 4) due to restoration 
of the citizenship; 5) due to adoption; 6) 
due to taking a child under the 
guardianship or ward, placing a child 
into a child-care institution, medical 
institution, foster home or adopting 
family, or due to placing a child into a 
patronage fostering family 7) due to 
taking a guardianship of a person, 
declared incapable by a court; 8) in 
relation to Ukrainian citizenship of one 
or both parents of the child; 9) due to 
recognition of the fact of paternity and 
maternity, or due to establishment of the 
fact of paternity and maternity 10) on 
the basis of other grounds, provided by 
the international and bilateral 
agreements. 
 stipulates that dual citizenship 
for foreigners and stateless persons 
acquiring the citizenship of Ukraine is 
not allowed. If a citizen of a foreign 
country wants to acquire Ukrainian 
citizenship he/she is obliged to 
renounce previous citizenship.  
The main pre-conditions for the 
naturalization are: 
1. Recognition and observance of the 
Constitution of Ukraine (254к/96-ВР) 
and the laws of Ukraine;  
2. Filing of a declaration of absence of 
foreign citizenship (for stateless 
persons) or an obligation of 
renunciation of foreign citizenship (for 
foreigners);  
                                                          
7 the Law “On the Citizenship of Ukraine is available at http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2235-14 
8 the Law “On the Citizenship of Ukraine is available at http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2235-14 
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3. Permanent lawful residence at the 
territory of Ukraine during the last 
five years (2 years for spouses of 
UA citizens, 3 years for refugees).  
4. Permit for immigration (except for 
recognized refugees) 
5. Basic knowledge of the national 
language. 
6. Means of subsistence (not applicable 
to refugees) 
International 
Protection 
The issues of asylum, refugee status and subsidiary protection are regulated by the 
Constitution of Ukraine, ‘The Law on refugees and persons in need of 
complementary or temporary Protection’9
In 2002 Ukraine also ratified The United Nations Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has his 
permanent mission in Ukraine. 
 of 8 July 2011, The Law ‘On legal status of 
foreigners and stateless persons’ and other national legislative acts. 
According to Article 26 of the Constitution of Ukraine an asylum in Ukraine may 
be granted to foreigners and stateless persons. 
In accordance with the 2011 Law the following forms of international 
protection exist in Ukraine:  
− refugee status: in compliance with Geneva Convention;  
− complementary (subsidiary) protection: the form of protection, which is 
granted in Ukraine on an individual basis to foreigners and stateless persons 
who cannot obtain Geneva Convention refugee status, but need protection 
whereas such person was forced to arrive in Ukraine or stay in Ukraine in 
consequence of the threat to his/her life, safety or freedom in the country of 
origin owing to fear of execution in relation to him/her a death penalty or 
implementation of judgment on death penalty, torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment), and  
− temporary protection: which is an exceptional time-bounded measure, and is 
granted to foreigners and stateless persons who arrived en masse from the 
country bordering Ukraine, and cannot return to the country of habitual residence 
owing to circumstances such as external aggression, foreign occupation, civil 
war, ethnic clashes, natural disasters, man-made disasters or other events 
which violate public order in a certain part or throughout the country of origin. 
                                                          
9 ‘The Law on refugees and persons in need of complementary or temporary Protection’ is available at 
http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3671-17  
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The Socio-Political Framework of Migration 
Ukraine has developed a migration policy that has been mainly influenced by its geopolitical situation. In 
fact, Ukraine has a more developed policy on migration management than the number of immigrants would 
suggest it necessary. The restrictive and control measures prevail, while the state has not used any 
mechanism to attract long-term immigrant workers with much needed skills: the quota for foreigners and 
stateless persons who are highly qualified specialists and workers has never been established, although it 
is provided for in the immigration law.  
Moreover, Ukraine has not developed an active policy towards emigrant communities and Diaspora, 
which is at odds with the clear emigration character of the country and the negative role massive emigration 
plays in the socio-economic development of the country, facing a demographic decline. 
In March 2010, State Migration Service of Ukraine was established. It is a central state authority of 
Ukraine responsible for the realization of the state policy in the field of migration (immigration and 
emigration) including combating illegal migration, citizenship, registration of natural persons, refugees.10 In 
May 2011, the Concept of Migration Policy of Ukraine”11 was adopted. The Concept provides analysis of 
the recent migration processes in Ukraine, provides the strategy of the development of migration policy of 
Ukraine, constitutes and divides the competences of the state authorities of Ukraine in the field of migration.  
Ukraine’s socio-
political 
framework 
Outward migration Inward migration 
Governmental 
Institutions 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs protects the 
rights of citizens abroad; ensures 
development of ties with Ukrainians 
abroad. 
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 
has a joint responsibility with the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior 
in terms of labour migration. 
The President, as the Guarantor of the 
Constitution, participates in shaping the 
migration policy (legislative initiative, 
signing of laws, veto right, management of 
foreign affairs). He/she takes decisions 
regarding acquisition of citizenship, 
granting of asylum in Ukraine, etc.  
The Cabinet of Ministers establishes 
the immigration quota. 
Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for 
Human Rights monitors access to rights by 
immigrants. 
State Border Guard Service (SBGS) 
registers foreigners at border check points; 
counteracts irregular migration; checks 
grounds for foreigners’ entry; and takes 
decisions on shortening the term of their 
stay in Ukraine and deportation. 
Ministry of Interior, the State 
Department for Citizenship, Immigration 
and Registration of Individuals  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is 
responsible for visa policy. 
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 
develops policies on social wellbeing of 
migrants and refugees. 
State Migration Service has executive 
powers in the issues of migration, 
citizenship and immigration. 
                                                          
10 Decree of the President of Ukraine №405/2011, dated April, 6, 2011 ‘On the Statute of the State Migration Service 
of Ukraine’ is available at http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/405/2011  
11 Decree of the President of Ukraine “On Adoption of the Concept of Migration Policy of Ukraine” is available at 
http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/622/2011  
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State Border Guard Service of Ukraine 
is a main state authority of Ukraine 
responsible for exercising border control. 
Governmental 
Strategy 
Currently the main strategic document 
addressing emigration is 2011 Action 
Plan on Integration of Migrants and 
Reintegration of Ukrainian Migrants in 
Ukraine for 2011-2015. 
Main challenges include: 
− reintegration of return migrants  
− repatriation of ethnic Ukrainians 
− education of emigrated children 
− ensuring voting rights abroad 
− simplification of procedures for 
emigrants 
− promotion of investments by 
emigrants  
 
Currently a number of policy documents 
delineate main challenges in the area of 
immigration: 
− 2011 Concept of Migration Policy of 
Ukraine  
− 2011 National Plan on Implementation 
of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan on visa 
liberalization 
− 2011 Action Plan on Integration of 
Migrants and Reintegration of 
Ukrainian Migrants in Ukraine for 
2011-2015 
− 2012 Social Programme on combating 
of human trafficking.  
Main objectives include:  
− attract skilled immigrants 
− develop and implement integration 
policies 
− conclude readmission agreements 
− develop foreigners control system 
based on biometric data 
− develop identification system for 
people under international protection 
− develop labour matching mechanisms 
Civil Society  Association for Cultural Relations with 
Ukrainians Abroad 
Ukrainians also establish their own 
associations in each of the country of 
destination. 
The Open Ukraine Philanthropic 
Foundation  
The Kharkiv Regional Charitable 
Foundation (KRCF) “Social Service of 
Assistance” (previously “Caritas Kharkiv”)  
The Western-Ukrainian Resource Centre 
(WURC) 
Migration and 
economic 
development 
Ukraine has not yet implemented 
programmes that would visibly link its 
communities abroad to economic 
development objectives at home. 
In the past two nation-wide projects 
were implemented by the state: the 
National Program “Ukrainian Diaspora” 
for 1996-2000, and the National Action 
Plan “Foreign Ukrainians” for 2001-
2005. Both of them were geared to the 
requirements of Ukrainians who 
already lived abroad. They were mainly 
aimed at providing support to the 
development of relations with the 
Diaspora, involving them in nation-
building in Ukraine, encouraging the 
preservation of ethnic identity and 
cultural legacies.  
Traditionally immigration to Ukraine was 
limited to ethnic Ukrainians or people 
originating from the Soviet or post-Soviet 
area. Only in the recent years Ukraine has 
faced challenges integrating immigrants 
coming from culturally different regions of 
the world. These new challenges have 
been recognized and included in the 
recent government strategies (see above). 
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The recent government strategies 
however underline the need to involve 
diasporas and emigrants for 
development of the country (see 
above). 
International 
Cooperation 
Ukraine is a member of the following associations actively working on migration 
issues: IOM, Council of Europe, Commonwealth of Independent States, and OSCE. It 
participates in the following regional processes: Budapest Process, Prague Process, 
and Eastern Partnership. It is subject to the European Neighbourhood Policy and 
Black Sea Synergy.  
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